Thanks for posting, Jeff.
Deggesty Is telling lies to Congress a crime punishable by a prison sentence? Though, perhaps the congressman simply is insulated from the reality of what has been done by the railroads?
Is telling lies to Congress a crime punishable by a prison sentence? Though, perhaps the congressman simply is insulated from the reality of what has been done by the railroads?
It depends on who is telling the lies.
There is reality and then there is political reality. Usually they are not one and the same. Most politicians focus on and only worry about the political reality.
Jeff
Yes, Larry, you have two good points--ignorance of reality and and ignorance of how to learn the truth?
Johnny
DeggestyThough, perhaps the congressman simply is insulated from the reality of what has been done by the railroads?
I think it depends on the filters you're looking through. Ie, if you haven't completed something, you must be sandbagging. Far be it for someone with an agenda to acknowledge any realities.
And I'd imagine some staffer put together his notes for him...
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
jeffhergert Saw this today frpm Railway Age. https://www.railwayage.com/news/ptc-ignore-circus-heres-whats-really-going/ Jeff
Saw this today frpm Railway Age.
https://www.railwayage.com/news/ptc-ignore-circus-heres-whats-really-going/
Yard Limit rules are rarely made effective in territory that is NORMALLY CTC territory. I personally have not heard of Yard Limit Rules being placed in effect when Signal Suspensions happen in yard areas that are normally operated with CTC.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Someone can check positively to see if Silica Siding involves Yard Limits; I can't do it on this Family Unfriendly Comments phone.
http://www.multimodalways.org/docs/railroads/companies/CSX/CSX%20ETTs/CSX%20Florence%20Div%20ETT%20%235%201-1-2008.pdf
Here is a PDF copy of the Florence Division ETT from 2008. The Columbia Sub starts on p.67. I do not know, of course, if there have been material changes in that area since then, and someone with a more recent or current ETT should consult it as a check and then comment on any significant difference that may exist.
I have not read the government regs dealing with PTC so what I say may be wrong. The feds mandated PTC without any funding. The railroads in concert with the signal companies had to design a uniform PTC system so trains could operate anywhere (Amtrak). This all takes time. Next all kinds of approvals from a myrid of agencies must be obtained before construction commences. Just look at BNSF getting approval from the Indian tribes and FCC to put a radio tower next to their track. Hopefully the system will be operational by year end.
Electroliner 1935 jeffhergert 2. The crew ensures movement will not: a. Exceed the limit of the train’s authority. b. Exceed the train’s length. c. Enter or foul a private or public crossing except as provided by Rule 6.32.1 (Providing Warning Over Road Crossings). d. Be made into or within yard limits, restricted limits, interlocking limits, drawbridges, railroad crossings at grade, or track bulletin Form B limits. When movement is made under these conditions, restricted speed does not apply. Trains backing up under the provisions of this rule may pass signals indicating Stop and Proceed, without stopping. Jeff Something seems wrong with this wording. Was not the freight train within a yard hence yard limits, and how is blindly backing up a train safe?
jeffhergert 2. The crew ensures movement will not: a. Exceed the limit of the train’s authority. b. Exceed the train’s length. c. Enter or foul a private or public crossing except as provided by Rule 6.32.1 (Providing Warning Over Road Crossings). d. Be made into or within yard limits, restricted limits, interlocking limits, drawbridges, railroad crossings at grade, or track bulletin Form B limits. When movement is made under these conditions, restricted speed does not apply. Trains backing up under the provisions of this rule may pass signals indicating Stop and Proceed, without stopping. Jeff
Something seems wrong with this wording. Was not the freight train within a yard hence yard limits, and how is blindly backing up a train safe?
