Did UP+C&NW cause BN+ATSF?

[VerMontanan]

Murphy Siding

If fans of NP, or Milwaukee Road, or  Anti-fans(?) of GN want to believe that "They did it wrong",  I guess I'm OK with that.  I just haven't seen anything that would convince me of that.  So, back to my opinion- I just don't buy it.

 

Murphy,

 

You're not alone. 

 

With regard to whether the GN or NP route was the correct route to keep when/if the railroad became Burlington Northern, it's interesting that people question that decision now, when in years past, there really wasn't any doubt (and there isn't really any now, amongst those who operate the railroad, just on such forums, I suppose).  I think all that's really going on here is that challenging history in this manner shows how emotional people can get over "their" railroad when it was downgraded or abandoned.  But that still doesn't mean the right decisions weren't made or that the operating people didn't know which routes were superior to others all along.

 

For those that may have these books, or could find them, I have two that pretty much explain the constant that was the superiority of the GN route.  The book, "The Burlington Northern Railroad in 1993" by Robert Del Grosso and Patrick Dorin (published in 1994 by Great Northern Pacific Productions) has a rather lengthy article about the 1957 "Wyer Report" which was a study about a GN-NP-CB&Q merger commissioned by John Budd, president of the Great Northern, and Robert Macfarlane, president of NP.  An excerpt from the article is "Ruling grades, helper districts, and route mileage were the primary considerations in selecting the primary transcontinental route between St. Paul and Spokane.  The same criteria applied in determining the route over the Cascade Mountain Range in Washington State.  The consolidated company's route was recommended by the Wyer Report and was largely implemented."

 

The only major difference in the primary route structure actually implemented by BN was that the ex-NP route was kept between Spokane and Pasco, rather than the SP&S route, which Wyer suggested.  While I would guess that as far back as James J. Hill himself there was consideration to such a route consolidation, the Wyer Report definitively outlined the most efficient routes 53 years ago, and 13 years prior to actual merger.

 

"James J. Hill's Legacy to Railway Operations" is a self-published book by Earl Currie, who was once a very high-ranking officer on GN and later BN.  This book goes into detail about the operating characteristics of most of BN's routes (not just the transcontinental route, and not just comparing the GN with the NP, but also the other carriers).  He comes to the same conclusion.  And while there might be an inclination to suggest that a GN official would favor his own line, he also writes on the knowledge gained as Superintendent of BN's Rocky Mountain Division, headquarted in Missoula, squarely in ex-NP territory.

 

As for the statement about the greater population along the NP route, I would remind everyone that things are relative.  Clearly, Missoula and Billings are much larger than Whitefish and Havre, but really, there are no big cities in Montana or North Dakota.  Montana is nearly as large as California, but as of the 2009 Census estimate, has yet to reach a population of 1 million (California is about to hit 37 million).  Therefore, the best freight route across Montana is one that can move the freight from the Pacific Northwest to the Upper Midwest most efficiently, regardless of how it crosses Montana.  Being a Montana native, I have always wondered how Montanans can complain about the BN being a "monopoly" in their state.  Such claims were made at BN merger time, and again after the Milwaukee Road bowed out in 1980.  It's interesting that cities like Las Vegas, San Diego, and Albuquerque, or all of Southern Idaho or most of Florida outside of Jacksonville and West Palm Beach-to-Miami only have one railroad (and in some cases have always only had one railroad), and are as populous or much more populous than Montana, but their railroad monopoly doesn't seem to be an issue.

 

By far, the primary reason that the ex-GN route was chosen most of the way was grade.  The GN route did not exceed .65 percent either way between the Twin Cities and Havre, Montana (midway across the state).  Crossing the Continental Divide in Montana, the GN route was 1 percent westbound (with a very short 1.3 percent at Bison), and 1.8 percent eastbound.  Crossing the Cascades in Washington was 2.2 percent each way.

 

The NP route has numerous 1 percent climbs each way from about 50 miles west of Fargo, ND to Glendive, Montana.  Bozeman Pass in Montana is 1.8 percent westbound and 1.9 percent eastbound.  Winston Hill near Townsend is 1 percent in each direction, and crossing the Continental Divide in Montana is 2.2 percent westbound and 1.4 percent eastbound.  In Washington, westbound trains faced a 1.2 percent climb leaving Spokane, and 2.2 percent was the grade both ways over the Cascades.

