Quoting Euclid: " Maybe there are forms to sign to certify the verbal information but I am not familiar with any of that. In any case, that part appears to have failed."
Euclid, apparently you missed all the references to the form in the various posts that referred to the form. Can someone tell me how many times the forms have been mentioned on the threads concerning this wreck?
It is not the signing of the forms that failed. It is either the failure of the person responsible to align the switch for the main to so align it, or else someone with a switch key came along and maliciously lined it back to the siding.
Johnny
zugmann Euclid So, to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong. An approach speed. Define that. Are we operating the whole block restricting? Or just near the switches? How far in advance? As any day 1 RRer can tell you, "restricted" is not a speed. It's a method of operation. Can't just throw the term around willy-nilly.
Euclid So, to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong.
An approach speed. Define that. Are we operating the whole block restricting? Or just near the switches? How far in advance? As any day 1 RRer can tell you, "restricted" is not a speed. It's a method of operation. Can't just throw the term around willy-nilly.
It is whatever speed and location where that speed is stipulated that accomplishes the goal that I defined in this part of my prior post:
"to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong."
Euclid"to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong."
Gald you don't write the rules.
Using the term "approach speed" is odd.
Either make the block restricting, or have a requirment to prepare to stop before each facing point. See? Much simpler. Or have maintainers out to man each switch that needs used. Or did EHH fire all of them, too?
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.
Murphy Siding Euclid I am talking about rule-defined “restricted speed.” If the switch points are visible at 250 feet, you approach no faster than the speed at which you can stop within 125 feet. As I understand it, the switch position would have been known to the dispatcher if the signals had not been suspended. Being that they were suspended, the dispatcher had to rely on verbal information conveyed by the freight conductor. Maybe there are forms to sign to certify the verbal information but I am not familiar with any of that. In any case, that part appears to have failed. It reminds me of the Chester wreck where permission was granted, but expired without proper information exchanges and understandings. In any case, it sounds like it was mainly or exclusively switch position verification that was compromised in the suspension of signals. So, to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong. Would that be a problematic disruption? How many miles of track, how many switches, and for how many days are we talking about? At what speed would they be able to stop the train in 125 feet? To keep from having a restricted speed that varied with the visibility available for each switch, you'd probably just end up rolling along at whatever the most restricted speed was.
Euclid I am talking about rule-defined “restricted speed.” If the switch points are visible at 250 feet, you approach no faster than the speed at which you can stop within 125 feet. As I understand it, the switch position would have been known to the dispatcher if the signals had not been suspended. Being that they were suspended, the dispatcher had to rely on verbal information conveyed by the freight conductor. Maybe there are forms to sign to certify the verbal information but I am not familiar with any of that. In any case, that part appears to have failed. It reminds me of the Chester wreck where permission was granted, but expired without proper information exchanges and understandings. In any case, it sounds like it was mainly or exclusively switch position verification that was compromised in the suspension of signals. So, to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong. Would that be a problematic disruption? How many miles of track, how many switches, and for how many days are we talking about?
Would that be a problematic disruption? How many miles of track, how many switches, and for how many days are we talking about?
At what speed would they be able to stop the train in 125 feet? To keep from having a restricted speed that varied with the visibility available for each switch, you'd probably just end up rolling along at whatever the most restricted speed was.
That is up to the judgment of the engineer. As others have said, "restricted speed" it is not a specific speed. It is defined by the objective to stop short of something, and can vary according to train, grades, weather, etc.
So you're calling for restricted speed, which on my railroad carries the caveat "not to exceed 20 MPH."
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EuclidThat is up to the judgment of the engineer. As others have said, "restricted speed" it is not a specific speed. It is defined by the objective to stop short of something, and can vary according to train, grades, weather, etc.
