tree68I gave what was, based on the gauges. Pure hindsight, which we all know is generally 20-20. There was a very definitive spike in river levels. That may not have been properly anticipated. In fact, I'd bet it wasn't. Had BNSF been aware of that spike, I'd opine they probably would have taken action. The levels of the Rock River (and thus the Little Rock River, as it flows into the Rock a short distance beyond the derailment site) were already high, above "Action" stage as I recall, but not necessarily at "Flood" stage, and they had been at that level for several days. Apparently BNSF didn't find those levels actionable or they would have issued the appropriate guidance. And this is the question at hand - at what level of the Little Rock River would BNSF determine the need to slow, or stop trains? Apparently it hadn't reached that level the last time BNSF folks had checked. Bucky apparently feels that the threshold should have been lower. How much?
There was a very definitive spike in river levels. That may not have been properly anticipated. In fact, I'd bet it wasn't. Had BNSF been aware of that spike, I'd opine they probably would have taken action.
The levels of the Rock River (and thus the Little Rock River, as it flows into the Rock a short distance beyond the derailment site) were already high, above "Action" stage as I recall, but not necessarily at "Flood" stage, and they had been at that level for several days. Apparently BNSF didn't find those levels actionable or they would have issued the appropriate guidance.
And this is the question at hand - at what level of the Little Rock River would BNSF determine the need to slow, or stop trains? Apparently it hadn't reached that level the last time BNSF folks had checked. Bucky apparently feels that the threshold should have been lower. How much?
The severe weather alerts CSX was recieving from their Weather Service when I was working never mentioned directly or in passing flood stages for any of the bodies of water that they were mentioning in their flood alerts. The degree of specificity that these warnings gave was Subdivision and Mileposts between which the Flood Warning was effective.
Never having worked for BNSF I have no idea who their Weather Service is or what kind of reports they issue and to whom those reports are issued.
The thing that Terex has never been able to understand about railroads - Trains are not line of sight vehicles.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACDThe thing that Terex has never been able to understand about railroads - Trains are not line of sight vehicles.
Oh, I think I picked that up fairly early in life. What does not being line of sight vehicles have to do with the topic here? It seems like there are already a hundred good excuses, and now let's add that trains are not line of sight vehicles.
tree68I gave what was, based on the gauges. Pure hindsight, which we all know is generally 20-20. There was a very definitive spike in river levels. That may not have been properly anticipated. In fact, I'd bet it wasn't. Had BNSF been aware of that spike, I'd opine they probably would have taken action.
Sure, your gauge readings were hindsight, but the level graphs show that there would have been ample forewarning available if BNSF had used IFIS.
If they did or not we don't know, but I would deem it negligent if they didn't. This or a comparable service.
tree68The levels of the Rock River (and thus the Little Rock River, as it flows into the Rock a short distance beyond the derailment site) were already high, above "Action" stage as I recall, but not necessarily at "Flood" stage, and they had been at that level for several days.
The levels on June 21 and 22 were above Major Flood Stage of 19ft. That was the reason to post the above definition of Major Flood Stage.
From one of my earlier posts:The water level Tree68 gave for up-river from Doon is defined as Major Flood Stage: http://ifis.iowafloodcenter.org/ifis/app/?c=Doon_(Rock_River)Klick on the Attention mark for more information.
And than on more info in new small window.
As I said I don't know if the rule 6.21 was applicable. On the other hand this was a crude oil unit train not an intermodal.
The problem with dams is, you get have the train across a location and than vibration have summed up enough to get the soil moving.Regards, Volker
Euclid BaltACD The thing that Terex has never been able to understand about railroads - Trains are not line of sight vehicles. Oh, I think I picked that up fairly early in life. What does not being line of sight vehicles have to do with the topic here? It seems like there are already a hundred good excuses, and now let's add that trains are not line of sight vehicles.
BaltACD The thing that Terex has never been able to understand about railroads - Trains are not line of sight vehicles.
Yet how many times in this thread alone have you asserted 'they saw the water and should have slowed down'. Seeing water is a function of 'line of sight'.