 

The difference in cost between the two routes is dramatic even today.  For instance, a standard unit grain train consisting of 110 cars and 16,000 tons needs 5 road crews and no helper crews between Fargo/Dilworth and Spokane/Hauser when routed via the ex-GN route.  Via the ex-NP route between the same points, the same train needs 7 road crews and 2 helper crews, and consumes about 2,000 gallons more fuel.  (To cross the Cascades, most of these trains operate via Wishram on the ex-SP&S water level route rather than over the mountains.)  Where helper crews are used on the ex-NP route (Bozeman Pass and Mullan Pass), there is the additional cost of stationing helper power at all times, and delay cutting helper power in and out, and the potential cost of delay waiting for helper power to become available if the number of helper trains overtaxes availability.  In other words, the same helper power can only be used a certain number of times in any given day.  When train count exceeds that, more helper power must be created, or trains must sit waiting for what's available; regardless, it's an expensive proposition. 

BNSF routes coal trains from the Powder River Basin to the Pacific Northwest both via MRL (ex-NP) and via Great Falls and Whitefish (ex-GN).  The 125-car trains are powered with 4 AC locomotives in 2-by-2 configuration (2 on the head end and 2 on the rear).  The trains via Great Falls make the entire trip without any power modifications whatsoever; the trains via MRL receive a 3 unit helper (SD70ACs) at Livingston (which are cut out at Bozeman) and a 5 unit helper (again SD70ACs) at Helena (which are cut out at Elliston) along with the same 4-unit road power.  The Great Falls routing is about 95 miles more, but this shows that even with longer mileage, not requiring additional power en route can make it very cost effective compared to the shorter route.  With regard to the "tranncontinental" routing, the GN route had the mileage and grade advantage both.

 

Earl Currie's book offers this insight in the operations on the GN and NP: "Bob Downing, Executive Vice President of the Great Northern at the time of merger, recalls how Great northern officers would have the Operator at the interlocking plant at Casselton (ND) where the Great Northern and the NP crossed at grade (the Operators at "Cass Tower" were Great Northern employees since it was the "junior" road) report the time No. 603 (the NP hotshot freight train) passed Casselton.  Even with running a small, highly-powered No. 603, it took the NP four hours longer to make the run to Seattle..  As long as No. 97 (the corresponding GN hotshot freight, previously called First 401) would leave Casselton not more than four hours after No. 603 passed, the Great Northern would not be in danger of arriving in Seattle later than the NP.  These comments are not intended to downplay the capabilities of the NP management, its operating plan or its ability to run an on-time railway.  The difference lay in the difficulty the NP had in trying to compete with a railway having a shorter route with lower grades and less curvature that was severe enough to require speed restrictions."

 

The Milwaukee was in a similar disadvantage to the Great Northern.  Like the NP, which encountered its first 1 percent grade west of the Twin Cities in Eastern North Dakota, the Milwaukee's first such hill - and it was and still is a long one - in Eastern South Dakota at Summit (compared to west of Havre on the GN).  Within Montana, the MILW route was slightly better than NP westbound (1.4 percent at Loweth vs. 1.8 pecent at Bozeman Pass, and 2.0 percent at Pipestone Pass vs. 2.2 percent at Mullan Pass), but the Milwaukee's huge disadvantage was climbing the Bitterroot Mountains.  NP went from Missoula to Spokane and GN went from Whitefish to Spokane in both directions at a grade never exceeding 1 percent.  But the Milwaukee had a grueling 1.7 climb - both ways - over St. Paul Pass (on the Montana/Idaho border) that had, in addition, loads of curvature and slow running. 

