daveklepper Tsarist Russia claimed Alaska.
Tsarist Russia claimed Alaska.
Tsarist Russia owned Alaska until Sec. of State Seward had the wisdom to purchase Alaska (Seward's Folly, indeed!) from Russia in 1867 for $7.2 million. The Russian government was seeking buyers as early as the late 1850's. Britain showed no interest and the US turned down a Russian offer in 1859.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Interesting references, firelock, if secondary and pretty dated. What would be more intriguing would be primary sources and more recent topical histories.
Schlimm, those books from 1883, 1890, and from 1919 were referenced by "wanswheel", not me. You give me too much credit! At any rate, just because a book's old doesn't necessarily mean it's dated, trust me. There's a lot of gold in those old volumes!
Anyway, I hit the archives here at the "Festung Firelock" looking for some references to back my assertions, although it looks like everyone else has done the job pretty well. I found Theodore Judahs sales pitch for the transcontinental where he said the government needed the railroad. California HAD to be bound to the Unions side. The Far West had to be settled and made a permanent part of the Nation. AND how could you move the troops that might be needed in the West if the War went badly?
A Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts said "What are seventy-five or a hundred million dollars in opening a railroad that shall connect the people of the Atlantic and Pacific and bind us together? Nothing!"
Then there was Grenville Dodge, quoting the MAN himself, Abraham Lincoln as saying the railroad was "... a military necessity and should be built."
Researching California and the Civil War in the Wikepedia, I found there was a strong secessionist movement in southern California. It had been put down by the few US Army personnel in California with the help of Unionist militias, but there was a VERY strong secessionist movement in the Arizona Territory that was still very active. They flat-out voted to join the Confederacy but in the end it came to nothing.
So no, I didn't find anyone using the term "breakaway republic" at the time, but Abe Lincoln would have been a very poor Chief Executive indeed if it didn't cross his mind and taken steps to prevent it happening, either in 1862 or at some point in the future.
Oh, and to edblysard: I was amazed when you told of all the relics such as bullets and such being found around the San Jacinto battlefield, considering it was a fairly small battle. I guess those Texans under General Sam must have been very, VERY emotionally stirred up!
REMEMBER THE ALAMO! REMEMBER GOLIAD!
I am as impressed as I am delighted with the responses to this thread, even those I disagree with.
But I must genuflect before Wanswheel's posting. Here we have several sound examples of scholarship which, while they certainly don't support some of my contentions, certainly have to be not only considered, but admitted as significant. For example, earlier I was going to ask Who has ever heard about a serious threat of California seceding from the Union? Well, here we have Bancroft to speak to that. He makes it clear it wasn't a major threat, but it was, apparently, a threat. Still, I have not seen anything to make me think secession in Washington, Oregon, or Idaho was a serious threat either, but it was bandied about, I guess by a few.
I don't think any of this necessarily refutes White's book or its several theses. He simply doesn't give any credence to this being a major cause. It needs to be reiterated here that White does admit that the Overland route was probably a necessity as well as a good thing. From what I read, the onset of the Civil War got Congress off the dime and the thing was authorized.
Now, it seems we have 2 questions in this thread: One, why were the railroads built, and two, what was the seriousness of the secession threat in the motivations behind the transcontinental RR in 1862? I think we've seen plenty of evidence from White to Bancroft and others that the secession threat was, at best, rather minimal or slight, except for that dust-up in New Mexico. I can't help but note that the canonic text in American History, Morison & Commager (& Leuchtenburg)'s The Growth of the American Republic (two volumes, Oxford University Press, many editions; mine the 1980) makes absolutely no mention of West Coast secession as a cause or impetus for the transcontinental railroad. In fact, on this point they are rather silent, as if the need for such a railroad was inevitable or obvious.
As to the major point about why the western railroads were built, I want to say again that White notes that the routes to California via Panama or Nicaragua were cheaper per ton than the transcontinental railroad from the day the railroad opened in 1869 and for many years, even decades, after. I think we need to remember that transit of the isthmus was neither very dangerous, slow, or expensive. Also, I am sure that many readers here are unfamiliar with the instrumental role played by Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt in making the route via Nicaragua a huge success for him and his companies. In fact, last night as I looked again through The First Tycoon: The Epic Life of Cornelius Vanderbilt by T.J. Stiles (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009) I see no mention of his thinking about any idea concerning the transcontinental railroad. I find this interesting. Commodore Vanderbilt obviously did not see such a railroad as much of a threat to his Nicaragua route-interests, at least not in his foreseeable future. Also, he doesn't seem inclined to be involved in any discussions, let alone construction, of such a proposed line, no matter what the route. Then again, just about the time he was getting into railroading, the Civil War broke out. 1860-1862 must have been a hectic time for everyone, to say the least, and a game-changer in many ways.