Stop short of some things - look our for others.
zugmann Euclid "to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong." Gald you don't write the rules. Using the term "approach speed" is odd. Either make the block restricting, or have a requirment to prepare to stop before each facing point. See? Much simpler. Or have maintainers out to man each switch that needs used. Or did EHH fire all of them, too?
Euclid "to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong."
Well as long as you understand what I mean, you can put it into the right words. I am only concerned with saying what needs to be accomplished.
zugmann Euclid "to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong." Gald you don't write the rules. Using the term "approach speed" is odd. Either make the block restricting, or have a requirment to prepare to stop before each facing point. See? Much simpler.
Either make the block restricting, or have a requirment to prepare to stop before each facing point. See? Much simpler.
Maybe he is a no experience weed weasel trying to hang everybody with his interpertation of how the rules are written and specified 'in his minds rule book', not the one that a railroad has published and teaches for its employees.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Euclid Murphy Siding Euclid I am talking about rule-defined “restricted speed.” If the switch points are visible at 250 feet, you approach no faster than the speed at which you can stop within 125 feet. As I understand it, the switch position would have been known to the dispatcher if the signals had not been suspended. Being that they were suspended, the dispatcher had to rely on verbal information conveyed by the freight conductor. Maybe there are forms to sign to certify the verbal information but I am not familiar with any of that. In any case, that part appears to have failed. It reminds me of the Chester wreck where permission was granted, but expired without proper information exchanges and understandings. In any case, it sounds like it was mainly or exclusively switch position verification that was compromised in the suspension of signals. So, to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong. Would that be a problematic disruption? How many miles of track, how many switches, and for how many days are we talking about? At what speed would they be able to stop the train in 125 feet? To keep from having a restricted speed that varied with the visibility available for each switch, you'd probably just end up rolling along at whatever the most restricted speed was. That is up to the judgment of the engineer. As others have said, "restricted speed" it is not a specific speed. It is defined by the objective to stop short of something, and can vary according to train, grades, weather, etc.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
EuclidWell as long as you understand what I mean, you can put it into the right words. I am only concerned with saying what needs to be accomplished.
We all know what needs to be accomplished. But getting there IS the battle.
But assuming you know what a rule means is the fatest way to get written up for it. But at least you'll learn what it really means, I guess.
Deggesty Quoting Euclid: " Maybe there are forms to sign to certify the verbal information but I am not familiar with any of that. In any case, that part appears to have failed." Euclid, apparently you missed all the references to the form in the various posts that referred to the form. Can someone tell me how many times the forms have been mentioned on the threads concerning this wreck? It is not the signing of the forms that failed. It is either the failure of the person responsible to align the switch for the main to so align it, or else someone with a switch key came along and maliciously lined it back to the siding.
At least a million is how many times forms have been mentioned in the threads about this wreck. I don't know what failed besides the position of the switch. All I recall is that the conductor basically confirmed that they had finished their work involving the switch. And I guess that there is an implication there that the switch had been properly re-lined for the main line. However, as I understand what Balt said, the suspension of signals also suspended the means of the dispatcher confiming that the switch was actually properly lined.
So maybe we should go back to that point and revisit the issue of how the switch was wrong and nobody knew it.
Overmod Euclid That does not answer my question which you highlighted in red. Why is dark territory sufficient for a line that has been deemed necessary to signalize? I'm not sure I understand the point of this question. The line WAS signalized, but what do you do if the signals then stop working for some reason? Quit and go home in the van until they light up again? No, you go to the procedures in the CSX rules and the Florence Division employee timetable -- which in this particular case resembles the procedure used for permanently-unsignaled line because, in a suspension, the signals may not be "dark" but you ignore anything about them. Now, this has no bearing on suspending observation of EO 24, which calls for holograph confirmation of safe switch lining in ANY circumstance (which is a CYA formality) but also explicit confirmation to the manual-rules dispatcher that all the actions and conditions required to be signed off on that CYA form have, in fact, been completely done. This specific thing, which after discussion was adopted as a Federal Rule specifically to prevent JUST this kind of incident, is the great concern here, and its evident failure the great mystery here, not anything to do with railroaders supposedly being unable to run trains in the absence of pretty colored lights.
