Murphy—Schlimm is correct. Speaking as a retired rail I can say from a dispatching standpoint that the total number of trains handled a day is the main factor in handling traffic over a given track segment and configuration. So CNSF's data about the tonnage increases since 1960 needs to be qualified. How many trains (of all types) was the ATSF handling then compared to what the BNSF is handling today?
Other factors that the dispatcher considers are:
HP/ton ratio—determines what speed it's even possible for the train to attain
Tons/operative brake—On the BN trains over 100 TOB were restricted to 45 MPH
Empties in train—55 MPH restriction on empty freight cars in mixed freight trains
Type of train—Passenger, oil train, intermodal; all higher or lower speed than typical freight
Length of train—Not much of a factor except on subdivisions with shorter sidings
"Back in the day" there was a mix of trains also—drag freights, hotshots, fast passenger trains, and not-so-fast passenger trains—for the dispatcher to contend with, and those passenger trains had to be kept on time or heads would roll, beginning with the dispatcher's.
Notice I qualified my initial statement with "for a given track segment and configuration" as this can be a major factor in train capacity. A single track line with Track Warrant Control will not be able to handle as many trains as a line with two main track CTC. Grades and curves also affect capacity by reducing maximum speeds.
Consider that the ex-ATSF main line has substantially the same grades and curves as it did in 1960 (after the Williams Jct.-Crookton line relocation) but now is two main track CTC instead of a mix of single and double main CTC; with that the line certainly has more capacity than during the passenger train era.
Kurt Hayek
I think an important point in CNSF's post has been missed.
There has to be a market need for a service. No one has identified such a need for a Super C type service. In fact, the original Super C was launched without identifying such a need. It was the the brain child of a senior Santa Fe executive. It flopped because it served no significant customer need.
Maybe 10 or so years ago UPS did ask BNSF for a train that could deliver Monday shipments from Los Angeles to New York for Friday delivery. (one day per week operation.) BNSF took a look, did some analysis, and said no. Such a service would be too disruptive on their busy mainline.
So the UP saw an opportunity for a lot of "Thank You" UPS business and tried to run the train. They fell on their ass. And they disrupted their network doing so.
It's foolish to think that a railroad can just start some service and then tell marketing/sales to just fill up the train. The market need must be identified and quantified first. Then the operating people have to be able to meet that need in an economical manner. Nobody has identified such a need for a new Super C.
sandiego Murphy—Schlimm is correct. Speaking as a retired rail I can say from a dispatching standpoint that the total number of trains handled a day is the main factor in handling traffic over a given track segment and configuration. So CNSF's data about the tonnage increases since 1960 needs to be qualified. How many trains (of all types) was the ATSF handling then compared to what the BNSF is handling today? Other factors that the dispatcher considers are: HP/ton ratio—determines what speed it's even possible for the train to attain Tons/operative brake—On the BN trains over 100 TOB were restricted to 45 MPH Empties in train—55 MPH restriction on empty freight cars in mixed freight trains Type of train—Passenger, oil train, intermodal; all higher or lower speed than typical freight Length of train—Not much of a factor except on subdivisions with shorter sidings "Back in the day" there was a mix of trains also—drag freights, hotshots, fast passenger trains, and not-so-fast passenger trains—for the dispatcher to contend with, and those passenger trains had to be kept on time or heads would roll, beginning with the dispatcher's. Notice I qualified my initial statement with "for a given track segment and configuration" as this can be a major factor in train capacity. A single track line with Track Warrant Control will not be able to handle as many trains as a line with two main track CTC. Grades and curves also affect capacity by reducing maximum speeds. Consider that the ex-ATSF main line has substantially the same grades and curves as it did in 1960 (after the Williams Jct.-Crookton line relocation) but now is two main track CTC instead of a mix of single and double main CTC; with that the line certainly has more capacity than during the passenger train era. Kurt Hayek
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Please add into your equation(s) that the dispatcher today has a much broader territory with more trains, more tonnage and is less likely to give the premium train the attention it got then. The Q-train experiment of the 80's and 90's (dedicated route pairs of short/ light trains) put a strain on a system then that has only gotten leaner since.
On the other side, crew districts are longer, flying crew changes are illegal (must stop), capacity is enhanced (Super C ran after the massive line changes that DC was part of), FRA inspections are fewer, no cabeese and better, more reliable power.
(I can still remember the running joke about the Valley Division dispatcher (Fresno) announcing - "199 left Chicago; Everybody off the railroad, NOW!"
Posters SanDiego and Greyhounds both made most intelligent comments. But a factor that has been lost in this thread is start to finish time of shipments, i.e., from the time a shipment leaves a shipper to when it is received by a customer. As for the train under discussion, it made NO difference how fast the Super C traveled. Remember, the shipment had to be brought to the loading site, loaded, wait for other shipments to be loaded, and finally depart at a certain time. At the other end of the trip, the reverse consumed time. Time, time, time being consumed – with nothing moving shipment-wise!
I think it was the BNSF website that had (and probably still has) some schedules that shippers could use to plan their shipments. There was often five or six scheduled departures to a particular destination. While slower than the Super C and less disruptive logistics-wise, a customer’s shipment would under most cases involve LESS start to finish time overall. Who could argue with that?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- K.P.’s absolute “theorem” from early, early childhood that he has seen over and over and over again: Those that CAUSE a problem in the first place will act the most violently if questioned or exposed.
CNSFIn the 1960's Santa Fe was handling about 40 million gross tons on the "Transcon" between Clovis and Vaughn
Net (not gross) ton-miles per mile in 1962, in millions:
Clovis-Vaughn 6.74 westward, 4.25 eastward
Gallup-Winslow 6.76W 3.55E
Hesperia-San Bernardino 8.90W 2.30E
Highest density was Emporia-Ellinor, 6.98W 10.36E. Dunno whether the Cajon segment includes UP-- probably not? Cadiz-Barstow is shown as 6.51W 3.34E, Barstow-Hesperia is 8.00W 2.32E and Barstow-Mojave is 2.27W 3.72E.
In 1952 Clovis-Vaughn 4.70W 4.03E, Gallup-Winslow 4.59W 3.43E, and the densest was Argentine-Holliday 7.20W 10.61E.
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