BaltACD charlie hebdo Overmod charlie hebdo Last I heard it was an NS train operating on NS infrastructure. Last I heard it was an NS wreckmaster being ordered on direct threat of arrest -- well before the polymerizing vinyl chloride was even detected -- from issuing any orders whatsoever regarding the accident response. THAT defeats any whining that "it's all Norfolk Southern's fault because their train came off the rails". Get with the actual picture, not what people are trying to spin you into. It was the planned response, not the train wreck, that has caused most of the ecological disaster. Wait to see who's to blame for that before judging. If you actually want to be persuasive, you might try avoiding the condescension, conspiracy claiming (portraying NS as a victim) and logorrhea. The big picture is that there would not have been a chemical spill, etc. if there had not been an avoidable derailment. In the 'if only' world - everything is avoidable. The real world is different.
charlie hebdo Overmod charlie hebdo Last I heard it was an NS train operating on NS infrastructure. Last I heard it was an NS wreckmaster being ordered on direct threat of arrest -- well before the polymerizing vinyl chloride was even detected -- from issuing any orders whatsoever regarding the accident response. THAT defeats any whining that "it's all Norfolk Southern's fault because their train came off the rails". Get with the actual picture, not what people are trying to spin you into. It was the planned response, not the train wreck, that has caused most of the ecological disaster. Wait to see who's to blame for that before judging. If you actually want to be persuasive, you might try avoiding the condescension, conspiracy claiming (portraying NS as a victim) and logorrhea. The big picture is that there would not have been a chemical spill, etc. if there had not been an avoidable derailment.
Overmod charlie hebdo Last I heard it was an NS train operating on NS infrastructure. Last I heard it was an NS wreckmaster being ordered on direct threat of arrest -- well before the polymerizing vinyl chloride was even detected -- from issuing any orders whatsoever regarding the accident response. THAT defeats any whining that "it's all Norfolk Southern's fault because their train came off the rails". Get with the actual picture, not what people are trying to spin you into. It was the planned response, not the train wreck, that has caused most of the ecological disaster. Wait to see who's to blame for that before judging.
charlie hebdo Last I heard it was an NS train operating on NS infrastructure.
Last I heard it was an NS wreckmaster being ordered on direct threat of arrest -- well before the polymerizing vinyl chloride was even detected -- from issuing any orders whatsoever regarding the accident response.
THAT defeats any whining that "it's all Norfolk Southern's fault because their train came off the rails".
Get with the actual picture, not what people are trying to spin you into. It was the planned response, not the train wreck, that has caused most of the ecological disaster. Wait to see who's to blame for that before judging.
If you actually want to be persuasive, you might try avoiding the condescension, conspiracy claiming (portraying NS as a victim) and logorrhea.
The big picture is that there would not have been a chemical spill, etc. if there had not been an avoidable derailment.
In the 'if only' world - everything is avoidable. The real world is different.
In the real world, progress is made by learning from our mistakes to avoid them in the future, rather than cover up, minimize or spin. Making NS take responsibilty is also an objective.
EuclidI posted some information about this on the other “derailments” thread. As I recall, it involved positions on the question of who approved the controlled burn. So the following parties were asked whether they approved the controlled burn: The Ohio and Pennsylvania Governors, Norfolk Southern RR, the Federal and Ohio EPAs, the East Palestine Fire Chief Incident Commander, and the local Police Department. There was a public hearing that addressed this matter; and all the above-mentioned denied having given the approval for the controlled burn.
I've only been involved in a few spills that were big enough to have needed the incident command structure, but I am at a loss to understand how the incident commander was not involved in, or unaware of such an impending major mitigation event as blowing holes in pressurized tanks.
EuclidI am most curious about what the Federal EPA would have recommended had they been asked for an approval of the controlled burn. I would like to know what the EPA considers to have been the acceptable method of dealing with the wreck of railcars that included five tank cars of vinyl chloride. I want to hear what the EPA recommends as the proper procedure for this.
