About less than carload freight

[wanswheel]

Paul_D_North_Jr

Or was he sharp enough to have thought it up and worked it all out himself ?    

Paul, thanks again to you, sir. I wonder if Mrs. Smith's car was attached to a regular NY and Boston train that split at Albany. 

ALFRED HOLLAND SMITH (1863-), American railway official, was born in Cleveland, 0., April 26 1863. He began work on the New York Central railway system as a messenger-boy in 1879. After serving as a foreman of construction and in various capacities in the engineering department, he was in 1890 appointed superintendent of the Kalamazoo division of the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern railway. He was successively division superintendent, assistant general superintendent and general superintendent of the Lake Shore road. In 1902 he became general superintendent of the New York Central railroad; in 1906 vice-president of the New York Central system; and in 1914 president. When the American railways were taken over by the U.S. Government Dec. 27 1917, he was appointed assistant director-general and it was he who worked out the form of central and regional administration under which the railways of the country were managed during the 26 months of Government operation. His aim, in which he succeeded, was to keep the management of the roads with their 2,000,000 employees, nearly all voters, in the hands of practical railway-men and, above all, out of politics. He divided the country into two regions and later into seven, each region being in charge of a railway officer of experience and reputation, he himself taking charge of the most important region, the Eastern. These regional directors had complete authority and only broad matters of policy and inter-regional questions were handled by the central (political) administration at Washington. In this way the railways were conducted throughout the war without great blunders or disorganization. On the completion of this important national service he was reelected president of the New York Central Lines in June 1919. It was largely due to him that the New York Central Lines were greatly strengthened in operating efficiency and financial credit.

Title: RAILWAY ADVISORY BOARD. STANDING: HALE HOLDEN; EDWARD CHAMBERS; WALKER D. HINES; JOHN BARTON PAYNE; OSCAR E. PRICE. SEATED: A.H. SMITH; JOHN SKELTON WILLIAMS; HENRY WALTERS; W.G. McADOO

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/pnp/hec/10200/10239v.jpg

More about the bridge.

http://www.railarchive.net/nyccollection/greene_calendar_3292.htm

http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F70E17FE3B5511738DDDA80B94DB405B898DF1D3

Mike

[MP173]

Just ordered Organization and Traffic of the Illinois Central System thru Abe Books.

 

Thanks for the info Greyhound.

 

Ed

[wanswheel]

Just one more thing, said Columbo, the link to a patent granted in 1925 is supplemented by this link to a patent granted in 1922. I guess NYC's contract with the Post Office was proof to the Patent Office that "Smith's invention" was highly patentable.

http://www.google.com/patents?id=HvdNAAAAEBAJ&printsec=abstract&zoom=1#v=onepage&q&f=true;

Excerpts from Transportation (1940)

Most of the tonnage moved on the railroads consists of bulk freight transported in carload lots. The American railroad freight facilities, including the freight car, have been developed to accomplish the movement of heavy freight long distances at minimum cost per ton mile. There is, however, a not inconsiderable volume of less-than-carload and package freight for which appropriate terminal and transportation facilities have to be provided. Before the improved highways and the motor trucks transferred from rail to road half or more of this l.c.l. freight, it constituted about 5 per cent of railroad tonnage and yielded about 15 per cent of railroad freight revenues. While freight will continue to move in large and increasing quantity by highway and truck, it is, nevertheless, possible for the railroads to adopt methods and use facili- ties that will increase l.c.l. traffic. The methods being adopted provide for the transportation of freight, not merely from station to station and only by rail, but directly from shipper to consignee by a coordinated motor and rail service. To facilitate, and lessen the cost of, this coordinated and complete service, provision is being made for the loading of package freight at the shipper's platform into freight containers or into demountable truck bodies and the transport of the loaded containers and truck bodies by motor-rail-and-motor to the platform of the consignee.