Yard Limits are specified by the ETT. Just the existance of a yard does not create Yard Limits. In some cases Yard Limits are specified for a single track that has no yard anywhere within the limits of the single track.
jeffhergert2. The crew ensures movement will not: a. Exceed the limit of the train’s authority. b. Exceed the train’s length. c. Enter or foul a private or public crossing except as provided by Rule 6.32.1 (Providing Warning Over Road Crossings). d. Be made into or within yard limits, restricted limits, interlocking limits, drawbridges, railroad crossings at grade, or track bulletin Form B limits. When movement is made under these conditions, restricted speed does not apply. Trains backing up under the provisions of this rule may pass signals indicating Stop and Proceed, without stopping. Jeff
Electroliner 1935 daveklepper After that train is entirely on the main, and the switch is restored, the train can slowly back down on the main to pick up the crewman to avoid his having to walk the length of the consist, since the train that past gives some assurance of a cear track. You would have a train back up with no one observing the move? The lawyers would have a field day. Better to leave the switch lined for the siding and have the dispatcher have the next train ordered to stop and line it for their train. I have just posted this without seeing any posts since Tuesday.
daveklepper After that train is entirely on the main, and the switch is restored, the train can slowly back down on the main to pick up the crewman to avoid his having to walk the length of the consist, since the train that past gives some assurance of a cear track.
You would have a train back up with no one observing the move? The lawyers would have a field day. Better to leave the switch lined for the siding and have the dispatcher have the next train ordered to stop and line it for their train. I have just posted this without seeing any posts since Tuesday.
GCOR Rule 6.6 allows for unprotected back up movements under certain conditions. It used to be titled Backing up to pick up a crewmember but has been revised. The rule cited is basic GCOR, UP's rule has a bit more to it, but allows backing up without point protection. (I tried to copy UP's rule but it jumbles it up. To see it for yourself go here: https://www.up.com/ert/gcor.pdf
6.6 Back Up Movements
After obtaining permission from the train dispatcher, a train may back up on any main track or on any track where CTC is in effect under the following conditions:
1. The train dispatcher must verify the following within the same or overlapping limits: a. Another authority is not in effect unless conflicting movements are protected. b. A track bulletin Form B is not in effect. c. A main track is not removed from service by a track bulletin. d. Permission to leave a switch in the reverse position has not been granted.
2. The crew ensures movement will not: a. Exceed the limit of the train’s authority. b. Exceed the train’s length. c. Enter or foul a private or public crossing except as provided by Rule 6.32.1 (Providing Warning Over Road Crossings). d. Be made into or within yard limits, restricted limits, interlocking limits, drawbridges, railroad crossings at grade, or track bulletin Form B limits.
When movement is made under these conditions, restricted speed does not apply. Trains backing up under the provisions of this rule may pass signals indicating Stop and Proceed, without stopping.
daveklepper2. The responsibility for aligning and locking and reporting switch positions is the responsibility of both crews, both the train in the siding and the train holding the main.
But this was accounted for in the formulation of, and the discussions regarding, EO 24 back toward the turn of the millennium. Making the train holding the main necessarily responsible for all switch positions makes something of a mockery out of the whole idea of TWC in the first place. Of course it is 'safe', but spiking the switches (and inherently requiring MOW presence and assistance, and additional representation on SPAF, for any intermediate switching moves) is safer still and avoids all the rigmarole in crawling along as if this were still 1845 and no one knew to telegraph ahead to check switch positions.
If you spend any time looking at what the CSX train was doing spotting its train, you will I think recognize why it couldn't 'shove back to pick up the conductor'.
An essential point to remember here is that the EO 24 procedures should have prevented this accident, and would have prevented it if executed as mandated. We have yet to see exactly what went wrong, and who might be involved, and I don't want to start 'assessing blame' the way we love to do here, but it's pretty clear that the mandated procedure to ensure switch positions before granting track authority was not correctly followed. And I continue to think that fixing that procedure to 'patch' where it may turn out to have failed is a far more important approach than defaulting to slow and uncertain operations, at least for railroads that want to have their cake and eat it too during signal suppressions.
Further thouoghts: Even without the two-man verification proposed for temporary dark territory, there is no way to avoid a crew member having to walk the length of the consists unless:
1. There is a three-man crew
Or
2. The responsibility for aligning and locking and reporting switch positions is the responsility of Both crews, Both the train in the siding and the train holding the main.
So my question now is the latter, the second above, the normal procedure on dark CSX lines? That would involve safe operation if every train had a crew who knew the location of all switches and then cotrolled the train to be prepared to stop and throw and lock the siwtches for their needs. If this was normal for CSX in dark territory, then perhaps the crew of the CSX freight expected the Amtrak train to stop with its crew responsible for restoring the siwtch to straight! Nobody told them they had to realign the switch, and they simply reported to the dispatcher that their train was in the clear!
Again, temporarily dark lines require more consideration of safety than regularly dark lines.
