March 1965 Trains had an excellent and lengthy article about the reasons and process for the NYC's removal or surplus track:
http://trc.trains.com/Train%20Magazine%20Index.aspx?view=ViewIssue&issueId=5890
- Paul North.
We all have our "what ifs" and "if onlys." Even if things had happened differently, I really think the railroad map of today wouldn't be that much different. Maybe some lines might have wound up into a different system than they did, but we would still have a few major carriers and a multitude of short lines/regionals operating what the big boys didn't want.
Maybe because of a different arranging of the companies, some main lines that were lost would still be in use. The flip side could also be true, that some lines active today may not have survived with the different pairings.
Jeff
mudchicken USRA's reports (preliminary and final system plans) can be found on Multimodalways site. By the time they got involved, PC had already failed. They tried to save some lines by making them available to other roads while still keeping a competitive balance, but pre-Staggers costs killed that option off. Also, the east coast bias was pretty obvious in the report. Some lines in Indiana and Illinois were not even mentioned.
USRA's reports (preliminary and final system plans) can be found on Multimodalways site. By the time they got involved, PC had already failed. They tried to save some lines by making them available to other roads while still keeping a competitive balance, but pre-Staggers costs killed that option off. Also, the east coast bias was pretty obvious in the report. Some lines in Indiana and Illinois were not even mentioned.
USRA, was created as a result of the 3R Act of '73, which in itself was in response to the PC bankruptcy in '70. The Midwest lines may have been ignored in the report but since they (USRA) were responsible for setting up CR's maintenance and spending plans for the first couple of years they had to be on their radar screen. USRA was also responsible for dolling out the Federal recovery $ to CR. The whole scheme is reputed to be the brainchild of Frank Barnett, UP's chairman.
Don't forget that Conrail had a monopoly on meaningful rail freight in the Northeastern US (I'm not taking a stance on whether this was a good or bad outcome, BTW). Had either the NYC, Erie-Lackawanna, or PRR been given the same situation and been allowed to strip the existing plant of the three systems down to a useful core, I would guess that any one of the three entities would have wound up looking very much like Conrail in 1997. The economics of transportation would eventually have taken their course one way or the other.
"IF" the NYC had survived I wonder waht paint color and scheme they would have used? An SD70Ace or ES44AC in jade green would have looked sharp.
greyhounds BaltACD History is what it is - It cannot be reveresed. That is very true. But we can learn from past mistakes and try to avoid them in the future.
BaltACD History is what it is - It cannot be reveresed.
That is very true.
But we can learn from past mistakes and try to avoid them in the future.
Amen! In this amateur historians opinion it's the main, if not the ONLY reason to study history. Learn from the mistakes of the past and try your best NOT to repeat them. Learn what works and what doesn't, why it works and why it doesn't, for all the various reasons involved.
Every thing else is what I call the "fun stuff."
ruderunner Funny how the govt let CR do what they neeeded to do but for years prevented the northeast railroads from doing the same thing. Might have prevented the formation on CR in the first place.
Funny how the govt let CR do what they neeeded to do but for years prevented the northeast railroads from doing the same thing. Might have prevented the formation on CR in the first place.
What I think is being forgotten is the process of conveyance of routes from the bankrupt properties to CR. A government entity, USRA (forget what the full name was) was established to examine the potential profitability of each and every line of those properties. Only those lines deemed to have profitability potential were conveyed. So many of the abandments associated with the formation of CR were dictated by a unit of government not at CR's request.
I once had a copy of USRA's final report with a summary of the information for each analyzed line segment but it's lost in time. Have a friend that worked on the process a a young engineer.
dakotafredAnd their flagships both ran off New York-Chicago in the same 16 hours flat. Wonder who had the cost advantage, PRR or NYC?
As late as 1967, the Broadway managed the eastbound run in 15 1/2 hours (westbound 16).
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
schlimm caldreamer I agree that the NYC route was a flatter route (no mountains to climb) to the east coast, BUT it was a lot longer than the PRR route over the Horseshoe Curve. across to Buffalo and Albany, then down the Hudson River to New York, whereas the PRR ran to Columbus to Harrisburg, Philadelphia and New York almost direct line. PRR was 907 miles, with many curves and grades while NYC was 970 miles, largely flat and many tangent stretches. Obviously the "Water Level Route" wasn't just superior for a better, quieter night passenger ride (as Wanswheel's) period ad/poster reminds us), but easier for freight as well.
caldreamer I agree that the NYC route was a flatter route (no mountains to climb) to the east coast, BUT it was a lot longer than the PRR route over the Horseshoe Curve. across to Buffalo and Albany, then down the Hudson River to New York, whereas the PRR ran to Columbus to Harrisburg, Philadelphia and New York almost direct line.
I agree that the NYC route was a flatter route (no mountains to climb) to the east coast, BUT it was a lot longer than the PRR route over the Horseshoe Curve. across to Buffalo and Albany, then down the Hudson River to New York, whereas the PRR ran to Columbus to Harrisburg, Philadelphia and New York almost direct line.
