The bridge

[CliqueofOne]

CBC News: Disclosure
Off the Rails: Incident at Mile 7.9 The Bridge
Broadcast: March 2, 2004

Railroad trestles... They are graceful timber bridges that span gorges and rivers. Without them, Canada would never have realized its national dream of building a rail line from coast to coast.


A CN train crossing a timber bridge.

Today, lumber may drive the economy of McBride, British Columbia [link], but it’s the railroad that drives the lumber.

From the moment you arrive in McBride and take a look around, it’s clear the railway is the tie that binds the town. From the street signs to the cinder sidewalks, everything seems to reflect a rich railroad history [link] [archival photos].

The bridge outside McBride at mile 7.9 is similar to the many timber bridges in this part of the country. They may look like throwbacks, but Canadian National (CN) [link] still has 650 of them in operation.

In fact, until 1968 when the highway was built, the wooden bridge at mile 7.9 was the only way in and out of McBride.

McBride is the kind of place that doesn’t need a town clock - the trains keep time in this town. On May 14, 2003, one of those trains would be late – and a tragic accident meant it would never arrive.

next: The Accident

Off the Rails: Incident at Mile 7.9 The Accident

Art McKay worked the rails in British Columbia for 32 years. On the morning of May 14th, 2003, he woke early and kissed his wife, Jane, goodbye. There was a storm brewing as he headed for the yards.


Art McKay
“He said goodbye that morning when he left,” recalls Jane. “He called me at about 7:15 that morning just to tell me not to catch a bus, to take a taxi because it was raining.”

After that call, the 51-year old engineer left the Prince George station on board Canadian National (CN) train #356, heading east for McBride and Jasper.

Coming the other way was engineer Gary Holmes at the control of Via Rail train #5. Holmes, 47, had driven the route from Jasper to Prince George hundreds of times before – but this trip promised to be different. May 14th marked the inaugural run of the Skeena - Via’s new domed passenger car [link]. There were 40 passengers on board as the train wound its way west through the Rockies.

The two trains were scheduled to pass each other at a siding just east of the town of McBride. The smaller Via train was to make way for McKay’s 86-car freight.


McBride train station.

Anticipation of the Skeena’s arrival that afternoon had created a buzz in McBride. It was the hot topic over at The Beanery coffee shop inside the old train station. McBride is the kind of place that doesn’t need a town clock - the trains keep time in this town.

At 12:02 that afternoon, as Art McKay’s freight neared the timber bridge near McBride at mile 7.9, McKay slowed his train to 40 km/h. A device on the rails indicated the train was in good working order. McKay was given clearance to proceed.

Around that time, the Via train was passing Moose Lake in northern B.C. It was travelling at 80 km/h, barrelling towards McBride.

While the sky had threatened all day, around noon it broke. People in McBride say they heard a sudden rumbling in the distance… maybe thunder, maybe something much worse.


John Molodowich
John Molodowich set his watch by the trains. He ran McBride’s bunkhouse for the rail crews. On May 14th, he noted that Art McKay’s train was unusually late:

“It was uncommon, but every once in a while something happened, like a broken knuckle or sticking brake pad or some such thing but then they could radio. At this time, they weren’t able to radio and that was unusual. That had never occurred before.”

At 12:19, Fraser Murray, a paramedic in McBride, was alerted to trouble on the CN tracks. “There was a sense of urgency on the radio,” he recalls. “There was definitely something up – like, the hairs were standing up on the back of your head. You knew you were going into something.”

Fraser Murray could see black smoke near the timber bridge. The biggest question on his mind was if it was a train on fire, which one was it…


Ken LeQuesne

“There was confusion whether it was going to be the Via train with possibly 45 passengers or a CN train with a crew of two,” says Murray.

He arrived at the bridge at mile 7.9 and was confronted by a scene of utter devastation: “We were confronted by a wall of fire. The entire trestle was taken out and four cars were sitting on top of those two locomotives... It was clear that we couldn't do anything at that time for the two gentlemen. The front locomotive had been fully consumed by fire.”

