traisessive1 wrote: I want you all to think about this. CN already does a good job of running their railroad with as few employees as possible.
I want you all to think about this.
CN already does a good job of running their railroad with as few employees as possible.
Does this include all of the derailments and/or hazmat spills they have had recently?
arbfbe wrote: greyhounds wrote: MichaelSol wrote: greyhounds: We had the "Slinghsots", which were 15 car intermodal trains shutteling between Chicago and St. Louis. They pre-dated the Sprints. We didn't care how long the train was. We cared how much money it made. Not that the Slingshots made a lot of money, but we didn't have anything better to do with that rail line. "Illinois Central 'Slingshot' service (Chicago-St. Louis) was abandoned due to lack of demand." -- Short-Haul Intermodal Service: Can Rail Compete with Truck? Transportation Research Board, Alternative Freight Capacity Workshop, January 11, 2004, Randolph R. Resor, Vice President, Costing and Economic Analysis, ZEtA-TECH Associates, Inc. Oh, good grief. Sol's quoting Randy Resor. I went to grad school with Resor. Leave it to Sol to take a bullet point out of a slide show and pond the table with it. After all, it fits his agenda. I was still at ICG intermodal when the Slingshots went away. It was a kind of "Lack of Demand" - but not a lack of demand for intermodal transportation between Chicago and St. Louis. The ICG didn't abandon the market. (Eventually, the IC did) We replaced the Slingshots with conventional overnight intermodal trains. The Slingshot concept was flawed. It used short, fast, freqent trains. The idea behind it was that freight became available throughout the day and that truckers would just take it and go. Intermodal service required the freight to sit for hours until the train left. The theory was that if you ran several trains you would cut down on the truckers' advantage. Well freight does become available for movement throughout the day. But few receivers want to unload a trailer at 2:00 AM. Now there were exceptions. Avon Cosmetics would dispatch an over the road trailer from their Morton Grove facility to St. Louis at 6:00 PM. Scheduled arrival in St. Louis was midnight. The orders would be sorted and delivered to their customers homes the next day. An Avon rep could phone in a cosmetic order Monday afternoon and deliver the product on Tuesday. But it was one trailer per day. UPS wanted three trailers per day delivered before midnight so they could sort the contents and deliver the packages the next day. So that was four trailers per day total. Virtually everything else was in a "Load it today, deliver it tomorrow morning" situation. The Slingshots just didn't fit the market. At all. The union agreement was no more than 15 cars per train. There was no flexibility. If there were 31 trailers to go overnight on the Slingshot, one got left behind. And I got the handle the angry phone call the next morning from the shipper. A conventional overnight train, which could have flatcars added as needed, fit the market better. And that's where we went. Right back to where things were before the Slingshot experiment. Overnight intermodal trains between Chicago and St. Louis. But before the Slingshots they ran on the N&W and were called "Roadrunners". There was no lack of demand for intermodal service. There was a lack of demand for the Slingshots' short, fast, frequent service. I'd guess that the reason the IC eventually exited the Chicago-St. Louis intermodal market was not "Lack of Demand" (Demand, in this case, would be determined by price.) There's A Lot 'O Freight moving between Chicago and St. Louis. It was the very low margins on this business for the railroad. The unions required the use of four crew members to move a train 275 miles - and that will kill intermodal competiveness on a 275 mile haul. And that's why one person crews are an excellent idea for such service. One person crews that don't change in Bloomington. See, there is the point of view of railroad management. They want the one person crew implemented but do not want to give up anything to do it. They will use a freight service as an example of where one person crews will work but fail to mention no customers want to use that service. They promise the unions no more than 15 cars for the new service but complain when the union holds them to the service thresholds. If 30 trailers, why not 31 once in a while? If 31 why not 50 on occasion? Why stick to the limit at all? One person crews but no short hauls, the carriers want the full mileage, 12 or more hours a day every day, all hour of the day or night, inaccurate line ups, sudden changes of plans, long terminal delays watching the train being switched or seeing it's headlight just outside the yard for hours, power for their train which has not yet arrived on a train that is dead on the law 30 miles out and still needs to be fueled. Fact is, the railroads are too irresponsible with crew management and quality of life to be granted the leeway to operate trains with just one person on the train. I know I want to make twice as many people miserable by keeping train crews the same size but it will also keep them safer, train replacement workers so they can take vacations and days off and retire when the time comes. So the short fast trains could not compete with trucks account the truck could move the trailer as soon as it was ready so customers were not happy waiting for 6 hrs for the train to be ready to move the trailer yet the best solution was to run fewer longer trains with greater dwell times for the trailers. That and the idea longer and heavier is always better in railroad accounting. Four persons on the crew or one person on the crew would not have made a difference with the short fast except perhaps instead on one 15 car train with 4 you could try four 4 car trains with one person crews running on 90 minute headways saving the 6 hr dwell time for the trailers. Do you think management would go for it? What would the trains/ton would look like for that?