A railroad freight container is a metal weather-proof, theft-proof box in which two to seven tons of freight (depending on the kind of freight) can be placed. The container is of such size as to form a definite sub-division of the surface area and the capacity of a railroad flat car. It can be transported upon a motor truck chassis. The container being a sub-division of a car's loaded capacity, the contents of the container can be given freight rates that are less than the standard l.c.l. rates per hundred pounds, but higher than carload rates. The container provides an improved service by simplifying the transfer and handling of package freight and by reducing the packing requirements. For those shippers who can make regular shipment of l.c.l. freight of considerable volume, and for freight forwarders who can combine several shippers' packages consigned to a common destination, the container has real advantage.

The use of freight car containers is not rapidly increasing, because satisfactory arrangements have not been made for the interchange of containers among connecting railroads, and a standard type of container has not been adopted by the railroads. The general inauguration of container car facilities and services and the interchange of containers by connecting carriers would require a larger investment in equipment than present traffic conditions seem to warrant.

Some railroads, the New York Central, the Lehigh Valley, the Reading, the Baltimore and Ohio, lease containers from the L.C.L. Corporation which designs, builds and leases equipment. The largest user of containers is the Pennsylvania Railroad, which has between four and five thousand of the approximately eleven thousand containers used by all railroads. While all of the Pennsylvania Railroad's freight containers can be employed in coordinated rail and motor service only one-eighth are so used, the other seven-eighths being loaded and unloaded at station platform. This station-to-station use of containers eliminates the sending of l.c.l. freight from the receiving stations to a transfer freight house for classification and consolidation by stations of destination. Freight not carried in containers may sometimes also be rehandled at transfer freight houses en route, with the consequent delays....

Originally rates upon freight shipped in containers were made upon a straight line rate per container per mile transported. These rates were found to disrupt the class rates upon goods shipped in regular services and were held to be unjustly discriminatory by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1931. The freight rates established by the railroads upon merchandise shipments transported in containers are based upon the third class rates applicable upon the net weight of the freight in the containers subject to a minimum charge equal to the third class rate upon 4000 pounds.

In no case, however, may the rates applicable to shipments in containers be less than: (1) the highest carload class rates applicable to any article in the container; (2) the class rate next lower than that specified for any article in the container as an any quantity rate; or (3) the rate applicable to the highest rated commodity in the container applied to the entire contents of the container, when articles referred to in the first two alternatives are loaded in the same container.

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

A few posts above someone essentially asked why the PRR and NYC didn't set-up autonomous businesses to run the container/ LCL operations so as to evade - no, comply with - the ICC's rulings.  An obvious response is, "How do you then keep enough control to prevent it from becoming a monster that turns around and eats you up ?"

That got me to wondering about how much the NYC and PRR would have trusted each other not to do something like that - based on their past mutual enmity as demonstrated some 30 years earlier by the South Penn RR vs. West Shore RR standoff, etc. 

But more worthwhile - I also wondered what the extent and volume of their respective container operations were.  They really served separate and different territories from New York City west to about Buffalo - and pragmatically, as far west to mid-Ohio; west of there, they weren't far apart, and both served the major cities as far west as Chicago of course and St. Louis.  So were these containers used mainly for short-hauls within a couple hundred miles of the Big Apple, or did they go to Chicago frequently ?  Did any other western - or southern - railroads handle them, or was that the extent the organized operation ? 

Interesting subject, and thanks again for the links and copy of that article, Mike.

- Paul North. 

[henry6]

In today's conglamorated and merged railroad map, Paul, you do bring up a point the youngen's can't fathom.  That is that individual railroad used to be much more territorial measured in miles and feet than by states and regions.  The NYC and the PRR did serve the same end points defined as Chicago and New York City but by and large the space between those cities was not at all the same.  Yes, there was incursions of NYC into PA and W.VA coal country and PRR branches lapping the shores of the Great Lakes; and it was competitive but there was room for it.  If you take NJ as an example, going west from tidewater each railroad commandeered a valley  or pathway across the state often within sight of each other yet setting themselves seperate and apart from each other, not interfering in the others business (not saying they didn't compete for business and traffic in towns and the state, just that they were seperate).  Thus loading a container in NY for Philadelphia or Atlanta or New Orleans would most likely have been the PRR's job while Albany, Buffalo, and Cleveland would go to the NYC ( yes, for this arguement I am ignoring Erie, LV, DLW, B&O et al.)  But the point is that there were more railroads giving more communities more choices.  And while the routes were seperated there were many opportunities for competition among railroads (which help keep prices down) encouraged service.  

