i'm sure that the engineers among us will vouch that knowledge of careful use of the dynamic brake comes with experience, just like careful use of the air.
Engineers 'could' be termed - Professional Slack Adjusters
Slack is the force that Engineers must control in getting today's 10K, 15K and 20K foot trains across their assigned territories. Mishandling of the slack with excessive buff forces or excessive draft forces, in either/or both circumstance damage to the train can happen that may or may not end up in a derailment.
Train handling is a skill that Engineers learn with the seat of their pants with every trip they take across their terrirories. They learn where the slack runs in and where it runs out - with the size trains that are being operated in the 21st Century and the territories the trains are being operated across - a train can have multiple slack actions taking place within it - all at the same time - a run in on the first 50 cars and a run out on the second 50 car and a run in on the third 50 car with the fourth 50 cars 'running free'. The train is operating over multiple grades and dips all at the same time with the slack moving throughout the train as the terrain it is operating over changes.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
https://lawblet13.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/su-2020-02T.pdf
I think this above link will open the notice that is pertinent to this topic.
Euclid I found a notice published by BNSF in 2020, which cautions engineers on how to minimize the risk of derailing their trains that comes from improper use of dynamic brakes. It says that the company has had a number of recent derailments that were caused by improper use of dynamic braking. The notice begins with the following: “Engineers making rapid adjustments of dynamic brakes while attempting to slow/control train speed or attempting to stop have contributed to several recent derailments. In all events, the slack was not adequately gathered before advancing to the higher-braking notches therefore causing a severe run-in event and subsequent derailment.” With other brake systems, such as ones on cars and trucks, ships and other heavy equipment, the brake systems only raise the question of whether they will work when needed and whether they can stop in time for emergencies. But train dynamic braking is unique in the number of operational variables that can jeopardize the safety of its use. Since the notice linked here states that there has been a recent increase in derailments caused by improper use of dynamic brakes; I wonder how they can determine that such misuse has occurred. Do locomotives have recorders that document dynamic brake application force, timing, location, etc.? If they do have such recorders, do they also have onboard equipment that can record (or calculate) the buff force generated by dynamic braking throughout the train, and the relative danger that it imposes, if any? I would guess not. But even if they don’t record those forces, can they estimate them based on train weight, consist, and speed; coupled with that actual record of dynamic brake usage? Otherwise, if this caution is supposed to be achieved only by the reckoning of the engineer, it seems like a tall order, as indicated by this BNSF notice.
It's 2024 why wouldn't they be able to monitor and analyze this type of data?
Any locomotive in use on a Class 1 will have an event recorder, which will record various data about the operation of the locomotive, including brake system pressures, throttle position, and dynamic brake amperage. Many are programmed to "phone home" when certain events are detected, such as an emergency application or excessive use of power braking. All of that data would be available to management to use while trying to determine the cause of a derailment. While locomotives don't contain sensors to monitor in-train forces, combining the event recorder data with the train make-up information would allow someone to estimate those forces with some degree of accuracy (assuming they know how to do all that math or have a simulator to do it for them).
This is essentially a continuation of an earlier Euclid post (about a derailment in a sag that was said to have been complicated by dynamic application) which originated in a different discussion about the use of 'heavy dynamic' as an aggravating factor at East Palestine. (I look forward to the promised NTSB report to see what, if anything, they say explicitly about this...)
The issue is that no monitoring of dynamic application, even one that allows extraction of rate of change of application or release, says anything definitive about in-train forces or momenta. In theory you could get a defective 'first approximation' if you had sufficiently-instrumented "in-train FREDs" as we've discussed as means to reduce service applications in the absence of ECP. You could get an even better approximation from one of the 'on-car instrumentation' solutions being bruited about, if they included some modern version of LVDT measuring draft-gear displacements in realtime with fast communication to the locomotive computer. But any of that is science fiction -- with a very expensive pricetag to implement even with a time-scale of years -- in modern practice.
The obvious Bucky-style short-term 'fix' would be to apply the same kind of 'excitation delay' to dynamic application that GE applies to 'motoring' (in part in order to reduce pollution from accelerating the diesel prime mover 'too quickly'). Ideally this would include some mapping, perhaps "user-selectable" in some way, about how fast the dynamic excitation changes over time vs. what a 'combined power handle' might produce when moved by the engineer to different ranges of dynamic.