greyhounds wrote: MichaelSol wrote: greyhounds: We had the "Slinghsots", which were 15 car intermodal trains shutteling between Chicago and St. Louis. They pre-dated the Sprints. We didn't care how long the train was. We cared how much money it made. Not that the Slingshots made a lot of money, but we didn't have anything better to do with that rail line. "Illinois Central 'Slingshot' service (Chicago-St. Louis) was abandoned due to lack of demand." -- Short-Haul Intermodal Service: Can Rail Compete with Truck? Transportation Research Board, Alternative Freight Capacity Workshop, January 11, 2004, Randolph R. Resor, Vice President, Costing and Economic Analysis, ZEtA-TECH Associates, Inc. Oh, good grief. Sol's quoting Randy Resor. I went to grad school with Resor. Leave it to Sol to take a bullet point out of a slide show and pond the table with it. After all, it fits his agenda. I was still at ICG intermodal when the Slingshots went away. It was a kind of "Lack of Demand" - but not a lack of demand for intermodal transportation between Chicago and St. Louis. The ICG didn't abandon the market. (Eventually, the IC did) We replaced the Slingshots with conventional overnight intermodal trains. The Slingshot concept was flawed. It used short, fast, freqent trains. The idea behind it was that freight became available throughout the day and that truckers would just take it and go. Intermodal service required the freight to sit for hours until the train left. The theory was that if you ran several trains you would cut down on the truckers' advantage. Well freight does become available for movement throughout the day. But few receivers want to unload a trailer at 2:00 AM. Now there were exceptions. Avon Cosmetics would dispatch an over the road trailer from their Morton Grove facility to St. Louis at 6:00 PM. Scheduled arrival in St. Louis was midnight. The orders would be sorted and delivered to their customers homes the next day. An Avon rep could phone in a cosmetic order Monday afternoon and deliver the product on Tuesday. But it was one trailer per day. UPS wanted three trailers per day delivered before midnight so they could sort the contents and deliver the packages the next day. So that was four trailers per day total. Virtually everything else was in a "Load it today, deliver it tomorrow morning" situation. The Slingshots just didn't fit the market. At all. The union agreement was no more than 15 cars per train. There was no flexibility. If there were 31 trailers to go overnight on the Slingshot, one got left behind. And I got the handle the angry phone call the next morning from the shipper. A conventional overnight train, which could have flatcars added as needed, fit the market better. And that's where we went. Right back to where things were before the Slingshot experiment. Overnight intermodal trains between Chicago and St. Louis. But before the Slingshots they ran on the N&W and were called "Roadrunners". There was no lack of demand for intermodal service. There was a lack of demand for the Slingshots' short, fast, frequent service. I'd guess that the reason the IC eventually exited the Chicago-St. Louis intermodal market was not "Lack of Demand" (Demand, in this case, would be determined by price.) There's A Lot 'O Freight moving between Chicago and St. Louis. It was the very low margins on this business for the railroad. The unions required the use of four crew members to move a train 275 miles - and that will kill intermodal competiveness on a 275 mile haul. And that's why one person crews are an excellent idea for such service. One person crews that don't change in Bloomington.
MichaelSol wrote: greyhounds: We had the "Slinghsots", which were 15 car intermodal trains shutteling between Chicago and St. Louis. They pre-dated the Sprints. We didn't care how long the train was. We cared how much money it made. Not that the Slingshots made a lot of money, but we didn't have anything better to do with that rail line. "Illinois Central 'Slingshot' service (Chicago-St. Louis) was abandoned due to lack of demand." -- Short-Haul Intermodal Service: Can Rail Compete with Truck? Transportation Research Board, Alternative Freight Capacity Workshop, January 11, 2004, Randolph R. Resor, Vice President, Costing and Economic Analysis, ZEtA-TECH Associates, Inc.
greyhounds: We had the "Slinghsots", which were 15 car intermodal trains shutteling between Chicago and St. Louis. They pre-dated the Sprints. We didn't care how long the train was. We cared how much money it made. Not that the Slingshots made a lot of money, but we didn't have anything better to do with that rail line.
