MNRR announced early last week that full, normal, service would return Port Jervis to Suffern to Hoboken on Monday, Nov. 28. This is at least a full month ahead of what they thought they'd be able to do. The MNRR website has a long list of kudo's for those individuals, contractors, and towns who pitched in and helped make things happen and happen easier than first anticipated....including reclaiming rock from the Ramapoo River instead of buy new (save about a half million bucks!) Not all is perfect nor complete but enough so that there will still be a few slow orders and line will be temporarily single track from Suffern to Sloatsburg where normal single track operation begins. Schedules seem to be stretched by about 5 minutes for most trains but there will be other day by day service changes and interruptions...one mid day westbound holding east of Campbell Hall for 20 minutes waiting an eastbound. Work on Moodnal Viaduct has been able to continue virtually unhampered.with no or little traffic and Woodbury Viaduct is next to be worked on (both projects independent of flood damage work). What I am not sure about is the signal system....there is on the drawing boards at least, a plan for new signal system to be installed, cab signals, shorter blocks, no wayside lights except at interlocking CP's. I don't know if this was installed on the newly reworked track and signals from Suffern to Harriman or if the old system was patched back in. But it is an amazing bit of reconstruction and reopening of the railroad with such huge amount of damage that was done!.
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Reports this morning are that both MNRR/NJT have been making equipment moves and NS is running local freights from Suffern to Harriman and west. All looks like a go for 11/28/11 return to full commuter services.
It's good to see service back on the Erie Mainline to Port Jervis, but the time is not "shorter" for this project, but sadly very long. Three months to fix washouts is not a very "good show".
In contrast with the New England Central RR rebuilding over 50 washouts in 50 miles in Vermont and the Vermont Rail System/Green Mountain RR rebuilding virtually the entire 49 mile Rutland-Bellows Falls route both in less than 25 days after Hurricane Irene, Metro North's dawdling is disgraceful. In both states the damage was dreadful, but MNRR took an exceptionally long time to get things going again. Trains readers know from Kevin Burkhardt's superb photograpy and reporting in the "Newswire" section how overwhelming the Vermont damage was.
In 1972, after Hurricane Agnes, a similar if not more devastating storm, the Erie Lackawanna (nearly bankrupt before the storm and in reorganization very shortly after) rebuilt the Ramapo River stretch and much more on the Port Jervis route in days. Even the nearly obliterated former Lackawanna RR Pocono mainline and the devastated EL mainlines in western New York came back within a month.
By contrast MNRR brought in the consultants and absurdly failed to get the qualified railway rebuilders like R. J. Corman quickly onto the property. Now they are thrilled to discover the ballast wasn't all washed away. Did anyone walk the grade after the storm waters receded? If so this should have been immediately obvious. In every respect it's good this project came in under budget, but quick it most clearly was not.
Nothing can be proven, (was MNRR hoping to find an excuse to exit the west of Hudson service completely), but the contrast with the "can-do" approach shown by the shortlines in Vermont with what is, at least for passenger trains, still a significant main line in New York does not speak well at all for Metro North.
Carl Fowler
President
Rail Travel Adventures
First, Railvt, MNRR is part of a complex buracracy invloving state, county, and municipal layers of "supervision"; in reality they cut through a lot of the red tape and BS and got down to doing it as quickly as could be done. So much destruction of so much property and of so many things, they were lucky to find somebody who wasn't already involved in other projects and could show up and do the work.. And the totality of the destruction cannot be compared to VT Ry; it was much more complex. A signal system had to be rewired along with other circuits. Access to the property is not as easy as it looks...although it runs parallel to both RT17 and the Thruway, there is a lot of private land that had to be negotiated to be traversed or otherwise enchroached upon. Where there was no roadbed there also was no right of way, the Ramapoo claimed so much. Time was indeed bought when it was found that much of the rock which was washed away could be reclaimed; this also saved dollars in purchasing and transporting new rock and fill material to the sites. MNRR already had a new signal system...cab signals, no wayside automatics, shortened blocks, etc....on the drawing boards but I don't know if they built that into the new relay but probably not because new hardware, et al, had not been specked and bid. I saw some of the bad stuff in VT, NH and other parts of NY and none of it could compare with the enormity of this job. No, it's not done...there is still settling to be done and stretches west of Harriman to be fully tended to. As an aside, work on Moodna Viaduct, as a different and ongoing project, was able to continue at a somewhat accelerated pace because of the lack of traffic; work on Woodbury Viaduct is hoped to begin sooner than planned. All in all, this has been a great undertaking by MNRR and its contractors, and cannot be dismissed in any way.
We must agree to disagree on this. Comparing catastrophes is always risky. But I'll give it a brief go.
The Vermont damage ranged from completely erased rights of way in multiple spots over distances in excess of 50 miles to undermined bridge piers, to literally twisted bridges, to countless washouts, lost culverts and vanished ties. With the exception of the White River Bridge at White River Jct all were fixed within 25 days.