BaltACD Euclid BaltACD The thing that Terex has never been able to understand about railroads - Trains are not line of sight vehicles. Oh, I think I picked that up fairly early in life. What does not being line of sight vehicles have to do with the topic here? It seems like there are already a hundred good excuses, and now let's add that trains are not line of sight vehicles. Yet how many times in this thread alone have you asserted 'they saw the water and should have slowed down'. Seeing water is a function of 'line of sight'.
To me, the seriousness and debate on the cause of the Doon, IA. derailment has degenerated into the Abbott and Costello bit about baseball.
“Who” is on first and he was on his cell paying too much attention to the river gauge at Little Rock River. He stepped off base and was tagged out. "What", was on second and was googling the rules about mandated slow movement of trains in severe weather. He wandered off base and was tagged out also. Now,"Where," was on third and saw a chance to steal home plate. He did but the run did not count since the third base coach did not give him authority to proceed and steal. Therefore, the run does not count. Now there is a catcher at home plate named, "Who". Who is talking on his cell phone to his dad. His dad happened to be the engineer on the ill-fated derailment train.
All this talk about what happened, how, why, etcetera, is all a waste of time, like the above story is about as good a contribution to the thread as all I have read lately. However, since it was not a fatal, NTSB, won’t have an investigation. And probably BNSF will not have a detailed account of the incident for public consumption. HOWEVER, Who, the catcher will know all about it since his dad was there. mike endmrw0703181354
Good one CB!
This thread has degenerated into the circular "yes, but" pattern.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
SD70DudeThis thread has degenerated into the circular "yes, but" pattern.
Per usual.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
I think it has been a fine discussion. A lot of things have been considered in the process. I have been thinking about some of the points brought up about railroad company preparedness, versus the theory that nobody told the crew about the flood, and that they were thus blindsided by it as they suddenly came upon it.
Embedded in that theory about the crew being uninformed, is the sub-theory that they never even saw the water at all because it was dark. Another sub-theory is that they recognized the water and the need to reduce speed the instant the water was in their presence, but there was not enough time to reduce speed to what was required, and so the derailment occurred at a relatively high speed.
In considering all this, I speculate that everybody in the company including the crew, was 100% informed about every single detail and specification of the flood conditions, including rain amounts, forecasts for rain, water levels, currents, locations of conditions, and changing patterns over time. I believe they ran several track patrols prior to the oil train and concluded that the track was in perfectly good condition. For various reasons, I don’t believe the water ever rose above the tops of the rails. I don’t think there was much, if any, current there, and thus there was no erosion observed. Given all of this due diligence, I suspect they suspended the requirements of Rule 6.21 and felt it was safe to let the train pass at its full speed limit.
They basically felt that they had performed all the requirements of Rule 6.21 in the course of their monitoring and patrolling of the track. Since they found no track defects, they saw no reason to slow the train down so he could look for defects.
So all of this leads me to conclude that one of two things happened:
1) The train derailed due to liquefaction of the fill as it was agitated by the passing train.
2) The train derailed due to some cause that was not related to the flood.
I imagine BNSF quickly determined the cause, and passed that information on to an NTSB representative. Presumably the NTSB decided there was nothing of real broad value for future prevention to be learned from a full investigation. In other words, the derailment cause was likely nothing unique or unusual, and continued routine train operation in that area that night was not considered problematic.
EuclidGiven all of this due diligence, I suspect they suspended the requirements of Rule 6.21 and felt it was safe to let the train pass at its full speed limit.
Nobody "suspended" any rules. All the rules are all in effect. Its that it wasn't applicable.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
dehusmanNobody "suspended" any rules. All the rules are all in effect. Its that it wasn't applicable.
+1
dehusman Euclid Given all of this due diligence, I suspect they suspended the requirements of Rule 6.21 and felt it was safe to let the train pass at its full speed limit. Nobody "suspended" any rules. All the rules are all in effect. Its that it wasn't applicable.
Euclid Given all of this due diligence, I suspect they suspended the requirements of Rule 6.21 and felt it was safe to let the train pass at its full speed limit.
Dave, I did not say they suspended Rule 6.21. I said they suspended the requirements of rule 6.21. In other words, they informed the crew that they were not to slow down as required by the rule because the site had already been thoroughly inspected for track defects and none were found.
So basically, the derailment could not have been caused by the flood unless it was caused by flood-induced liquefaction of the roadbed; a condition that is not readily detectable by track inspections.