[greyhounds]

Paul_D_North_Jr

A few posts above someone essentially asked why the PRR and NYC didn't set-up autonomous businesses to run the container/ LCL operations so as to evade - no, comply with - the ICC's rulings.  An obvious response is, "How do you then keep enough control to prevent it from becoming a monster that turns around and eats you up ?"

That got me to wondering about how much the NYC and PRR would have trusted each other not to do something like that - based on their past mutual enmity as demonstrated some 30 years earlier by the South Penn RR vs. West Shore RR standoff, etc. 

But more worthwhile - I also wondered what the extent and volume of their respective container operations were.  They really served separate and different territories from New York City west to about Buffalo - and pragmatically, as far west to mid-Ohio; west of there, they weren't far apart, and both served the major cities as far west as Chicago of course and St. Louis.  So were these containers used mainly for short-hauls within a couple hundred miles of the Big Apple, or did they go to Chicago frequently ?  Did any other western - or southern - railroads handle them, or was that the extent the organized operation ? 

Interesting subject, and thanks again for the links and copy of that article, Mike.

- Paul North. 

I didn't understand the post saying the railroads should have formed a forwarder and then sold it off either. 

Duplicating Acme Fast Freight (a forwarder) would do what?  Acme was started in 1926 and within the next 10 years  grew to handle more LCL than any railroad save the Pennsylvania.  That's pretty good growth in a depression   The growth indicates there was a strong market need for forwarder services.

85% of the New York Central's container traffic was forwarder business and that railroad had its own forwarding company, Universal Carloading and Distributing.

What the regulators didn't like was the rates the railroads charged their customers for container service.  These customers included the forwarders.

There were other forwarders who competed with Acme and Universal.  Forwarders basically confused the regulators.  On one hand the fowarder was a shipper that bought services from railroads and truckers.  On the other hand, the forwarder held itself out to handle freight from hither to yon - did that make it a carrier?

In 1938 the ICC said forwarders should not exist (299 ICC 201).  But it lacked the authority to force them out of business.  Despite the regulators' opinion, there was obviously a need for forwarder services or people wouldn't have used forwarder services.  The whole thing was settled badly in 1940 when congress regulated forwarders as carriers.  Forwarder growth ceased.  Acme no longer is in business.

With regard to where container services were offered, the Ludite's worst fears were coming true.  Other railroads besides the New York Central were adopting the container for LCL.  These lines included the Boston & Maine, Lehigh Valley, Chicago & North Western, Pennsylvania, and the Missouri Pacific.

I don't have a list of container terminals, but any system that cut costs by 75%-85% was going to spread rapidly.  It did so until it was just stopped by government regulation.

 

[MP173]

Greyhound:

The mailman delivered "Organization and Traffic of the Illinois Central System" today.  This is a very good look at how one railroad operated during the late 1930's.  The book was written by a series of key personnel within the IC and covers various topics such as 1.  IC Property (including in depth review of the Chicago operation)2.  Operations of the company. 3 Traffic Department functions 4.  Passenger Traffic 5.  Freight traffic (including chapters on all major commodities such as coal, lumber, grain, automotive 6.  Traffic outlines by areas in which certain geographic areas are reviewed.

This is a very interesting look at the IC at one period of time with very detailed explanation of why this company was in business.  This book was compiled for training and educational purposes for the IC employees.

Does anyone know of any similar books published by other railroads? 

I picked this up for $15 including shipping from Abebooks.  Well worth it.