PRR was 907 miles, with many curves and grades while NYC was 970 miles, largely flat and many tangent stretches. Obviously the "Water Level Route" wasn't just superior for a better, quieter night passenger ride (as Wanswheel's) period ad/poster reminds us), but easier for freight as well.
And their flagships both ran off New York-Chicago in the same 16 hours flat. Wonder who had the cost advantage, PRR or NYC? (Or maybe it was a horse apiece.)
BaltACDHistory is what it is - It cannot be reveresed.
History is what it is - It cannot be reveresed.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
And what would have happened, had the NYC and ATSF merged to form a coast-to-coast line, say, New York, Chicago & Santa Fe, in the 1960s? NYC would still have needed to offload the NE commuter line costs and eliminate the unprofitable branch lines, but the resulting road would not have been saddled with the EL, LV, NH, PRR, Reading, and other messes that Conrail had to contend with. Perhaps the 60s were too early for coast-to-coast to achieve critical mass. But the concept is intriguing.
ruderunnerFunny how the govt let CR do what they neeeded to do but for years prevented the northeast railroads from doing the same thing.
It took a crisis to get the government's attention. It wasn't until Conrail told congress that unless there was deregulation Conrail would be a permanent drain on the US Treasury that things started to change for the better. Couple that with some knowledgeable economists working for the government who could actually explain things in terms politicans could understand and the chains of economic regulation were greatly loosened; if not entirely broken.
The New York Central is a hot button item for me. It was a creation of commerce that enabled more commerce. The men who created it built it from nothing into an engine of commerce that enabled economic growth and prosperity for the people of North America.
And it was destroyed. Largely, if not entirely, by ignorant government fools who knew not what they did.
One can only wonder what the NYC would look like if it had been allowed to: 1) continue the development of its innovative intermodal container system. A system started in the early 1920s as soon as highway trucks that could carry a decent load were available., 2) Continue to implement its "Freight, All Kinds" pricing plan (The old "Value of Commodity" plan was made obsolete by trucking but the government didn't understand that.), 3) Continue to develop marketing freight services through its forwarder subsidiary, Universal Carloading and Distributing; 4) Freely adjust its route structure to meet changing market needs; 5) Freely adjust and downsize its passenger operations as the market need for such services declined.
Until virtually the entire railroad system in the northeast US collapsed financially the government would allow none of this. The Feds needed to be hit over the head with a 2X4 before they would begin to think, let alone act.
ruderunner Funny how the govt let CR do what they needed to do but for years prevented the northeast railroads from doing the same thing.
Funny how the govt let CR do what they needed to do but for years prevented the northeast railroads from doing the same thing.
The difference being that it was "their" -- really our -- money in the game instead of that of mere stockholders. A scandalous record that should not be forgotten, lest we be tempted by the re-regulators.
Govt restrictions not withstanding, Perlman was making great strides in improving the NYC. Eliminating extra mainlines, consolodating yards, adding CTC etc. His plan was sound and had the PC not happened I'd bet the NYC would have been around for a much longer time. At lest until PRR collapsed and brought the northeast to a standstill anyways.
The NYC was on it's way to making it routes more like what Conrail ended up with from the NYC. Funny how the govt let CR do what they neeeded to do but for years prevented the northeast railroads from doing the same thing. Might have prevented the formation on CR in the first place.
Modeling the Cleveland and Pittsburgh during the PennCentral era starting on the Cleveland lakefront and ending in Mingo junction
caldreamer I did not know that the difference was only 63 mils. I would have to vote for the NYC. As you said water level and tangent grades. I live not far from the old PRR mailine near Harrisburg, PA and the run over the Alleghenny Mountains was a tough one. From Altoona to Gallitzen there are two percent grades. What is the maximum grade on the NYC (NY to Chicago)?
I did not know that the difference was only 63 mils. I would have to vote for the NYC. As you said water level and tangent grades. I live not far from the old PRR mailine near Harrisburg, PA and the run over the Alleghenny Mountains was a tough one. From Altoona to Gallitzen there are two percent grades. What is the maximum grade on the NYC (NY to Chicago)?
Conrail moved the traffic from the PRR route west of Pittsburgh up to the NYC at Cleveland, so the difference betwen the two routes grew to even less. The NYC had one short tough grade west of Albany out of the Hudson Valley. I think t was 1.7%
Gramp What if NYC+Penn hadn't been saddled with the New Haven?
What if NYC+Penn hadn't been saddled with the New Haven?
Editor Emeritus, This Week at Amtrak
I live in NW Indiana and my employer is located just west of CP482 (Porter). I literally park in the lot adjacent to the former NYC tracks. Further, I spend far too much time on the Chesterton webcam, watching the parade of trains.
Yes, it is a parade of Amtraks, hot UPS/intermodals, slower stacks (both international and domestic), a load of general freights, coal trains, ethanol tankers, oil tankers, unit grain trains, and who knows what else. Oh, let's not forget the giant industrial complex stretching from Burns Harbor west to the state line with several steel mills and refineries, plus local industries serving that complex.
