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This is why it is important to keep mass transit propery funded, even if it means subsidizes: <br /> <br />USA PATRIOT Act <br />1. <br />Section 215 of the Act amended 50 U.S.C. § 1861 to allow the FBI Director or his <br />designee (who must hold the rank of Assistant Special Agent in Charge or higher) to <br />apply for an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for “the <br />production of tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and <br />other items) for an investigation to protect against international terrorism or <br />clandestine intelligence activities . . . .” Such an investigation may only be <br />conducted under guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive <br />Order 12333 (or a successor order ). 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(2)(A). <br />A. <br />What guidelines has the Attorney General approved under Executive Order <br />12333 or a successor order for the conduct of such investigations? <br />Answer: These investigations are conducted under the Attorney General <br />Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign <br />Counterintelligence Investigations, which were approved pursuant to Executive <br />Order 12333. <br />B. <br />Before such an order can be sought, do the guidelines require that the FBI <br />have already established probable cause that a person under investigation is <br />an agent of a foreign power? What is the Department’s definition of <br />“probable cause” and how has it changed since September 11, 2001? <br />Answer: The Department does not have the authority to define “probable cause”; <br />it is a statutory and constitutional term. Except where a statute has been amended, <br />the term has not changed meaning since September 11, 2001. <br />Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Act) added the current version of 50 <br />U.S.C. § 1861 to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). In order to <br />obtain business records, section 1861(b)(2) requires the Department to <br />demonstrate to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) that the records <br />are sought “for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not <br />concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or <br />clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United <br />States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the <br />first amendment to the Constitution.” The Guidelines do not impose a probable <br />cause requirement over and above the requirements Congress set forth in the <br />statute. <br />Congress did not authorize a new innovation with section 215. Grand juries <br />investigating ordinary crimes traditionally have had the power to issue subpoenas <br />to all manner of businesses, including libraries and bookstores. For example, in <br /> <br />Page 4 <br />-2- <br />the so-called Unabomber investigation of the mid-1990s, federal grand juries <br />subpoenaed library records at Brigham Young University, the University of Utah, <br />Northwestern University, the University of California, the University of Montana, <br />and the Missoula County Library in order to determine who had checked out the <br />four books cited in the “Unabomber Manifesto.” Section 215 simply provided <br />that this investigative tool is also available for foreign intelligence and terrorism <br />investigations. <br />Importantly, section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act imposes more restrictions on <br />its use than a federal grand jury subpoena for the same records. First, a court must <br />explicitly authorize the use of section 215 to obtain business records. By contrast, <br />a grand jury subpoena is issued on the authority of the district court and clerk of <br />the court but without any prior judicial review or approval. Second, section 215 <br />contains explicit safeguards for activities protected by the First Amendment, <br />unlike federal grand jury subpoenas. And, third, as noted above, section 215 <br />requires, for an investigation relating to a U.S. person, that the information be <br />sought in an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine <br />intelligence activities. By contrast, a federal grand jury can obtain business <br />records whenever such records are relevant to a grand jury investigation of any <br />federal crime. See generally United States v. R. Enterprises., Inc., 498 U.S. 492 <br />(1991). <br />C. <br />Please produce all guidelines approved under Executive Order 12333 or a <br />successor order for the conduct of such investigations. <br />Answer: These guidelines are classified at the Secret level. Under section 3.3 of <br />Executive Order 12333, the Guidelines “shall be made available to the <br />congressional intelligence committees.” As required, we have provided the House <br />Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) with the Guidelines, and, <br />pursuant to the Committee’s April 1, 2003, letter, we will provide HPSCI with <br />another copy for the review of the House Committee on the Judiciary. <br />2. <br />Such investigations also may not be conducted of a United States person solely on <br />the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the <br />United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(2)(B). Other authorities under the Foreign <br />Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) are also subject to the limitation that an <br />investigation of a United States person in which those authorities are used may not <br />be conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to <br />the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (regarding pen register and trap <br />and trace orders under FISA). <br />A. <br />In seeking such orders, does the government make an explicit certification <br />that an investigation of a United States person is not being conducted solely <br /> <br />Page 5 <br />-3- <br />on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the <br />Constitution of the United States? <br />Answer: 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) requires that an application for a pen register or <br />trap and trace device include a certification “that the information likely to be <br />obtained is foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person <br />or is relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism <br />or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United <br />States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the <br />First Amendment to the Constitution.” Accordingly, applications concerning <br />United States persons made under this section include a certification by a <br />Department attorney that the investigation of a United States person is not being <br />conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment. <br />50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2) requires that each application for access to certain <br />business records “shall specify that the records concerned are sought for an <br />authorized investigation in accordance with subsection (a)(2) to obtain foreign <br />intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect <br />against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” Section <br />1861(a)(2)(B) requires that an investigation under this section of a United States <br />person not be conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First <br />Amendment to the Constitution. Section 1861 does not require that an application <br />concerning a United States person make an explicit certification that the <br />investigation is not being conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by <br />the First Amendment. <br />B. <br />In issuing such orders, does the court make an express finding that an <br />investigation of a United States person is not being conducted solely on the <br />basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of <br />the United States? <br />Answer: With respect to orders for a pen register or trap and trace device, 50 <br />U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1) states that “[u]pon application made pursuant to this section, <br />the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or modified, approving the <br />installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device if the judge finds that <br />the application satisfies the requirements of this section.” The statute does not <br />require the FISC to make an express finding that the investigation of a United <br />States person is not being conducted solely on the basis of activities protected by <br />the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. However, the judge <br />may approve the application only if he or she finds that the application satisfies all <br />the requirements of the section 1842, and -- as noted above -- section 1842(c)(2) <br />provides that the application shall include a certification that investigation of a <br />United States person is not being conducted solely upon the basis of activities <br /> <br />Page 6 <br />-4- <br />protected by the First Amendment. <br />With respect to orders for access to certain business records, 50 U.S.C. § <br />1861(c)(1) provides that “[u]pon application made pursuant to this section, the <br />judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as modified, approving the <br />release of