We had the "Slinghsots", which were 15 car intermodal trains shutteling between Chicago and St. Louis. They pre-dated the Sprints.
We didn't care how long the train was. We cared how much money it made. Not that the Slingshots made a lot of money, but we didn't have anything better to do with that rail line.
"Illinois Central 'Slingshot' service (Chicago-St. Louis) was abandoned due to lack of demand." -- Short-Haul Intermodal Service: Can Rail Compete with Truck? Transportation Research Board, Alternative Freight Capacity Workshop, January 11, 2004, Randolph R. Resor, Vice President, Costing and Economic Analysis, ZEtA-TECH Associates, Inc.
Oh, good grief. Sol's quoting Randy Resor. I went to grad school with Resor. Leave it to Sol to take a bullet point out of a slide show and pond the table with it. After all, it fits his agenda.
I was still at ICG intermodal when the Slingshots went away. It was a kind of "Lack of Demand" - but not a lack of demand for intermodal transportation between Chicago and St. Louis. The ICG didn't abandon the market. (Eventually, the IC did) We replaced the Slingshots with conventional overnight intermodal trains.
The Slingshot concept was flawed. It used short, fast, freqent trains. The idea behind it was that freight became available throughout the day and that truckers would just take it and go. Intermodal service required the freight to sit for hours until the train left. The theory was that if you ran several trains you would cut down on the truckers' advantage.
Well freight does become available for movement throughout the day. But few receivers want to unload a trailer at 2:00 AM. Now there were exceptions. Avon Cosmetics would dispatch an over the road trailer from their Morton Grove facility to St. Louis at 6:00 PM. Scheduled arrival in St. Louis was midnight. The orders would be sorted and delivered to their customers homes the next day. An Avon rep could phone in a cosmetic order Monday afternoon and deliver the product on Tuesday. But it was one trailer per day.
UPS wanted three trailers per day delivered before midnight so they could sort the contents and deliver the packages the next day. So that was four trailers per day total. Virtually everything else was in a "Load it today, deliver it tomorrow morning" situation.
The Slingshots just didn't fit the market. At all.
The union agreement was no more than 15 cars per train. There was no flexibility. If there were 31 trailers to go overnight on the Slingshot, one got left behind. And I got the handle the angry phone call the next morning from the shipper.
A conventional overnight train, which could have flatcars added as needed, fit the market better. And that's where we went. Right back to where things were before the Slingshot experiment. Overnight intermodal trains between Chicago and St. Louis. But before the Slingshots they ran on the N&W and were called "Roadrunners".
There was no lack of demand for intermodal service. There was a lack of demand for the Slingshots' short, fast, frequent service.
I'd guess that the reason the IC eventually exited the Chicago-St. Louis intermodal market was not "Lack of Demand" (Demand, in this case, would be determined by price.) There's A Lot 'O Freight moving between Chicago and St. Louis.
It was the very low margins on this business for the railroad. The unions required the use of four crew members to move a train 275 miles - and that will kill intermodal competiveness on a 275 mile haul.
And that's why one person crews are an excellent idea for such service. One person crews that don't change in Bloomington.
See, there is the point of view of railroad management. They want the one person crew implemented but do not want to give up anything to do it. They will use a freight service as an example of where one person crews will work but fail to mention no customers want to use that service. They promise the unions no more than 15 cars for the new service but complain when the union holds them to the service thresholds. If 30 trailers, why not 31 once in a while? If 31 why not 50 on occasion? Why stick to the limit at all? One person crews but no short hauls, the carriers want the full mileage, 12 or more hours a day every day, all hour of the day or night, inaccurate line ups, sudden changes of plans, long terminal delays watching the train being switched or seeing it's headlight just outside the yard for hours, power for their train which has not yet arrived on a train that is dead on the law 30 miles out and still needs to be fueled. Fact is, the railroads are too irresponsible with crew management and quality of life to be granted the leeway to operate trains with just one person on the train. I know I want to make twice as many people miserable by keeping train crews the same size but it will also keep them safer, train replacement workers so they can take vacations and days off and retire when the time comes.
So the short fast trains could not compete with trucks account the truck could move the trailer as soon as it was ready so customers were not happy waiting for 6 hrs for the train to be ready to move the trailer yet the best solution was to run fewer longer trains with greater dwell times for the trailers. That and the idea longer and heavier is always better in railroad accounting. Four persons on the crew or one person on the crew would not have made a difference with the short fast except perhaps instead on one 15 car train with 4 you could try four 4 car trains with one person crews running on 90 minute headways saving the 6 hr dwell time for the trailers. Do you think management would go for it? What would the trains/ton would look like for that?