Burns Harbor Yard runs a number of locals, several of which are dedicated steel shuttle trains. The bottle trains add yet more variety.
Had NYC been able to prune it's trackage and apply accepted railroad conditions such as the balance of the industry, I think it would have basically been a Chicago - Albany/Boston or New York and St. Louis to Cleveland (joining the Chicago line) with a few important secondary lines, such as Columbus to Cincinnati and Charleston WVa. In other words, it would have been very similar to Conrail....and probably would have been purchased.
The NYC in my estimation had superior routes from Chicago and St. Louis to the east coast...."The Water Level Route" if you will. Yes, it missed all the coal out of Pa and the steel mills of Pittsburgh, but those are on the decline.
The NYC out of Chicago is simply the main artery to the east coast. CSX has a pretty good route, particularly east of Cleveland (which is NYC), but most critical tonnage seems to move on the NYC lines.
As I was typing this, NS train B-09 just passed with 57 steel coil cars (empty) and a handful of gons with scrap metal. Those 57 cars will soon move eastward with 3 coils of steel moving less than 50 miles to I/Ntek Steel for processing. Who says short haul traffic cannot move? Imagine the pounding the highways would take from 150+ trucks of steel moving on US20?
Ed
JoeBlowIf I remember correctly, the NYC always derived most of its revenue from high value, time sensitive cargo and was hurt by the construction of the highways. I would imagine it would derive much of its revenues from inbound freight, bridge traffic and short-haul intermodal.
There is a big, important story here.
Yes, the New York Central was more dependant on high value, time sensative freight than other railroads. They early on recognized the threat of diversion to motor freight. And they came up with a solution to deal with that threat.
In the early 1920s, under the able direction of NYC railroad president Alfred Holland Smith, the NYC developed an intermodal container system that dropped their cost of moving high value containerized freight by 75%. That is not a typo on my part. There was a 75% cost reduction. And also improved service with dedicated container trains offering rapid, reliable, damage free transportation for high value goods. In the early 1920s!
The container service made the railroad fully competitive with the new highway mode. About 2/3 of the savings was passed through to the customer (who got better rail service at a lower cost) while the railroad hung on to about 1/3 of the savings. The customer got a lower price and better service. The railroad made more money. It was a win/win. Who could object to such a thing?
The fools of the US Government could object to such a thing. And they controlled railroad freight rates. In 1931 the stupid (there is no other word to accurately describe the actions) government economic regulators ordered an increase in the rail container rates. They were trying to preserve a "Rate Structure" that the advent of motor freight had already destroyed. The regulators, being the government lawyer/bureaucrat ignorant fools that they were, didn't understand that the elasticisity that the rate structure was based on had changed.
So the government ordered the container rates increased to a non-competitive level. And the New York Central, along with other railroads such as the Pennsylvania, couldn't use container service to compete with the truckers.
Eventually, some type of intermodal service was allowed. But it wasn't until 1981, a full 50 years after the initial fatal restriction, that all economic regulation was removed from intermodal freight. By then the nation's logistics system had been largely built around motor freight. The stupid government gave the truckers a 50 year head start.
I've seen a lot of pathetic excuses for the government's actions. None of them hold water. It was just plain ignorance and stupidity on the government's part.
What would an indepedent NYC look like today?
A bigger Iowa Interstate?
I'd have to review Loving to refresh my memory on the physical conditions of NYC vs. PRR. Re. finances at NYC, the story (from Loving) that sticks with me is of the first huddle of Perlman and Young after Perlman had been hired. As a welcome aboard, Young told Perlman there was enough money in the bank to meet the next payroll and that was it.
Undaunted, Perlman allowed that it was time to get to work!
Perlman did work miracles at NYC, but I think the tug was still irresistibly downward, as traced by Paul above. I don't know if anyone could have made a go of PC -- two sick giants trying to prop one another up -- but I can't help but think Perlman would have made a better fight of it than the vain, foolish and inept Saunders.
In the end, it was probably only the just-in-time investment of taxpayer money in a struggling Conrail that gave management the breathing room it needed to succeed and make today's franchise possible.
NYC may have been in better physical shape than PRR but it was still in weak financial shape. If the PC merger didn't happen, I'm not so sure that NYC would have avoided Chapter 77 although it may have happened a few years later.
New York Central routes weren't too badly affected by the initial iteration of Amtrak, getting stuck with Empire Service (GCT-Buffalo), Chicago-Cincinnati and Chicago-Detroit. GTW was not considered a reasonable alternative at the time. However, they would still have had a sizable suburban service north out of GCT plus a small Boston operation.
Freight traffic wasn't doing too well either. While NYC did promote its intermodal service, it was using Flexi-Van because of clearance issues and this limited interchange. The steel-related traffic on P&LE was a major contributor but even that was in decline.
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