Electrolioner, you are correct. That is why I came up with the simple two-crew-member solution, instead. And one man can remain in the cab while the other checks. It is a simple solution that would have prevented the latest tragedy. If one crew member thinks he restored the switch but didn't, a remote possiblity but one that appeared to have happened, the other will catch the mistake. Again, you are correct, and that is why I thought some more about the problem.
It was stated earlier by someone that Amtrak operates in Dark Territory. Can those locations be listed please?
Thinking some mroe about the problem. I should not have used the words "secure the train" in my sugestion, because that means handbreaks and the crew is not really leaving the train. Secondly, there are good reasons for at least one crew member to be in the cab at all times, one of the reasons for two-men mininum on the train. I think the problem of additional protection in a case where a signalled and/or train-controlled line is temporarily dark is the requirement that switch postions and two-line or multi-line crossing clearances be confirmed to the dispatcher by two crew members, not just one.
This requirement certainly would have prevented this latest tragedy.
And the tragedy did not occur in a case where it may most likely occur. That would be in a situation where crew members Never had experience in operating in dark territory. An electrified commuter line might be an example. With only one man on the front platform of the usual electric mu train. But the train does also have a conductor (and possibly other trainmen), and the same rule could apply.
What are the objections or limitations of such a rule? Again, to be applied only where signal and/or other safety protection is temporarily not working.
Aviation has similar multi-level flight rules.
Visual Flight Rules and Instrument Flight Rules. If and when instrumentation and/or the on ground facilities that support IFR aren't operational - be that planned or accidental - VFR becomes the means of flight in the area affected.
The basic level of flight that every pilot learns from day one is VFR. Learning IFR is an entire course of learning and flight training.
It certainly follows that installation in dark territory costs much more.
Could you call it "twilight" territory now?
jeffhergertI believe the Alaska Railroad has PTC on both signalled and otherwise dark segments of their line. https://www.alaskarailroad.com/sites/default/files/akrr_pdfs/2013_09_30_3Qtr_Rpt_PTC_PROJ.pdf https://www.alaskarailroad.com/sites/default/files/Communications/2016PositiveTrainControl.pdf Jeff
https://www.alaskarailroad.com/sites/default/files/akrr_pdfs/2013_09_30_3Qtr_Rpt_PTC_PROJ.pdf
https://www.alaskarailroad.com/sites/default/files/Communications/2016PositiveTrainControl.pdf
CSX has installed PTC on both Signalled and Dark territories.
From my limited knowledge, I believe more effort and money was invested per mile in putting PTC in Dark territory as all Main track switches had to be equipped with 'reporting technology', electricity and radio stations to transmit the reports.
Randy Stahl He's thinking of the ARES system. VOLKER LANDWEHR I think the promlem is that the railroads designed PTC as an overlay to the existing signal system. It depends on its functions. To connect the two you have to shut down the signals. BN once designed ACSES as a stand-alone kind of PTC. Track circuits are the best way to detect broken rails as required in 49 CFR 236.1005 (5) Another paragraph of this is the reason given by the railroads for the overlay design: § 236.1007 Additional requirements for high-speed service. (a) A PTC railroad that conducts a passenger operation at or greater than 60 miles per hour or a freight operation at or greater than 50 miles per hour shall have installed a PTC system including or working in concert with technology that includes all of the safety-critical functional attributes of a block signal system meeting the requirements of this part, including appropriate fouling circuits and broken rail detection (or equivalent safeguards). If this requirement really demanded for an overlay system or if a stand-alone with logic interconnection would have been possible I don't know. But even the temporary shut-down would have been necessary. Regards, Volker ACSES = Amtrak civil speed enforcement system. Not BN. ACSES is an overlay to ATC.
VOLKER LANDWEHR I think the promlem is that the railroads designed PTC as an overlay to the existing signal system. It depends on its functions. To connect the two you have to shut down the signals. BN once designed ACSES as a stand-alone kind of PTC. Track circuits are the best way to detect broken rails as required in 49 CFR 236.1005 (5) Another paragraph of this is the reason given by the railroads for the overlay design: § 236.1007 Additional requirements for high-speed service. (a) A PTC railroad that conducts a passenger operation at or greater than 60 miles per hour or a freight operation at or greater than 50 miles per hour shall have installed a PTC system including or working in concert with technology that includes all of the safety-critical functional attributes of a block signal system meeting the requirements of this part, including appropriate fouling circuits and broken rail detection (or equivalent safeguards). If this requirement really demanded for an overlay system or if a stand-alone with logic interconnection would have been possible I don't know. But even the temporary shut-down would have been necessary. Regards, Volker
I think the promlem is that the railroads designed PTC as an overlay to the existing signal system. It depends on its functions. To connect the two you have to shut down the signals.
