Convicted One I've got a couple questions, regarding standard procedure. If you were leaving a cut of say 40 cars on a siding for an as yet undetermined length of time, how many handbrakes are you expected to set? Not all of them right? (at least that is what I thought to be the case) So, if you are setting only a portion determined by some formula, is there any prescribed method to determine which cars get their brakes set, to fulfill the requirement? And, more particular to my curiosity, how does the next person to work with these cars go about determining which brakes must be released? Do they have to physically test each handbrake, or is there a readily visible indicator of some sort that flags which cars have their handbrakes set?
I've got a couple questions, regarding standard procedure.
If you were leaving a cut of say 40 cars on a siding for an as yet undetermined length of time, how many handbrakes are you expected to set? Not all of them right? (at least that is what I thought to be the case)
So, if you are setting only a portion determined by some formula, is there any prescribed method to determine which cars get their brakes set, to fulfill the requirement?
And, more particular to my curiosity, how does the next person to work with these cars go about determining which brakes must be released? Do they have to physically test each handbrake, or is there a readily visible indicator of some sort that flags which cars have their handbrakes set?
It is a formula - start with some specified minumum (it'll be in the rulebook) and then set an additional X% (also in the rulebook). On top of that, one should do some sort of hold test to ensure that the brakes that have been set will hold, ie, release the automatic and the independent. If the consist rolls, set more brakes.
You'll be setting the brakes on the downhill side, if there is one.
You might also place a skate or chock if appropriate.
It's not hard to tell which handbrakes are set - shoes hard against the wheel or chains in the rigging being tight are two common indicators. The cars vary, so it's not just one thing.
Barring special requirements, most folks will set all the brakes in a group (on the downhill side, as noted). I suppose there could be cases where groups of cars were set out separately, resulting in brakes set throughout the consist.
Unless the cars were left on air, the entire consist needs to be inspected anyhow.
Most situations are repeated on a regular basis, so odds are those who usually work in that area will have a good idea what to look for.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Another way to test the handbrake securement is to perform a push/pull test with the power of the locomotive. The need for that is prescribed in the rules depending on conditions of the securement factors. Such a test was required with the Lac Megantic oil train parked at Nates prior to the runaway.
The test is to confirm whether there are sufficient handbrakes to hold the train with some extra margin of holding power. Otherwise if you merely set handbrakes, then release the air brakes, and find the train does not move, you don’t know how close to being able to roll away it is. If it is just on the edge of being held, it may become free to move due to wind and/or thermal expansion/contraction in the brake rigging of rods and levers.
Most interesting to me is that the TSB has previously publically stated (in a runaway report in 2011) that a push/pull test is an unreliable indicator of brake holding power on steep mountain grades. They did not offer a reliable substitute.
In the case of Lac Megantic, the engineer did perform a push/pull test, but did not follow the rules of that procedure. He performed the test while having the locomotive independent air brakes set. So his securement was holding during the test but it was relying on a combination of handbrakes and air brakes.
It was therefore also relying on at least one locomotive left running to keep the air pumped up against any possible leakage. He broke the rules by including air brakes as a portion of his securement force. If he had performed the push/pull test for his handbrakes alone, the test would have revealed that the train was not secured. After he set handbrakes, if he had released the independent brake, that alone would have likely allowed the train to roll.
His actions of securing partly with air brakes (independent application), leaving one locomotive running to pump air assuring maintenance of the air application, and the failure of the securement due to the one engine subsequently being shut down, and the resulting loss of air to maintain the independent application—all of this is a perfect example of why the rules do not allow air brakes to supplement handbrakes for securement.
I suspect that the rules would allow the setting of the independent brakes and/or the automatic brakes during securement, after the test, but they do not allow testing securement with air brakes being set during the test.
Tree-Euclid:
Thanks to both of you.
Returning a cut of cars to service that has been thusly secured sounds like one of those situations where the whole world is in a hurry and waiting on you? I can just feel the joy.