Euclid That does not answer my question which you highlighted in red. Why is dark territory sufficient for a line that has been deemed necessary to signalize?
I'm not sure I understand the point of this question. The line WAS signalized, but what do you do if the signals then stop working for some reason? Quit and go home in the van until they light up again? No, you go to the procedures in the CSX rules and the Florence Division employee timetable -- which in this particular case resembles the procedure used for permanently-unsignaled line because, in a suspension, the signals may not be "dark" but you ignore anything about them.
Now, this has no bearing on suspending observation of EO 24, which calls for holograph confirmation of safe switch lining in ANY circumstance (which is a CYA formality) but also explicit confirmation to the manual-rules dispatcher that all the actions and conditions required to be signed off on that CYA form have, in fact, been completely done.
This specific thing, which after discussion was adopted as a Federal Rule specifically to prevent JUST this kind of incident, is the great concern here, and its evident failure the great mystery here, not anything to do with railroaders supposedly being unable to run trains in the absence of pretty colored lights.
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Euclid oltmannd Euclid So why not impose something to fully compensate the loss of safety on the signal suspension, and thus retain the same safety level as before the signal suspension? Dark territory rules attempt to do exactly this. That's why the lower speeds. That's why the "belt and suspenders" rules on switch position. The safest course would be to not run the train. The next safest course would be to run the whole thing at restricted speed. Of course, there is a need for railroads to actually function as transportation, so dark territory is allowed and the rules are codified and judged by the Federal regulators as adequate for safety. Why is it that when I suggest a little more safety, people say, “Well we could just stop running trains” ? Is there not a happy medium? Obviously a restriction to 59 mph was not slow enough. The OP here spoke of a system for guaranteed control over power grid switches and wondered why the railroads don’t have something equivalent. He was immediately assured that they do have something equivalent; and yet that was not the case at the time and place of this collision. Rather than shut the railroad down, why not impose a restricted speed order on approach to mainline switches? Would that be just too much perfection?
oltmannd Euclid So why not impose something to fully compensate the loss of safety on the signal suspension, and thus retain the same safety level as before the signal suspension? Dark territory rules attempt to do exactly this. That's why the lower speeds. That's why the "belt and suspenders" rules on switch position. The safest course would be to not run the train. The next safest course would be to run the whole thing at restricted speed. Of course, there is a need for railroads to actually function as transportation, so dark territory is allowed and the rules are codified and judged by the Federal regulators as adequate for safety.
Euclid So why not impose something to fully compensate the loss of safety on the signal suspension, and thus retain the same safety level as before the signal suspension?
Dark territory rules attempt to do exactly this. That's why the lower speeds. That's why the "belt and suspenders" rules on switch position.
The safest course would be to not run the train.
The next safest course would be to run the whole thing at restricted speed.
Of course, there is a need for railroads to actually function as transportation, so dark territory is allowed and the rules are codified and judged by the Federal regulators as adequate for safety.
Rather than shut the railroad down, why not impose a restricted speed order on approach to mainline switches? Would that be just too much perfection?
A little reality check. Balt, and common-sense understanding of how the signal system works, will tell you that if the facing point switch is open in block it will inform the ENGINEER, via s red board in the face, not the dispatcher.
Euclid: google FRA Emergency Order 24, and be sure you have read and carefully comprehended both the comments filed when it was first proposed (after Graniteville) and the FULL text of the final rule as published in the Federal Register. That will make you enough of an expert on the 'forms' to comment on the details intelligently, particularly as involves notifying dispatchers when operating under some version of track-warrant control.
Rest of you: leave him alone until he has done all that. Then we can reduce it to reading comprehension relative to the actual words in the actual Final Rule that applies anywhere, Florence Division, signal suspension, or whatever.