EuclidDave, I did not say they suspended Rule 6.21. I said they suspended the requirements of rule 6.21. In other words, they informed the crew that they were not to slow down as required by the rule because the site had already been thoroughly inspected for track defects and none were found.
Fine. The requirements of rule 6.21 were not suspended. Rule 6.21 remains in effect. The rule tells the crew if there is bad weather to watch out, if they see something they think is hazardous to slow down or to stop. Doesn't matter who inspected it, or if they put on a slow order or not. Nobody suspends the rule or its requirements.
Euclid I think it has been a fine discussion. .......................
I think it has been a fine discussion. .......................
Since this thread has degenerated, as others have mentioned, into a, “yes, but” circular conversation.
I will venture into yet another comparison. While not train related, my comparison to the Abbott and Costello comic routine was in my mind an apt description of what the thread has degenerated into.
As the partial quote was posted, SEE ABOVE.........
I thought, now who is doing to disagree. Interesting to whom? Yes very very interesting to one who enjoys and invites “verbal sword fighting”. I have always thought a good exercise to combat this “without end dialogue” was to practice, extinction. There is NO end to this.
As Abbott and Costello was used before to describe the Doon/BNSF derailment (I need to keep this rail specific), I wondered if any young folks would wonder who Abbott and Costello is. Now this next one is ACTUALLY………….THE...... FIRST THOUGHT, that came to mind, when this back and forth began. My thought was of a religious song sung by a quartet. Without the lyrics it deals with not becoming a Christian, thus the repeating line is ………I shuhd, cuda, wooda. Exactly what this discussion is like in DETAILING the cause of the derailment.
Remember "WHO", the catcher?, he and his dad know exactly what happened. I doubt that we will ever know. But this is a free county, as today memorializes and endless arguments are allowed here.
By the way I do realize that I can unsubscribe the specific thread if I am so so so offended. And on that note the Adios Coal thread has recently posted some very interesting information that is informative and pertinent to the REAL discussion
God Bless America ya’ll mike endmrw0704181139
dehusman Euclid Dave, I did not say they suspended Rule 6.21. I said they suspended the requirements of rule 6.21. In other words, they informed the crew that they were not to slow down as required by the rule because the site had already been thoroughly inspected for track defects and none were found. Fine. The requirements of rule 6.21 were not suspended. Rule 6.21 remains in effect. The rule tells the crew if there is bad weather to watch out, if they see something they think is hazardous to slow down or to stop. Doesn't matter who inspected it, or if they put on a slow order or not. Nobody suspends the rule or its requirements.
Euclid Dave, I did not say they suspended Rule 6.21. I said they suspended the requirements of rule 6.21. In other words, they informed the crew that they were not to slow down as required by the rule because the site had already been thoroughly inspected for track defects and none were found.
The rule (Rule 6.21) most definitely does not say: “If there is bad weather, watch out, if you see something that you think is hazardous, slow down or to stop.”
The Rule says this: “In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.”
Approaching a “hazardous point prepared to stop” means be prepared to stop if the “hazardous point” is found to contain a hazard that is unsafe to pass. So in that circumstance, “prepared to stop” means slowing down enough that it is possible to stop short of any discovered hazard that is unsafe to pass. In this case the condition that began the requirement of Rule 6.21 was the high water.
In your interpretation of what the Rule says or means, you have the engineer required to slow down only if he sees something he thinks is unsafe to pass. But the actual rule requires the engineer to slow down before seeing something he thinks is hazardous to the extent of being unsafe to pass. He is supposed to slow down in anticipation of seeing a hazard that is unsafe to pass, so he will be able to get stopped before reaching that hazard.
Rules have as many interpretations as the people enforcing them.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
Any point is potentially hazardous, all the time. But most of the time the probability is extremely low, like having an airplane crash just in front of the train.
The train crew, track forces and other field personnel know their territory intimately through experience, and will be very aware of the actual hazardous POINTS that are the intent of Rule 6.21. Raging streams and rivers can erode embankments, undermine bridge piers, or even carry away a span. Flooded fields beside the track are not unusual and are generally harmless as long as the level is below the ties.
cx500 Any point is potentially hazardous, all the time. But most of the time the probability is extremely low, like having an airplane crash just in front of the train. The train crew, track forces and other field personnel know their territory intimately through experience, and will be very aware of the actual hazardous POINTS that are the intent of Rule 6.21. Raging streams and rivers can erode embankments, undermine bridge piers, or even carry away a span. Flooded fields beside the track are not unusual and are generally harmless as long as the level is below the ties.