records if the judge finds that the application meets the requirements of <br />this section.” The statute does not require the FISC to make an express finding <br />that the investigation of a United States person is not being conducted solely on <br />the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the <br />United States. However, the judge may approve the application only if he or she <br />finds that the application satisfies all the requirements of the section 1861, and -- <br />as noted above -- section 1861(a)(2)(B) requires that an investigation not be <br />conducted of a United States person solely upon the basis of activities protected <br />by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. <br />3. <br />The Department has increased the use of “national security letters” that require <br />businesses to turn over electronic records about finances, telephone calls, e-mail and <br />other personal information. <br />A. <br />Please identify the specific authority relied on for issuing these letters. <br />Answer: Congress has authorized the issuance of National Security Letters in 12 <br />U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5) (the Right to Financial Privacy Act); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u and <br />1681v (the Fair Credit Reporting Act); 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (the Electronic <br />Communications Privacy Act); and 50 U.S.C. § 436(a) (relating to records of <br />persons with authorized access to classified information, who may have disclosed <br />that information to a foreign power). <br />B. <br />Has any litigation resulted from the issuance of these letters (i.e. challenging <br />the propriety or legality of their use)? If so, please describe. <br />Answer: There has been no challenge to the propriety or legality of National <br />Security Letters. <br />4. <br />Has any administrative disciplinary proceeding or civil action been initiated under <br />section 223 of the Act for any unauthorized disclosure of certain intercepts? If so, <br />please describe each case, the nature of the allegations, and the current status of <br />each case. <br />Answer: There have been no administrative disciplinary proceedings or civil actions <br />initiated under section 223 of the Act for unauthorized disclosures of intercepts. <br />5. <br />In the Administration’s 2004 Budget Request, DOJ is requesting $22 million to <br /> <br />Page 7 <br />-5- <br />establish an automated cross-case analytical system to facilitate sharing case specific <br />information through the agencies that belong to the Organized Crime Drug <br />Enforcement Task Force Program. These include law enforcement agencies in DOJ, <br />the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Treasury. Is this <br />system also intended to facilitate implementation of the authority to share criminal <br />investigative information with intelligence officials under Section 203 of the Act? <br />Will it be used for that purpose? <br />Answer: The Department’s 2004 budget request is specifically intended to establish and <br />support a central warehouse for drug investigative information and to enable the <br />Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) and its member agencies to <br />undertake cross-case analysis of that drug information. However, the system may <br />indirectly facilitate or enhance efforts to share investigative information with intelligence <br />officials. In particular, the proposed system would be co-located with the Foreign <br />Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF), not only enabling OCDETF to leverage FTTTF’s <br />existing technology and analytical tools, but also enabling FTTTF, as appropriate, to <br />extract relevant drug investigative information. To the extent such information included <br />foreign intelligence information, FTTTF would certainly ensure that the information was <br />shared in accordance with the Act and the Attorney General’s September 23, 2002, <br />Guidelines Regarding Disclosure to the Director of Central Intelligence and Homeland <br />Security Officials of Foreign Intelligence Acquired in the Course of a Criminal <br />Investigation. In addition, the proposed system will likely utilize the Special Operations <br />Division (SOD) as a clearinghouse for the distribution of tips and leads to the field. <br />Given that SOD already has established protocols for the identification and dissemination <br />of foreign intelligence information, such protocols certainly would be applied to any <br />intelligence gained from the data warehouse. <br />6. <br />What has been the role of the Department in establishing standards or procedures <br />regarding implementation of the authorities provided in Section 358 (Bank Secrecy <br />Provisions and Activities of United States Intelligence Agencies to Fight <br />International Terrorism)? Please provide any written guidance regarding the <br />requirements of that section that the Department has either issued or approved. <br />Answer: The Department of Justice has not been involved in establishing standards or <br />procedures regarding implementation of the authorities provided in section 358. <br />Nonetheless, criminal investigations of terrorism violations in which the Department is <br />involved -- such as violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B, which prohibit <br />providing material support or resources either to terrorists or to designated foreign <br />terrorist organizations -- have substantially benefitted from section 358, which allows <br />financial regulators to share certain financial information related to terrorism with <br />intelligence and criminal investigators. <br />7. <br />What are the dollar amounts that have been paid under the reward authorities <br />provided in Section 501 of the Act or the terrorism related awards under the newly <br /> <br />Page 8 <br />-6- <br />enacted 28 U.S.C. § 530(C)(b)(1)(J)? How many non-U.S. citizens have received <br />rewards under these authorities? <br />Answer: As of April 30, 2003, the Department of Justice has provided a total of <br />$245,000.00 in reward payments, as tracked in its accounting records (1997-2002). <br />Current financial data does not capture these reward payments by a particular statute, nor <br />does it delineate the citizenship of the recipients. The information that is currently <br />available can only provide us the amount paid, and the time period in which it was paid. <br />However, the financial data indicates that there have been no reward payments made in <br />the last 2 years and hence the data tells us that there are currently no known rewards paid <br />under the newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 530C(b)(1)(J). <br />8. <br />The Administration’s Office of Justice Programs 2004 Budget request includes a <br />$12 million increase for Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) <br />improvements. The request refers to Section 701 of the USA PATRIOT Act and <br />states that the requested increase will be used to expand RISS’s accessibility to state <br />and local public safety agencies to share terrorism alerts and related information. <br />Please provide the Committee with a description of the management oversight <br />process by which DOJ will ensure that the proposed expenditures will accomplish <br />improvements in the U.S. information infrastructure and the specific improvements <br />that are envisioned. Please provide copies of any guidance issued to state and local <br />agencies with respect to the further dissemination of such materials. <br />Answer: Currently, 84 United States Attorneys Offices (USAOs) are using the Regional <br />Information Sharing Systems Program (RISS.net) as a method to communicate with the <br />Department’s state and local law enforcement partners. In the USAOs, there are nearly <br />600 “Access Officers” of RISS.net. These users typically include the Anti-Terrorism <br />Task Force Coordinators, Counterterrorism Attorneys, OCDETF Attorneys, Intelligence <br />Analysts, and Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee Coordinators. Additionally, in <br />many districts the United States Attorney, First Assistant United States Attorney, and <br />Criminal Chief also utilize the RISS System. The Department expects the remaining <br />USAOs to be fully vetted for RISS in the very near future. <br />The RISS Program is funded, managed and monitored by the Bureau of Justice <br />Assistance (BJA) of the Office of Justice Programs (OJP). Each of the six projects is <br />monitored on an annual basis by BJA program staff and the OJP Office of General <br />Counsel (OGC). The OGC monitoring focuses on compliance with the “Criminal <br />Intelligence Systems Operating Policies,” which are designed to ensure that information <br />in the system is relevant, updated, and based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal <br />activity. <br />While this level of monitoring and oversight will continue, we intend to refine our focus <br />to ensure that the enhancements to the RISS.net system are responsive to the need for <br />expansion, both with respect to terrorism and to the broader public safety audience <br /> <br />Page 9 <br />-7- <br />envisioned in the USA PATRIOT Act. We are working very closely with the Department <br />of Homeland Security (DHS), both at the Chief Information Officer level