Yet I did point out the one case where reducing oil-train speed might possiblly reduce safety instead of increasing it. But both the stop-one-train-at-meets and reducing speed were Fred Frailey;s suggestions, and again I just tried to figure out how to iimplement them without major reductions in overall railroad capacity. They did make sense to me. You are sayiing the overall speed reduction is far more important than one train stopped at meets. Maybe you are right. But since Fred is nbt following up on his recommendations, I really would like to drop the whole matter.
EuclidI can see a lot more potential to reduce the overall hazard if the speed is reduced for the entire route, as you mention.
This reduces the capacity of the line. If this is the only train on the line, no big deal. If it's a busy mainline, not so good.
Next time you're on a nice, curvy 55 mph two lane road (no passing zones), try driving at 40 instead of the speed limit...
If you want to see what disparate speeds do to a mainline, hang around one for a few hours around some Amtrak activity.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Larry,
I am not suggesting that slowing down is the solution. I only meant to compare it to stopping one train in a passing meet. In that comparison, I think that slowing down would be far more effective because its safety-adding effect would apply for a much longer time during the travel of the train. But I don’t see slowing down as being a practical solution and I don’t think stopping one train during a meet would be enough to solve the overall problem. I also don’t think that strengthening tank cars will be enough of a solution.
As I type (5 PM) the temperature in Fargo/Casselton is -11 degrees F.
Should oil trains be parked until more moderate temperatures return? Well away from the mains.
Would that the cause of the Dec. 30 incident were known, but there has been discussion that either a broken rail, wheel, or axle on the grain train caused that derailment into the CBR train.
The effects of low temperature on rairoad steel are well-studied.
What would an experienced railroad metallurgist recommend?
What would a railroad CEO decide?
Euclid I can see a lot more potential to reduce the overall hazard if the speed is reduced for the entire route, as you mention.
I can see a lot more potential to reduce the overall hazard if the speed is reduced for the entire route, as you mention.
A classic situation.
Lets say under the current operation a train is loaded today, takes 3 days to transit to destination, 2 days to unload, 3 days to transit back to origin, and another 2 days to load. Total cycle is 10 days. If the customer requires one train a day, then it will take 10 sets of equipment, 3 of which will be under load moving on the railroad at any given time.
For safety we reduce the speed of the trains to 30 mph and stop them at all meets and passes We will assume the empties are not considered "unsafe" and can move at normal speed. That doubles the transit time on the loaded side. It now takes 6 days to transit to destination, 2 days to unload, 3 days to transit back to origin, and another 2 days to load. Total cycle is 13 days. If the customer requires one train a day, then it will take 13 sets of equipment, 6 of which will be under load moving on the railroad at any given time.
So to "improve" safety you have doubled the number of loaded oil trains moving on the railroad and now you have to find a place to hold the empty hazardous sets of equipment that will be queueing for loading. Instead of 1000 Type 111 tank cars out there you now have 1300 type 111 tank cars hauling crude oil.
Have you really reduced the risk?
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
466lex As I type (5 PM) the temperature in Fargo/Casselton is -11 degrees F. Should oil trains be parked until more moderate temperatures return? Well away from the mains.
Just for the record, the train that derailed in Casselton wasn't an "oil train". It was a manifest train (a mixed freight train) that had a few cars of crude oil traveling in it. If you parked all the unit trains that train would still be running.
It was a mechanical failure on the wheel and axle. Had nothing to do with the rail.
Probably since the BNSF has a CEO and the railroad did what they did and major railroads have people whose only job is to assess risk and report to the CEO and the board of directors, I can only think that a railroad CEO would do EXACTLY what the railroads are currently doing, since that is in fact what they are doing.
Dehusman,
I have no idea how those logistics would shake out. They may very well add to the hazard because of the increased amount of equipment moving. I am just looking at hauling the same amount of oil, but hauling it slower. And I only mention it because it was brought up in conjunction with another proposal to stop one train when two meet and pass. I thought the slowing down option would be far more effective in reducing tank car breaching than the option of stopping one train during a passing meet.
But that does not mean that I prefer the slowdown option. I think the meeting and passing revision would not do enough to solve the problem, and the slowdown option would be too expensive and impractical to implement. It could very well be impractical and counterproductive for the very reasons you cite.