51-year-old Ken LeQuesne was the conductor on the train. He would have been getting off for a crew change in McBride. Instead, he died beside his friend, Art McKay [article].

As for Gary Holmes, he and the passengers on the Via train were safe. Holmes listened to the tragedy unfold on his two-way radio:

“I just remember hearing ‘no survivors’ on there. The train, the bridge had collapsed and ‘no survivors’. It was just that blunt and sobering.”


Jane, Art McKay's wife.
The fact that the bridge had collapsed made no sense to Holmes. “You don’t count on that or go around thinking that,” he says. “It’s something you have faith in and you have to go out there everyday believing that things are a stand-up and the track’s gonna be good in front of you.”

That faith in the integrity of the railroad was shared by McKay’s widow, Jane:

“I worried about him going by cab when they were on the highway,” she says. “There have been a few accidents that way and we’ve had friends who have been hurt. And that’s what really scared me. I figured once they were on the rails, they were pretty safe.”

next: The Investigation

Off the Rails: Incident at Mile 7.9 The Investigation

The incident at mile 7.9 was a shock to the people in McBride, where the rail faithful felt the tragedy had to be an act of God – lightening, or a freak fire.

Timber bridges must be constantly inspected, beams and braces constantly replaced.

But there are other possible theories. Timber bridges are made of wood – and wood rots. That’s why the bridges must be regularly inspected, beams and braces constantly replaced.

But when the federal Transportation Safety Board (TSB) [link] began investigating the accident, it discovered problems with Canadian National's (CN) repair work.

Disclosure obtained a copy of the TSB’s findings. They note that back in 1999, CN's inspector found there was wood rotting on the bridge at McBride, but that not all of the wood had been replaced [article]. According to CN’s own records, they felt that work could be put off.
CN asked its employees not to speak to us, but Via engineer Rick Madden did. He’s an old friend of Art McKay. He wonders if fewer CN employees can keep up with all the repairs on all of those bridges:

“There’s a lot of speculation amongst the peers and my fellow workers that the bridge was rotten… I think there’s more people out there than myself with that opinion. It’s just that I’ve chosen to come down and talk to you.”


CN's Jim Feeny says the accident “did not occur as a result of a structural failure on that bridge.”
CN maintains that the bridge was safe. “We believe it was safe,” says CN’s Jim Feeny. “Our position is that this tragic accident, the accident that occurred on May 14th 2003, did not occur as a result of a structural failure on that bridge.”

Feeny concedes parts of the bridge were rotting, but he says they weren’t critical components: “We’ve reviewed the records that exist. We’ve talked to the people that were up there doing the work. And that’s the basis on which we make those statements.”

As for why the bridge collapsed, Feeny can’t say: “That is the essential question and that’s what under investigation right now. We don’t know the answer to that.”

After seeing the problems with the inspection and maintenance of the bridge in McBride, the TSB became concerned about the safety of all of CN’s 650 timber bridges. Last December, the TSB did something it rarely does: the board issued safety recommendations before its investigation was over [link]. The last time the TSB did that was after the crash of Swissair Flight 111, when 229 people died off the coast of Halifax [Disclosure: Wired and Dangerous].

The TSB recommended CN inspect all of its timber bridges to ensure they were safe – and it considered this a matter of urgency. CN told the TSB that wasn’t necessary. Their bridges are safe.

DISCLOSURE: What if they’re right?
FEENY (CN): We believe that we’re right.
DISCLOSURE: And you’re so confident of this that you haven’t followed their recommendation to verify the state of your other timber bridges?
FEENY: We are sure that those bridges are in good shape. We have very rigorously defined inspection procedures. There are some problems in some of the reporting that we’re doing. We’re tightening that up right now…
DISCLOSURE: But you don't think in the confusion, in this reporting process, that that could have been a contributing factor to what happened in McBride last year?
FEENY: No, because you have to come back to what work was actually done, what inspections were done… and we’re pretty confident of that.
DISCLOSURE: Pretty confident?
FEENY: We’re confidant that work was done. That’s our belief.


