A steam locomotive operating in excursion service near Eeklo, Belgium, suffered some type of Boiler failure releasing steam into the locomotive cab. One of the Enginemen suffered serious scalding, while the other suffered a Broken Leg and other unspecified injuries after falling from the Locomotive. Two others suffered less serious injuries. The locomotive was a former DRG Class 64 tank locomotive number 64 250. Wheel arrangement is 2-6-2T.
Just guessing, but from what I read in the "Trains" news article it sounds like a partial crown sheet failure, similar to what happened on the Gettysburg Railroad back in 1995. Something had to cause the burning coals from the firebox to shotgun back into the cab.
But like I said, just a guess.
I hope someone closer to the event like Sir Madog or Juniatha can weigh in on this.
Safety First!Thank You.
Around here we have a Major glass plant. Few years ago the company that owns it decided to get rid of the procedure of keeping it hot during the holidays aka just plug the bottom of the furnace and keep the glass tank full. Well they learned real fast what happens when you drain a glass tank and let it cool fast. They had fire bricks breaking and shatter from cooling to fast. Cost them more in repairs than the gas to keep the furnace hot for the time off.
Firelock76Just guessing, but from what I read in the "Trains" news article it sounds like a partial crown sheet failure, similar to what happened on the Gettysburg Railroad back in 1995. Something had to cause the burning coals from the firebox to shotgun back into the cab.
Partial crownsheet failures don't 'just' blow fire back into the cab - they blow boilers off running gear. If this were what had happened, the story would likely have been far different.
The blowback-into-the-cab accidents are almost always a tube/flue or superheater-element failure -- steam expands rapidly into the below-atmospheric combustion-gas spaces, can't escape quickly enough out of the front end, and so quickly expands back to the firebox spaces, blowing the combustion products, the 'live flame' evolving from combustion, etc., out through the grates and the firedoor. As noted, the 'safety' firedoors on some European power are expressly intended to preclude the expulsion of flame into the cab.
I think it has been established that the cause here was failure of a flue (large-diameter firetube holding a superheater element) at the front tubeplate.
Supposedly if fusible safety plugs let go 'enough' (when for example a crown is overheated due to low water) they can open up enough area to give mass flow that will 'throw fire' although they're obviously not designed to cause that to happen. One of the Australian "T1 lookalikes" had an accident years ago where the whole bung that holds the fusible let go suddenly, and a passenger getting a cab ride was killed. Note that this is not the same thing as the drop plug button letting go.
And yes, if a modern Super-Power size boiler had enough fusibles to provide 'safe' free area for reduction of pressure in an overheated-crown event -- it's far more than usually provided in a working boiler anyway -- dropping them would produce enough mass flow to cause fire ejection...
Well, like I said I was guessing.
The Gettysburg Railroad incident I mentioned was caused by an atypical crownsheet failure. Instead of a catastrophic failure the sheet "peeled" away from it's supports causing a gradual release of boiler pressure instead of the violent boiler-launching release associated with most crown sheet failures.
Certainly not nice for the cab crew, both were hospitalized with severe burns but at least they weren't vaporized.
The Gettysburg crown sheet failure was atypical and less catastrophic thanks to the particular boiler design that CPR used on their modern G5 Pacifics, built in the late 1940s. We know very little about the recent incident, but perhaps the Belgian engine used the same design.
Actually it was a German-built engine, former Reichsbahn of the World War Two era, but no matter. I'd like to know all the follow-ups on this but I'm afraid the news cycle will have moved on by the time the investigation's done and we'll never know just what happened, unless the folks at "Trains" can provide the follow-up.
And in the vein of NDG's earlier comment...
About a year or two ago I got a private message from former frequent poster Juniatha about a steam fest she'd gone to in Germany. From what she told me the crew of one steam engine were getting it all wrong, throttle settings, cut-off settings, you-name-it-settings. She pointed all these out to them but they wouldn't listen because, ahem, "she's a girl so what does she know?"
Yeah, a girl with a doctorate in mechanical engineering.
From the way she described the crew they sounded like a bunch of German yahoos. I didn't think they had yahoos in Germany but I suppose they can have them anywhere.
Steam engines and safety? Steve Lee said it best: "A steam locomotive is as safe as YOU make it!" Just like anything else mechanical, when you come down to it.