Euclid But the actual rule requires the engineer to slow down before seeing something he thinks is hazardous to the extent of being unsafe to pass. He is supposed to slow down in anticipation of seeing a hazard that is unsafe to pass, so he will be able to get stopped before reaching that hazard.
I'll have to double check my job description for engineer. I didn't think clairvoyance was in there anywhere.
tree68 Euclid But the actual rule requires the engineer to slow down before seeing something he thinks is hazardous to the extent of being unsafe to pass. He is supposed to slow down in anticipation of seeing a hazard that is unsafe to pass, so he will be able to get stopped before reaching that hazard. I'll have to double check my job description for engineer. I didn't think clairvoyance was in there anywhere.
Read the entire context of what I said rather than just a part needed to cleverly craft up the illusion of a contradiction.
Where does clairvoyance come in? You are slowing down in anticipation of spotting a reason to stop such as a washout or a broken rail. You are not slowing down by using psychic reading to see that such a dangerous defect lies ahead. You are slowing down only as a precaution in case there is a dangerous defect ahead. Indeed, there may prove to not be any such dangerous defects ahead, but you slow down just in case there is. It is stunning that this simple point is so hard to make here.
The way Dave describes it, you only slow down or slow to a stop if you see an actual dangerous defect ahead. The problem with that is that if you wait until seeing a hazard before beginning to slow down, there might not be enough distance left to get stopped. It is really the same concept as restricted speed.
I've looked at the Sheriff Office video again. After the accident the train is parked across the river, standing on a bridge.
GCOR 6.21 says amon others: In unusually heavy rain, storm, or high water, trains and engines must approach bridges, culverts, and other potentially hazardous points prepared to stop.
So the head end approached and crossed a bridge.
Question: Does a high water level exceeding the Major Flood Stage mark qualify as an unusually high water level in the sense of Rule 6.21? And wouldn't the train not need to slow down approaching the bridge?Regards, Volker
Euclid It is really the same concept as restricted speed.
You need to review the restricted speed rule.
We get it - in your mind you would be the god among engineers and would never make a mistake. If the crew did is found at fault - then BNSF may pursue discipline actions against them. But judging everything on hindsight and your (sometimes odd) interpretations of the rules is an exercise in futility. But carry on, like you always do.
VOLKER LANDWEHRQuestion: Does a high water level exceeding the Major Flood Stage mark qualify as an unusually high water level in the sense of Rule 6.21? And wouldn't the train not need to slow down approaching the bridge?
I would opine that the answer to that question is: "It Depends."
As in, it depends on the location.
The classifications for water levels weren't written with the railroads in mind. They were considered with your house in mind.
I know it's a bit of an absurd example, but do you really think the Erie (and all its successors) would be worried about a 14 foot flood at Lanesboro, PA? The D&H would have been concerned. The local residents would be concerned. The Erie probably wouldn't care. Starucca Viaduct is stone, over 100 feet high, and is probably built on bedrock.
So the answer is "it depends." That line has been there since at least 1938 (Historic Aerials image), so I'm sure there is plenty of experience with water levels, including Major Flood Stage, at that location. BNSF would have to tell us how high is too high for that location.
zugmann Euclid It is really the same concept as restricted speed. You need to review the restricted speed rule. We get it - in your mind you would be the god among engineers and would never make a mistake. If the crew did is found at fault - then BNSF may pursue discipline actions against them. But judging everything on hindsight and your (sometimes odd) interpretations of the rules is an exercise in futility. But carry on, like you always do.
I do not believe they are guilty of violating Rule 6.21. And I do not believe there were unaware of the flood waters. I think the crew was told to proceed without slowing down per Rule 6.21 for the reason that the track had been fully inspected. So there was no reason for the train to slow down in anticipating of finding a dangerous flaw. Isn't that a fair conclusion on my part?