and with the <br />Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IA&IP), to ensure that the <br />RISS infrastructure enhancements are consistent with the statutory authorities and <br />responsibilities of DHS. <br />In addition, BJA’s overall information technology (including RISS) is, in large measure, <br />guided by the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, a Federal Advisory <br />Committee made up of State and local constituency organizations that reports to the <br />Attorney General, and Global’s Intelligence Working Group, comprised of Federal, State <br />and local intelligence officials and information sharing specialists. Specifically, RISS- <br />ATIX is the improvement to the U.S. information infrastructure envisioned in this regard, <br />and we are already working with DHS to provide an architecture that will provide for an <br />effective two-way exchange of information between State and local law enforcement, <br />public safety and other first responder agencies, and organizations and officials at DHS. <br />9. <br />Under section 213 of the USA PATRIOT Act, a court may order a delay in any <br />notice of the execution of a search warrant if “the court finds reasonable cause to <br />believe that providing immediate notification of the execution of the warrant may <br />have an adverse result,” which is defined as (1) endangering the life or physical <br />safety of an individual; (2) flight from prosecution; destruction or tampering with <br />evidence; (3) intimidation of potential witnesses; or (4) otherwise seriously <br />jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying trial. Please respond to the <br />following questions regarding the use of this authority: <br />A. <br />How many times has the Department of Justice sought an order delaying <br />notice of the execution of a warrant under this section? <br />Answer: Whenever Justice Department personnel execute a court-issued search <br />warrant, they always provide required notice to the person whose property has <br />been searched. But in some cases – e.g., when it is necessary to protect human <br />life, or to avoid compromising an investigation – federal law authorizes the <br />Department to delay giving notice for short periods of time. <br />The Department has had the legal authority to delay giving notice that a warrant <br />had been executed since before the USA PATRIOT Act. But the law was a mix <br />of inconsistent rules, practices, and court decisions that varied widely from <br />jurisdiction to jurisdiction across the country. This lack of uniformity hindered <br />terrorism cases and other complex nationwide investigations. <br />Section 213 of the USA PATRIOT Act resolved this problem by establishing a <br />uniform statutory standard. Now, a court can delay the required provision of <br />notice if it finds “reasonable cause” to believe that immediate notification may <br />have an adverse result as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (including endangering the <br /> <br />Page 10 <br />-8- <br />life or physical safety of an individual, flight from prosecution, evidence <br />tampering, witness intimidation, or otherwise seriously jeopardizing an <br />investigation or unduly delaying a trial). The section requires that notice be <br />provided within a “reasonable period” of a warrant’s execution, and a court can <br />further extend the period for good cause. <br />Section 213’s “reasonable cause” standard is in accord with prevailing caselaw for <br />delayed notice of warrants before the USA PATRIOT Act. See, e.g., United States <br />v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990) (government must show “good <br />reason” for delayed notice of warrants). It also is consistent with the exceptions to <br />the general rules that agents must “knock and announce” before entering, and that <br />warrants must be executed during the daytime. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 <br />U.S. 385 (1997) (no-knock entry to execute warrant is justified when the police <br />have “reasonable suspicion” that knocking and announcing their presence would <br />be dangerous or futile or would inhibit the effective investigation); Fed. R. Crim. <br />P. 41(c)(1) (“The warrant shall be served in the daytime unless the issuing <br />authority, by appropriate provision of the warrants, and for reasonable cause <br />shown, authorizes its execution at times other than daytime.”). <br />As of April 1, 2003, the Department of Justice has requested a judicial order <br />delaying notice of the execution of a warrant under section 213 forty-seven times, <br />and the courts have granted every request. <br />B. <br />How many times has a court ordered the delay in such notification? <br />Answer: As of April 1, 2003, courts have ordered the delay in such notification <br />each of the forty-seven times requested by the Department. <br />10. <br />That same section allows the notice to be delayed when the warrant prohibits the <br />seizure of among other things, any tangible property, unless “the court finds <br />reasonable necessity for the seizure.” 18 U.S.C. § 3103a (b)(2). <br />A. <br />Since the enactment of that section, how many times has the government <br />asked a court to find reasonable necessity for a seizure in connection with <br />delayed notification under this section? <br />Answer: Whenever Justice Department personnel execute a court-issued warrant <br />authorizing the seizure of property, the Department provides required notice to the <br />person whose property was seized. In some highly sensitive cases, however, it is <br />necessary that courts be able to authorize a temporary delay in giving that notice. <br />Section 213 of the USA PATRIOT Act is designed primarily to allow courts to <br />authorize delayed notice of searches. But it also enables courts, in certain narrow <br />circumstances, to authorize delayed notice of seizures. Section 213 expressly <br /> <br />Page 11 <br />-9- <br />requires that any warrant issued under it must prohibit the seizure of any tangible <br />property, any wire or electronic communication, or (except as expressly provided <br />in chapter 121) any stored wire or electronic information. Courts can waive this <br />requirement only if they find “reasonable necessity” for the seizure. <br />As of April 1, 2003, the government has asked a court to find reasonable necessity <br />for a seizure in connection with delayed notification under this section fifteen <br />times, and the courts have granted fourteen of the requests. <br />B. <br />On what grounds has the government argued that seizure was reasonably <br />necessary under a warrant for which the government also asked for delayed <br />notification? <br />Answer: The government has argued that seizure was necessary: (1) to prevent <br />jeopardizing the investigation by protecting the safety of confidential informants; <br />(2) to prevent compromising an investigation by preventing the removal or <br />destruction of evidence; and/or (3) to seize controlled substances that are <br />inherently dangerous to the community. <br />C. <br />How often has a court found “reasonable necessity for the seizure” in <br />connection with a warrant for which it also permitted delayed notification? <br />Answer: As of April 1, 2003, a court has found reasonable necessity for the <br />seizure in connection with a warrant for which it also permitted delayed <br />notification fourteen times. <br />D. <br />How often has a court rejected the government’s argument that a seizure was <br />reasonably necessary in connection with a warrant for which the government <br />sought delayed notification? <br />Answer: As of April 1, 2003, a court once has rejected the government’s <br />argument that a seizure was reasonably necessary. In that one instance, the <br />government requested a delayed-notice warrant to permit federal agents to check a <br />storage unit that was believed to contain information concerning credit card fraud, <br />false identification documents, and other such material. The government also <br />sought authority to seize the items discovered to prevent their possible destruction <br />or removal. The court authorized the warrant but did not authorize seizure <br />because it believed that photographs of relevant items in the storage unit would be <br />sufficient. <br />E. <br />On what grounds have the courts found that the seizures were reasonably <br />necessary in connection with warrants for which delays in notification were <br />granted? <br /> <br />Page 12 <br />-10- <br />Answer: The courts have found that the seizures were necessary: (1) to prevent <br />jeopardizing the investigation by protecting the safety of confidential informants; <br />(2) to prevent compromising an investigation by preventing the removal or <br />destruction of evidence; and/or (3) to seize controlled substances that are <br />inherently dangerous to the community. <br />F. <br />What grounds have the courts rejected as establishing reasonable necessity <br />for a seizure in connection with a warrant for which the government sought <br />delayed notification? <br />Answer: In the one instance, the government requested a delayed-notice warrant <br />to permit federal agents to check a storage unit that was believed to contain <br />information concerning credit card fraud, false identification documents, and other <br />such