 

Ed

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Meanwhile, the Canadian railroads - unhampered by the ICC - went ahead and started the modern container era, even before Malcolm MacLean and his Sea-Land Service.  See:

Integration in the north

How White Pass & Yukon, Alaska, and CN-Newfoundland interchange

by Hilton, George W. 

from Trains July 1971  p. 36

ARR  CNR  container  ferry  WP&Y

and, an even better article from Toronto in 2006 that I just found today (while looking for something else, of course) that has some interesting tidbits about the development of the various systems - see esp. the comments below it:

http://readingt.readingcities.com/index.php/toronto/comments/the_magic_box_the_real_history_of_shipping_containers 

While lots of libraries around here have Marc Levinson's 2006 or 2008 book "The Box", none appear to have Peter Hunter's "The Magic Box".   So another 'snipe hunt' for me, I suppose . . .  

Fascinating history, at least to me.

- Paul North.

[greyhounds]

Paul_D_North_Jr

Meanwhile, the Canadian railroads - unhampered by the ICC - went ahead and started the modern container era, even before Malcolm MacLean and his Sea-Land Service.  See:

Integration in the north

How White Pass & Yukon, Alaska, and CN-Newfoundland interchange

by Hilton, George W. 

from Trains July 1971  p. 36

ARR  CNR  container  ferry  WP&Y

and, an even better article from Toronto in 2006 that I just found today (while looking for something else, of course) that has some interesting tidbits about the development of the various systems - see esp. the comments below it:

http://readingt.readingcities.com/index.php/toronto/comments/the_magic_box_the_real_history_of_shipping_containers 

While lots of libraries around here have Marc Levinson's 2006 or 2008 book "The Box", none appear to have Peter Hunter's "The Magic Box".   So another 'snipe hunt' for me, I suppose . . .  

Fascinating history, at least to me.

- Paul North.

Yeah!

First, let me say that i consider Marc Levinson's "The Box" as a must read for anyone interested in the "Science and Art" of moving freight.  It's not perfect, but it's very close to perfect.  If you want a better understanding, you'll gain such from reading this wonderful book.  At least twice. 

One of the things that isn't perfect is Levinson's insistence that Malcom McLean's (Sea-Land) Ideal-X was the first container ship.  It wasn't.  The White Pass Company's "Cliford J. Rogers" was the first container ship.  I have no idea why Levinson dismisses the Rogers, but he does.

The White Pass company was headquartered in Winnipeg and functioned as the main suppy carrier in to the Yukon Territory.  The White Pass would load freight on to a ship at Vancouver.  The ship would sail to Skagway, Alaska.  (Skagway was the "natural" port to serve the Yukon, despite being in the US.)  The small containers would be transferred from the Rogers to the narrow guage railway owned by the White Pass company.  The railroad would move the containers up a steep 4% grade though about 25 miles of US territory and on to Whitehorse, Yukon Territory.  About 110 rail miles total.  At Whitehorse the containers would be transferred to trucks for final delivery.

Through this efficient system people living in one of the most remote places on earth got their coffee, canned peaches, boots, shovels, whatever.

AFAIK, the company still functions today.  They just don't use the narrow guage railroad.  In 1982 some spoilsports built a paved highway into Skagway.  There was no longer an economic reason to transfer the containers twice.  They simply loaded the containers from ship to truck in Skagway.

That integrated ship/rail/truck system could not have been done in the US.  The government would have blocked it.  For no discernable good reason.  In the US integration was allowed just a little bit.  The Federal honcho saw it as "dangerous".  Say What?

The Canadian government didn't have a problem with integrated transportation companies.  The chief of transportation regulation in the US, one Joseph B. Eastman, "Saw the dangers of intermodal transportation."  I'm still waiting on his biography from Amazon.  This one ought to be good for some laughs and quite a few sighs.

And it wasn't just the smallish White Pass in Canada, the Canadian Pacific became an intigrated transportaiton company with ships, trains, and trucks.  Using each transportation tool where it's most efficient to use that particular tool.  That's been the Canadian way.  It would have been the American way too, except our government wouldn't allow such a thing.

