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[quote user="oltmannd"] [quote user="Bucyrus"] [quote user="oltmannd"]How do you know the MM&A has no such rule?[/quote] I don't know that.  What you quoted is my question to tgmidget asking how he knows what rules the engineer was supposed to follow in securring the train.  I said the responsibility to secure the train is meaningless without a rule to define how the securement is done.  Do you agree?  <div style="clear:both;"></div> [/quote] Then you are speaking completely hypothetically. Do we know if the locomotive wheels had flanges?  Wouldn't you agree that a locomotive wheel without flanges is more likely to derail than one with? MM&A likely uses GCOR or has a rule something very close to GCOR 32.1.   Now, can a train in compliance with GCOR 32.1 run away?  Very highly unlikely, but yes.  But something had to change from the time the brakes were applied to the time the run away occurred.[/quote] Don, Previously I listed item #3 as one of my FOUR POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE RUNAWAY as follows: 3) The train securement rules of the MM&A at Nantes are inadequate, or non-existent.   Is it a hypothetical premise? Sure it is.  Is it irrelevant like your example question of whether a wheel without a flange is more likely to derail than a flanged wheel?  I don’t think so.  While it may be hypothetical, the point is that if that hypothetical happens to be fact, then it diminishes or eliminates the engineer’s responsibility and places it on the defective rule.  Therefore, it is critically important to find out whether the hypothetical point happens to be fact. Apparently the Lac-Megantic accident investigators agree with me because they are asking the TSB to review their CRPR Rule 113 to check whether it is adequate.  This is detailed in this link: <a href="http://www.canadianunderwriter.ca/news/transport-canada-may-wish-to-review-rail-rules-agency-investigating-lac-megantic-derailment/1002482141/">http://www.canadianunderwriter.ca/news/transport-canada-may-wish-to-review-rail-rules-agency-investigating-lac-megantic-derailment/1002482141/</a>   From the link, here is a transcription of a letter from Robert Johnston asking the TSB to review Rule 112, and expressing his doubts about the sufficiency of the rule:   CROR Rule 112 ensures that hand brakes are applied to prevent unwanted movement of the train while providing flexibility for a railway’s operational needs.  However, CROR Rule 112 is not specific enough in that it does not indicate the number of hand brakes necessary to hold a given train tonnage on various grades and it continues to be left up to the operating employee to determine the number of hand brakes to apply.  Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the push-pull test is not always a good indicat0or of whether an adequate number of hand brakes have been applied and not handbrakes are effective even when properly applied.  Considering all these risk, Transport Canada may wish to review CROR Rule 112 and all related railway special instructions to ensure that equipment and trains left unattended are properly secured in order to prevent unintended movements. Yours sincerely, Original signed by Robert Johnston Acting Director Investigation Operations Rail/Pipeline
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