material. The government also sought authority to seize the items discovered <br />to prevent their possible destruction or removal. The court authorized the warrant <br />but did not authorize seizure because it believed that photographs of relevant <br />items in the storage unit would be sufficient. <br />11. <br />That same section allows a court to order delayed notice when “the warrant <br />provides for the giving of such notice within a reasonable period of its execution, <br />which may be extended for by the court for good cause show.” 18 U.S.C. § <br />3103a(b)(3). <br />A. <br />What are the shortest and longest periods of time for which the government <br />has requested initial delayed notice? <br />Answer: The most common period of delay authorized by courts is seven days. <br />Courts have authorized specific delays of notification as short as one day and as <br />long as ninety days; other courts have permitted delays of unspecified duration <br />lasting until the indictment was unsealed. <br />B. <br />On what grounds has the government argued that the period of delayed <br />notification was reasonable? <br />Answer: The government has argued that the delay period was reasonable in light <br />of the need: (1) to protect the physical safety of cooperators, confidential sources <br />and informants; (2) to prevent the harassment or intimidation of witnesses; (3) to <br />prevent compromising an investigation, which may cause the subject to flee; <br />and/or (4) to prevent the removal or destruction of evidence by avoiding <br />disclosure of the scope and nature of the investigation. <br />C. <br />How often has the government sought an extension of the period of delayed <br />notice? <br /> <br />Page 13 <br />-11- <br />Answer: As of April 1, 2003, the government has sought an extension of the <br />period of delayed notice 248 times. This number includes multiple extensions for <br />a single warrant. For example, if a court authorizes a delay of notification for <br />seven days and the investigation lasts one month, the government might seek four <br />renewals. <br />D. <br />On what grounds has the government asked for an extension of the period of <br />delayed notice? <br />Answer: The government has sought extensions of the delayed notice period: (1) <br />to permit the imminent arrest of subjects; (2) to protect the physical safety of <br />confidential sources and informants; (3) to prevent the harassment or intimidation <br />of witnesses; (4) to prevent jeopardizing undercover investigations; (5) to prevent <br />compromising an investigation, which may cause the subject to flee; and/or (6) to <br />prevent the removal or destruction of evidence by avoiding disclosure of the scope <br />and nature of the investigation. <br />E. <br />How often has a court rejected the government’s request for delayed <br />notification on the ground that the period for giving delayed notice was <br />unreasonable? <br />Answer: As of April 1, 2003, a court has never rejected the government’s request <br />for delayed notification on the ground that the period for giving delayed notice <br />was unreasonable. <br />F. <br />On what grounds have the courts rejected the government’s position that the <br />period for giving delayed notice was reasonable? <br />Answer: As of April 1, 2003, no court has rejected such a request. <br />G. <br />How often has a court rejected the government’s request for an extension of <br />the period of delayed notification? <br />Answer: As of April 1, 2003, no court has rejected such a request. <br />H. <br />On what grounds have the courts rejected the government’s argument that <br />an extension of the period for delayed notice was reasonable? <br />Answer: As of April 1, 2003, no court has rejected such a request. <br />12. <br />On January 21, 2003, the Wall Street Journal published an article entitled “New <br />Powers Fuel Legal Assault on Suspected Terrorists.” That article claims that the <br />Department of Justice is using information that was “previously largely <br />unavailable” and that had been obtained from FISA surveillance to support <br /> <br />Page 14 <br />-12- <br />criminal prosecutions. According to the article, this information is now available to <br />prosecutors as a result of the FISA Review Court’s decision regarding the meaning <br />of the Act’s amendment to FISA permitting the government to obtain a surveillance <br />order when “a significant purpose,” (rather than “the purpose”) of the surveillance <br />is to collect foreign intelligence. <br />A. <br />Prior to the FISA Review Court’s decision, as long as surveillance was <br />properly ordered for “the purpose” of collecting foreign intelligence, was <br />there any legal impediment to prosecution of a crime using evidence obtained <br />under FISA? <br />Answer: Prior to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review’s <br />decision in In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (2002), there was no legal <br />impediment to the use of evidence obtained pursuant to FISA in a criminal <br />prosecution. Under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806 and 1825 as originally enacted, <br />information properly obtained or derived from a lawful FISA search or <br />surveillance could be used in a proceeding, including a criminal proceeding, with <br />the approval of the Attorney General. There are published decisions of the federal <br />Courts of Appeals in which such information was used in a criminal prosecution. <br />See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984). <br />While there was no legal impediment to introducing in a criminal prosecution <br />evidence obtained through FISA before the USA PATRIOT Act and the decision <br />of the Court of Review, as a practical matter such evidence was unavailable <br />because of the metaphorical “wall” between law enforcement and intelligence <br />activities. This wall – which derived from certain court decisions and <br />administrative practice by the Department – prevented the sharing of information <br />between, and coordination among, law enforcement and intelligence officials, <br />thereby interfering with a comprehensive and effective defense of the national <br />security against international terrorism and other threats. The wall – and how it <br />was affected by the USA PATRIOT Act, revised Department guidelines issued in <br />March 2002, and the Court of Review’s decision – are described in the answer to <br />Question 12(C). <br />B. <br />Please identify all cases brought since the FISA Review Court’s decision that <br />use information that was previously unavailable under FISA procedures. <br />Answer: After enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, and even prior to the Court <br />of Review’s decision, the Attorney General instructed all United States Attorneys <br />to review intelligence files to determine whether there was a basis for proceeding <br />criminally against subjects of intelligence investigations. This substantial effort <br />represented an enhanced level of review by criminal prosecutors of national <br />security investigative matters. The overall goal of the effort was to protect the <br />Nation from further terrorist attacks by identifying evidence of felonies that had <br /> <br />Page 15 <br />-13- <br />been, or were about to be, committed. <br />On October 1, 2002, the Attorney General addressed the United States Attorneys <br />and instructed each of them to develop a plan to monitor terrorism and <br />intelligence investigations, and to ensure that information regarding any <br />individual who poses a threat of terrorism to America is shared with other <br />agencies and that appropriate criminal charges are considered. <br />Almost 4,500 intelligence files were considered as part of the review process and <br />most of these files have been now been reviewed by a criminal prosecutor <br />pursuant to the Attorney General’s directive. Evidence or information from this <br />review has been incorporated in numerous cases. <br />C. <br />Please explain why such information was unavailable and why it became <br />available following the FISA Review Court’s decision. <br />Answer: Before the USA PATRIOT Act, the metaphorical “wall” between the <br />intelligence community and federal law enforcement often precluded effective and <br />indeed vital information sharing, perversely creating higher barriers in the most <br />serious cases. This wall, which derived from certain court decisions, was <br />established in written Department guidelines in July 1995. Sections 218 and <br />504(a) of the Act – as implemented by Department guidelines issued in March <br />2002 that were approved by the Court of Review in November 2002 – finally <br />permitted the coordination between intelligence and law enforcement that is vital <br />to protecting the Nation’s security. <br />The wall between intelligence and law enforcement resulted from perceived <br />differences between legal authorities that permit the Federal Bureau of <br />Investigation (FBI) to engage in electronic surveillance in the course of its foreign <br />counterintelligence function, on the one hand, and its law enforcement function on <br />the other. These perceived differences created an artificial dichotomy between <br />intelligence gathering and law enforcement, and FISA and Title III (which <br />authorizes electronic surveillance in criminal cases). <br />As enacted in 1978, FISA required that “the purpose of electronic surveillance is <br />to obtain foreign intelligence information,” a term that was (and still is) defined to <br />include information necessary to the ability of the United States to “protect” <br />against espionage or international terrorism. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 (a)(7)(B), <br />1801(e). Courts interpreted “the purpose” to mean “the primary purpose,” and <br />they interpreted “foreign intelligence information” to include information <br />necessary to the ability of the United States to protect against espionage or <br />international terrorism using methods other than law enforcement. Thus, <br />according to this judicial interpretation of FISA, that statute could be used only if <br />the primary purpose of surveillance or a search was the protection of national <br /> <br />Page 16 <br />-14- <br />security using non-law enforcement methods; gathering evidence to support the <br />prosecution of a foreign spy or terrorist could be a significant purpose of the <br />surveillance or search, but only if that prosecutorial purpose was clearly secondary <br />to the non-law enforcement purpose. As a practical matter, courts determined the <br />government’s purpose for using FISA by examining the degree of coordination <br />between intelligence and law enforcement officials: the more information and <br />advice exchanged between these officials, the more likely courts would be to find <br />that the primary purpose of the surveillance or search was law enforcement, not <br />intelligence gathering. This legal structure created what the Court of Review <br />termed “perverse organizational incentives,” expressly discouraging coordination <br />in the fight against terrorism. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 743. <br />To maintain the ability to present viable FISA applications under this perceived <br />legal standard, the Justice Department issued written guidelines in July 1995 that <br />limited the contacts between Department personnel involved in foreign <br />intelligence collection and those involved in law enforcement. This wall between <br />intelligence and law enforcement allowed for intelligence information – including <br />information developed from FISA-approved methods – to be shared with <br />prosecutors and criminal investigators only where such information established <br />that a crime “has been, is being, or will be committed.” In such circumstances, <br />the intelligence officials could seek approval to “throw information over the <br />wall.” The decisions on when to take this action, however, resided solely with <br />intelligence officials. <br />This policy proved to be wholly unworkable, as it entrusted the decision whether <br />to share information with those who were not best positioned to apply the <br />applicable standards. Only the law enforcement agents and prosecutors pursuing a <br />particular criminal investigation can determine what evidence is pertinent to their <br />case. In contrast, intelligence officials, who focus on the development of foreign <br />intelligence for national security purposes rather than collecting and reviewing <br />information for a particular criminal investigation, rarely consider the potential <br />evidentiary value of a particular piece of information, unless such information <br />self-evidently proves that a crime has been, or may be, committed. Thus, as a <br />matter both of perceived legal imperative and of Department culture, it was <br />impossible to permit full coordination between intelligence and law-enforcement <br />personnel and to combine foreign intelligence and law enforcement information <br />into a seamless body of knowledge. Indeed, law enforcement and intelligence <br />personnel could not speak openly to each and share information beyond the <br />piecemeal sharing envisioned by the previously existing rules. As a result, sharing <br />under these guidelines was relatively rare and generally not meaningful. <br />The reexamination of these perceived standards became more urgent after the <br />September 11 attacks, when the Attorney General clarified that the Department’s <br />primary mission was the prevention of terrorist attacks before they occur. This <br /> <br />Page 17 <br />1 <br />Attachments A and B. <br />2 <br />Attachment C. <br />-15- <br />goal could not be achieved where personnel needed for key preventative tools <br />(including criminal investigation and prosecution and immigration enforcement) <br />did not have the full range of actionable intelligence, including information <br />developed through FISA methods. The USA PATRIOT Act addressed this <br />problem by making two changes to FISA. First, section 218 displaced the <br />“primary purpose” standard, permitting the use of FISA when a “significant <br />purpose” of the search or surveillance was foreign intelligence. Second, section <br />504(a) clarified that coordination between intelligence and criminal personnel was <br />not grounds for denial of a FISA application. <br />Following enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Department promulgated <br />new procedures dated March 6, 2002, that expressly authorized – and indeed <br />required – coordination between intelligence and law enforcement. These revised <br />procedures were rejected in part by the FISC on May 17, 2002, but were approved <br />in full by the Court of Review on November 18, 2002. (The decisions of both <br />courts are attached.) <br />1 <br />In addition to confirming that the Department’s revised <br />procedures were valid under FISA, as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, the <br />Court of Review also noted that the judicial decisions and administrative actions <br />that established the wall between intelligence and law enforcement were not even <br />required by FISA prior to the amendments enacted by the USA PATRIOT Act. <br />See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 723-27, 735. In December 2002, the <br />Department issue field guidance with respect to the March 2002 procedures and <br />the Court of Review’s decision. (A copy of the field guidance is attached.) <br />2 <br />The enhanced ability to coordinate efforts and share information – permitted as a <br />result of sections 218 and 504(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Department’s <br />March 6, 2002 procedures, and the Court of Review’s decision – has allowed the <br />Department of Justice to investigate cases in a more orderly, efficient, and <br />knowledgeable way, and has permitted all involved personnel, both law <br />enforcement and intelligence, to discuss openly legal, factual, and tactical issues <br />arising during the course of investigations. These substantive and procedural <br />improvements have maximized the prospects that the option best calculated to <br />protect the national security and the American people will be chosen in any <br />individual case. In sum, the Department has developed counterterrorism tools and <br />methods that plainly would not have been possible under the previous standards. <br />The recent indictment of Sami Al-Arian and other alleged members of a <br />Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) cell in Tampa, Florida, illustrates a case that <br />benefitted from the new standards. The allegations contained in the conspiracy <br />indictment were based largely on electronic surveillance authorized pursuant to <br /> <br />Page 18 <br />-16- <br />FISA and conducted prior to the USA PATRIOT Act. Before the Act, the <br />Department was required to submit repeated certifications that the primary <br />purpose of the proposed surveillance methods was intelligence, as opposed to <br />criminal law enforcement. Moreover, special handling procedures were imposed <br />in this investigation on intelligence officials to guard against information sharing <br />that was believed to be improper. On several occasions, information developed <br />through FISA surveillance was identified as potentially relevant to a criminal case <br />against Al-Arian and others, and the FBI’s intelligence personnel notified the <br />Criminal Division of this information. The Criminal Division duly disseminated <br />this information to the U.S. Attorney in Tampa, as envisioned by the July 1995 <br />rule. However, the existing protocols denied criminal prosecutors and <br />investigators full access to information obtained through FISA, and they <br />prevented criminal and intelligence personnel from coordinating their parallel <br />investigations. <br />The USA PATRIOT Act’s amendments to FISA and the new rules adopted by the <br />Department pursuant to those amendments enabled criminal investigators in <br />Tampa finally to obtain and systematically consider the full range of evidence of <br />the alleged conspiracy. After the Court of Review’s decision confirmed the <br />Department’s understanding of the Act, this information, which existed in the <br />FBI’s intelligence – but not criminal – files, became available and was examined. <br />Armed with the entire intelligence yield, prosecutors for the first time were able to <br />consider the comprehensive history of the surveillance of Al-Arian and others, to <br />understand the context of their communications, and to document the decade-long <br />conspiracy that is