 

[carnej1]

greyhounds

Paul_D_North_Jr:

Meanwhile, the Canadian railroads - unhampered by the ICC - went ahead and started the modern container era, even before Malcolm MacLean and his Sea-Land Service.  See:

Integration in the north

How White Pass & Yukon, Alaska, and CN-Newfoundland interchange

by Hilton, George W. 

from Trains July 1971  p. 36

ARR  CNR  container  ferry  WP&Y

and, an even better article from Toronto in 2006 that I just found today (while looking for something else, of course) that has some interesting tidbits about the development of the various systems - see esp. the comments below it:

http://readingt.readingcities.com/index.php/toronto/comments/the_magic_box_the_real_history_of_shipping_containers 

While lots of libraries around here have Marc Levinson's 2006 or 2008 book "The Box", none appear to have Peter Hunter's "The Magic Box".   So another 'snipe hunt' for me, I suppose . . .  

Fascinating history, at least to me.

- Paul North.

 

Yeah!

First, let me say that i consider Marc Levinson's "The Box" as a must read for anyone interested in the "Science and Art" of moving freight.  It's not perfect, but it's very close to perfect.  If you want a better understanding, you'll gain such from reading this wonderful book.  At least twice. 

One of the things that isn't perfect is Levinson's insistence that Malcom McLean's (Sea-Land) Ideal-X was the first container ship.  It wasn't.  The White Pass Company's "Cliford J. Rogers" was the first container ship.  I have no idea why Levinson dismisses the Rogers, but he does.

The White Pass company was headquartered in Winnipeg and functioned as the main suppy carrier in to the Yukon Territory.  The White Pass would load freight on to a ship at Vancouver.  The ship would sail to Skagway, Alaska.  (Skagway was the "natural" port to serve the Yukon, despite being in the US.)  The small containers would be transferred from the Rogers to the narrow guage railway owned by the White Pass company.  The railroad would move the containers up a steep 4% grade though about 25 miles of US territory and on to Whitehorse, Yukon Territory.  About 110 rail miles total.  At Whitehorse the containers would be transferred to trucks for final delivery.

Through this efficient system people living in one of the most remote places on earth got their coffee, canned peaches, boots, shovels, whatever.

AFAIK, the company still functions today.  They just don't use the narrow guage railroad.  In 1982 some spoilsports built a paved highway into Skagway.  There was no longer an economic reason to transfer the containers twice.  They simply loaded the containers from ship to truck in Skagway.

That integrated ship/rail/truck system could not have been done in the US.  The government would have blocked it.  For no discernable good reason.  In the US integration was allowed just a little bit.  The Federal honcho saw it as "dangerous".  Say What?

The Canadian government didn't have a problem with integrated transportation companies.  The chief of transportation regulation in the US, one Joseph B. Eastman, "Saw the dangers of intermodal transportation."  I'm still waiting on his biography from Amazon.  This one ought to be good for some laughs and quite a few sighs.

And it wasn't just the smallish White Pass in Canada, the Canadian Pacific became an intigrated transportaiton company with ships, trains, and trucks.  Using each transportation tool where it's most efficient to use that particular tool.  That's been the Canadian way.  It would have been the American way too, except our government wouldn't allow such a thing.

 

The White Pass & Yukon is in serious discussions about resuming freight (ore) service:

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2010/06/28/whitepass-yukon-rail-freight.html

Although it's not mentioned in the linked article, they are seriously considering rebuilding the line to standard gauge...

[cx500]

carnej1

 

 

 

The White Pass & Yukon is in serious discussions about resuming freight (ore) service:

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2010/06/28/whitepass-yukon-rail-freight.html

Although it's not mentioned in the linked article, they are seriously considering rebuilding the line to standard gauge...

I have also heard knowledgeable comments that this is a mostly a serious pipedream.  A large amount of the construction costs would have by government investment, and Canada is no different from the US in the unequal treatment of transportation investment and support.

John