That could be thought of as similar to the approach we used in designing the 'freight-compatible' train-control solution for Conrail in the wake of the Chase wreck -- that was originally intended only to modulate the Westinghouse brake 'as a human engineer would' for a given consist, but it was extended to include versions (or in some cases approximations) to 'blended braking' by setting up dynamic for situations short of 'wiped full emergency' stops in nominal minimum distance. You could still implement this, probably in software, without too much conceptual difficulty...
adkrr64 Any locomotive in use on a Class 1 will have an event recorder, which will record various data about the operation of the locomotive, including brake system pressures, throttle position, and dynamic brake amperage. Many are programmed to "phone home" when certain events are detected, such as an emergency application or excessive use of power braking. All of that data would be available to management to use while trying to determine the cause of a derailment. While locomotives don't contain sensors to monitor in-train forces, combining the event recorder data with the train make-up information would allow someone to estimate those forces with some degree of accuracy (assuming they know how to do all that math or have a simulator to do it for them).
Not only does it record the information, on the modern engines management can remote in to a locomotive in real time. They do our annual check ride in this manner.
After an incident, such as any undesired emergency application, our Operations Command Center (OPCC) calls up the train to check if the air is coming back or the conductor is walking. They also will check the download to see what was happening at the time of the incident. If the train was being operated by one of the Energy Management System's auto throttle, then they aren't concerned with any possible train handling deficiency.
Jeff
jeffhergert They also will check the download to see what was happening at the time of the incident. If the train was being operated by one of the Energy Management System's auto throttle, then they aren't concerned with any possible train handling deficiency.
The computer caused the problem? Well then, nothing to see here. Let's all just move on....
adkrr64 jeffhergert They also will check the download to see what was happening at the time of the incident. If the train was being operated by one of the Energy Management System's auto throttle, then they aren't concerned with any possible train handling deficiency. The computer caused the problem? Well then, nothing to see here. Let's all just move on....
All kinds of trains can be torn up as long as fuel is being saved.
Actually, I think that the railroads see such "events" as opportunities to provide the feedback necessary to further refine the TO and LEADER software. It's all part of the larger plan to eventually get to crewless operation after a transition period with 1-person crews.
I sympathize with engineers. If they screw up they get "handled" and usually very roughly with time off with no pay. If the computer screws up its an "enlightening learning experience". The duplicity is enough to make even the most even tempered person lose their minds.
Overmod This is essentially a continuation of an earlier Euclid post (about a derailment in a sag that was said to have been complicated by dynamic application) which originated in a different discussion about the use of 'heavy dynamic' as an aggravating factor at East Palestine. (I look forward to the promised NTSB report to see what, if anything, they say explicitly about this...)
1) Train makeup.
2) Speed.
3) Grade/curvature.
4) Type and axle limitations of the dynamic brake.
5) Amount of slack.
6) Current slack in train.
7) Car types in train.
8) Power configuration including distributed power consists and position in train.
It comes under the heading of experience.
CSSHEGEWISCH It comes under the heading of experience.
Kind of like knowing how to land a plane safely in the Hudson River after a group of birds have laid waste to your engines.
Gramp CSSHEGEWISCH It comes under the heading of experience. Kind of like knowing how to land a plane safely in the Hudson River after a group of birds have laid waste to your engines.
Which then leads to another question -
If that Hudson River flight had been propeller driven instead of jet propelled. Would the propellers have chopped their way through the bird flock vs. the jet engines ingesting the birds and causing the gets to flame out and stop?
Well then what is causing the derailments that BNSF is talking about?
Euclid CSSHEGEWISCH It comes under the heading of experience. Well then what is causing the derailments that BNSF is talking about?
Lack of experience.
Us 'boomers' that hired out in the 60's through the early 80's, that have carried the carriers for decades - are retiring and being replaced with newly hired employees.
The path from hiring off the street to have one behind a engineers console on a locomotive is realtively rushed. When I was working, people were hired off the street to become Conductors and after nominally ONE YEAR of working as a Conductor they were tapped in seniority order to take Engineer's training. I am not totally conversant the aspects of Engineer Training before they are 'graduated' and marked up as Engineer Trainee and paired with 'experienced' engineer on a call by call basis as the ET board moves in realtion to the Engineer's Board.
Promotion to Engineer is greatly influenced by the ability of the existing Engineer's Board to satisfy the level of business - if business is going great balls of fire, the Road Foreman of Engines are more likely to Qualify a Trainee to be a working Engineer than if business is slack and layoffs may be in to offing.
BaltACD Euclid CSSHEGEWISCH It comes under the heading of experience. Well then what is causing the derailments that BNSF is talking about? Lack of experience. Us 'boomers' that hired out in the 60's through the early 80's, that have carried the carriers for decades - are retiring and being replaced with newly hired employees. The path from hiring off the street to have one behind a engineers console on a locomotive is realtively rushed. When I was working, people were hired off the street to become Conductors and after nominally ONE YEAR of working as a Conductor they were tapped in seniority order to take Engineer's training. I am not totally conversant the aspects of Engineer Training before they are 'graduated' and marked up as Engineer Trainee and paired with 'experienced' engineer on a call by call basis as the ET board moves in realtion to the Engineer's Board. Promotion to Engineer is greatly influenced by the ability of the existing Engineer's Board to satisfy the level of business - if business is going great balls of fire, the Road Foreman of Engines are more likely to Qualify a Trainee to be a working Engineer than if business is slack and layoffs may be in to offing.