I'm expecting that some of the British magazines will be providing good information in the months ahead. You can be sure that the many steam operators and enthusiasts in that country will be watching closely, as well as the regulatory bodies.
From "Railway Herald issue 502"
"The investigation revealed that one of the superheater flues had deteriorated and while working, this imploded and detached itself from the front tubeplate causing the accident."
Presumably the steam filled the smokebox and found its way back to the cab through the tubes and remaining flues.
M636C
Firelock76 Juniatha .... She pointed all these out to them but they wouldn't listen because, ahem, "she's a girl so what does she know?" Yeah, a girl with a doctorate in mechanical engineering.
Juniatha .... She pointed all these out to them but they wouldn't listen because, ahem, "she's a girl so what does she know?"
Juniatha sent me a personal message accusing me of attacking her some time ago because she refused to believe that Cossart valves were vertical cam operated piston valves.
She insisted that they were poppet valves (because they were vertical?) despite the fact that the drawings showed ports in the liners where the steam entered and departed.
So depending upon what was said at the time I may have some sympathy with the German crew.
I was always polite but she refused to accept that she could be wrong.
Incidentally, the French word for the Cossart valves was "piston-valves" while conventional piston valves were called "tiriors cylindrique".
Thank You! for the explanation as to the cause of the incident!Frankly, 'Steam' scares me.A prelude to 'Blue Peter'?? Note rail burns @ end of film.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eb8uWexXQyM
NDG With all the 'Devices' out there, someone must have a vid of the flue letting go?? Probably would have blown all sorts of ejecta out the stack?
With all the 'Devices' out there, someone must have a vid of the flue letting go?? Probably would have blown all sorts of ejecta out the stack?
By coincidence I got a still photo of a similar incident in 1980. The preserved Beyer Garratt 6029 had a failure in the main steam pipe to the front engine unit inside the smokebox. At least in that case closing the regulator cut the steam flow but there were some injuries. I took a sequence of Kodachrome slides exactly at the time of the incident and the last one showed white steam from the stack instead of the black coal smoke seconds earlier. I didn't even realise that I'd shot the event until looking for another photo three years later.
[As a peripheral note, even though a number of reports of this accident were illustrated with a class 52 2-10-0, I think the locomotive that actually suffered the failure was the 2-6-2. Someone please confirm before I can do so on steam_tech later today.]
I think that before the locomotive operated the elements would have been pulled and the tubeplate joints carefully inspected. Any incipient sign of failure would have been notable on initial hydro testing (someone here might comment on European requirements for periodic testing). There was a recent hair-raising thread on RyPN about someone watching and then operating a locomotive with a developed LEAK from a rear flue-tubeplate joint ... it may be that something like this developed, or was being tolerated, in the locomotive in question, but that's mere speculation (and an undue canard on the operators).
As NDG indicated, it can be difficult to assess front-tubeplate damage with the elements in place, even when there is physical leakage present from the joint (showing itself in part with a trail of visible 'salts' from the boiler chemicals), and also difficult to assess any internal damage or wastage without pulling the elements. (I don't know if any 'death ray' ultrasonic apparatus that can be manipulated around a superheater header is in current use -- but I suspect after this that there might be...)
From what little I am reading, it appears that the problem was a distortion of the flue itself, which might have led both to the failure of the integrity of the rolled (or welded/seal-welded) front tubeplate joint and also a relative displacement of the flue structure away from the tubeplate (the element serving to hold it roughly in alignment) to open up an arc through which overcritical water would be easily and promptly ejected into the smokebox.
As noted, this should have produced an almost immediate and very dramatic evolution of steam through the front end and stack. But I'd expect the 'path of least resistance' for that much evolution of steam will be back through the tubes and flues, causing a rapid and accelerating expulsion of hot gas and flame that even a 'safety' firedoor might not catch -- it doesn't seem to have caught a considerable amount of flame in this incident. The steam itself, with water and not steam being ejected through the break as long as level permits, would remain a significant hazard, and of course steam evolution of most of the remaining water mass below that level would continue as a hazard. (Perhaps the good news is that the steam would produce fairly prompt reduction of the actual fire being carried!)