Vanderbilt was an honest, but sharp, man. He would never have fit with that gang of thieves and scoundrels we call the Big Four, who finally got the CP-UP built, but not by using primarily their money, but rather the public's. And they profited, shall we say, handsomely. Their influence on national and state politics was corrupt and corroding. We owe them little, if any thanks, I think. Want to thank someone? Try Grenville Dodge or the Casement brothers who actually were responsible for building the railroad.
White's thesis about the AT&SF, the SP, the 2 northern transcons and lots of the never-completed wannabes, is that they were not needed, at least not so quickly. They were built because they could be, and because there was plenty of subsidy and corruption to make it worthwhile to the owners, if not the stockholders. Railroad men themselves (think Charles Francis Adams of the Union Pacific) thought the number overlapping and competing lines ruinous and unnecessary. I think a simple look at the map will confirm that. The market, as White clearly and convincingly demonstrates, didn't and couldn't support this overbuilding. Were it not for subsidies, tax breaks, land grants, naked political corruption, etc., most, if not all of these railroads wouldn't have been built, at least not until later, when it would have been cheaper and the public wouldn't have been involved, at least not to the extent they were.
Lastly, on top of the financial, political, and ecological damage all tis railroad building did for the country, can we railfans please think of people other than White Men like ourselves? The railroads were a disaster for the Indians of the West and White makes a convincing argument that if the building had come a generation or so later the Indian tribes might have had more time to adjust, as the Navajos did, instead of causing wars and all the attendant misery that resulted in many if not most other areas. And while I'm at it, please remember, too, the cost to white European (and other) immigrants who believed all that malarky the midwestern and western railroads were feeding the public.
Look, I'm glad I can ride a train across the West, too, and I'm glad all this transpired before I was born. But this railroad building has been a mighty complex story with a cost that can be figured in many ways. I also think a few contributors here ought to know better than to gainsay a book they not only haven't read, but have no intention of reading. That isn't what I call an open mind.
NKP guy As to the major point about why the western railroads were built, I want to say again that White notes that the routes to California via Panama or Nicaragua were cheaper per ton than the transcontinental railroad from the day the railroad opened in 1869 and for many years, even decades, after. I think we need to remember that transit of the isthmus was neither very dangerous, slow, or expensive. Also, I am sure that many readers here are unfamiliar with the instrumental role played by Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt in making the route via Nicaragua a huge success for him and his companies. In fact, last night as I looked again through The First Tycoon: The Epic Life of Cornelius Vanderbilt by T.J. Stiles (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009) I see no mention of his thinking about any idea concerning the transcontinental railroad. I find this interesting. Commodore Vanderbilt obviously did not see such a railroad as much of a threat to his Nicaragua route-interests, at least not in his foreseeable future. Also, he doesn't seem inclined to be involved in any discussions, let alone construction, of such a proposed line, no matter what the route. Then again, just about the time he was getting into railroading, the Civil War broke out. 1860-1862 must have been a hectic time for everyone, to say the least, and a game-changer in many ways.
The rates may have been cheaper for coastal cities, or cities on a navigable river (e.g. Sacramento), but not likely for inland areas. Mining in Nevada took off only after the railroads provided a means of low cost transportation.
The real scoundrel and thief was Durant of the Credit Mobilier and UP. Dodge and the Casement brothers were responsible for building the UP and had nothing to do with building the CP.
You vastly underestimate Crocker and Huntington. While they used some questionable tactics in getting construction subsidies, the CP had better track than the UP. Unlike Durant of the UP, the Big Four intended to make money of running the CP rather than just on construction.
Much of the financing for the SP came from profits generated by the CP. The SP was getting a lot of traffic from the copper mines in Arizona even before it was completed through Arizona. You would do well to read Myrick's Railroads of Arizona, Vol 1 to get a good picture of how and why the SP was built.
- Erik
NKP guy I think we need to remember that transit of the isthmus was neither very dangerous, slow, or expensive.
I think we need to remember that transit of the isthmus was neither very dangerous, slow, or expensive.