If we are looking at a system like Euclid's: the 'parking brake' has to be applied on all cars simultaneously to be worth anything... after which the rules require a pull test without any additional power brake, independent or automatic. Since this represents a set of 100% of the train brakes it is in excess of any 'optional' formula (like 78% or other alarming figure in the Canadian tables) for holding a train during recharge operations. Only if it has independent confirmation of application (e.g.visible or 'telemetered' positive engagement) would it be 'safe' not to walk the train to confirm the emergency was engaged on 'sufficient' cars; you would need to reach the rear of the train anyway to confirm adequate set there (to prevent separation and runaway of trailing cars).
As I understand the system he proposes at present, it uses truck spring-brake components to actuate a valve holding pressure in train-brake cylinders acting on the foundation in each car, and presumably to release that pressure upon 'recharge' of the truck-based components. I presume he has worked out how that is done without illegally compromising the FRA-regulated one-pipe automatic system. I don't see how he'll avoid walking the train to confirm release when the truck-based system has fully released its special valves, nor what precautions he has made about individual truck-based emergency brakes triggering on moving cars.
I agree with Zug that ECP is a better use of any dollars devoted to automatic system-wide parking brakes. The adaptive re-use of truck brake components to control a rail-suitable separate brake means, though, is interesting.
Bucky thinks properly setting handbrakes is too much work. We do expect people hired for T&E position to work don't we? Properly setting handbrakes is a segment of the the job they are expected to do. Setting handbrakes is a matter of public safety, not just railroad procedure.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACDBucky thinks properly setting handbrakes is too much work. We do expect people hired for T&E position to work don't we?
There is also no discussion of the many accidents where some aspect of the handbrake equipment is defective, often without warning even to employees using brakestick leverage.
Personally I think a case can be made for automatic securement (meaning mechanical positive frictional engagement, not any sort of fluid power that can leak off) -- the issue being more one of cost than technical engagement. Note that something absent from either commercial 'system' of ECP is such a positive brake...
It would be nice to 'mandate' something like 92-day review and testing at next interchange of handbrake function. I can almost hear the screaming start now, and sometime later, excuses from the sort of people like that CSX crew for which fudging a SPAF was a mere formality, or the Canadians putting equipment into service that had been sitting years without attention...
BaltACD Bucky thinks properly setting handbrakes is too much work. We do expect people hired for T&E position to work don't we? Properly setting handbrakes is a segment of the the job they are expected to do. Setting handbrakes is a matter of public safety, not just railroad procedure.
Euclid BaltACD Bucky thinks properly setting handbrakes is too much work. We do expect people hired for T&E position to work don't we? Properly setting handbrakes is a segment of the the job they are expected to do. Setting handbrakes is a matter of public safety, not just railroad procedure. Sure trainmen are expected to set handbrakse, and should be physically able to do so. But the point is that it cost money, and that money could be saved by investing in a moderinzed system of securement. The railroad industry frequently invests money to reduce manual labor and its danger.
The payoff for that investment must be measured in months not years before you will see anything done.
How much will your device(s) cost - cost to purchase - cost to install - cost to maintain? $1K per car; $2K per car; $3K per car, $10K per car ?????
What will be installation mandated time? 5 years, 10 years, more?
How will the system's proper operation on the entire train be verified before the crew leaves the train unattended?
BaltACDHow will the system's proper operation on the entire train be verified before the crew leaves the train unattended?
It will be verified by a push/pull test.
Overmod If we are looking at a system like Euclid's: the 'parking brake' has to be applied on all cars simultaneously to be worth anything... after which the rules require a pull test without any additional power brake, independent or automatic. Since this represents a set of 100% of the train brakes it is in excess of any 'optional' formula (like 78% or other alarming figure in the Canadian tables) for holding a train during recharge operations. Only if it has independent confirmation of application (e.g.visible or 'telemetered' positive engagement) would it be 'safe' not to walk the train to confirm the emergency was engaged on 'sufficient' cars; you would need to reach the rear of the train anyway to confirm adequate set there (to prevent separation and runaway of trailing cars). As I understand the system he proposes at present, it uses truck spring-brake components to actuate a valve holding pressure in train-brake cylinders acting on the foundation in each car, and presumably to release that pressure upon 'recharge' of the truck-based components. I presume he has worked out how that is done without illegally compromising the FRA-regulated one-pipe automatic system. I don't see how he'll avoid walking the train to confirm release when the truck-based system has fully released its special valves, nor what precautions he has made about individual truck-based emergency brakes triggering on moving cars. I agree with Zug that ECP is a better use of any dollars devoted to automatic system-wide parking brakes. The adaptive re-use of truck brake components to control a rail-suitable separate brake means, though, is interesting.