The TSB continues to investigate, though there isn’t much left to go on.

CN says Art McKay’s freight train may have derailed first, sparking a fire that brought down the bridge. The TSB continues to investigate, though there isn’t much left to go on.

For Gary Holmes it’s just a memory – and a bad one. He can’t forget the first time he passed by the crash site and saw a family holding a vigil by the side of line:

“You’re back there going at it and their life is on hold. And as much as we’re all devastated, it just seemed that we’re going back to work and business as usual. And you know, it was just a lousy feeling.”

Jane, Art McKay’s wife, says she’s never asked for answers to find out what went wrong on May 14, 2003, though she has asked for a final copy of the report when it comes (it is expected to be released in May, 2004):

“I don’t know… I’m worried for all the other workers, but it’s not important to me anymore. My loss has happened; nothing’s going to change that.”


“My loss has happened,” says Art McKay's wife, Jane. “Nothing’s going to change that.”
The TSB’s report may not change much in McBride, either. They remember when CN employed about 100 workers here, many of them inspecting and maintaining the timber bridge at mile 7.9. After years of cutbacks, however, there are only four CN workers left in town.

Still, it is still a company town – even if the company has all but left: “CN isn’t necessarily an evil empire because they’ve cut back,” says Glen Frear. “Some things are still running fine.”

In fact, just 48 hours after Art McKay’s train crashed, CN reopened the line and was back to business as usual. Today, you’d never know the bridge at mile 7.9 once stood there, except for a few pieces of twisted rail and a black cross in that was put up in tribute to the two men who died in the accident.

next: Links and Documents


CBC does not endorse and is not responsible for the content of external sites. Links will open in a new window.

You'll need Adobe Reader to view some of the documents listed below (they're in Adobe PDF file format). If you don't have it installed on your computer, you can download it at www.adobe.com.

News:
•

Fires blazed at the accident scene for 22 hours [article].
Rail investigation needed, says safety group - article from CBC News British Columbia, February 26, 2004.
• Union set to use Westray Act: CN negligence alleged over killer McBride bridge collapse - press release from the United Transportation Union, February 26, 2004.
• CN - TSB Report and Access to PM - MP Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg-Transcona, NDP) raised the issue of the report in the House of Commons February 26, 2004. A transcript of the exchange is available on the United Transportation Union in Canada website.
• 'No track record' of bridge repairs, says TSB - article from CBC News British Columbia, February 25, 2004.
• Rail safety group raises concerns about railway ops in Canada – article from Canadian Transportation and Logistics, January 23, 2004.
• Railways hit over safety: Maintenance neglected, watchdog claims – article from the Toronto Sun, January 23, 2004.
• New questions about rail bridge safety - article from CBC News British Columbia, May 20, 2004.
• Safety questions raised after fatal train wreck – article from CBC News British Columbia, May 16, 2003.
• Two bodies found inside derailed B.C. train - article from CBC News Online, May 16, 2003.
• Train derailment kills two – article from CBC News British Columbia, May 15, 2003.
•

Inspectors survey the accident scene [article].
Bodies found in derailed train – article from the Globe and Mail, May 16, 2003.
• Fire out at B.C. trail derailment site, remains of two people are found – article from Canoe.com, May 15, 2003.
• Canadian group urges inquiry into rail safety – article originally appeared in the Toronto Star, January 23, 2004. Here it is reproduced on the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen website.

Transportation Safety Board:
• TSB Letter [PDF] - Transportation Safety Board officials say CN Rail identified defective parts of the bridge near McBride years before the trestle collapsed – but didn't complete the repairs. The TSB details its concerns in this letter to the company and to the Minister of Transport – a document obtained by Disclosure.
•

Today, you’d never know the bridge at mile 7.9 once stood there.
Investigation Report: Press Release – Canada’s Transportation Safety Board recommends verification of CN Rail timber bridges in investigation of derailment of CN freight train in McBride, British Columbia, December 22, 2003.