Man when your right, your right!!!
They (management) sign an agreement with us then moan when they're expected to follow it. A really great example of the divide agreement and management have on America's railroads!
zardoz wrote: traisessive1 wrote: I want you all to think about this. CN already does a good job of running their railroad with as few employees as possible. Does this include all of the derailments and/or hazmat spills they have had recently?
Your friendly neighborhood CNW fan.
arbfbe wrote: No, I am not whining to get the old jobs back but enough is enough. On person crews on the railroad is really a bad idea from an operational standpoint and probably will not realize the financial returns predicted. No, it will not be nearly as safe either.
No, I am not whining to get the old jobs back but enough is enough. On person crews on the railroad is really a bad idea from an operational standpoint and probably will not realize the financial returns predicted. No, it will not be nearly as safe either.
I remember the same argument being made when the railroads wanted to go down to 2 man crews on trains. It didn't work very well then, either.
Bert
An "expensive model collector"
As I recall, it was this very issue that created the MRL, was it not? BN (of that day) refused to consider the possibility of a TWO-person crew along the affected lines in MT, so they basically spun the track off. Could this be a future incentive for larger regional RRs like MRL to be created if the Class Is don't get their way this time?
Riprap
arbfbe wrote: See, there is the point of view of railroad management. They want the one person crew implemented but do not want to give up anything to do it. They will use a freight service as an example of where one person crews will work but fail to mention no customers want to use that service. They promise the unions no more than 15 cars for the new service but complain when the union holds them to the service thresholds. If 30 trailers, why not 31 once in a while? If 31 why not 50 on occasion? Why stick to the limit at all? One person crews but no short hauls, the carriers want the full mileage, 12 or more hours a day every day, all hour of the day or night, inaccurate line ups, sudden changes of plans, long terminal delays watching the train being switched or seeing it's headlight just outside the yard for hours, power for their train which has not yet arrived on a train that is dead on the law 30 miles out and still needs to be fueled. Fact is, the railroads are too irresponsible with crew management and quality of life to be granted the leeway to operate trains with just one person on the train. I know I want to make twice as many people miserable by keeping train crews the same size but it will also keep them safer, train replacement workers so they can take vacations and days off and retire when the time comes. So the short fast trains could not compete with trucks account the truck could move the trailer as soon as it was ready so customers were not happy waiting for 6 hrs for the train to be ready to move the trailer yet the best solution was to run fewer longer trains with greater dwell times for the trailers. That and the idea longer and heavier is always better in railroad accounting. Four persons on the crew or one person on the crew would not have made a difference with the short fast except perhaps instead on one 15 car train with 4 you could try four 4 car trains with one person crews running on 90 minute headways saving the 6 hr dwell time for the trailers. Do you think management would go for it? What would the trains/ton would look like for that?
No, you missed the point.
The trains were truck competitive. They were quite an inovation when they started. The idea at the start was to offer multiple departures throughout the day so the freight wouldn't sit for hours waiting for a train departure.
The point you missed is that this series of multiple departures was found to be ill fitted to the market. The market didn't develop as projected. This meant adjustments were needed. I know you want stability and consistency in your life. Most people do. But the reality is that the only constant thing is change.
It's perfectly natural that when anything new is implamented that there will have to be an adjustment period. But getting people to accept changes/adjustments in something as important as their work is difficult.
One of the best marketing operations around is Proctor & Gamble. I'll give you an example of how even they can miss planning for a new product concept. I worked with a PhD researcher who had been at P&G when they rolled out Pampers. They had done all the research, the interviews, the focus groups, etc. But when they actually put Pampers on sale they were in for quite the surprise.
They were planning for Pampers to be a niche product, something people with young babies to use when they traveled so they didn't have to carry along a diaper pail full of ***. That's all they were going for. But when they first put the product on sale it didn't work that a-way. What they'd missed was the shift to working mothers who were subject to significant time constraints. Pampers gave these working mothers something very valuable - time. They didn't have to spend their valuable time constantly washing dirty diapers.
So P&G had to make a happy adjustment. Pampers became the regular diaper for many babies, not the limited use niche produce as projected. Sales went through the roof.
Another example is the Boeing 727. With just a few potential customers you'd think it would be easy to forecast the market demand. It wasn't. They projected the total market for the aircraft to be 100 or so. They wound up selling over 1,000 of the planes.