My guess is to let the relief valves on the tank cars vent the gas, however, since the valves were thought to have been schorched, they might have had to get creative.
Euclid Then one of their first acts was to inform NS that it was wrong for NS to have just refilled and graded their torn up roadbed, and relayed the track. The EPA told NS that they must remove their newly laid track and excavate out all contaminated soil below their track, and then re-fill that volume with new uncontaminated soil. Regarding that point, I am surprised that NS had deemed it proper to simply bury the mix of soil and spilled chemicals on site, and let it go at that. And if NS did not deem it proper, I am even more surprised that NS thought they could get away with that methodology. I think it raises the question of why NS was in such a rush.
My experience is in oil field spills, and in some cercumstances it is acceptable to remediate soil in situ using soil venting/air sparging/groundwater purge, etc. Remember vinyl chloride boils at 8 deg F, so as the pressurized liquid comes out of the tanks, its trying to evaporate. Would it flash freeze wet soil that it came in contact with?
Euclidn the legal action announced in the first post here, the EPA does say that the controlled burn added five loaded cars of vinyl chloride to the “release,” a term that I assume refers to the general chemical spillage of the derailment, as opposed to the release of smoke during the controlled burn. It also says that it was the NS that vented and burned the five tank cars. I must conclude that if NS did not make the decision to vent and burn the five cars, they surely must know who did make that decision.
Generally the term "release" means the product has escaped the primary containment, eg., the tank. It could include liquid and smoke. As far as the EPA knowing who made the decision to vent and burn, I would refer back to your paragraph at the top of this post.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACDDon't worry - elements of this incident will still be in court in 2030.
Convicted OneYanno? there is just something about NS dragging that sparkler show 20+ miles through the countryside leading up to the incident, that kinda defeats arguments seeking to hold them less than liable.
What the accident response ought to be about was reducing the space between measurements, adding more sensor fusion, providing more intelligent (and realtime) analysis of trending conditions that might produce derailment, and potentially bringing in more direct and sensible ways of communicating a catastrophic failure to a train crew... a failure that would NOT have been detectible by any of the increased inspection that is planned to be made a mandate, or for that matter by any crew riding in a caboose. While there's only an idiotic response from Congress so far, I have full faith that relatively quick action to reduce detector spacing to 'what would have picked this up if it were only a bearing failure' will be made, and that AAR will be looking at ways that this can be done with the appropriate technology, cost-minimized through intelligent design and OTS adaptation rather than 'peddled by the lowest bidder'.
... attempts at mitigation might precipitate additional liability for third parties, but that in no way relieves NS of the responsibility to conduct its affairs properly.
NS is on the hook for the full cost of remediation of the accident, no matter how generated. Presumably they were self-insured for this kind of accident, so there will be no convenient limitation on what they'll eventually have to pay. We could speculate on whether some 'fix will be in' regarding what actually gets paid out after appeals and whatever, but I don't particularly think the outcome would be 'better' for NS than it was for the Elizabeth Jones catastrophe... and that's before all the strict-scrutiny pile-on that's already coming, whether it turns out to be functionally relevant to this or not.
The point remains that a great deal of 'additional cost', that we all can stipulate NS is on the hook for legally, was potentially provided not only by threatening NS but by removing any ability to handle the situation more effectively. I can think of numerous reasons why this is not particularly tolerable as an 'excuse to blast NS for some deficiency or other in their safety culture'... until proven. And you can't prove it at this point.
Perhaps had the sparkler show lit up trackside overgrowth, NIMBYs might have reported it, prior to reaching the disaster it ultimately became?
The issue here is to DESIGN and then IMPLEMENT policies and procedures that will help reduce actual problems like this, without introducing hundreds of thousands of hours and other easily-predictable accidents from false positives or improper responses. And to do so, if necessary, in ways that highlight any actual underlying issues with bearings, or responses to issues with bearings, that turn out to be... well, I suppose you have no concept of statutory immunity, either, but it applies to NS if they have defective bearings not directly related to contributory negligence, which unfortunately remains to be proven and I suspect will be remarkably resistant to effectively proving.