Canadian National:
• Canadian National (CN) – official site.
Transport Canada:
• Transport Canada - official site.
• Transport Minister Announces Coming into Force of Railway Safety Management System Regulations - press release from Transport Canada, March 30, 2001. Includes a backgrounder on Transport Canada's Railway Safety Management System Regulations.
• Railway Safety Act - from Transport Canada.
• Railway Safety Management System Regulations - from Transport Canada.[B)]

[CliqueofOne]

CHARGES LAID IN MCBRIDE, B.C. DERAILMENT

OTTAWA - The Attorney General of Canada has laid charges against the Canadian National Railway Company (CN) under the Railway Safety Act and the Canada Labour Code, Part II. The charges follow an extensive investigation conducted by Transport Canada into a derailment that resulted in the death of two CN employees on May 14, 2003 near McBride, British Columbia.

The Attorney General of Canada has laid one charge against CN under the Railway Safety Act alleging the company failed to ensure the engineering work relating to a line work, including design, construction, evaluation or alteration, was done in accordance with sound engineering principles.

The Attorney General has also laid two charges against CN under the Canada Labour Code, Part II, alleging that the company:

- failed to ensure that the safety and health at work of every person employed by it was protected by failing to ensure that the bridge structure at Mile 7.9 would support the loading of the train operating over it; and

- failed to ensure that the safety and health at work of every person employed by it was protected by failing to ensure that the bridge structure at Mile 7.9 would support the loading of the train operating over it, the direct result of which was the death of two employees.

The Transportation Safety Board (TSB) is currently investigating the accident to determine the cause. Transport Canada is closely following the TSB's ongoing investigation through a Minister's Observer who was appointed after the accident. The Minister's Observer will advise the department of any significant regulatory factors, identify deficiencies that require immediate corrective actions and assist in coordinating the required support for an investigation.

As the railway regulator, Transport Canada is responsible under the Railway Safety Act for promoting, monitoring and enforcing compliance with existing rules and regulations. The department has a regular inspection program in place as well as a mechanism to audit railway infrastructure, equipment and methods of operation to ensure that rail companies comply with the Railway Safety Act.

Transport Canada also oversees employment and workplace safety in the federal transportation sector, on behalf the Labour Program of Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, under the Canada Labour Code, Part II. Transport Canada therefore is responsible for ensuring that transportation-related accidents or hazardous incidents are fully investigated by the employer and that appropriate remedial measures are taken.

Canada has one of the safest and largest rail networks in the world with 48,000 kilometres of track and over 40,000 railway crossings. Transport Canada takes very seriously any incident or accident that affects the transportation system.

Transport Canada is online at www.tc.gc.ca.

Contact:
Cathy Cossaboom
Transport Canada
Communications, Ottawa
[phone]

[B)][8]

[CliqueofOne]

CNR charged in two-death bridge crash a year ago near McBride, B.C.
Canada - Canadian Press
Tue May 11, 9:04 PM ET

OTTAWA (CP) - Canadian National Railway Co. faces federal charges a year after two employees died when a wooden trestle collapsed and the front of a freight train plunged into a ravine near McBride, B.C.

The crash in a remote area of the Cariboo region near the Alberta border last May 14 killed the engineer and conductor, the only people on the 86-car eastbound train. Transport Canada said Tuesday that charges have been laid under the Railway Safety Act and the Canada Labour Code.


The Railway Safety Act charge alleges that Canada's largest railway company did not ensure that work on the line was done in accordance with sound engineering principles.


The Labour Code counts state that CN failed to ensure worker health and safety "by failing to ensure that the bridge structure at Mile 7.9 would support the loading of the train operating over it, the direct result of which was the death of two employees."


The first six cars of the train fell into the ravine with the trestle, which CN (TSX:CNR - news) said had been inspected two days previously.