Actually, I don’t expect the industry to come up with a solution to the problem. But it is all a matter of the odds. Fred Frailey has a blog on the odds of future oil train wrecks. But just because the odds predict a certain number per year, that does not mean that the distribution of wrecks will be equal over time.
The oil-by-rail industry needs a miracle to survive this juggernaut of bad press. Such a miracle would be zero fireballs for say five years. If that were the case, that would at least give some breathing room to fight back and create the perception that the problem has been solved. But the odds predict a lot more oil train derailments than zero in five years.
Response to dehusman comments on Tue, Jan 21 2014 12:51 AM:
“Just for the record, the train that derailed in Casselton wasn't an "oil train". It was a manifest train (a mixed freight train) that had a few cars of crude oil traveling in it. If you parked all the unit trains that train would still be running.”
Perhaps Reuters got it wrong. Looks like a DPU, a buffer car, and a string of tank cars, but I wasn’t there. Just a picture and a news story to indicate it was a unit CBR train….
“Reuters – Monday, Dec 30, 2013
Caption:
“Reuters/REUTERS - A plume of smoke rises from scene of a derailed train near Casselton, North Dakota December 30, 2013. The train that derailed was travelling eastbound, carrying crude oil, according to a BNSF spokeswoman. Emergency and fire-fighting crews are responding to the derailment, which occurred around 2:10 p.m. Casselton is roughly 20 miles west of Fargo, ND along Interstate 94. REUTERS/Michael Vosburg/Forum News Service
“By Alicia Nelson
“FARGO, North Dakota (Reuters) - A BNSF train carrying crude oil in North Dakota collided with another train on Monday setting off a series of explosions that left at least 10 cars ablaze, the latest in a string of incidents that have raised alarms over growing oil-by-rail traffic.
“Local residents heard five powerful explosions just a mile outside of the small town of Casselton after a westbound train carrying soybeans derailed, and an eastbound 104-car train hauling crude oil ran into it just after 2 p.m. CST (2000 GMT), local officials said. There were no reports of any injuries.
“Half of the oil cars have been separated from the train, but another 56 cars remain in danger, said Cecily Fong, the public information officer with the North Dakota Department of Emergency Services. ….” [Emphasis added.]
Source link: http://news.yahoo.com/two-trains-collide-north-dakota-one-them-carrying-215524489--finance.html
“It was a mechanical failure on the wheel and axle. Had nothing to do with the rail.”
Perhaps the NTSB has issued their final report and I just missed it. Pretty fast turnaround.
“Probably since the BNSF has a CEO and the railroad did what they did and major railroads have people whose only job is to assess risk and report to the CEO and the board of directors, ….”
Interesting inside information. I guess I have missed the statements of the BNSF CEO quoting their risk assessors on the Casselton event. Must have been reassuring. (I imagine CSX will have their risk assessors talking to the Philadelphia media within the next month or so.) Inside information presumably will show that BNSF metallurgists gave the high green to continue full CBR operations through Casselton at 20 below tonight. After all …
“…I can only think that a railroad CEO would do EXACTLY what the railroads are currently doing, since that is in fact what they are doing.”
What’s that old tragi-comic definition of insanity?
I still wish the discussion would cease, but in answer to Euclid's question, the answer is:: "Yes. we still have reduced the risk, and to undersand why, you have to learn the relationships between force, acceleration, mass, and velocity." Double the speed of the impact, you double the total kinetic energy. But because of nonlinearities in structure failure, some locations may see quadruple the force or even more.
466lex Perhaps Reuters got it wrong. Looks like a DPU, a buffer car, and a string of tank cars, but I wasn’t there. Just a picture and a news story to indicate it was a unit CBR train….
I stand corrected, one of the reports I read said there were other cars/commodities involved and that lead to my misunderstanding.