The greater issue that has to be addressed here is precisely the matter of incident command that increases public risk out of the control of the entity suffering the accident. Along with this issue comes the much more relevant one of implementing quick and positive command, control, communications and intelligence (which prospectively ties into rapid processing of and response to, for example, streamed video from random cell phones or Ring-monitored surveillance devices [there are already cases about the 'right' of public responders to the full recorded data from those systems].
But these aren't things we're likely going to see from the congeries of sources all too gleeful to talk about how NS owes everybody for everything in this derailment, whether or not it's actually something NS isn't already acknowledging as its financial responsibility regardless of any sort of third-party 'subrogation'. And it isn't something I expect to see from the kind of grandstanding evidenced by things like Buttegieg's letter, for which there is no actual excuse grounded in fact or truth.
Convicted OneLOL, let NS sue said third parties to recover the damages caused through their mismanagement?
Don't worry - elements of this incident will still be in court in 2030.
LOL, let NS sue said third parties to recover the damages caused through their mismanagement?
Yanno? there is just something about NS dragging that sparkler show 20+ miles through the countryside leading up to the incident, that kinda defeats arguments seeking to hold them less than liable.
Bad decisions made during attempts at mitigation might precipitate additional liability for third parties, but that in no way relieves NS of the responsibility to conduct it's affairs properly.\
Perhaps had the sparkler show lit up track side overgrowth, NIMBYs might have reported it, prior to reaching the disaster it ultimately became?
charlie hebdoLast I heard it was an NS train operating on NS infrastructure.
OvermodThere are to me very clear, and ongoing, attempts at a 'narrative' that pins the environmental vinyl-chloride catastrophe on NS.
Last I heard it was an NS train operating on NS infrastructure.
OvermodIt remains to be seen what the nature of attempts at containment of the vinyl chloride were -- I remember seeing news reports that 'containment' efforts, probably including berming, barriers and drainage to catch basins, but again, this is something a fair report will include and discuss. To some extent this would preclude released chemicals from inclusion in the grade and subgrade, but I personally doubt that it would prevent effective contamination to levels that would, in fact, require subsequent mass excavation and abatement (probably via portable pyrolysis on that scale...
BaltACDFailure has but a single Mother...
Or, to paraphrase the old adage in Balt's context: It's a wise child that knows its own failure.
Success has many fathers! Failure has but a single Motherf..... At least you believe all the fathers that were also involved in the failure.
The ONLY real issue that makes East Palestine other than most other 'serious' derailments is the implementation of the botched "controlled release". (I will address the main-line remediation, which to me is a completely different issue and concern, later.)
There are to me very clear, and ongoing, attempts at a 'narrative' that pins the environmental vinyl-chloride catastrophe on NS. To the extent -- and it may be considerable -- that this interferes in genuine fact finding and assessment of responsibility for controlled demolition of all five cars simultaneously (which, we must not forget, was carefully described in detail many hours before it was implemented), such a narrative in and of itself is reprehensible and should be viewed and treated for what it is.
That is not at all to 'spin around' that the actual people involved in directing and conducting the burn should be held morally and financially responsible for the problems it has caused, and this should not be 'excused away' simply by using deep-pockets litigation (which will almost certainly be how the costs wind up being paid).
It remains to be seen what the nature of attempts at containment of the vinyl chloride were -- I remember seeing news reports that 'containment' efforts, probably including berming, barriers and drainage to catch basins, but again, this is something a fair report will include and discuss. To some extent this would preclude released chemicals from inclusion in the grade and subgrade, but I personally doubt that it would prevent effective contamination to levels that would, in fact, require subsequent mass excavation and abatement (probably via portable pyrolysis on that scale...