Via Rail uses the same line for its Skeena service between the resort town of Jasper, Alta., and the port of Prince Rupert, B.C.


The crash started a fire which raged for a day before workers recovered the remains of conductor Ken LeQuesne and engineer Art McKay, both 51 years old and from Prince George, B.C., and each with 30 years of railway experience.

[Anonymous]

I just saw that in the news, this problem certainly doesn't seem to be going away anytime soon.

[CliqueofOne]

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada Cites Shortcomings Inspection and Maintenance Programs as Factor Contributing to the Derailment of a Canadian National Freight Train Near McBride, British Columbia

http://tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/rail/2003/r03v0083/r03v0083.asp


GATINEAU, March 2 /CNW Telbec/ - The Transportation Safety Board of
Canada (TSB) issued its final report (R03V0083) today into the May 14, 2003
derailment of a Canadian National (CN) freight train, near McBride, British
Columbia, that resulted in the death of two CN crew members. The TSB's
investigation determined that the derailment was most likely due to the
collapse of the trestle bridge under the weight of the lead locomotive. A post-
crash fire ensued and the bridge, the two locomotives, and the five cars and
their contents were further destroyed.
"The severity of the internal rot of several of the trestle bridge's
wooden components was identified in a detailed inspection report in 1999,"
said TSB Chairman, Charles Simpson. "Our investigation identified several
shortcomings in the inspection, planning and maintenance processes that
allowed the unsafe condition to exist."
As a result of heavy workload, overlaps of duties during job transitions,
and reliance on overall system assessments, the severity and urgency of the
condition that was identified in 1999 was not recognized, and the continuing
deterioration was therefore not reassessed.
In December 2003, seven months into the investigation, the TSB made
public two safety recommendations that focused on the inspection and
maintenance of timber bridges, and regulatory overview of railway maintenance
and record-keeping. Following the two recommendations made by the TSB, safety
action was taken by CN and by Transport Canada to improve safety.
"In this - and all other cases - our job is to find out what happened,
how it happened and how we can avoid a similar incident from happening again,"
added Mr. Simpson. "If these recommendations are acted upon in full, it is the
assessment of the Board that this type of tragic occurrence can be avoided in
the future."

The TSB is an independent agency that investigates marine, pipeline,
railway and aviation transportation occurrences. Its sole aim is the
advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to
assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.

A copy of report is available on the TSB web site at www.tsb.gc.ca .


Background
Rail Investigation Report R03V0083

Recommendations - Extract from Railway Investigation Report R03V0083,
Derailment of Canadian National (CN) freight train, near McBride, British
Columbia

In December 2003, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) issued
two safety recommendations in advance of the final report. The recommendations
focused on the issues of timber bridge maintenance, inspection and safety
regulation.

Action Taken - Inspection and Maintenance of Timber Bridges

A number of bridge components were identified as defective and were not
repaired by CN because of shortcomings in inspection and maintenance
practices. Deficiencies associated with the inspection and maintenance of
timber bridges were identified during the TSB investigation.
As a result, concerned that CN's inspection and maintenance practices
were not providing a primary line of defence for timber bridges on the CN
network, the Board recommended that:

Canadian National verify the condition of its timber bridges and ensure
their continued safety with effective inspection and maintenance
programs. R03-04

Action Taken - Transport Canada's Monitoring Program

The Board identified a safety deficiency in the lack of integration of
Transport Canada's inspection processes for this structure with its reviews of
railway inspection and maintenance records. Given the potential for similar
problems with other structures across the country, the Board recommended that:

Transport Canada incorporate in its compliance reviews a comparison of
railway working procedures and practices with railway inspection and
maintenance records. R03-05

Transport Canada is revising its program to integrate its infrastructure
monitoring into its Safety Management System approach to auditing.