It's been a long time since those going through the engineer's training program having actually worked as an engineer for us. We started running engineer's training programs in my area last year. Because we don't force guys in seniority order, as long as someone younger in seniority willing to go, they don't force someone. When they do start forcing people, it's those at the bottom of the trainmen's seniority that meet the required time qualifications (I think now it's 2 years) that get forced. They will credit previous railroad experience from other companies to meet the minimum time requirement. I've had a few trainees who had previous experience from other railroads.
Our company, and I imagine others, like a reserve that can be called as-needed to fill engineer spots. (Since they are working set-back as conductors, it works out better than having a reserve of furloughed trainmen.) This means that someone goes through the training program, gets certified as an engineer, then never touches a throttle again for a few years. Unless they find an engineer willing to let them have some throttle time. Assuming the set back person wants throttle time.
So you have an engineer, on paper, who's been engineer qualified for 3 to 5 years but in reality has 6 to 8 months training and experience who gets an emergency call to work as an engineer.
BaltACD The engines powering the propellers would still require air flow to operate. I imagine that this could be blocked by a slug of ground up bird bodies. Gramp CSSHEGEWISCH It comes under the heading of experience. Kind of like knowing how to land a plane safely in the Hudson River after a group of birds have laid waste to your engines. Which then leads to another question - If that Hudson River flight had been propeller driven instead of jet propelled. Would the propellers have chopped their way through the bird flock vs. the jet engines ingesting the birds and causing the gets to flame out and stop?
The engines powering the propellers would still require air flow to operate. I imagine that this could be blocked by a slug of ground up bird bodies.
Euclid BaltACD Euclid CSSHEGEWISCH It comes under the heading of experience. Well then what is causing the derailments that BNSF is talking about? Lack of experience. Us 'boomers' that hired out in the 60's through the early 80's, that have carried the carriers for decades - are retiring and being replaced with newly hired employees. The path from hiring off the street to have one behind a engineers console on a locomotive is realtively rushed. When I was working, people were hired off the street to become Conductors and after nominally ONE YEAR of working as a Conductor they were tapped in seniority order to take Engineer's training. I am not totally conversant the aspects of Engineer Training before they are 'graduated' and marked up as Engineer Trainee and paired with 'experienced' engineer on a call by call basis as the ET board moves in realtion to the Engineer's Board. Promotion to Engineer is greatly influenced by the ability of the existing Engineer's Board to satisfy the level of business - if business is going great balls of fire, the Road Foreman of Engines are more likely to Qualify a Trainee to be a working Engineer than if business is slack and layoffs may be in to offing. If the BNSF cannot hire enough people who have enough training or experience to avoid causing derailments from poor handling of dynamic braking, how can management overcome that problem? The BNSF Safety Update says the problem is caused by this: “Engineers making rapid adjustments of dynamic brakes while attempting to slow / control train speed or attempting to stop have contributed to several recent derailments. In all events, the slack was not adequately gathered before advancing to the higher-braking notches therefore causing a severe run-in event and subsequent derailment.” If BNSF cannot hire enough people who can learn and apply the proper procedure to eliminate the problem described above, Why not just solve the problem with a technical modification of the dynamic brake controls? If the problem is that engineers do not adequately gathering the slack before advancing to the higher braking notches, do this: Make the controller unable to advance to the higher braking notches until the slack is adequately gathered. How complicated can that be? It seem like a reasonable solution to a problem that can derail a train just because the controls were not operated quite right.
Any control that delays what it was commaded to do is more dangerous than one that performs what it is requested to do when it is requested. The delay is percieved by the operator that the control is not working and in panic because the operator is not getting the response he asked for he will tend to increase the magnitude of the control he is requesting.
There is only ONE WAY to get experience - doing it day in and day out, getting the seat of the pants feel of what the response to the command is at a particular geographic location on the line.
Euc - your inability to understand train handling dynamics is legendary.