I must take friendly exception to this characterization. The definitive modern account of the building of the first transcon, EMPIRE EXPRESS, by David Haward Bain, 1999, discusses the danger and slowness. (Can't recall what he said about expense.) Theodore Judah himself caught his death on his last Panama transit -- heartbreakingly, just as the first rails of his longtime dream were being laid, in California.
I think the best way to understand the transcon is as a big idea, long aborning from many considerations, whose time came around at last, finally proving irresistable -- to government, to business, to the citizenry at large. Kind of like the breaking away from England; the abolishment of slavery; going to the moon. One can question, and pick and pick, without coming up with the one definitive answer. Life and history are messy that way.
NKP guy For example, earlier I was going to ask Who has ever heard about a serious threat of California seceding from the Union? Well, here we have Bancroft to speak to that. He makes it clear it wasn't a major threat, but it was, apparently, a threat.
For example, earlier I was going to ask Who has ever heard about a serious threat of California seceding from the Union? Well, here we have Bancroft to speak to that. He makes it clear it wasn't a major threat, but it was, apparently, a threat.
I believe it is important to point out that the Bancroft cited was Hubert H. Bancroft, a writer of regional and local western histories, but not a trained historian. Ironically, he died after being run over by a streetcar. The famous historian was George Bancroft, author of the monumental History of the United States of America, from the discovery of the American continent. (8 or 10 volumes 1854-78).
dakotafred NKP guy: I think we need to remember that transit of the isthmus was neither very dangerous, slow, or expensive. I must take friendly exception to this characterization. The definitive modern account of the building of the first transcon, EMPIRE EXPRESS, by David Haward Bain, 1999, discusses the danger and slowness. (Can't recall what he said about expense.) Theodore Judah himself caught his death on his last Panama transit -- heartbreakingly, just as the first rails of his longtime dream were being laid, in California. I think the best way to understand the transcon is as a big idea, long aborning from many considerations, whose time came around at last, finally proving irresistable -- to government, to business, to the citizenry at large. Kind of like the breaking away from England; the abolishment of slavery; going to the moon. One can question, and pick and pick, without coming up with the one definitive answer. Life and history are messy that way.
NKP guy: I think we need to remember that transit of the isthmus was neither very dangerous, slow, or expensive.
I should hasten to clarify that the trip across the isthmus itself was not slow (altho surely dangerous); it was the circuitous route itself, New York-San Francisco VIA the isthmus.
Thanks to my friends schlimm & dakotafred.
First, I admit I was confused about which Bancroft was being quoted.
Second, I take your point, dakotafred about the dangers of the crossing. Certainly the Overland Route was a thing whose time had come. Also, in the Vanderbilt book (The First Tycoon) the author notes with detail the machinations of William (?) Walker of Nicaragua in fomenting a revolutionary movement there; surely the unstable political situation in Central America was a factor in the impetus to build the CP-UP route. And thanks for reminding us about Theodore Judah, a man too-often forgotten in these discussions.
Now, once we get past the point of admitting a need for the Overland route and public involvement.....what about the rest of the railroads White discusses?
(Do you think it was Commodore Vanderbilt's activity in Nicaragua that led to the whole place being called "Central America"?) lol
As far as transit across the isthmus at Panama goes, once the Panama Railroad was completed in January, 1855, trains ran safely in 4-6 hours. Until the opening of the canal in 1914, carried the heaviest volume of freight per unit length of any railroad in the world. Not dangerous and rather fast.
NKP guy [snipped - PDN] . . . White's thesis about the AT&SF, the SP, the 2 northern transcons and lots of the never-completed wannabes, is that they were not needed, at least not so quickly. They were built because they could be, and because there was plenty of subsidy and corruption to make it worthwhile to the owners, if not the stockholders. Railroad men themselves (think Charles Francis Adams of the Union Pacific) thought the number overlapping and competing lines ruinous and unnecessary. I think a simple look at the map will confirm that. The market, as White clearly and convincingly demonstrates, didn't and couldn't support this overbuilding. Were it not for subsidies, tax breaks, land grants, naked political corruption, etc., most, if not all of these railroads wouldn't have been built, at least not until later, when it would have been cheaper and the public wouldn't have been involved, at least not to the extent they were. . . .
But on a broader scale - yes, there were too many railroads between the major city centers (or 'nodes' in today's 'network-speak'). What was it - 7 railroads from Chicago to Kansas City ? (One of UCLA Professor of Economics George W. Hilton's articles in Trains of the 1960's - 70's documented this 'chapter-and-verse'.) And didn't all 3 northern transcons - NP, GN, MILW - serve Butte in each's attempt to claim a share of the copper mine traffic from there ? In that context, the 'overbuilding' criticism has a lot of merit, it seems to me.
