If you ask me that sentence should have been 25 years in the Federal Pen minimum. Sentence was far too light.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/bellingham-woman-sentenced-federal-prison-002550127.html
As someone who was nearly directlty impacted by these two idiots, I agree. They are domestic terrorists. Twenty years at least.
But my guess is they in order to receive a plea bargain, they in turn ratted out other domestic terrorists that the FBI now has under surveillance.
Her co-defendant was sentenced to 6 months in October after taking a deal to plead guilty to interference with railroad signals. Both defendants got off way too easy, given examples of shunts causing massive environmental damage and even leading to death after the trains derail as a result of braking issues due to the shunt. Prosecution asked for 27 months in prison, least the judge could have done is allow that
https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/bellingham-washington-woman-sentenced-prison-shunt-attack-bnsf-track
Not in defense of their actions - shunting track circuits in unexpected locations is a routine function of Trainmasters and other company officials in performing Efficiency Tests.
I will say that in most cases company officials will set their shunts just beyond a wayside signal so that they can observe how the train responds to the wayside signal.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
I'm fine with some jail time for this sort of thing.
I do have a problem with a prosecutor who asserts that car driver's lives were at risk because the shunt caused the crossing gates to drop. The shunt should shut down all rail traffic through that area. So what's the danger to the drivers?
By exagerating the threat (if indeed I am correct in the above paragraph), it lessens the logic of the punishment.
"We're going to punish you for something that couldn't happen."
Ed
7j43kI'm fine with some jail time for this sort of thing. I do have a problem with a prosecutor who asserts that car driver's lives were at risk because the shunt caused the crossing gates to drop. The shunt should shut down all rail traffic through that area. So what's the danger to the drivers? By exagerating the threat (if indeed I am correct in the above paragraph), it lessens the logic of the punishment. "We're going to punish you for something that couldn't happen." Ed
The danger to drivers is that crossing protection that operates in the absence of a train creates the idea in drivers that the protection is 'always' malfunctioning, even when it is not.
One of the first claims when someone is hit at a protected crossing when the protection is operating as intended - is that 'its working all the time when no trains are coming'.
I can't speak for other carriers, on CSX once there is a initial report of crossing protection working in the absence of a train - the appropriate Signal Maintainer is notified to investigate and resolve the issue.
Agree.
BaltACDThe danger to drivers is that crossing protection that operates in the absence of a train creates the idea in drivers that the protection is 'always' malfunctioning, even when it is not.
I think we've all seen (in person or on a video) instances where someone ignored the crossing protection when there is clearly a train coming.
Can't be encouraging them.
I was running a light engine move this past fall when we hit a crossing at which the crossing protection failed. Talk about your pucker factor...
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
The last sentence in the next to last paragraph is a bit cryptic. Does anyone know what a "broken train collision" is? I'm mystified.
GN_FanThe last sentence in the next to last paragraph is a bit cryptic. Does anyone know what a "broken train collision" is? I'm mystified.
My supposition is that it would be referring to a situation where a train comes apart because of a broken knuckle or a failed drawbar and nominally the head end of the train 'accelerates' ahead of the rear portion of the train before stopping and the rear portion of the train has a much longer stopping distance than the front and it impacts the stopped front of the train at a sufficient speed to cause a derailment.
I believe the PC Switch on locomotives delays shutting down locomotive power for 15 or 30 seconds after a emergency application is detected in the attempt to move the front (or the entire train) to prevent such a situation. The physical laws of mass enter into the final outcome.
This is the "broken train collision" in Custer. Definitely an act of sabotage or vandalism.
https://www.kuow.org/stories/sabotage-caused-washington-state-oil-train-disaster-rail-union-says
We got a couple DP software updates the very next day, speed comparison and automatic idle. If there is enough of a difference between the speeds of the lead and remote units a penalty brake application will be triggered automatically, and the DP system goes to idle mode once the train has been stationary for more than a few minutes.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
It is mentioned that the Engineer upon taking over the parked train should have made a brake test to confirm brake line integrity. Is this normally done with DPU trains? Based on what happened, it seems like it should be a defensive test to prevent a similar event.
Electroliner 1935It is mentioned that the Engineer upon taking over the parked train should have made a brake test to confirm brake line integrity. Is this normally done with DPU trains? Based on what happened, it seems like it should be a defensive test to prevent a similar event.
It is often mentioned that railroad rule books are written in blood. Procedures are perfectly acceptable - UNTIL THEY AREN'T. Once it is determined that the procedures are a cause of a incident then rules are modified or created to prevent the incident from happening in the future.
Electroliner 1935 It is mentioned that the Engineer upon taking over the parked train should have made a brake test to confirm brake line integrity. Is this normally done with DPU trains? Based on what happened, it seems like it should be a defensive test to prevent a similar event.
Even if the engineer didn't do a Class 3 (set & release, using the EOT), I would opine that he should have done a running brake test (to verify that setting the brakes has the desired effect), and should have noted the brake line pressure changes on the EOT display.
We are now allowed to skip a Class 1 brake test (full inspection of the train both set and released) if the train has been intact and on air for less than 24 hours. It used to be 4 hours. We still do a Class 3.
Our rules require isolating the DP consist(s) through the DP control screens when leaving an unattended train. Doing that also cuts out the brake valves on the DPs. When a new crew gets on, the DPs are returned to normal operation. For the DPs' brake valves to cut back in, they have to see a rise in brake pipe pressure.
There's also an automated "train check" feature to be used when a DP train is stopped for any extended length of time. (During extreme cold weather, it's only required at crew change points.) It can also be done manually. Both involve cutting out the DP brake valves. They then need to see brake pipe pressure rise to cut back in.
Jeff
On CN we don't have to set out or isolate remotes on unattended trains, just put the system to idle mode. We are supposed to do a train check at crew change points or when taking over an unattended train.
There is an exception to the train check/continuity test requirement in winter conditions, as long as you directly trade off with the outbound, the lead unit has working dynamic braking, and all the air gauge readings appear to be normal.
CN got a further exemption to airflow standards for trains with more than one remote consist, on these trains you are required to do a train check/continuity test at every crew change regardless of temperature. The first exemption I mentioned still applies to conventional trains or those with only one remote consist.
So getting back to the original topic, does anyone else find it ironic that the eco-terrorists's actions could have directly brought about the disaster they were so afraid of in the first place? It's bad enough to drop a signal in front of any train, but doubly so in front of a train of tank cars that tend to slosh and have extra buff forces when using the emergency brakes. What were they thinking. Hopefully, they use their newly discovered "free-time" to think about this.
rrnut282So getting back to the original topic, does anyone else find it ironic that the eco-terrorists's actions could have directly brought about the disaster they were so afraid of in the first place?
Perhaps they were seeking just such an incident so they could point out just how dangerous the trains are and thus seek to ban them.
It may be counter-intuitive, but who knows how some people think...
Of course, they were looking at one small aspect of the whole story. I doubt they were considering the over all fallout of such a ban.
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