The point is that you don't know what's going to really happen until the wheels start to turn. And then you have to change and adjust. This is hard for many people to accept, but it's reality.
The "hard cap" of 15 cars on the Slingshot trains didn't fit the market needs. The market demand for the overnight trains was far greater than the market demand for the day trains. We needed to adjust/change (gasp!) by adding overnight capacity and reducing day capacity. A reasonable adjustment would have been to allow capacity to shift between trains. But no, we had this "Agreement" with the union that was "Enforced" by the union. They had the power to prevent the needed adjustments. And they used that power to their members' own detriment.
The Slingshots in full operation used 24 crewmembers per day. 12 engineers and 12 conductors. When we replaced the 'Shots with a conventional overnight train to better meet the market needs those 12 engineers became 4 and those 12 conductors became 4. We did have to put the brakemen/flagmen back on. But still, we were better able to serve the market with flexible length overnight trains using 16 crew instead of 24.
As I have said, accepting change and adjustments is a necessary thing. When people/unions resist it people loose their jobs and companies loose their customers.
greyhounds wrote: The point is that you don't know what's going to really happen until the wheels start to turn. And then you have to change and adjust. This is hard for many people to accept, but it's reality.
Expanding from your thoughtful comments about CHI/STL od pairs we move right on to Houston after the UP bought the SP and the Sunset Corridor after T&E folks could get full retirement at 60. If the use of one man crews expands I hope the railroads take it step by step with lots of adjustments as they see what actually happens to costs and service.
n012944 wrote: arbfbe wrote: No, I am not whining to get the old jobs back but enough is enough. On person crews on the railroad is really a bad idea from an operational standpoint and probably will not realize the financial returns predicted. No, it will not be nearly as safe either. I remember the same argument being made when the railroads wanted to go down to 2 man crews on trains. It didn't work very well then, either. Bert
"It didn't work very well then either."
No, not when railroads were perched on the edge of, or had gone over the edge of, financial failure.
I have spoken at some length on this issue with the original negotiators of the two man crew agreement. At that time, there was one single driver of the negotiation: the alternative to a two man crew agreement was complete shutdown and "no man" crews -- 100% unemployment.
Nothing "worked very well" compared to that argument. But, that isn't the argument nor the issue today.
So "then" is quite a bit different than "now" irrespective of what you "remember."
Further, capacity was not a significant constraint then. If a given statistical proportion of trains might incur delays due to effects of the two man crew, those effects were also statistically isolated. And, in any event, the inefficiency which may or may not have resulted was insignificant compared to the overall financial benefit to the company.
It would be reckless to conclude that a further crew reduction would have the same overall positive effects now. And it would be reckless for these reasons:
As any system reaches a constraint, it often begins to behave differently at its limits than at midranges, that is, prior suggestive experiences are not uniformly applicable across the entire relevant range. A Chevy 350 within its relevant range of operation -- 0k to 4500 rpm -- is good for 200,000 miles, 7000 to 8000 hours. The same machine at 6500 is good for about 8 hours, and then it is no longer a working engine. The economic utility of that engine changes significantly as its design limits are reached.
When the two man crew agreements were first negotiated, few mainlines were close to capacity. Train delays due to fewer crew members did not impact system capacity. Any concern for that was so minimal, I am unaware of any data collected on the subject, nor studies made.
Those days are over.
Any mainline has an optimal capacity at any given average train speed. Any changes in any operating characteristic for a system at capacity will generally affect capacity, for the simple reason that the system is at capacity. Those changes wouldn't have that effect on a system at 50% capacity.
The economic impacts, then, of anything that may affect average train speed are far more significant now than they were in 1980.
In 1980, the side effects of a smaller crew might be a couple of hundred dollars in crew pay from hours of service. Not a big deal. But, while a train might be delayed, that isn't affecting the railroad's ability to run its other trains, and does not affect overall capacity.
Today, a simulation on a hypothetical division that happens to include something resembling the Cascade Tunnel suggests that the reduction of line capacity of one single train a day due to decreased statistical efficiency of train operation, can cost the railroad $1.6 million in gross revenue that day, if it happened to be a grain train for instance. That would be the impact of a mere 5% reduction in overall efficiency of train operations on a single track mainline operating at capacity. If that operating efficiency decline resulted from converting to a one person crew, the crew savings would, however, amount to $7,000 on that division that day.