The NECR literally had to cut entirely new roads in from the highway several hundred yards long to even reach the railway's alignment in three spots. The VRS System, besides rebuilding the bulk of the 49 mile Bellows Falls line in under a month, had to fix multiple washouts along its Rutland-Whitehall, Rutland-Burlington and Rutland-Hoosic Jct lines. The Whitehall section was reopened in less than a week. The Rutland-Burlington mainline returned in 3 days despite areas where the roadbed had been under 5 feet of water.
MNRR faced very similar conditions. If NECR and VRS could contract with not only R.J. Corman but also a host of local contractors within 48 hours to get work going so too could MNRR. It did not. Vermont was lucky on the NECR that crews were on-hand doing High(er) Speed Rail work on the NECR, but remarkably south of White River Jct that work continued even during the flood reconstruction.
Vermont's railroads, like MNRR, faced the hurtles of limited funds, overwhelming competition for resources given parallel and massive highway damage and the same "hassles" of bureaucracy and regulation, but the job got done. Much of the VRS system's trackage is state owned, but the private VRS operating company managed the work with the full cooperation of the Vermont Agency of Transportation. The NECR is entirely private, a part of the Rail America system, but it too profited from quick action and cooperatrion from both the state and Amtrak.
Would the situation on the Erie Mainline have gone better if the line was still managed by NS rather than under long-term lease to the commuter authorities? We can never know, but the public agency's response was certainly sluggish. The 1972 record suggests a properly managed freight railroad (with then unwanted, but well-run commuter passenger service) would have responded far faster.
MNRR failed in multiple ways. The discovery of the ability to lift ballast from the Ramapo River apparently took six weeks after the flood to make, based on MNRR's own public pronouncements.. This was absurd. I grew up along the Erie Mailine and am very famiilar with both its alignment and its configuration. The route is closely paralled by both Route 17 (damaged, but quickly restored) and on higher ground by the New York State Thruway. It might have been necessary to bushwack a bit (alot in spots), but it should have come as little surprise that ballast was still around.
The signal system is (was) old, but ironically the fact that it be functional was/is not essential to service restoration. As you note its renewal was already planned. The destroyed section of signaled track could/can certainly have been operated as Class 3 "Dark" trackage. The Ramapo stretch as "dark territory" is under ten miles long and good for 59mph passenger operation as unsignaled trackage. The added running time at most amounts to 2-3 minutes.
Fundamentally MNRR at best proved unable to get bodies on the ground and a plan in motion for several weeks after the storm, at least along the Harriman-Suffren segment. NS wasn't particularly concerned for their freight operations, as they could send what little freight remained over the NYS&W over Sparta Mountain--steeper, but passable, or south through PA on former DL&W/CPR and/or LV routes, or most obviously via CSX and the River Division (West Shore) lines. From their perspective the leased track east/south of Port Jervis was happily MNRR's problem.
MNRR got a bus bridge going--I'll give them that, but they could and should have had service restored in much less time and didn't for at best bureaucratic reasons and at worse policy considerations that could have related to the basic issue of route survival.
Obviously we will not agree on this, but the "damage matrix" (or similar bureaucratic formulations) does not give MNRR any kind of a pass in this matter.
I say any of this with no pleasure. To put it mildly I am not a opponent of government passenger rail service. I've spent the last 30 years working full time to sell travel on Amtrak, VIA Rail, overseas rail, tourist rail and frequently on commuter rail services. Rail Travel Center (the eariler name of Rail Travel Adventures) ran multi-day tours that used the MNRR Port Jervis line on multiple occasions. I served for 18 years on the NARP Board. I express these regrets about MNRR's performance because this kind of lethargy, this kind of reliance on consultants rather than traditional railway practice, these wildly varying cost estimates, are exactly the sorts of things that feed the critics of public transportation.
The best part of the outcome of the Ramapo River flood is that the line appears to have been fixed under the originally ("guesstimated") budget. But that pleasant surprise may be less than it appears if MNRR could/should have known much sooner that the damage was in some areas less intense than they believed.
President, Rail Travel Adventures
Several factors. First, I failed to mention the difference between a 40MPH freight railroad compared to a 70mph passenger line. It was not that the damage was less intense but that they found they were able to retrieve more as time went on. It was iindicated that accessing the property was problematical, too, as private land had to be crossed from highways to the right of way. A quick response by Sloatsburg led to an advantage that was not originally counted on to help get equipment and materials onto the right of way. Also MNRR was faced with major problems, more quickly fixed, west of Harriman on thte S.T. LIne, and also on the Hudson and Harlem lines on the other side of the river where higher traffic volume (hourly and half hourly services and Amtrak), put a different rebulding schedule in effect. Other NJT lines were also hit bad, and I think they did the assessing of the problems at the beginning. Plus the highways and roads in the vast area from the Catskills south into Central Jersey and east well toward's the Connecticuit Valley, put a big demand on available manpower and contractors. In some places, the lack of power coupled with no passage ways, put the perspective that there was no rush during the first couple of days. I personally believe this was a mind crushing, mind bending catastrophe which had as much to do with recovery efforts as the physical damages itself; it took many days for people to get their bearings. It actually was overwhelming across the entire region. To say it was mishandled or should have been done quicker, is a difficult charge to make in view of what I saw and from those I spoke with who live there and those who I know involved.