BUT at a time and on a schedule that would permit NS to construct the required shooflies, bypasses, shoring, rerouting, etc. to keep at least critical traffic moving in the 'lanes' served by that line. To me, there is no contradiction between NS doing heavy regrading to restore working track geometry ASAP and NS subsequently acting to remove all sources of 'trapped' contamination within their right-of-way. (Something that should be in the docket, eventually, is EPA assessment of how the release from the ROW would worsen over time, and how the cost and scope for this piece of the remediation effort would increase over time. But I distinguish the delay necessary to organize and implement traffic continuation from 'delay' in stonewalling or in acknowledging that full remediation will have to be done, and done as 'timely' as reasonable. And as yet I haven't seen any credible claim by NS that they just rebuilt the main expediently to pretend business as usual, or to claim the residual contamination was 'unimportant' because quickly built over to reopen for traffic.
MidlandMike Euclid There has been other discussion and controversy on-line about the question who formulated and executed the decision to do the controlled burn. Notice is says that NS did this. I have yet to see any references indicating whether or not the regulators approved of the vent/burn treatment of the five tank cars of vinyl chloride, either before it was done, or after it was done. My guess is that the incident commander (often the fire chief) with input from environmental engineers and the RR, would have approved it as the best alternative. This was done to mitigate an explosive situation. The point is that it was still NS's accident/spill.
Euclid There has been other discussion and controversy on-line about the question who formulated and executed the decision to do the controlled burn. Notice is says that NS did this. I have yet to see any references indicating whether or not the regulators approved of the vent/burn treatment of the five tank cars of vinyl chloride, either before it was done, or after it was done.
My guess is that the incident commander (often the fire chief) with input from environmental engineers and the RR, would have approved it as the best alternative. This was done to mitigate an explosive situation. The point is that it was still NS's accident/spill.
In the legal action announced in the first post here, the EPA does say that the controlled burn added five loaded cars of vinyl chloride to the “release,” a term that I assume refers to the general chemical spillage of the derailment, as opposed to the release of smoke during the controlled burn. It also says that it was the NS that vented and burned the five tank cars. I must conclude that if NS did not make the decision to vent and burn the five cars, they surely must know who did make that decision.
EuclidI am surprised that these bearings can be re-manufactured.
blue streak 1About 1/2 way down on the below link you will find an overhead drone picture with every car involved in the incident. The challenges of East Palestine's toxic waste cleanup : NPR
The challenges of East Palestine's toxic waste cleanup : NPR
The overhead only begins at car 26.
About 1/2 way down on the below link you will find an overhead drone picture with every car involved in the incident.
Overmod(And I say that as a confirmed and very satisfied perpetual customer on the yard at Pull-A-Part on Farrisview here...)
Yes, I've had considerable good fortune at the self-serve salvage yards as well. But there is ONLY one reason I use such places.
Same logic would apply to "factory reconditioned" warez, as well.
One would think that with all the emphasis we've heard about efforts to remove rolling stock from inventory the past decade or so, that there would be a considerable stockpile of used bearings awaiting reconditioning?
EuclidThere has been other discussion and controversy on-line about the question who formulated and executed the decision to do the controlled burn. Notice is says that NS did this. I have yet to see any references indicating whether or not the regulators approved of the vent/burn treatment of the five tank cars of vinyl chloride, either before it was done, or after it was done.
OvermodBut that level of damage, if developed suddenly in a working bearing, would have the additional damage of the debris in addition to the tribology failure contributing...
This is why I look at the possibility of a single roller essentially disintegrating as a possibility. The pieces of that one roller could cause massive destruction of the rest of the bearing.
Note in my linked source that rebuilt bearings are actually quite common - to the extent that most of the cars on the railroad may well have remanufactured bearings, railroad owned and privately owned.
I'm pretty sure that there is a mechanism in place for whatever railroad a car happens to be on to be reimbursed for necessary repairs. Thus the car in question might have been repaired by, say, UP, from their stock of wheels if the car had a condemnable flat wheel.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Convicted OneSo, are there any "Pic-a-Part" type outfits catering specifically to railroads?