A net penalty of $1.6 million resulting from a relatively small decrease in efficiency suggests that the idea of anything that might even remotely affect overall efficiency is something that needs to be looked at very carefully.
If that relatively minor 5% decrease in efficiency is a permanent feature of one man crew operation on that single division, the savings of $2,555,000 per year in crew costs compare to the $584,000,000 penalty in capacity loss if that division represents, as it does in this instance, the bottleneck for the entire mainline.
If the one person crew system results in a capacity loss of one train only twice a year [two trains out of a 9,855 train matrix] instead of 5%, that represents an efficiency loss of a minscule .01%, yet the gross revenue loss for the year of $3.2 million still exceeds the total wage savings on that division. That's a natural result of a system operating at capacity, compared with systems in 1980.
The possible penalty incurred by the operation is far out of proportion to the savings gained. The economic risk is extremely high compared to the possible savings.
That is the difference between "then" and "now".
greyhounds wrote: The "hard cap" of 15 cars on the Slingshot trains didn't fit the market needs.
The "hard cap" of 15 cars on the Slingshot trains didn't fit the market needs.
I'm still not clear on why there had to be a "hard cap" at all. This was a scheduled train, right? You leave on the hour whether you have one trailer or 50, because dependability (predictability) of service is what's being sold. The train leaving with only one trailer is the loss leader for the train that leaves with 50, and your hope is that the shipper will see that schedules are kept regardless of quantity, and thus be more willing to commit to the service. If over time the single trailer train does not grow, you cut it, because perhaps the time slot just doesn't fit the needs of the shipper. But you still have to dedicate enough of a time window to see if the service can grow or not.
Was there any empirical evidence of the era that suggested a car limit per crew number was credible? This is what is so vexing regarding these management vs union spats - I can understand the larger fear of de facto labor force reductions if one man crews were implemented systemwide, but when you replace one specific long train with multiple scheduled shorter (usually shorter, but not necessarily) trains, you usually end up with more folks working even with one man crews in the shorter trains. Six short trains of one man crews employs more people than one long train with four crew members.
"greyhounds": Another example is the Boeing 727. With just a few potential customers you'd think it would be easy to forecast the market demand. It wasn't. They projected the total market for the aircraft to be 100 or so. They wound up selling over 1,000 of the planes.
In 1962 or 63, I stood in an aircraft hangar on the east side of Boeing Field in Seattle with the chief engineer, looking at the prototype of the B727, which had just been test flown by Tex Johnson. I distinctly recall the conversation. Their break-even on the plane was about 150 aircraft, and they projected over the next five years that the market would be approximately 350 or more aircraft as airlines retired their DC-6s and Electras. But, that was a five year projection, not the "ultimate" market. From a financial planning perspective, the market after 7 years or so was/is not relevant because the bank loans were not made payable "someday."
The ultimate market bought 1,831 B727s, but most of those were also not the original B727 design. Approximately 400 of the original design were sold -- just about on the mark, and just about exactly within the projected time frame.
The Boeing example is not one of unexpected market changes, but exactly the opposite: extraordinarily good, conservative market research in advance of the enormous capital committments to the manufacturing process.
Like the misinterpretation of the P&G example above, good marketers make sure that they have the basic market to support the innovation, first, and if the product turns out more popular for other reasons, well that's icing on the cake, but in no way undermines the need for careful marketing analysis to support the product initially.
The moral of the story being the exact opposite of the "Slingshot" experiment for which we now have three somewhat muddled and divergent explanations of and for which its ultimate demise had absolutely zero to do with numbers of crew members on the trains.
futuremodal wrote: greyhounds wrote: The "hard cap" of 15 cars on the Slingshot trains didn't fit the market needs. I'm still not clear on why there had to be a "hard cap" at all. This was a scheduled train, right? You leave on the hour whether you have one trailer or 50, because dependability (predictability) of service is what's being sold. The train leaving with only one trailer is the loss leader for the train that leaves with 50, and your hope is that the shipper will see that schedules are kept regardless of quantity, and thus be more willing to commit to the service. If over time the single trailer train does not grow, you cut it, because perhaps the time slot just doesn't fit the needs of the shipper. But you still have to dedicate enough of a time window to see if the service can grow or not. Was there any empirical evidence of the era that suggested a car limit per crew number was credible? This is what is so vexing regarding these management vs union spats - I can understand the larger fear of de facto labor force reductions if one man crews were implemented systemwide, but when you replace one specific long train with multiple scheduled shorter (usually shorter, but not necessarily) trains, you usually end up with more folks working even with one man crews in the shorter trains. Six short trains of one man crews employs more people than one long train with four crew members.