EuclidI do not believe they are guilty of violating Rule 6.21. And I do not believe there were unaware of the flood waters. I think the crew was told to proceed without slowing down per Rule 6.21 for the reason that the track had been fully inspected. So there was no reason for the train to slow down in anticipating of finding a dangerous flaw. Isn't that a fair conclusion on my part?
It's a nice story. May not reflect the truth, but hey.. it's something?
The flood stage is measured relative to a point somewhere along the stream. Based on the previous discussion the point was not AT the RR bridge. Just because the water is high there at the measuring station, doesn't necessarily mean it floods every bridge. The water could be up into the bridge at the measurement point but the RR bridge could still be high and dry above the water where it is located. The railroad isn't going to change its operation because the farmer's fields are flooded. Major flood stage means there is a high level of water, but doesn't necessarily mean that something near the river is automatically in danger. If "major flood stage" is 10 ft above normal water levels and the railroad is 20 ft above normal water levels, is the railroad flooded? No.
dehusman VOLKER LANDWEHR Question: Does a high water level exceeding the Major Flood Stage mark qualify as an unusually high water level in the sense of Rule 6.21? And wouldn't the train not need to slow down approaching the bridge? The flood stage is measured relative to a point somewhere along the stream. Based on the previous discussion the point was not AT the RR bridge. Just because the water is high there at the measuring station, doesn't necessarily mean it floods every bridge. The water could be up into the bridge at the measurement point but the RR bridge could still be high and dry above the water where it is located. The railroad isn't going to change its operation because the farmer's fields are flooded. Major flood stage means there is a high level of water, but doesn't necessarily mean that something near the river is automatically in danger. If "major flood stage" is 10 ft above normal water levels and the railroad is 20 ft above normal water levels, is the railroad flooded? No.
VOLKER LANDWEHR Question: Does a high water level exceeding the Major Flood Stage mark qualify as an unusually high water level in the sense of Rule 6.21? And wouldn't the train not need to slow down approaching the bridge?
Again the fallacious argument. The track was flooded.
charlie hebdoYour argumentum ad absurdum is false as it usually is. The question here is probabilities. Obviously the probability of a derailment on track running through your "flooded fields are harmless" example is much greater than an airplane hitting the train. In fact, the train did derail, period, no matter how much you and some other posters try to twist and turn away from that. Methinks thou protesteth too much, sir.
charlie hebdo
Please tell me how you KNOW that the train did derail because of the high water. It is merely one of several plausible theories, and the cause is more likely to be the far more common one of broken rails, wheels or dragging equipment. I expect that may be why the NTSB chose not to investigate the circumstances despite the significant oil spill.
I agree that I carried the argument to absurd lengths, even more absurd than the one that certain other posters are using. We are just discussing how many "0"s are found to the right of the decimal point, and there will be lots of them in both cases. In the routine operation of a railroad on an elevated grade across an area that probably floods regularly, with presumably no history of ensuing subgrade weakness, the probabilities of either happening are remote.
And unlike many here, I worked most of my career with a railroad, mostly with the engineering department. Some frequent posters are very reluctant to share what qualifications they may have to justify their opinion.
dehusmanThe flood stage is measured relative to a point somewhere along the stream. Based on the previous discussion the point was not AT the RR bridge. Just because the water is high there at the measuring station, doesn't necessarily mean it floods every bridge.
To your last sentence I agree. I try to understand the sense of a rule whose definition lies in the hand of the railroad.
Regarding the first two sentences: One gage is 10 miles upstream of the accident location, the next 40 miles downstream. So you can interpolate. See the links to these two gauges I provided earlier.
Here is the link to the Sheriff Office video: https://www.facebook.com/Sioux.County.Sheriff/videos/1782149598499719/
At 19:35 is a view of the river crossing. The video was posted at 7:34 am on June 22, 2018, only few hours after the accident.
A bridge doesn't need to be flooded to get damaged in high water situations.
I don't know, but isn't that a situation were one should consider to slow down.Regards, Volker
VOLKER LANDWEHRI don't know, but isn't that a situation were one should consider to slow down.
In hindsight, you won't find anyone who disagrees.
As I've noted, there was a rapid spike in the river level that likely caught folks unaware. Had that spike level been the product of a gradual rise, I would imagine warnings would have been posted.
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