alleged. Such a comprehensive review and evaluation would <br />not have been possible under the old rules. Thus, the USA PATRIOT Act was <br />critical to the Department’s ability to safeguard the Nation’s security by bringing <br />criminal charges against Al-Arian and others in February 2002. <br />In order to ensure that – as with the Al-Arian case – criminal investigators benefit <br />from now-available intelligence information, after enactment of the USA <br />PATRIOT Act the Attorney General directed that prosecutors review existing <br />intelligence files to determine whether they contained evidence of crimes. This <br />process, which is almost completed, involved the detailed review of almost 4,500 <br />files. The Attorney General also directed, in October 2002, that each United <br />States Attorney know fully the FBI’s intelligence cases in their Districts. These <br />efforts, along with coordination between law enforcement and intelligence <br />personnel in ongoing investigations, have been made possible by the USA <br />PATRIOT Act and are essential to preventing terrorism before it occurs and <br />locating and prosecuting terrorists. <br />13. <br />The FISA Review Court’s decision permits enhanced coordination between law <br />enforcement and intelligence officials. <br /> <br />Page 19 <br />-17- <br />A. <br />What FISA-related training is currently being planned or conducted? <br />B. <br />What topics will it address? <br />C. <br />Who will give the training? <br />D. <br />Who will receive the training? <br />E. <br />Is the training going to be coordinated with the Intelligence Community in <br />general and/or the Director of Central Intelligence? <br />Answer to A through E: In the past year, the Department’s Office of <br />Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) has conducted FISA training for FBI <br />and/or US Attorney’s Office personnel in various cities, including San Diego, <br />Portland, Denver, Houston, Detroit, Chicago, New York, Washington, and <br />Boston, and at the FBI Academy in Quantico. <br />Between May and September 2003, eight training sessions are planned for FBI <br />and US Attorney’s Office personnel. Approximately 100 FBI agents and <br />prosecutors are expected to attend each session. Most of the sessions will occur at <br />the National Advocacy Center in South Carolina, while others are expected to <br />occur in Washington, DC. In addition to FISA, topics covered by these sessions <br />will include an overview of the intelligence community; information sharing and <br />coordination between the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies; <br />FBI intelligence investigations; law enforcement investigations and collection <br />tools; litigation involving classified information; training on sections 203 and 905 <br />of the USA PATRIOT Act, and training as required by section 908 of that Act; <br />and the handling of classified information. OIPR, the FBI, the Criminal Division, <br />the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, the Central Intelligence Agency, the <br />Department of Homeland Security and other entities have been planning the <br />training, and will conduct it jointly. Additional training also will be conducted for <br />FBI personnel involved in national security investigations who are unable to <br />attend one of these eight training sessions. <br />14. <br />How many emergency FISA surveillance orders did the Department of Justice <br />process between FISA’s enactment and September 11, 2001? How many has it <br />processed since September 11, 2001? Has the change from 24 to 72 hours in 50 <br />U.S.C. 1805(f) and 1824(e) facilitated the use of FISA emergency searches and <br />surveillance, and if so, how? <br />Answer: From the enactment of FISA in 1978 through September 11, 2001, available <br />records indicate that Attorneys General issued 47 emergency authorizations for electronic <br />surveillance and/or physical searches under FISA. Between September 11, 2001 and <br />September 19, 2002, the Attorney General made 113 emergency authorizations for <br /> <br />Page 20 <br />-18- <br />electronic surveillance and/or physical searches under FISA. Of course, following <br />September 11, 2001, the Department conducted the most extensive investigation in the <br />history of the United States, with the overriding goal of preventing another catastrophic <br />terrorist attack occurred against the American people and the United States homeland. <br />FISA was the critical investigative tool in that effort. <br />The change from 24 to 72 hours in the pendency of the Attorney General’s emergency <br />approval authority under FISA before review by the FISC has enabled the Department to <br />respond more quickly, and therefore more effectively, to threats against our national <br />security. By lengthening the time before approval is sought from the FISC, the <br />Department has been able to use the emergency authority to obtain information that <br />otherwise might well have been unavailable. Moreover, by providing additional time, the <br />Department has been able to submit more thoroughly vetted applications originating in <br />Attorney General emergency approvals to the FISC for its review. <br />15. <br />Since enactment of the USA Patriot Act, what procedures have been implemented to <br />improve the efficiency of processing FISA applications? <br />Answer: On April 15, 2002, the Counsel for Intelligence Policy -- who is responsible for <br />OIPR – reported to the Deputy Attorney General on actions taken at that time to improve <br />the FISA process. These reforms included: <br />• <br />A requirement that, to improve the prioritization of FISA applications, <br />renewal applications to the FISC were to be made at the FISC’s regular <br />sessions, in the absence of exigent circumstances. This new requirement <br />has enforced a more orderly preparation of renewal applications and <br />limited the more labor-intensive “special” sessions to higher priority <br />initiations and other, operationally driven exigencies. <br />• <br />Refined procedures for the vetting and requesting of emergency Attorney <br />General approvals under FISA. <br />In order to ensure that requests from the <br />FBI for emergency approvals reflected the priorities of Bureau <br />management, such requests are now made only by the Assistant Directors <br />for Counterintelligence or Counterterrorism or their Deputies <br />. <br />• <br />Establishment of regular meetings between OIPR and FBI managers to set <br />and review priorities under FISA. <br />• <br />Expanded OIPR presence at FBI field offices on a continuous basis. <br />Specifically, OIPR has placed one of its line attorneys in New York on a <br />temporary basis to work with the New York field office, has hired an <br />attorney to begin work on a permanent basis in San Francisco, and plans to <br />hire attorneys permanently assigned to New York, possibly Chicago, and <br />with other key field offices as budgets permit. <br /> <br />Page 21 <br />-19- <br />• <br />Appointment of an Assistant Counsel in OIPR to establish, with FBI <br />attorneys, a joint FISA training program for all FBI foreign <br />counterintelligence agents. <br />• <br />Adjustments by the Counsel and his Deputy for Operations, on a <br />continuing basis, to improve the workloads, procedures, substance, and <br />flow of the FISA process. To accommodate multiple emergency and other <br />requests that at times may overpower OIPR duty officers, for example, the <br />Counsel or Deputy for Operations has adjusted workloads, called for <br />volunteers, or taken other management action to keep OIPR line attorneys <br />productive and effective. <br />On January 27, 2003, the Counsel for Intelligence Policy reported on the status of <br />additional steps taken by the FBI and the Department to improve the efficiency of the <br />FISA application process. These steps include: <br />• <br />Revised filing procedures with the FISC that enable it to review, adjudge, <br />and issue orders more efficiently. <br />• <br />Procedures enabling FBI field offices to submit FISA requests directly to <br />OIPR, rather than just through FBI headquarters, to accelerate the <br />application process. <br />• <br />Standardization of requests from the FBI for FISA authorities that will <br />enable faster preparation of applications. <br />• <br />A major reorganization approved by the Director of FBI of the units and <br />process for handling FISA within FBI headquarters that will enable the <br />Bureau to handle and track applications to the FISC, and to distribute its <br />orders, more efficiently. Specifically, in November 2002, the FBI created <br />the FISA Unit within the Office of General Counsel to perform the <br />administrative support functions for the FISA process. The FISA unit (1) <br />ensures that all FISA applications move expeditiously through the FISA <br />process, coordinating with the field divisions, FBI headquarters <br />substantive units, the National Security Law Unit (NSLU), and OIPR, (2) <br />is overseeing the development and implementation of an automated <br />tracking system that will electronically connect the field divisions, FBI <br />headquarters, NSLU, and OIPR, and (3) distributes all FISA court orders <br />and warrants to the field divisions, telecommunications carriers, Internet <br />service providers, and