FM, as usual, your ignorance of how railroad employees in the transportation department work shows. What is to stop the railroad from running six LONG trains with one crewmember? Or if they only have enough work for one train, running the single train with one employee? Nothing.
The displaced employees will bump to wherever their seniority will allow them to hold at worst the extra board. Perhaps one of them will hold down a utility man's job as backup conductor for the long train. The rest will be furloughed. That is the reality and it is the eventuality that the unions are afraid of. Further, the battle between the BLET and UTU for survival will heat up again as it did with RCL adding additional wrinkles as has been pointed out above.
In many places today, running six additional scheduled trains to move existing traffic is simply not possible due to congestion in any event, so the concept isn't workable.
Ther real place one man crews have potential is in small low margin local work. For example, some short lines have trains with two engineers and two locomotives that perform certain work and split into two trains at points along their trip to switch separate industries and later reform into a single train for a return trip. Others have used road switchers with a single engineer backed up by a roving conductor/utility man in a vehicle. Where track speeds are low this method can keep the train and its switching moving smoothly to improve customer service. Multiple such trains using one or more utility men could conceivably get customers better service and cut employment. The unions know this and fear it. As the Indiana RR has shown such efforts can ultimately increase employment if carefully managed. It also requires a significant capital investment in RCL technology for locomotives, yard switches and dispatcher interface to make it work. On a small scale it does work and could significantly aid revival or at least preservation of quite a few branchlines and secondary mains. Assuming, of course that the Class 1s can take the additional traffic.
LC
Lord Atmo wrote:i just cant even imagine how hard it would be for one person to both operate a locomotive and ensure that nothing elsewhere on the train goes wrong. you NEED 2 people
Most through freight trains in Europe have 1 man in the cab...
Then again we have more double or multiple tracks too. One man or no man can run a locomotive, it is only a problem when things break down so maybe it is a question of being able to run around a train that breaks down. In other words, a capacity problem.
greetings,
Marc Immeker
Limitedclear wrote: futuremodal wrote: greyhounds wrote: The "hard cap" of 15 cars on the Slingshot trains didn't fit the market needs. I'm still not clear on why there had to be a "hard cap" at all. This was a scheduled train, right? You leave on the hour whether you have one trailer or 50, because dependability (predictability) of service is what's being sold. The train leaving with only one trailer is the loss leader for the train that leaves with 50, and your hope is that the shipper will see that schedules are kept regardless of quantity, and thus be more willing to commit to the service. If over time the single trailer train does not grow, you cut it, because perhaps the time slot just doesn't fit the needs of the shipper. But you still have to dedicate enough of a time window to see if the service can grow or not. Was there any empirical evidence of the era that suggested a car limit per crew number was credible? This is what is so vexing regarding these management vs union spats - I can understand the larger fear of de facto labor force reductions if one man crews were implemented systemwide, but when you replace one specific long train with multiple scheduled shorter (usually shorter, but not necessarily) trains, you usually end up with more folks working even with one man crews in the shorter trains. Six short trains of one man crews employs more people than one long train with four crew members. FM, as usual, your ignorance of how railroad employees in the transportation department work shows. What is to stop the railroad from running six LONG trains with one crewmember? Or if they only have enough work for one train, running the single train with one employee? Nothing. The displaced employees will bump to wherever their seniority will allow them to hold at worst the extra board. Perhaps one of them will hold down a utility man's job as backup conductor for the long train. The rest will be furloughed. That is the reality and it is the eventuality that the unions are afraid of. Further, the battle between the BLET and UTU for survival will heat up again as it did with RCL adding additional wrinkles as has been pointed out above. In many places today, running six additional scheduled trains to move existing traffic is simply not possible due to congestion in any event, so the concept isn't workable. Ther real place one man crews have potential is in small low margin local work. For example, some short lines have trains with two engineers and two locomotives that perform certain work and split into two trains at points along their trip to switch separate industries and later reform into a single train for a return trip. Others have used road switchers with a single engineer backed up by a roving conductor/utility man in a vehicle. Where track speeds are low this method can keep the train and its switching moving smoothly to improve customer service. Multiple such trains using one or more utility men could conceivably get customers better service and cut employment. The unions know this and fear it. As the Indiana RR has shown such efforts can ultimately increase employment if carefully managed. It also requires a significant capital investment in RCL technology for locomotives, yard switches and dispatcher interface to make it work. On a small scale it does work and could significantly aid revival or at least preservation of quite a few branchlines and secondary mains. Assuming, of course that the Class 1s can take the additional traffic. LC
Oh yes, it's "my" ignorance there mr. caveman.