BN once designed ACSES as a stand-alone kind of PTC.
Track circuits are the best way to detect broken rails as required in 49 CFR 236.1005 (5)
Another paragraph of this is the reason given by the railroads for the overlay design:
ACSES = Amtrak civil speed enforcement system. Not BN.
ACSES is an overlay to ATC.
Mechanical Department "No no that's fine shove that 20 pound set all around the yard... those shoes aren't hell and a half to change..."
The Missabe Road: Safety First
I believe the Alaska Railroad has PTC on both signalled and otherwise dark segments of their line.
Just when the discussion gets good I wind up out in the field on a phone that only shows two lines of text.
The two phrases separated by 'or' do have distinct meanings (even without applying Talmudic logic); they blur somewhat because the underlying assumption is that all PTC must take full cognizance of things most easily implemented with physical, robust track circuits, including the items in 1005 and elsewhere in the relevant sections that are partially cited in 1007.
Had the block-location logic of PTC been implemented modularly separate from the track-circuit-detection part, it would be relatively easy to 'harmonize' (as the ITU would say) CBTC with open-switch and broken-rail detection, etc. Instead we get the current 'overlay' paradigm taking the most limiting assumptions behind ABS and forcing them onto what should be a much more capable, flexible, and redundant system.
I would argue that had PTC been developed as a synergistic modular system addressing the various 'core requirements' more directly, some means of reading the switch positions or status wirelessly as well as via the CTC machine could easily be provided without a formal signal suppression. And these then used with the GPS-based mutual train location part of PTC so that trains can run during an actual suppression -- even if the suppression is to tie other contacts in the same position sensor into the track circuits -- with positive, default safety against unexpected facing-point mislines.
I have looked for information about CBCT and found this website: https://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/P0358
The FRA definition from this site:CBTC (Communications-Based Train Control): A vital stand-alone Positive Train Control (PTC) system, as defined in 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 236, Subpart I, Section 236.1015(e)(3). CBTC replaces the existing traffic control method of operation by requesting an override of the wayside signal system to display a Flashing Green or Flashing Yellow (if the green aspect does not illuminate) signal aspect. (Type Approved and Certified by FRA.)
And the referenced law:§ 236.1015 PTC Safety Plan content requirements and PTC System Certification.(e) The following additional requirements apply to:
(3)Stand-alone. A PTC system proposed on a newly constructed track, an existing track for which no signal system exists, as a replacement for an existing signal or train control system, or otherwise to replace or materially modify the existing method of operation, shall:
(i) Reliably execute the functions required by § 236.1005 and be demonstrated to do so to FRA's satisfaction; and
(ii) Have a PTCSP establishing, with a high degree of confidence, that the system will not introduce new hazards that have not been mitigated. The supporting risk assessment shall evaluate all intended changes in railroad operations in relation to the introduction of the new system and shall examine in detail the direct and indirect effects of all changes in the method of operations.
If I read all this correctly there was a different approach than the overlay possible and got certified by the FRA. Regards, Volker
OvermodIf the technology actually involves block-signal equipment, then 'including' and 'working in concert with' are really similar in requiring full interfacing with equipment that has been adapted (for example by providing one-bulb one-aspect heads throughout) for that purpose.
I believe including or working in concert with open different ways to same goal, having the signaling system as an additional safety feature. As fall-back system?
The railroads made dependend on the signaling system (including). The other way is to have stand-alone system that interconnects with the signaling system, by comparing the different system's indications and decide what to allow.
OvermodIt will have occurred to you that the PTC 'mandate' involves at least four core functionalities that are not well-served by any one physical system, and hence that "PTC" itself is best provided by a coordinated software approach running across different physical systems -- one of which would likely include the pre-existing portions of an ABS installation that provide its track sensing and power, since there is a recognizable benefit in time and cost to re-using as much of that infrastructure as possible.