“Probably since the BNSF has a CEO and the railroad did what they did and major railroads have people whose only job is to assess risk and report to the CEO and the board of directors, ….” Interesting inside information. I guess I have missed the statements of the BNSF CEO quoting their risk assessors on the Casselton event. Must have been reassuring. (I imagine CSX will have their risk assessors talking to the Philadelphia media within the next month or so.) Inside information presumably will show that BNSF metallurgists gave the high green to continue full CBR operations through Casselton at 20 below tonight. After all …
The comments on this forum seem to take the attitude that the railroads are just whistling in the dark and not paying attention to any of this. People are wildly speculating and throwing out "solutions" without real data to support them or any regard for what the consequences may be (Frailey included). The point was that rather than being reactionary, as your view of what the railroads do, they are actually attempting to get out ahead of the risk. So yes, the railroads will look at the accidents in hindsight, but the more important thing is that they do have people looking at the risk in the future. These aren't kneejerk reactions So whatever they do in response to some of these incidents won't be for months or years down the road because it will take that long to analyze, formulate any changes and then implement those changes. The railroads have been down this path before. It happened with the LPG/flammable gases in the 1970's (how BLVE, "blevee", became known), it happened when the ethanol trains started.
“…I can only think that a railroad CEO would do EXACTLY what the railroads are currently doing, since that is in fact what they are doing.” What’s that old tragi-comic definition of insanity?
Not a all. I never said railroads would never change. I'm saying that the major railroads have seriously looked at the transportation of hazmat, its one of their core businesses, and have made the best choices (you may have a different opinion on how to define "best"). The point is they are actually looking at facts and are picking solutions that fit the best fit of effective, efficient and sustainable. You can debate how you would score that fit differently, but the fact is they have looked at it.
Once again, my comments are pointed at the major, class 1 railroads. The smaller shortlines probably don't have the resources to do as much.
For example, here's a change I would make if I were a CEO, in light of the Lac Megantic incident, where part of the MMA's liability might blow back on the connecting carriers, I would offer any connecting shortlines assistance to audit their safety and operating practices with regard to hazmat shipments. If that became a legal anti-trust problem, I would work through the AAR to set up an industry audit team to assist those railroads without the expertise to determine where their risks were. That solution doesn't send trains on magical mystery tours across the country, it doesn't slow down the network, it doesn't add cars to the fleet, it doesn't increase shipping costs to the consumer, but suprise, it could have actually prevented Lac Megantic.
dehusmanSo whatever they do in response to some of these incidents won't be for months or years down the road because it will take that long to analyze, formulate any changes and then implement those changes.
The rails with have to come up with something far better than moving at the glacial pace you propose. If that's the best they can propose, they won't be transporting Bakken crude at all. Fortunately, their CEO's are wiser.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
schlimm dehusmanSo whatever they do in response to some of these incidents won't be for months or years down the road because it will take that long to analyze, formulate any changes and then implement those changes. The rails with have to come up with something far better than moving at the glacial pace you propose. If that's the best they can propose, they won't be transporting Bakken crude at all. Fortunately, their CEO's are wiser.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Murphy SidingI believe he railroad industry is no different. They know they have a problem. They know it costs lives, and it costs them money. They also know they have to improve things. I am sure they are working o it as we speak.
If you actually had read all of three of my sentences, you would have noticed the third one: "Fortunately, their CEO's are wiser." I do not think their wisdom is to wait around for years to change the current method of transporting Bakken crude by their rail lines the way some on these threads wish..
It is stunning to me that the whole Bakken oil field development has progressed this far with no understanding or consideration of the high volatility/flammability nature of the product. It is as if the railroads, the oil producers, the shippers, and the regulators have been blindsided by the explosive/flammable nature of Bakken crude. I would have thought they would have been intimately familiar with the product right down to the molecular level. But I guess not.
Even though lots of people are suggesting solutions to the problem, I don’t expect it to be solved. Sometimes evolution is not enough. Sometimes it takes a revolution, and I don’t think the industry is up to that challenge. Oh sure, they will take action right away, but it will only produce a marginal improvement.
The problem is set up by the convergence of the green movement, the Bakken boom, the killing of pipelines, and the emergence of rail as an alternative to pipelines. The catalyst that materialized the problem was Lac Megantic. And like that fire, this problem is out of control and will run its course.
schlimm If you actually had read all of three of my sentences, you would have noticed the third one: "Fortunately, their CEO's are wiser." I do not think their wisdom is to wait around for years to change the current method of transporting Bakken crude by their rail lines the way some on these threads wish..
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