OvermodA little reality check. Balt, and common-sense understanding of how the signal system works, will tell you that if the facing point switch is open in block it will inform the ENGINEER, via s red board in the face, not the dispatcher.
DS will have a TOL. Engineer will also know there is something in the block ahead. But unless you have an actual switch signal (Pennsy had those at one time), all you know is that there is something in the block.
tree68 Euclid "to address that narrow problem, all I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong." So you're calling for restricted speed, which on my railroad carries the caveat "not to exceed 20 MPH."
...20 mph because that's about as fast as you can go before your are "outdriving your vision".
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
zugmann Overmod A little reality check. Balt, and common-sense understanding of how the signal system works, will tell you that if the facing point switch is open in block it will inform the ENGINEER, via s red board in the face, not the dispatcher. DS will have a TOL. Engineer will also know there is something in the block ahead. But unless you have an actual switch signal (Pennsy had those at one time), all you know is that there is something in the block.
Overmod A little reality check. Balt, and common-sense understanding of how the signal system works, will tell you that if the facing point switch is open in block it will inform the ENGINEER, via s red board in the face, not the dispatcher.
+1
Since when have reality and common sense entered Euclid's world?
Euclidall I am suggesting is to impose an approach speed to switches which will enable engineers to spot the switch points and stop short if they are wrong."
So, you are expecting every engineer running what is normally CTC territory to remember exactly where every single facing point hand throw is on their territory? What do you think the error rate with this procedure would be?
zugmann ... But unless you have an actual switch signal (Pennsy had those at one time), all you know is that there is something in the block.
And the way you know this, say if you're approaching the block at 59mph, is how?
Euclid's argument doesn't care if the engineer knows it's an unlined switch vs. a standing train vs. lightning cycling the relays wrong. The important thing is that he will have a red board, and whatever rules he follows from that point could safely involve Euclid's creeping along at real restricted speed ... to the next clear block. That might not be intolerable.
OvermodAnd the way you know this, say if you're approaching the block at 59mph, is how? Euclid's argument doesn't care if the engineer knows it's an unlined switch vs. a standing train vs. lightning cycling the relays wrong. The important thing is that he will have a red board, and whatever rules he follows from that point could safely involve Euclid's creeping along at real restricted speed ... to the next clear block. That might not be intolerable.
I don't know what you're trying to ask here. Yeah, if you have a signal, then it would be restrictive. If you don't have a signal, you are running paper railroad. If you don't like the idea of paper railroad - then so be it.
WAIT A MINUTE ... nobody move!
I want Euclid to explain in his own words what a TOL is, and how it is generated.
No hints, either.
Overmod WAIT A MINUTE ... nobody move! I want Euclid to explain in his own words what a TOL is, and how it is generated. No hints, either.
Well I am just guessing, but I think it might mean "Track Occupied Light" and it lights up on the dispatcher's board when a switch is opened, and it indicates the block facing the points is occupied. But if I am wrong, I am hoping someone will chime in with the right answer.
EuclidBut if I am wrong...
Bucky wrong? How can that be?
Don't guess; research it. If you are going to speculate about what something does you should research how it works.
This could take a while, cue the jeopardy music!
I'll make some popcorn...
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
Murphy Siding zugmann Overmod A little reality check. Balt, and common-sense understanding of how the signal system works, will tell you that if the facing point switch is open in block it will inform the ENGINEER, via s red board in the face, not the dispatcher. DS will have a TOL. Engineer will also know there is something in the block ahead. But unless you have an actual switch signal (Pennsy had those at one time), all you know is that there is something in the block. TOL?
TOL?
Trolling Out Loud. I'm just guessing, I didn't research that.
Jeff
PS. The terminology I hear is close, but just a bit different. I imagine just like other things, it depends on where you are for the terms in use.
SD70Dude This could take a while, cue the jeopardy music! I'll make some popcorn...
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