The parking brake I describe does apply to all cars in the train simultaneously, or at least a single phase lasting maybe 2-3 minutes.
What I propose has nothing to do with highway truck vehicle spring brake components. Nor does it have anything to do with retaining an air charge in the car brake cylinders.
The lock is applied from the cab by a simple on/off control. When set, I don’t see why it would be necessary to walk the train to make sure it has set on every car. The confirmation of sufficient securement would be the push/pull test as is the confirmation today.
I don’t know that it would be necessary to walk the train after release of the brake lock. But in any case, it is the actual work of manually setting and releasing of handbrakes that this lock eliminates. The labor of walking the train is nothing compared to the effort of manual handbrake securement.
Also, I have never heard of a rule or requirement that bakes be set on the hind end of a train in order to prevent the hind end from running away if it happens to uncouple from the cars ahead of it that have handbrakes set.
Regarding the question of whether money should be spent on full ECP versus spending on this handbrake full train power lock:
I would have to see how this securement function would be accomplished with ECP brakes alone. It might be that it would be better to combine ECP with the brake lock function I describe. ECP has native functionality that could be used to simplify the brake lock system I describe. So I don’t see it as an either/or choice.
We're in "Pinto" territory here. Which will cost more - the installation and maintenance of this system on all rail cars, or the continued manual labor?
EuclidI don’t know that it would be necessary to walk the train after release of the brake lock. But in any case, it is the actual work of manually setting and releasing of handbrakes that this lock eliminates. The labor of walking the train is nothing compared to the effort of manual handbrake securement.
If a few get stuck on, they'll eventually burn off.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
EuclidThe labor of walking the train is nothing compared to the effort of manual handbrake securement.
Wow. By that statement, I know you have done neither.
EuclidAlso, I have never heard of a rule or requirement that bakes be set on the hind end of a train in order to prevent the hind end from running away if it happens to uncouple from the cars ahead of it that have handbrakes set.
*raises hand*
zugmann Euclid The labor of walking the train is nothing compared to the effort of manual handbrake securement. Wow. By that statement, I know you have done neither. Euclid Also, I have never heard of a rule or requirement that bakes be set on the hind end of a train in order to prevent the hind end from running away if it happens to uncouple from the cars ahead of it that have handbrakes set. *raises hand*
Euclid The labor of walking the train is nothing compared to the effort of manual handbrake securement.
Euclid Also, I have never heard of a rule or requirement that bakes be set on the hind end of a train in order to prevent the hind end from running away if it happens to uncouple from the cars ahead of it that have handbrakes set.
Bucky operates in a faireytale world.
zugmann Euclid The labor of walking the train is nothing compared to the effort of manual handbrake securement.
tree68 We're in "Pinto" territory here. Which will cost more - the installation and maintenance of this system on all rail cars, or the continued manual labor?
EuclidI am talking about walking 100 car lengths versus walking 100 car lengths and setting a hand brake on each car.
You must really hate your relief to do that.
TSB is focusing on the rise in cases of accidents caused by train brake failure in three different categories:
Train securement.
Switching cars without using air brakes.
Crew losing control of the train movement.
https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/surveillance-watchlist/rail/2020/rail-02.html
Note that one of the recommendations for better train securement is the use of physical defenses such as wheel chocks and portable derails:
https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/recommandations-recommendations/rail/2014/rec-r1404.html
From the TSB link:
“There are physical defenses to protect against the risk of runaway equipment, and these include derails, wheel chocks, mechanical emergency devices, and locomotive auto-start systems to maintain air pressure. New technology is available, such as GPS-equipped devices that can be applied to a hand brake chain, allowing for the remote monitoring of the hand brake status. In addition, some existing technology, such as reset safety controls and sense and braking units, with minor programming changes, can offer additional protection.”
BaltACDBucky thinks properly setting handbrakes is too much work. We do expect people hired for T&E position to work don't we? Properly setting handbrakes is a segment of the the job they are expected to do. Setting handbrakes is a matter of public safety, not just railroad procedure.