Background
Transportation Safety Board of Canada

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) is an independent agency
that investigates marine, pipeline, railway and aviation transportation
occurrences. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is
not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal
liability.
The mission of the TSB is to conduct independent safety investigations
and communicate risks in the transportation system.
A transportation occurrence is any accident or incident associated with
the operation of a ship, pipeline, railway rolling stock, or aircraft. An
occurrence is also any hazard that the TSB believes could cause an accident or
incident if left unattended.

- The TSB consists of up to five Board members, including a chairperson,
and has approximately 230 employees.
- Although TSB's headquarters are located in Gatineau, Quebec, most
investigation staff are located in various regional and field offices
across Canada, in order to respond quickly to transportation
occurrences anywhere in the country.
- Approximately 4000 transportation occurrences (accidents and incidents)
are reported to the TSB each year in Canada.
- The TSB investigates between two and three per cent of annual reported
occurrences by considering whether an investigation is likely to lead
to reduced risk to persons, property or the environment.
- The number of investigators sent to an occurrence site ranges from 1 to
more than 30, and investigations can last from one day to several
years.
- Investigations consist of three main phases: the field phase, post-
field phase and report production phase.
- During an investigation, the TSB works with all levels of government,
including international governments and regulatory bodies,
transportation companies, equipment manufacturers, survivors,
witnesses, and operators.
- The TSB keeps survivors and families informed at various stages of the
investigation and may request to interview them to assist in the
investigation.
- The TSB makes available factual information about the circumstances of
the occurrence throughout the investigation. Safety information is
shared immediately with those who can make changes to improve safety
and may take the form of recommendations, safety advisories, or safety
information letters.
- Draft investigation reports are reviewed by the Board and sent to
designated reviewers, who are people whose performance, behaviour or
products may be commented on in the report, as well as those who may
contribute to the completeness and accuracy of the report. After input
from designated reviewers is considered and any necessary amendments to
the report are made, the Board approves the final report and it is
prepared for release to the public.
- The TSB is guided by various industry standards, as well as internal
TSB policies, to ensure that investigations are conducted in a
systematic, thorough, independent and unbiased manner.

[CSSHEGEWISCH]

Does CliqueofOne contribute any original thoughts to any of his threads or is he just more adept at cut-and-paste (plagiarism?) than the rest of us?

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by CSSHEGEWISCH

Does CliqueofOne contribute any original thoughts to any of his threads or is he just more adept at cut-and-paste (plagiarism?) than the rest of us?

I'm not too sure he is actually plagairizing: he does quote his sources and/or provides links.

As to original thoughts, what more is needed to be said. The case against CN's operating practices seems fairly self-evident.

[spbed]

Extremely tragic story. Hopefully the CN is redoubling their inspections of wooden bridges.

[CliqueofOne]

CN PLEADS GUILTY TO CHARGE IN MCBRIDE DERAILMENT


http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/advisories/2005/05-ma025e.htm

[coborn35]

Just amazing. Sad amazing mind you though. He was nearing retirement too......

[jchnhtfd]

This also relates to the thread regarding CN derailments...

There are two quite separate problems here. The first is that there were some lapses in inspection and maintenance on CN, particularly in the west. One of these was partly responsible for the bridge collapse being discussed in this thread. CN has examined its practices and determined that there were indeed problems, and admitted it, and is working to change its practices. This should be sufficient; given the politics, unfortunately it probably won't be.

The second regards the problems on the former BC system. It is well to remember that the decision to sell the BC system to someone (CN wound up as the lucky (?) bidder) was a highly political decision. It was also, in some circles in British Columbia, a highly unpopular decision, as the BC system had been operated as a government operation rather than as a commercial enterprise, and it appeared to some as though there might be some changes made -- which are being made. CN got some surprises, though, when it took over the operation, one of which is directly relevant here: the state of the BC infrastructure was not as good as it had been thought to be, and certainly not up to the standards of the rest of CN, nor of CP. A considerable amount of work still needs to be done before the infrastructure can support the type of heavy operation normal on the rest of the systems. One could say that CN has been overly optimistic in determining the level of service which can be supported by this infrastructure, and it appears that they intend to change their operating practices as required. They also hope to upgrade the infrastructure to normal heavy duty main line standards, but this takes time and a good bit of capital. Unfortunately, even handed debate on the subject is almost impossible, given the highly charged political atmosphere regarding the sale of the BC system.