- Paul North.
Paul_D_North_Jr But on a broader scale - yes, there were too many railroads between the major city centers (or 'nodes' in today's 'network-speak'). What was it - 7 railroads from Chicago to Kansas City ? (One of UCLA Professor of Economics George W. Hilton's articles in Trains of the 1960's - 70's documented this 'chapter-and-verse'.) And didn't all 3 northern transcons - NP, GN, MILW - serve Butte in each's attempt to claim a share of the copper mine traffic from there ? In that context, the 'overbuilding' criticism has a lot of merit, it seems to me. - Paul North.
One parties 'overbuilding' is another parties 'competition'.
Shippers want carriers fighting for their business at the bottom dollar level and have no concern about the carriers profitability. Carriers want to price their services to cover the costs of maintenance and improvements to their lines and return profits to both the company and it's investors.
I find it very interesting that most of the customers that are complaining about the 'monopoly' power of the railroads that service them, have monopoly power over their customers in many cases. Monopoly power that they jealously guard. Monopoly power that they would use to bully competing carriers, were there to be competing carriers.
I have been employed in the rail industry for over 40 years - it has taken until recent years, where the carriers, post Staggers Act, have developed business accumen (that didn't really exist in the over regulated pre Staggers period) and through the services have generated pricing power on the traffic they handle and are able to put signifigant quantities of money back into the physical plant. My carriers physical plant is in the best condition that I have ever observed since the day I hired out.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
As far as overbuilding of railroads it really depends on your point of view and the circumstances at the time. In the 1850's the railroads in the North were overbuilt and one of the comtributing causes of the financial Panic of 1857. (Don't you love that term 'panic'? A lot more colorful than 'recession' or 'depression'!)
Anyway, those overbuilt 'roads really came in handy and into their own when the Civil War occurred, and were well placed when industrial America was born with that war. Likewise, it's a good thing we had as many rail lines as we did during World War Two, Imagine trying to fight a two ocean war without them back in those pre-interstate highway days.
"Too many railroads" didn't become a problem again until the industrial North and Northeast turned into the Rust Belt, and all the traffic that supported the 'roads up there didn't exist anymore. Look at all the "Fallen Flags", too many to list here.
I've read Richard White's "Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America." I don't see that he "Convincingly Argued" anything. His book is more of a political attack ad than a history.
He reaches several very much unsupported conclusions. The main one is that the transcons were built too soon. "Ahead of Development" (settlement) as he puts it. Because of this premature building they upset the Indians more than was necessary, damaged the environment (where?), brought down the US economy, and caused animal cruelty. (I am not making this up.) He also makes the claim that the western railroads were “overbuilt”. He provides precious little support for the “overbuilt” claim other than some quotes from the president of the Union Pacific. The UP president, Adams, was obviously not thrilled at the appearance of competition. (I don’t see much railroad overbuilding west of the Missouri River in the 19th century, the area and time White wrote about.)
In making his claim that the transcons were built too soon White totally ignores the 500 pound gorilla in the room. He mercilessly trashes the "Big Four" of the Central Pacific. Then he all but turns a blind eye to the fact that the transcontinental railroads were government projects. Both the US and Canadian governments basically contracted the building of transcontinental railroads.
It was the US Federal Government that decided when the first several transcontinental railroads would be built. White simply does not deal with this. He makes the unsupported assertion that the transcons were built too early, but then he totally fails to deal with why the government wanted them built at that time. There were reasons why the US Government took time out during some of its darkest days in the Civil War to enact legislation that would create a railroad linking the Pacific with the Missouri River. From reading White’s book no one can make a judgment as to whether these reasons were good or bad. He simply ignores the issue.
In making his claim of premature building “Ahead of Development” White demonstrates a remarkable lack of historical knowledge. (White is a professor of history at Stanford.) In the US it was common for the railroads to be built ahead of settlement. The US lines were commonly “Developmental Railroads” In his book “The North American Railroad” James E. Vance Jr. deals well with this fact.
Vance cites an early and pronounced divergence of US and British railway operations and equipment. The reason for the divergence was that the rail systems were built into two very different situations. The British railways were built to link established population and commercial centers. They could expect a good traffic volume from the get go. They could spend more up front on their roadbeds secure in the knowledge that the traffic would come quickly after a line’s completion.