We can certainly agree that it's a very good thing that MNRR service is back on the Erie Mainline. Let us both hope that the needed restoration of the second track (where it still was in place, as the line had basically been singled with fairly long passing sections), and of the signals is pushed forward at least as fast as the reopening of the main track and that the repairs to the Moodna Viaduct do not reveal any otherwise unknown really serious flaws.
Moodna Viaduct and Woodbury Viaduct were and are seperate projects which have been underway for about a year and were both basically unaffected by the water. There was a benefit, however, in that crews working on Moodna did not have to work under traffic for several weeks and then reduced traffic at that leaving wide open windows to get work done. Engineers have been quite positive about the good state of Moodna so far. I hope one of the things that was done in the rebuilt area is the new signal system, at least some of the basics laid down. Right now there are mile and a half to three mile long blocks which can slow traffic down tremendously, especially when it comes to making meets whereby trains can go as far as five miles at restricted speeds. The new signal system will bring blocks down to less than a mile and will be cab signal territory and should make for more effective meets, thus speedier schedules in some cases. And it is also important to note that double track from Sloatsburg to Suffern is not in service yet; the railroad is single track between Harriman Station and Suffern while that restoration continues.
My observation is that people are comparing two completely different situations. On the one hand are these wonderful systems that can quickly allocate funds and have access to ample manpower available to jump at a moment's notice. On the other hand is an enormous commuter system that is extensively damaged throughout its entire physical plant which is trying to balance its extremely limited manpower needs based on the needs of the commuting public. The Metro-North Port Jervis Line serves frighteningly few people relative to the efforts required, therefore its repair schedule reflects the relative need for repairing this line compared to the other lines that serve tens of thousands more people and were more widely damaged, though not as badly damaged, as this one was.
I feel that this comparison is not only unfair, it's illogical.
The MTA has a very large photographic essay with videos on its web site and Flickr.
This would be credible if MNRR had had to work weeks to fix its other lines, but they were back almost overnight. By contrast real work on the former Erie Mainline did not even begin immediately. On the most damaged stretch it waited nearly a month to get meaningfully underway.
Vermont is a very small state. Neither the New England Central nor the Vermont Rail System maintains anything like a traditional Maintenance of Way (MOW) department. They can fix minor troubles, but anything larger requires bringing in outside help, which is exactly as it is on most short-lines. They were lucky to have workers on-hand on the NECR doing Amtrak High(er) Speed Rail work, but this was far from the full force needed. Instead both companies hired both the rail specialists like R.J. Corman and local contractors and borrowed equipment from Amtrak as well within 48 hours. Accordingly they fixed over 100+ miles of staggering damage in basically three weeks.
Sadly the situations between MNRR and the little New England carriers are all too similar. MNRR has a much larger MOW force, but for the big stuff also calls in the outside specialists. This is the way the industry is now days, but MNRR couldn't get this going in a timely fashion even in terms of properly evaluating their damage. They were bureaucratic when they desperately needed to be pro-active.
The difference matters because the credibility of a large authority like MNRR is always a far too easy target for the critics of rail. It has nothing to do with one state theoretically being better. MNRR dawdled and in the long-term this could hurt.
Ironically however, so far MNRR seems to have the upper hand in the media spin. By finishing a month ahead of their absurdly pessimistic previous estimate of December 30 they've benefited from positive media coverage pronouncing a late project (from when it could/sgould have been done) as being done early. Good for them in playing the typically uninformed mass media in such a clever way.
Complaints about Metro North and the MTA being too bureaucratic in the letting of contracts usually fail to consider that the MTA is a governmental body and has to tread carefully when contracts of this size are let. Gripes about corruption, favoritism, government waste, etc. will occur if contracts are awarded quickly or bypass the usual bidding process.
CSSHEGEWISCH Complaints about Metro North and the MTA being too bureaucratic in the letting of contracts usually fail to consider that the MTA is a governmental body and has to tread carefully when contracts of this size are let. Gripes about corruption, favoritism, government waste, etc. will occur if contracts are awarded quickly or bypass the usual bidding process.
It's not like anyone on MetroNorth is going to get any different reward for getting the work done faster. With the Vermont roads, there was money sliding off the table each day they were out of action. With MetroNorth....?
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
I stand by my conclusion. This line serves so little traffic that an accelerated repair schedule would not have been more advantageous than a temporary bus bridge with a slower repair schedule. The Moodna Viaduct, just a couple stops north of here, was under heavy repair which was accelerated thanks to the reduced scheduled traffic on this line.
I am also reminded of the fact that faster repairs are an order of magnitude more expensive than repairs made during regular business hours. I think MNRR made the right decision based on the, again, emphasis mine, *frightenly low* ridership of this line.
I love this line but, hey, it doesn't serve many people. Indeed, in Newburgh, they take the ferry to the Hudson line because the stupid Port Jervis line takes a sharp turn west and then south after Salisbury Mills, cutting off anything north of there for no apparent reason that I can immediately figure out since Vales Gate is a reasonable junction in my amateur view.
**EDIT** My apologies. I think there's a mountain in the way to get to Newgurgh.
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