The question isn't predicated on the basic truth that one man can conceivably run a long consist (with an inherent increase in risk). Rather, the statement more pertains to the concept of the scheduled railroad with ostensibly shorter faster trains, and the subsequent need for more employees to cover the departure array. The risk to the railroad of running shorter faster scheduled trains is the spector of sharply reduced labor productivity measures if those shorter faster trains require the same number of crewmen as the standard on-call longer slower trains. Thus, in order for the railroad to mitigate that risk and still offer customers that special service (usually with premium markups) known as flexible departure times, there would have to be union concessions for such variable length scheduled trains to keep labor productivity within range of the current standard. If the unions aren't willing to negotiate a tiered system to differentiate scheduled railroading from on call railroading, the concept of the shorter faster scheduled train won't work, and that niche market that only railroads can serve will not be.
And you know what? We'll end up with one man crews running long slow consists anyway, while the flexible scheduled concept (where the increase in employment is the union's real pot of gold) will be lost to the ages as the predictable undercapitalization of capacity will be swamped by normal economic demand for rail services. Remember, there is a correlation among longer and longer trains, subpar industry average velocity, and the ostensible *lack* of current capacity.
MichaelSol wrote:[ It would be reckless to conclude that a further crew reduction would have the same overall positive effects now. And it would be reckless for these reasons: As any system reaches a constraint, it often begins to behave differently at its limits than at midranges, that is, prior suggestive experiences are not uniformly applicable across the entire relevant range. A Chevy 350 within its relevant range of operation -- 0k to 4500 rpm -- is good for 200,000 miles, 7000 to 8000 hours. The same machine at 6500 is good for about 8 hours, and then it is no longer a working engine. The economic utility of that engine changes significantly as its design limits are reached. When the two man crew agreements were first negotiated, few mainlines were close to capacity. Train delays due to fewer crew members did not impact system capacity. Any concern for that was so minimal, I am unaware of any data collected on the subject, nor studies made. Those days are over. If the one person crew system results in a capacity loss of one train only twice a year [two trains out of a 9,855 train matrix] instead of 5%, that represents an efficiency loss of a minscule .01%, yet the gross revenue loss for the year of $3.2 million still exceeds the total wage savings on that division. That's a natural result of a system operating at capacity, compared with systems in 1980. The possible penalty incurred by the operation is far out of proportion to the savings gained. The economic risk is extremely high compared to the possible savings. That is the difference between "then" and "now".
I agree that it's reckless to conclude it will work without trial. But I also maintain that it's recless to conclude it won't work without trial.
And a main line running at or near capcity, such as Stevens Pass, is the wrong place for trial.
Compare the Union Pacific lines between El Paso and Los Angeles and between Chicago and the Twin Cities. The Sunset Route is beyond capcity. Not the place to experiment. But the old "400 Route" needs some new business and that's where you learn from your mistakes.
There's traffic to be had. Eau Claire, Wisconsin originates baked beans (Bushes) and beer (Linencughel) (SP?). Talk to the shippers and put a one person crew on between Eau Claire and Chicago. Adjust as needed. (And drive the union guys nuts doing so.)
You're never gonna' know unless you try.
It could be a win/win. New business for the railroad, new jobs for the union. Nobody will actually know without a trial.
As far as the main lines - it's worth a shot. Here's how you take the shot.
1) Do time and motion studies on the crews
2) Identify crews that could operate "one person"
3) Conduct trials
4) Adjust as needed
The studies will make two errors. They will falsely identify "crews" as being able to work with one person that require two people. Fine, put the second crew member back on.
They will also fail to identify crews that can work with one person. So keep the time and motion people at work
If you don't change and adapt, you'll go extinct.
Greydogs,
Good points but you know the railroads. If they plan on making a substantial investment in Positive Train Stop or whatever they call it, the first place they will feel they can justify the investment will be on the high volume lines. You know, reduced investment per car loading. You are right, these are the lines which can least suffer the delays when problem arise with only one person in the cab. Time will tell how serious the railroads become about utility employees in a pick up to assist. I am sure they will be short on supply there.
How about the idea that diving alone is foolish. Railroading alone ranks right up there as risky behavior to do alone. That should about be the end of the debate but management will still figure it is OK and keep puhing.
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