I don't think you can equate what happened at Mentor with the Belgian accident. There you had operators who were blissfully ignorant both of the actual state of their boiler and with the 'right' way to operate a steam tractor. At Gettysburg, you had a combination of ignorance and expedience -- we could argue about the precise mix, but the effect in the end was unfortunate -- but I don't think it is fair to tar the Belgian heritage crews with that. (At least until we have MUCH more substantive proof that their restoration or maintenance or inspection procedures might have been inadequate...)
Firelock76About a year or two ago I got a private message from former frequent poster Juniatha about a steam fest she'd gone to in Germany. From what she told me the crew of one steam engine were getting it all wrong, throttle settings, cut-off settings, you-name-it-settings. She pointed all these out to them but they wouldn't listen because, ahem, "she's a girl so what does she know?" Yeah, a girl with a doctorate in mechanical engineering. From the way she described the crew they sounded like a bunch of German yahoos. I didn't think they had yahoos in Germany but I suppose they can have them anywhere.
I heard from her, too. She finally gave up on the forum because of the rudeness she encountered. Too bad. She gave some explanations that even non-engineering types could understand.
Germany is hardly immune to yahoos and other boors.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
I haven't seen much discussion on this site about regulatory supervision of steam locomotive boilers in foreign countries.
Within the United States the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) created in 1887 supervised the railroads of the United States maintaince of steam boilers with an extensive government bureaucracy. This was the oversight the commercial railroads bore with responsibility.
The use of occasionally operated railfan steam locomotives brought these locomotive operators into regular contact with US government ICC regulations in what seemed an unfairly imposed burden designed for regular commerical operation of steam railroads.
In 1995 the United States, President Ronald Reagan eliminated the Interstate Commerce Commission as a regulatory agency in his desire to among other things "Get the government off the backs of the people!"
Consequently for a time there existed in the USA a period when steam locomotive operation was without this immediate government supervision.
The infamous Gettysburg Railroad steam railroad locomotive boiler explosion brought new attention to this lapsed government regulation which then began under a new form with the Federal Railway Administration an agency created as part of the Department of Transportation (DOT) and its National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
Consequently, the USA now has extensive supervision of safe operation of steam boilers in the America. Taking the form of (1) regular boiler ultrasound of boiler shell condition, and (2) hydrostatic pressure testing of these steam large pressure vessels for safe functioning.
The boiler Hydrostatic Testing consists of filling the boiler entirely with cold water and then putting it under high "hydraulic pressure" to test it for failure in a safe and controlled condition. Testing its safety for many times the operating pressure it would work under. One can watch such hydro pressure testing on U-Tube.
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Steam locomotive boilers in the United States were a a matter of course designed to be two or three times stronger than the pressure they were required to operate at. This safety factor helped the long history of public trust in steam locomotive operation. Just about the only design factor that could not be safety built into the railroad steam locomotive was the danger caused by running with "low water" in the boiler.
This "low water" condition which was entirely preventable by the engine crew could if not attended cause the firebox top sheet aka roof to become uncovered and then uncooled by water - it would then melt with rhe steel giving way with disasterous results. Safety always concerned duel water gauges clearly readable with water taps along the boiler backhead so the actual water level could be verified by simply opening the tap and checking for water flow.
As steam railroad fans we need to be in the public relations business of communicating to the general public the high safety factor designed in all steam boilers and the paramount importance of knowlegable engine crews.
Years ago when we restored US steam locomotive PM 1224 in East Lansing, Michigan the "Project 1225 group" that brought the 2-8-4 boiler back to life as blessed with the help of the volunteer services of a retired Pere Marquette railroad "boilermaker." Our club was set on the fast track of knowing "how to do" steam boiler maintaince by a man who had spent his entire lifetime doing this in professional railroad boiler service. This knowledge asuaged our fears concerning that powerful boiler.
It was a known fact that steam boilers were never "perfect" constructions, and as such at regular intervals of service a boiler worker would dress in an asbestos suit and climb into the empty firebox of a hot steam boiler marking any water leaks with chalk. It was not uncommon for operational steam locomotives to be leaking water internally compromising performance and all the while to be still safe pressure vessels.
Certainly there is no excuse for not knowing what you are doing with something as powerful as a steam locomotive boiler. Good training and teaching as well as the retention of qualified boiler personel are an absolute requirement for steam operators.
Engineers of the nations steam locomotives were viewed then, as we do airline pilots today. They worked their way to this post by seniority - and were not the dork tech "guys off the street" without any experience as is so common today. The grey haired engineer was there in the cab seat - on purpose!