Sure, that was the reason why PTC was mandated. But PTC could handle it alone without the implementation of the signaling system. For some necessary detections it would be the easiest way to keep the track circuits.
The stand-alone would have saved the costs for a lot new signals und it would have allowed business benefits that the implemented system doesn't allow.
I think the decision was made because the design of the implemented system seemed easier and faster to accomplish considering the dead line not because of §236.1007 (a) requirements.Regards, Volker
BaltACDMy practical understanding of 'including or working in concert' are two ways of saying the same thing and thus giving lawyers something to argue about in the law suits that will result when an accident is pinned on PTC failure.
My experience with standards show that the word or indicates a different approach. But I have to admit that my experience is limited to European standards. That is the reason for asking. And European standards are not put in laws.
I remember an editorial in RailwayAge: https://www.railwayage.com/cs/the-tangled-tale-of-ptc/?RAchannel=home
and Wick Moormans rebuttal: https://www.railwayage.com/regulatory/untangling-the-tale-of-ptc/?RAchannel=home
I couldn't believe that the experts had overlooked the requirement to implement the signal system. So I looked for the wording. Since I found it, I'm not sure how to understand Wick Moorman's answer, an explanation or an excuse, naturally from my European viewpoint.Regards, Volker
What would be the safety equivalent of three-point train-being worked-on protection for switch locking safety? Here might be a possible suggestion, based on what I observed on the B&M some 65 years ago, but adapted to a two-man crew: This applies to the specific situation of the train backed into the siding and awaiting a meet with a train passing by on the main line in either diretion. After securing the train, both crew members exit the cab. The switch is restored and locked and reported to the dispatcher. One crew member remains stationed on each side of the track and performs a roll-by inspection of the passing train. If the wait is longer than a specific time, the crew can wait in the cab but must return to perform the ground level roll-by some five minutes or more before the passing train arrivves. After it clears, the switch is reset for the siding, one reboards the cab, the other remains behind to restore the switch. After that train is entirely on the main, and the switch is restored, the train can slowly back down on the main to pick up the crewman to avoid his having to walk the length of the consist, since the train that past gives some assurance of a cear track. If the weather is too horrible for this procedure, with health being an issure, then additional speed restridtions may be in order.
Your critiques will be of interest.
n012944 I agree. Did whoever reported to the Dispatcher that the switch was restored actually do the restoration? Did he or she personally check physically to see the switch restored? Is there any assurance that someone with a switch key that wished to perform sabatogue (very unlikely, but a lawyer can bring up the possibility) did not lock the switch in the reverse position after the switch was restored? Going dark on a heavily-traveled rout that usually has signal protection would seem to require a bit more attention to safety than on a regularly dark rout. Am I mistaken in this? Also, I am still unhappy that the Brotherhood did not regester a complaint to the Feds when HH removed 3-point protection. Perhaps that could have been the beginning of a lessening of Safety-First culture at CSX that indirectly could lead to a disaster like the most recent we are discussing? I am asking this as a question. And what is the status of 3-point protection on CSX today? daveklepper Correction. Amtrak running in dark territory every day is not a problem, because the specific tasks of each individual involved are known and practised repeatedly. So is restoring a mainline switch.....
I agree. Did whoever reported to the Dispatcher that the switch was restored actually do the restoration? Did he or she personally check physically to see the switch restored? Is there any assurance that someone with a switch key that wished to perform sabatogue (very unlikely, but a lawyer can bring up the possibility) did not lock the switch in the reverse position after the switch was restored?
Going dark on a heavily-traveled rout that usually has signal protection would seem to require a bit more attention to safety than on a regularly dark rout. Am I mistaken in this?
Also, I am still unhappy that the Brotherhood did not regester a complaint to the Feds when HH removed 3-point protection. Perhaps that could have been the beginning of a lessening of Safety-First culture at CSX that indirectly could lead to a disaster like the most recent we are discussing? I am asking this as a question. And what is the status of 3-point protection on CSX today?
daveklepper Correction. Amtrak running in dark territory every day is not a problem, because the specific tasks of each individual involved are known and practised repeatedly.
Correction. Amtrak running in dark territory every day is not a problem, because the specific tasks of each individual involved are known and practised repeatedly.
So is restoring a mainline switch.....
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