In a forty below zero (F) wind chill in the dark on the side of a mountain, and over the HOS, and you want a man to set the hand brakes on how many cars. Do you really expect that to be a reasonable request. I would tell you to TAKE THIS JOB ......
Electroliner 1935Do you really expect that to be a reasonable request.
In a word?
YES.
Electroliner 1935 BaltACD Bucky thinks properly setting handbrakes is too much work. We do expect people hired for T&E position to work don't we? Properly setting handbrakes is a segment of the the job they are expected to do. Setting handbrakes is a matter of public safety, not just railroad procedure. In a forty below zero (F) wind chill in the dark on the side of a mountain, and over the HOS, and you want a man to set the hand brakes on how many cars. Do you really expect that to be a reasonable request. I would tell you to TAKE THIS JOB ......
In two words
F'n YES!
At the time before Lac Megantic, the Engineer 'thought' how he secured the train was proper - NOW he knows he shirked his proper duties, he also knows all the lives that were lost are on HIS hands. Short cuts are fine until you start causing people to die. Personally, I don't know how the Lac Megantic Engineer can get to sleep at night these years.
The problem is that too many THINK their short cuts are safe - until the the death toll starts and proves beyond any shadow of doubt that they were not.
I read that the engineer screwed up by mistakenly counting the locos' handbrakes as part of the required total.
If the difference between safety and disaster, when securing a trainthat long, of oil tank cars, comes down to three handbrakes, then the railroad's rule was ridiculously inadequate.
Considering what they were dealing with, they should have determined what was surely safe THEN ADDED TEN CARS.
I too wonder how that engineer can sleep at night. But realistically, if he's even semi-normal, he will be tortured by this memory until the day he dies. He effed up spectacularly, but at some level I do feel sorry for him. That's a lot to carry around.
Lithonia OperatorIf the difference between safety and disaster, when securing a trainthat long, of oil tank cars, comes down to three handbrakes, then the railroad's rule was ridiculously inadequate.
The fundamental issue attributable to the railroad at Lac Megantic was the use of the independent brake to hold the train as part of a 'hurry up' asynchronous crew-change procedure. Together with environmentally-conscious or penny-pinching (take your choice) shutting down of all but the lead unit ... with the lead unit in shaky condition after having been 'worked pretty hard' with recognized problems.
ADDING TEN CARS to what TC told them was 'safe' would have been little additional securement... as things worked out. Keep in mind that on these cars there is no foundation between trucks, so "one brake" = one truck, something not implicit in the old CROR securement rule and table.
The point about adequate securement 'plus ten cars' on undegassed oil trains at least, stands as proper sense. Of course we can guess how long it would have taken Harding to make that practical securement on his train. Or what the dynamic duo in RFC Farnham would have told him had he started...
TSB is very concerned with the growth of the problem of runaways increasing after we have learned the lessons with Lac Megantic. If you look at the reference I posted above, they go into great detail.
In our several discussions on this forum, many have wondered why a portable derail and wheel chocks were not placed to prevent the oil train from running away down the grade from Nantes. But experts here have repeatedly ridiculed such ideas as being impractical for a host of reasons.
Yet, ironically, the TSB trots out those same portable derail and wheel chock remedies as part of the solution to what they cite as a growing problem with runaways.
They even propose ideas to assure that locomotives left running to pump air to hold securement do not accidentally stop running. Both supervisors and the engineer of the runaway oil train at Lac Megantic were fully apprised of the fact that the one engine left running to maintain air pressure holding the train—that engine—had been shut down after the fire. And yet those three people never bothered to connect the dots. Unbelievable.
Another thing they propose is hand brakes that can transmit information showing whether or not they are applied. Now all they would have to do is determine who that information should be sent to.
The problem with this “belt + suspenders” form of guarantee is that either one can be dismissed because the other one is known to be 100% reliable. That is precisely what happened at Lac Megantic with the belt and suspenders of hand brakes and air brakes.
In this link, you can see how desperate TSB is.
From the link:
The situation
Despite significant safety action taken by Transport Canada and the railway industry since the Lac-Mégantic accident (TSB Railway Investigation Report R13D0054) to reduce the number of unplanned/uncontrolled movements of rail equipment, the number of occurrences has continued to trend upwards, posing a significant risk to the rail transportation system.
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