Yah, I saw the TV show which featured people "off the street" being interviewed for entry level jobs - being trained by AMTRAK for passenger engineer! Illustrating everything that the government doesn't know about some common sense. And I about fainted - yes, its no wonder the recent AMTRAK train wreck at a speed over 100 mph was caused when the engineer was distracted by a radio call causing his inattention! OR the infamous California train wreck that was caused when a non high seniority passenger engineer missed a railroad track signal when "texting" on his cell phone while working.
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A steam locomotive boiler explosion like the one in Belgium gives rise to the question about the overall condition of that steam boiler as well as the crew. If the flue tube and front tube sheet failed, had there had been a recent boiler hydrostatic pressure test? How about a boiler ultrasound? Was the crew well trained? One certainly wonders about the regulatory requirements in Europe, India, China?
In some respects it seems the USA is often plagued with regulatory agencies which many of these other foreign countries live entirely without. And when well thought out and practiced can give the desired margin of required safety
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That's my take on it,
Doc
Your explanation does not include the comparatively recent re-inclusion of locomotive-boiler-specific design considerations in the ASME standards for steam-boiler design and construction. In part this came from careful and diligent work by the members of the Engineering Standards Committee of the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (to give both groups their full names) and represents as significant a step as the 'rewritten' provisions of 49 CFR 230 which gave us the 1472-day inspection.
Note also that Federal (FRA) regulation of steam locomotive boilers overrides the many different state codes that otherwise regulate steam power boilers, including tractor boilers like the one involved at Mentor.
With respect to 'foreign' boiler practice, I believe that the Australian and British boiler safety codes for 'heritage' locomotives are available on the Web. In the S160 thread samoht just mentioned that one of the locomotives just passed its boiler inspection, so he would be in a position either to talk about those inspection requirements or ask someone who does and 'report back' about them.
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF STEAM BOILERS -
I think after the Gettysburg Railroad steam locomotive incident there was some apprehension about riding the railroad, and for good reason. Incidents like that in Belgium have similar results.
Considering the large number of restored and running British Steam locomotives today there is a remarkable inability for the United States heritage groups to field similar steam operation enthusiasm.
The ignorance of most persons in the US about steam power is remarkable. Consigned to the past as an antique practice little knowledge remains of the use of steam power in both fossel fuel power generation, nuclear power plants and naval vessels. Also, the continued use of fossel fuel power generation does not automaticly equate to "steam power" in the mind of most persons. Say the word "Coal or Gas fired Electrical Power" and most folks would not see a boiler in this and steam power in this as the working fluid! Likewise if you say gas fired electrical power plant many would see gasoline instead of natural gas if they could even distinguish the difference. Such is the state of the public mind on power generation technology.
I would venture that when local municipal groups consider the operation of antique railroad steam power this ignorance, and the potential for the "antique boilered" locomotive to be a safety concern presents itself with this hidden objection as well as implied insurance risk.
My experience with the plan to restore PM 1225 back in the beginning of the Michigan State University group entailed much public relations work on our part about the inherent safety of the locomotive and availablity of knowlegable persons to help us develop and to run it.
Combating this ignorance, whenever steam power becomes a public discussion it would to my mind be present (1) that steam power is still widely used in industrial power generation and military use. (2) Steam and exhaust steam although invisible until condensed back to water, are real, and are a working fluid created from water - and are not as such a "fire." (3) Operational boilers are pressure vessels - boilers are substancially designed for 2 to 3 time the strength they are to operate at. (4) A steam boiler can be fired with any kind of fuel from natural gas to nuclear fuel and are a modern technology - their use often go along with remarkable cost savings. (5) That saturated steam and superheated steam, although invisible, contain incredable energy and as such have great power to create work and to do harm - to help or hurt the operators - beyond which is commonly known. (6) Most steam powered boilers are well designed to eliminate common fire safety hazards related to their use. (7) the operation of any steam powered boiler by uneducated and untrained persons is dangerous.
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The publicity of industrial accidents related to steam power usually leads to the general view that this is antique technology and as such should remain in the past along with other unsound enviornmental practice.
Somehow the Brits have overcome all this, and are able to relate steam power to EVERYBODIES EASY TO ACCOMPLISH AND FAVORITE LOCAL PASTIME.
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Shall we not all revisit the Queen's picture with reverence?
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