BaltACD Euclid BaltACD Euclid CSSHEGEWISCH It comes under the heading of experience. Well then what is causing the derailments that BNSF is talking about? Lack of experience. Us 'boomers' that hired out in the 60's through the early 80's, that have carried the carriers for decades - are retiring and being replaced with newly hired employees. The path from hiring off the street to have one behind a engineers console on a locomotive is realtively rushed. When I was working, people were hired off the street to become Conductors and after nominally ONE YEAR of working as a Conductor they were tapped in seniority order to take Engineer's training. I am not totally conversant the aspects of Engineer Training before they are 'graduated' and marked up as Engineer Trainee and paired with 'experienced' engineer on a call by call basis as the ET board moves in realtion to the Engineer's Board. Promotion to Engineer is greatly influenced by the ability of the existing Engineer's Board to satisfy the level of business - if business is going great balls of fire, the Road Foreman of Engines are more likely to Qualify a Trainee to be a working Engineer than if business is slack and layoffs may be in to offing. If the BNSF cannot hire enough people who have enough training or experience to avoid causing derailments from poor handling of dynamic braking, how can management overcome that problem? The BNSF Safety Update says the problem is caused by this: “Engineers making rapid adjustments of dynamic brakes while attempting to slow / control train speed or attempting to stop have contributed to several recent derailments. In all events, the slack was not adequately gathered before advancing to the higher-braking notches therefore causing a severe run-in event and subsequent derailment.” If BNSF cannot hire enough people who can learn and apply the proper procedure to eliminate the problem described above, Why not just solve the problem with a technical modification of the dynamic brake controls? If the problem is that engineers do not adequately gathering the slack before advancing to the higher braking notches, do this: Make the controller unable to advance to the higher braking notches until the slack is adequately gathered. How complicated can that be? It seem like a reasonable solution to a problem that can derail a train just because the controls were not operated quite right. Any control that delays what it was commaded to do is more dangerous than one that performs what it is requested to do when it is requested. The delay is percieved by the operator that the control is not working and in panic because the operator is not getting the response he asked for he will tend to increase the magnitude of the control he is requesting. There is only ONE WAY to get experience - doing it day in and day out, getting the seat of the pants feel of what the response to the command is at a particular geographic location on the line. Euc - your inability to understand train handling dynamics is legendary.
Well, if you were to read the Safety Update, you would find that acting too fast (at least at the time of its publication) was causing derailments. The Bulletin stresses the point of slowing the time between increases of dynamic braking, and the fact that they have engineers that are not doing that; and thus are causing derailments. The Safety Bulletin is attempting to teach their employees how to properly operate dynamic braking in order to reduce the number of derailments.
But according to you, I guess the way to teach them is only by “seat of the pants.” “Seat of the pants” leaning seems to be what is causing the mistake rather than somthing that could eliminate the mistake.
I doubt that even engineers with too little “seat of the pants” learning would panic if they encountered a delay between calling for control action and receiving it—as you say. Engineers would have no trouble dealing with a control response that was intentionally slowed to the proper spacing. If necessary, the system could even display the action and its reason.
EuclidMake the controller unable to advance to the higher braking notches until the slack is adequately gathered. How complicated can that be?
How would the controller know when the slack is adequately gathered?
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"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
Possibly they are running trains too long?
daveklepper Possibly they are running trains too long?
Paul of Covington Euclid Make the controller unable to advance to the higher braking notches until the slack is adequately gathered. How complicated can that be? How would the controller know when the slack is adequately gathered?
Euclid Make the controller unable to advance to the higher braking notches until the slack is adequately gathered. How complicated can that be?
Euclid The Safety Bulletin says to wait 10 seconds before transitioning from power to dynamic brake.
That's been printed on the dynamic brake handle since there were dynamic brakes.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
EuclidBut then, the Bulletin also says this: “At all speeds, it is imperative engineers plan in advance of where to slow/control train speeds and know the state of the slack in their train before advancing to higher braking notches.”
In other words, you have to know your territory. Hills, valleys, hogbacks, curves - there are many things that will have an effect on how a train is running. Understanding that is a key to clean train running.
One reason for waiting that ten seconds is because many locomotives take that time to adjust from power to braking. It's nothing new.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
zugmann Euclid The Safety Bulletin says to wait 10 seconds before transitioning from power to dynamic brake. That's been printed on the dynamic brake handle since there were dynamic brakes.
With the coming of EMS auto control, it's been changed for us to only do the pause for DC locomotives. The pause requirement doesn't apply to AC engines. EMS still waits 10 seconds before going to/from power and dynamic braking.
The pause is related to the electrical equipment rather than train handling.
I finally read the full, linked notice. Except for the part of recent derailments, it reads like standard train handling instructions/rules. I think Euclid is reading more into this notice. I don't think BNSF had a big jump in derailments due to improper dynamic brake operation. They obviously had some so they issued a bulletin. Four years ago.
The notice also says improper dynamic operation "contributed" to the derailments. It doesn't say how much of the derailments was being placed on improper dynamic operation as opposed to other factors. It could be that the supervisory manager, while reviewing the download, noted the improper use and assigned more of the blame to the engineer rather than nonhuman contributing factors.
They all like to blame their employees whenever possible.
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