Hope this helps at least a little...

[CrazyDiamond]

Man what a sad story above......just aweful....I remember the Westray events down here.....how sometimes profits do seem more important than people's lives.

QUOTE: Originally posted by jchnhtfd

CN got some surprises, though, when it took over the operation, one of which is directly relevant here: the state of the BC infrastructure was not as good as it had been thought to be, and certainly not up to the standards of the rest of CN, nor of CP.

Sounds like a classic case of 'buyer beware'. It is up to the buyer to do its due diligence. The more the buyer 'looks into' it, the more they know 'about it'. Inspecting all that infrastructure in great detail would be pretty costly....so there comes in the 2nd business factor....cost/risk.

It will be very interesting to see what comes out of all of this....and with a federal election campaign coming up....who knows....someone might try to turn this into a 'camera show'.

[jchnhtfd]

QUOTE: Originally posted by CrazyDiamond


It will be very interesting to see what comes out of all of this....and with a federal election campaign coming up....who knows....someone might try to turn this into a 'camera show'.

Too right, good buddy...[:(]

[CrazyDiamond]

Trouble-plagued CN Rail gets fined $75,000

Maurice Bridge, Vancouver Sun, with file from Prince George Citizen
Published: Thursday, December 08, 2005

CN Rail has been ordered to pay a $75,000 fine in connection with a train wreck in east-central B.C. that killed two employees in 2003.

It was the third B.C. setback this week for the national rail carrier, which had two trains derail in less than 24 hours, one near near Squamish and the other between Burnaby and Richmond.

CN pleaded guilty in provincial court in Prince George Wednesday to a single count under the Railway Safety Act for failing to ensure proper documentation and procedures in respect of railway work inspection and maintenance.

Engineer Art McKay and conductor Ken LeQuesne died May 14 when an eastbound train of two locomotives and five cars loaded with lumber derailed on a wooden trestle near McBride, plunged into a ravine and burned. The bridge was destroyed in the fire.

Read full story at:
http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/story.html?id=8487cefb-4053-4d83-8ef7-3376bebad57b&k=50152

[samfp1943]

Is there a pattern to the problems of CN cutting back on their maintainence? Not only have they had problems in Canada, but the CN/IC wrecks down in Mississippi were, I think also laid at the feet of lack of good MOW proceedures.
Read the January Trains and see what the CP employees have to indicate about what they think of their competitor and how it does things.

[jchnhtfd]

QUOTE: Originally posted by samfp1943

Is there a pattern to the problems of CN cutting back on their maintainence? Not only have they had problems in Canada, but the CN/IC wrecks down in Mississippi were, I think also laid at the feet of lack of good MOW proceedures.
Read the January Trains and see what the CP employees have to indicate about what they think of their competitor and how it does things.

Um... well... one might say there is a pattern: but what's the pattern? As I see it, the pattern is that CN purchases a railroad and tries to operate it in the manner in which it (and, I might add, the other five Class I's) operate, only to discover that what it's got can't stand up to that level of service and use. CN has recognized this, though, and is substantially upgrading its MOW activities on these lines.

One might point out that the problems have NOT been happening on CN, GT, or GTW track, nor on the lines which CN formerly owned but spun off (e.g. Central Vermont). Does that suggest a pattern, too?

[coborn35]

Wel, for now the CN is largely letting the DMIR operate themselves and no derailments have happened here recently.

[jchnhtfd]

QUOTE: Originally posted by coborn35

Wel, for now the CN is largely letting the DMIR operate themselves and no derailments have happened here recently.

Quite true. And one might note that DMIR was in first class shape to begin with. Unlike some of the other properties...