others. <br />• <br />An affirmation of the need for regular meetings between OIPR and Bureau <br />managers to review priorities and dockets for applications to the FISC. <br /> <br />Page 22 <br />-20- <br />• <br />Approval by the Attorney General of OIPR’s assigning attorneys to work <br />in the field at FBI field offices to improve the preparation and handling of <br />FISA applications and to facilitate the sharing of intelligence information <br />between Department components in a manner consistent with FISA and <br />applicable Court orders. <br />Moreover, the Department has increased the capacity of OIPR by increasing the hours and <br />workloads of OIPR attorneys, detailing lawyers from other components of the <br />Department to OIPR, and hiring additional attorneys. In particular, since September 11, <br />2001, 16 lawyers have been detailed to OIPR from elsewhere in the Justice Department, <br />and OIPR has hired 15 new attorneys. The FBI is making similar adjustments to increase <br />the staffing of the NSLU. <br />Finally, the Department has, in coordination with the FBI, undertaken a substantial <br />training program outlined in the answer to Question 13. <br />16. <br />In testimony presented to the Senate Judiciary on March 4, 2003, FBI Director <br />Robert Mueller stated that: <br />The FBI’s efforts to identify and dismantle terrorist networks <br />have yielded major successes over the past 18 months. We <br />have charged over 200 suspected terrorists with crimes - half of <br />whom have been convicted to date. The rest are awaiting trial. <br />Moreover, our efforts have damaged terrorist networks and <br />disrupted terrorist plots across the country. In the past month <br />alone, the FBI has arrested 36 international and 14 domestic <br />suspected terrorists. <br />A. <br />What authorities under the USA PATRIOT Act were used in identifying and <br />dismantling terror networks and were relied upon to prevent terrorist plots? <br />Answer: The Department of Justice and the FBI have used numerous authorities <br />provided by the USA PATRIOT Act in the investigation of the September 11 <br />terrorist attacks, and the continuing efforts to detect and prevent terrorism before <br />it occurs and to arrest and prosecute terrorists. The Department and FBI have <br />used, among others, investigative authorities provided in the following sections of <br />the Act: <br />• <br />201: Adds certain terrorism crimes to the list of offenses for which <br />wiretap orders are available. <br /> <br />Page 23 <br />-21- <br />& <br />These provisions have proven to be beneficial to law enforcement <br />officials, as several wiretap orders have used this expanded list of <br />terrorism offenses. <br />• <br />203: Permits law enforcement to share grand jury and electronic, wire, <br />and oral interception information containing foreign intelligence or <br />counterintelligence with federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, <br />immigration, national defense, or national security officials. <br />& <br />The Department has made disclosures of vital information to the <br />Intelligence Community and other federal officials under section <br />203 on dozens of occasions. <br />& <br />On September 23, 2002, the Attorney General issued guidelines <br />that establish procedures for the disclosure to the Intelligence <br />Community of grand jury and electronic, wire, and oral <br />interception information that identifies a United States person, as <br />defined by federal law. These guidelines include important privacy <br />safeguards. For example, they require that all such information be <br />labeled by law enforcement agencies before disclosure to <br />intelligence agencies and be handled by intelligence agencies <br />pursuant to specific protocols designed to ensure its appropriate <br />use. <br />• <br />205: Authorizes the FBI to expedite employment of translators in the fight <br />against terrorism. <br />& <br />The Bureau has hired 264 new translators to support <br />counterterrorism efforts, including 121 Arabic and 25 Farsi <br />speakers. <br />& <br />The Bureau also is working to implement its Law Enforcement and <br />Intelligence-agency Linguist Access system (LEILA), which will <br />store data regarding the proficiency and security clearance levels of <br />linguists available to the Bureau and its partner agencies. LEILA <br />will work across agency lines to maximize the use and availability <br />of the intelligence community’s language resources. <br />• <br />207: Increases authorization periods for FISA searches and electronic <br />surveillance. <br />& <br />While the details of FISA operations are classified, the FISA court <br />has authorized operations under section 207. The USA PATRIOT <br />Act has not only provided additional time to government <br /> <br />Page 24 <br />-22- <br />investigators targeting potential terrorist activity, but has also <br />helped the government and the FISC to focus their efforts on more <br />far-reaching terrorism-related cases. <br />• <br />209: Allows voice mail stored with a third party provider to be obtained <br />with a search warrant (upon a showing of probable cause), rather than with <br />a more time-consuming wiretap order. <br />& <br />Since the USA PATRIOT Act was passed, such warrants have <br />been used in a variety of criminal cases to obtain key evidence, <br />including voice-mails in the accounts of foreign and domestic <br />terrorists. <br />• <br />210: Clarifies the types of records that law enforcement can subpoena <br />from electronic communications providers to include the means and <br />source of payment, such as bank accounts and credit card numbers. <br />& <br />Prosecutors in the field report that this new subpoena authority has <br />allowed for quick tracing of suspects in numerous important cases, <br />including several terrorism investigations and a case in which <br />computer hackers attacked over fifty government and military <br />computers. <br />• <br />211: Clarifies that statutes governing telephone and Internet <br />communications (and not the burdensome provisions of the Cable Act) <br />apply to cable companies that provide Internet or telephone service in <br />addition to television programming. <br />& <br />Cable companies that provide telephone and Internet services are <br />now subject to search warrants, court orders, and subpoenas to the <br />same extent as all other communications carriers, ensuring that <br />terrorists and other criminals are not exempt from investigations <br />simply because they choose cable companies as their <br />communications providers. <br />• <br />212: Allows computer-service providers to disclose communications and <br />records of communications to protect life and limb; clarifies that <br />computer-hacking victims can disclose non-content records to protect their <br />rights and property. <br />& <br />Section 212 has been used to disclose vital information to law <br />enforcement on many occasions, including one case where such <br />records enabled agents to trace kidnappers’ communications. This <br />provision also proved invaluable in the investigation of a bomb <br /> <br />Page 25 <br />3 <br />Attachment D. <br />-23- <br />threat against a school. An anonymous person, claiming to be a <br />student at a high school, posted on an Internet message board a <br />bomb death threat that specifically named a faculty member and <br />several students. The owner and operator of the Internet message <br />board initially resisted disclosing to law enforcement any <br />information about the suspect for fear that he could be sued if he <br />volunteered that information. Once agents explained that the USA <br />PATRIOT Act created a new provision allowing the voluntary <br />release of information in emergencies, the owner turned over <br />evidence that led to the timely arrest of the individual responsible <br />for the bomb threat. Faced with this evidence, the suspect <br />confessed to making the threats. The message board’s owner later <br />revealed that he had been worried for the safety of the students and <br />teachers for several days, and expressed his relief that the USA <br />PATRIOT Act permitted him to help. <br />• <br />216: Amends the pen register/trap and trace statute to clarify that it <br />applies to Internet communications, and gives federal courts authority to <br />authorize the installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace <br />devices in other districts. <br />& <br />The Department has used the newly-amended pen/trap statute to <br />track the communications of (1) terrorist conspirators, (2) at least <br />one major drug distributor, (3) thieves who obtained victims’ bank <br />account information and stole the money, (4) a four-time murderer, <br />and (5) a fugitive who fled on the eve of trial using a fake passport. <br />& <br />This new authority was employed in the investigation of the <br />murder of journalist Daniel Pearl to obtain information that proved <br />critical to identifying some of the perpetrators. <br />& <br />The Deputy Attorney General has issued a memorandum to field <br />offices clearly delineating Department policy regarding the <br />avoidance of “overcollection,” the inadvertent collection of <br />“content” when using pen/trap devices. This guidance will help <br />protect the privacy of Internet