Where I'm worried stuff will be found in the woodwork is with the equivalent of places that forge, or pretend, to have proper procedures and certification for highly-stressed components that supposedly have anticipated service life well beyond expectations in service. I suspect that it is difficult to eyeball, say, a roller, and be able to determine whether it is developing internal stress raisers or inclusions leading to face spalling... 150,000 miles of rolling after being re-included in a bearing structure.
What is still 'yet to be determined' is whether lenient track-geometry or flat-wheel standards are leading these components to develop cumulative damage faster, even though they were suitable-for-purpose when installed. The 1998 catastrophic-damage-in-10-miles spalling was both massive and pre-existing when the test bearing was made up. But that level of damage, if developed suddenly in a working bearing, would have the additional damage of the debris in addition to the tribology faillure contributing...
BaltACD...I have not been able to ascertain the car initial and number of the 23rd car. Without knowing the ownership of the car, making any assertions to 'cheap' are way out of line.
OvermodSo save the Earl Scheib quality and Asian schadenfreude cracks until we have demonstrated proof of such practices in the industry -
So, are there any "Pic-a-Part" type outfits catering specifically to railroads?
n012944 Overmod You people are ignoring what is likely the most important factor in these 'remanufactured' bearings -- their material and quality make them "500,000" mile or better MTBF... but even multiwear wheels last only a fraction of that, and the bearing components must usually be disassembled to replace the wheels on the axles. So save the Earl Scheib quality and Asian schadenfreude cracks until we have demonstrated proof of such practices in the industry -- not sayin, after the loose-wheels-on-new-cars fiasco, that there aren't. Some people are acrobatic in trying to paint the cause of this accident as the railroads being cheap.
Overmod You people are ignoring what is likely the most important factor in these 'remanufactured' bearings -- their material and quality make them "500,000" mile or better MTBF... but even multiwear wheels last only a fraction of that, and the bearing components must usually be disassembled to replace the wheels on the axles. So save the Earl Scheib quality and Asian schadenfreude cracks until we have demonstrated proof of such practices in the industry -- not sayin, after the loose-wheels-on-new-cars fiasco, that there aren't.
You people are ignoring what is likely the most important factor in these 'remanufactured' bearings -- their material and quality make them "500,000" mile or better MTBF... but even multiwear wheels last only a fraction of that, and the bearing components must usually be disassembled to replace the wheels on the axles.
So save the Earl Scheib quality and Asian schadenfreude cracks until we have demonstrated proof of such practices in the industry -- not sayin, after the loose-wheels-on-new-cars fiasco, that there aren't.
Some people are acrobatic in trying to paint the cause of this accident as the railroads being cheap.
In my perusal of the various NTSB reports that have been published, there is repeated reference to the hot bearing on the 23rd car in the train, however, I have not been able to ascertain the car initial and number of the 23rd car. Without knowing the ownership of the car, making any assertions to 'cheap' are way out of line.
Do you actually know what is involved in either the fabrication or reconstruction of an AP bearing? These are parts that pass at least equal NDT testing to new manufacture, with hundreds of thousands of miles' worth of nominal life on them, and are installed with no less care than new components on the axle ends. Where, then, is the perceived 'unsuitability' for another wheel's worth of interchange wear?
Did you think they pulled bearing rollers out of a bucket and stuck them into a grease-filled cage putting a bearing back together?
An "expensive model collector"
OvermodYou people are ignoring what is likely the most important factor in these 'remanufactured' bearings -- their material and quality make them "500,000" mile or better MTBF... but even multiwear wheels last only a fraction of that, and the bearing components must usually be disassembled to replace the wheels on the axles. So save the Earl Scheib quality and Asian schadenfreude cracks until we have demonstrated proof of such practices in the industry -- not sayin, after the loose-wheels-on-new-cars fiasco, that there aren't.
I would think that the market for reman bearings and axles would nominally be for equipment that IS NOT going to be used in Interchange service. ie. short lines and historic operations on equipment that WILL NOT be going off line.
Such carriers can be willing to 'roll the dice' on such reman components knowing that they will not be subject to either high speed or high mileage uses.
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