Because most of the country wasn't settled, American railroad practice was different. US railroads were often built in to unsettled areas with the hope that settlement and traffic would develop with the provision of transportation. It worked. (I grew up in a town established by a railroad, Manito, IL) But it meant the lines had to be constructed cheaply and then upgraded as business conditions warranted. One major result from American style railroad construction was the 4-4-0 “American Type” locomotive. The pony truck gave it a three point suspension that could handle the tracks while pulling a decent load at a decent speed.
White is either ignorant of the history of the railroads in America or he chose to leave this part out because it didn’t fit the story he wanted to tell.
That’s enough for now. White also demonstrates a total lack of understanding with regards to railroad operations and the economics of railroading. I’ll get to that later.
greyhounds wrote the following [in part]:
[James E.Vance,jr.]"... cites an early and pronounced divergence of US and British railway operations and equipment. The reason for the divergence was that the rail systems were built into two very different situations. The British railways were built to link established population and commercial centers. They could expect a good traffic volume from the get go. They could spend more up front on their roadbeds secure in the knowledge that the traffic would come quickly after a line’s completion..."
"...Because most of the country wasn't settled, American railroad practice was different. US railroads were often built in to unsettled areas with the hope that settlement and traffic would develop with the provision of transportation..."
No argument with the underlined portions of the above statements!
I would point out the importance to the development of the American Railroad system and the importance of the Pacific Railroad Act of 1862. (linked @) http://www.coxrail.com/land-grants.htm
The railroads were designed first of all to make money for the stakeholders and allow them to profit by selling adjacent land to those brought in by the Railroad Companies. One only has to look at late 19th and turn of the 20th Century maps to see the network of railroads. Particularly out here in the Midwest,in Iowa and Kansas rail lines ran virtually everywhere, connecting even small population centers. To be a community by-passed by a rail line was a death-knell for that community. Grain and cattle could not get to markets, travel overland was difficult at best and in bad weather virtually impossible.
FTL:"...How do you get "ten square miles of land" for every mile of track?"
The final step in understanding a land grant is to imagine a rail line snaking across the checkerboard in a curving, twisting manner. If you draw two lines parallel to the rail line and ten miles to the left and right, you have the outline of the typical land grant created by the 1862 law..."
Land grants were an important mechanism to make a railroad profitable in America, and assure a level of commercial success for the enterprise. Land Grant Colleges as well were a function of that system,as well.
In England the urban centers were long established and connected by a network of roads some good, some not. It was the facilitation of the commercial activities, and mobility of the population that were the functions of their railroads in England. Settlements were firmly, long established, and movement of goods was a necessity as well as the desire of the populations to travel in what amounted to speedy comfort.
To sum up by quoting a statement of Bucyrus' earlier:
"...In actuality, the settlers who moved into the territory were the government. So they were the investors that partnered with the railroad to bring rail transportation into the territory. And as Greyhounds mentioned, the settlers received a return on their investment in the form of better transportation. Better transportation made more money for them. Hauling their goods made money for the railroad. The whole thing together created wealth..."
It sounds like the author has taken the social concerns of the academic left of today and projected them back 150 years into an era with a different set of real world problems. I'm glad that Greyhounds took the time to read the book and write the analysis above, but I think I'll skip the effort of reading it.
There is a certain amount of irony here when one considers the author's employer is an institution founded by one of the Big Four.
I'll say one more thing and that'll be the last I say. In an earlier post I stated I hadn't read Mr. Whites book and didn't have any plans to.
Why? Well from what I gather, Mr. White hasn't mentioned anything I didn't know already about the graft and corruption that swirled around the building of the Transcontinental Railroad, especially the UP side. And? So? I think anyone who's a student of railroad history has known that for years. Not a big revelation as far as I'm concerned.
Let's remember the people of that period of the 19th Century were not like us, their time was not our time. If someone was skimming a little off the top of any enterprise people of the time were usually willing to trun a blind eye to it, AS LONG as he delivered what he promised and didn't get TOO greedy. That was a rule Thomas Durant of the UP broke to his disgrace and downfall.
Interestingly, that little rule was followed with great success by the Richard Daly political machine in Chicago, according to the late journalist Mike Royko. Deliver the services you're SUPPOSED to deliver, police and fire protection, trash removal, keep the streets clean and safe,and do it all in an efficient and timely manner, and the people will let you get away with anything!
That's all!
As a cynical former colleague used to say (advise):
"Pigs just get fat - but hogs get slaughtered !" (i.e., don't get too greedy)
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