 

In 1960, the Milwaukee Road's Olympian Hiawatha was scheduled to depart Missoula at 620 PM; NP's North Coast Limited was scheduled out at 621 PM, 1 minute later.  The NP route, since it went around the mountains and not through them was 20 miles further than the MILW from Missoula to Spokane, yet it was 1 hour and 22 minutes faster!  In Washington State, often touted is the Milwaukee's gentle (.7 percent) westward crossing of the Cascades (versus 2.2 percent on GN and NP).  But often overlooked is that the MILW had a westward grade of its own - 2.2 percent - leaving the Columbia River valley at Beverly, and two significant hills eastbound - 1.74 percent in the Cascades and 1.6 percent east of Kittitas.  Also often overlooked is that GN and NP both had a water level route through the Cascades in their subsidiary SP&S which allowed them the option to move heavy trains with minimal power on this route, which of course is how BNSF chooses to run most much heavier trains today.  The SP&S route was, of course, meant to be the GN and NP link to Portland, which in addition to being a major city in it own right, was the gateway to California via Southern Pacific (even though GN had its own route to California, and interchange with WP and ATSF).  The Milwaukee didn't serve Portland until 1970 as a condition of the BN merger, and when they did, they simply got trackage rights from the Kelso/Longview area to the north into Portland.  This meant, for instance, that while BN traffic to/from Portland going or coming from the east arrived via the water level SP&S route, the MILW had to haul it over its major grades on the mainline (2.2 percent westbound, and 1.74 and 1.6 percent eastbound), but westbound, also had the additional ridiculous grade of 3.0 percent departing Tacoma.

 

An example of the MILW handicap is this: By the 1970s, most wheat from Montana was shipped to the Vancouver, WA/Portland, OR area for export, as is the case today (though nearby Kalama, WA is another popular destination).  A car of wheat from Great Falls to Portland would traverse 869 miles on an all-BN routing, but 1219, or 350 more, on an all-MILW route.  The MILW train handling would encounter a steeper grade just between Great Falls and Lewistown (1.5 percent), than the BN train would for its entire trip.  Such was the disadvantage of the MILW's entrance into Portland.  (In reality, such grain from the MILW would be handed off to UP at Marengo, WA to use UP's water level crossing of the Cascades, and a route only 150 miles longer than BN).  In any event, it's almost impossible to envision a railroad with the profile of the Milwaukee in Montana and without a water-level route through the Cascades handling the very heavy trains of today.   Another good reason it's not with us.

 

In the case of the BN transcontinental route chose after merger, debating whether the merger was a success or not is kind of moot, since so much of it was the ex-GN route.  In other words, the GN route would have been the low cost routing regardless; it was then and is now, and those wishing to revise history really can't change that.

 

 

[sandiego]

From Mark Meyer's message:

"Ruling grades, helper districts, and route mileage were the primary considerations in selecting the primary transcontinental route between St. Paul and Spokane.  The same criteria applied in determining the route over the Cascade Mountain Range in Washington State.  The consolidated company's route was recommended by the Wyer Report and was largely implemented."

Right on, right on, right on!

Back on page four of this topic are two lengthy messages I submitted that quote Robert W. Downing extensively on route selection for the merged railroads. He neatly summarized what Mark's very through analysis shows with the comment that the best parts of both railroads (GN and NP) were chosen, and the primary route ended up composed of about 75% GN and 25% NP trackage.

Judging by the lack of reaction or comment, it seemed that no one read those two messages, as the battle has raged between the GN, NP, and MILW partisans for four more pages without resolution.

Mark's detailed comparisons should certainly convince anyone that the best route was actually chosen!

Thanks again, Mark!

Kurt Hayek

PS:  When I worked for the BN on the Twin Cities-Twin Ports-Fargo-Willmar portion of the railroad I ran over both ex-GN and ex-NP lines; generally the ex-GN lines were better engineered with more favorable grades and less restrictive curvature.

[YoHo1975]

To be fair, I'm not much of a partisan for any of the routes, I'm playing devil's advocate and I generally assume management makes mistakes...see Milwaukee, Penn Central, etc.

I don't think anyone is arguing that advantages of the SP&S aren't there, but Cascade Tunnel poses a significant capacity restriction through the Cascades. A restriction that Snoqualmie with it's lowered tunnels does not have. Likewise, Stampede while needing tunnel work does not have the length of tunnel and attendant issues. Having said that, being able to judge the needs of Intermodal in the 70s and before is unreasonable, but the fact remains that Cascade tunnel in the year 2010 represents a capacity problem.

  I was not personally advocating for any of the routes east of the cascades as I'm less familiar with them.