users by ensuring that only <br />addressing information, and not the content of their <br />communications, is collected and used pursuant to section 216. (A <br />copy of this memorandum is attached.) <br />3 <br /> <br />Page 26 <br />-24- <br />• <br />217: Allows victims of computer-hacking crimes to request law <br />enforcement assistance in monitoring trespassers on their computers. <br />& <br />This provision has been used on several occasions. Computer <br />security officials and law enforcement investigators around the <br />country universally have praised this provision, and the <br />Department is committed to implementing it fully. <br />• <br />218: Allows law enforcement to conduct FISA surveillance or searches if <br />“a significant purpose” is foreign intelligence. <br />& <br />As explained in the answer to question 12, this change has allowed <br />increased coordination between intelligence and law enforcement <br />personnel in foreign counterintelligence investigations in which <br />FISA is being used. <br />• <br />219: Permits federal judges, in terrorism investigations, to issue search <br />warrants having effect outside the district. <br />& <br />This provision has been used on at least three occasions. One <br />noteworthy example occurred during the ongoing anthrax <br />investigation, when FBI agents applied for a warrant to search the <br />premises of America Media, Inc., in Boca Raton, Florida—the <br />employer of the first anthrax victim. Because of section 219, <br />agents were able to obtain a search warrant from the federal judge <br />in Washington, D.C., overseeing the wide-ranging investigation. <br />This saved investigators from wasting valuable time on petitioning <br />another judge in another district for that authority. <br />• <br />220: Permits a court with jurisdiction over the offense to issue a search <br />warrant for electronic evidence in possession of an Internet service <br />provider located in another district. <br />& <br />This provision has dramatically reduced the unnecessary <br />administrative burdens in the court districts that are home to large <br />Internet providers, such as the Northern District of California and <br />the Eastern District of Virginia. The enhanced ability to obtain this <br />information quickly has proved invaluable in several time-sensitive <br />investigations, such as one involving the tracking of a fugitive, and <br />another involving a hacker who stole a company’s trade secrets and <br />then extorted money from the company. <br />• <br />319: Permits the forfeiture of funds held in United States interbank <br />accounts. <br /> <br />Page 27 <br />-25- <br />& <br />On January 18, 2001, a federal grand jury indicted James Gibson <br />for various offenses, including conspiracy to commit money <br />laundering, and mail and wire fraud. Gibson, a lawyer, had <br />defrauded his clients, numerous personal injury victims, of <br />millions of dollars by fraudulently structuring settlements. Gibson <br />and his wife, who was indicted later, fled to Belize, depositing <br />some of the proceeds from their scheme in two Belizean banks. <br />The Department’s efforts to recover the proceeds initially proved <br />unsuccessful. Although Belize’s government initially agreed to <br />freeze the monies, a Belizean court lifted the freeze and prohibited <br />the government from further assisting American law enforcement <br />agencies. Efforts to break the impasse failed, while the Gibsons <br />systematically looted their accounts in Belize, purchasing yachts <br />and other luxury items. Following the passage of the USA <br />PATRIOT Act, a seizure warrant was served on the Belizean <br />bank’s interbank account in the United States pursuant to section <br />319, and the remaining funds were recovered. <br />& <br />In December 2001, the Department also used section 319 to <br />recover almost $1.7 million in funds. This money will be used to <br />compensate the victims of the defendant’s fraudulent scheme. <br />• <br />373: Makes it unlawful to run an unlicensed foreign money transmittal <br />business; eliminates prior requirement that the defendant have known <br />about the state licensing requirement. <br />& <br />On April 30, 2002, a federal jury in Boston convicted Mohamed <br />Hussein on two charges of running a foreign money transmittal <br />business (Barakaat North America, Inc.) without a license in <br />violation of section 373. The al-Barakaat network was affiliated <br />with and received funding from al Qaeda. In 2000 and 2001, after <br />Hussein ignored Massachusetts’s warning that his business needed <br />to be licensed, nearly three million dollars was wired from his <br />Boston bank account to the United Arab Emirates. On July 22, <br />2002, Hussein was sentenced to one and a half years in prison, to <br />be followed by two years of supervised release. <br />• <br />402: Appropriates funds to triple the number of INS agents on the <br />northern border and allocates monies to the INS and the Customs Service <br />to make improvements in technology for monitoring the northern border <br />and acquiring additional needed equipment. <br /> <br />Page 28 <br />-26- <br />& <br />The INS has rapidly implemented section 402, and committed to <br />hiring 245 new agents and assigning them to the Canadian border <br />by December 2002. The INS has arranged recruitment visits by <br />over 300 trained border patrol agents to colleges, universities, and <br />military installations. Since September 2001, the INS has received <br />over 65,000 applicants for agent positions, and the agency is <br />making selections at the rate of 1,000 per month (these selections <br />are in various stages of the pre-employment process). The INS has <br />also added five additional border agent basic training classes to its <br />training schedule. <br />& <br />The INS also has worked to quickly install the Integrated <br />Intelligence Surveillance System (ISIS) at 55 northern border sites. <br />When it is completed in approximately 18-24 months, ISIS, a <br />computer-aided detection system, will provide 24-hour/7-day <br />border coverage through ground-based sensors, fixed cameras, and <br />other technology. The INS further has enhanced border security by <br />deploying three new single-engine helicopters and 500 infrared <br />scopes for border agents at northern border stations. These scopes <br />significantly increase agents’ night-vision capability while on <br />patrol. <br />• <br />403: Requires the FBI to share information in its National Crime <br />Information Center (NCIC) files with INS and the State Department for <br />purposes of adjudicating visa applications. <br />& <br />On April 11, 2002, the Attorney General issued a major directive <br />on the coordination of terrorism-related information. That <br />directive requires all of the Department’s investigative <br />components, including the FBI, to include in the NCIC database <br />the names, photographs, and other identifying data of all known or <br />suspected terrorists. <br />& <br />Since the USA PATRIOT Act was passed, the FBI has given the <br />State Department over 8.4 million records from NCIC databases. <br />The FBI also has provided to the INS 83,000 comprehensive <br />records of key wanted persons in the NCIC databases, as well as <br />information regarding military detainees in Afghanistan, Pakistan, <br />and Guantanamo Bay. The INS has been working with the FBI and <br />United States Customs Service to provide to INS officers at <br />airports NCIC data on alien passengers. An information system to <br />permit such NCIC searches is on schedule to be deployed by the <br />end of fiscal year 2003. <br /> <br />Page 29 <br />-27- <br />• <br />414: Encourages the Attorney General to expedite the implementation of <br />the integrated entry and exit data system authorized by Congress in 1996. <br />& <br />The INS has established a multi-agency office to ensure that the <br />system is swiftly put into operation. On December 31, 2003, the <br />system should be operational for all travelers to the U.S. at all air <br />and sea points of entry. The system should be up and running at <br />the 50 largest land points of entry one year later, and at all points of <br />entry for all travelers by December 31, 2005. <br />• <br />416: Requires the Attorney General to implement and expand the foreign <br />student visa monitoring program authorized by Congress in the 1996 <br />Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. <br />& <br />The INS began enrolling schools for SEVIS on July 1, 2002. On <br />May 16, 2002, the INS published a proposed regulation that set a <br />January 30, 2003 deadline for all schools and programs to use <br />SEVIS for all of their foreign students. The INS has set up an <br />outreach program for eligible schools demonstrating the benefits of <br />SEVIS, developed training program materials, set up training <br />sessions, begun a competitive process to select contractors to assist <br />with the certification of schools prior to enrollment, and published <br />a variety of guidelines and memoranda concerning SEVIS <br />implementation. <br />• <br />801: Makes it a federal offense to engage in terrorist attacks and other acts <br />of violence against mass transportation systems. <br />& <br />The Department attempted to use section 801 in against <br />“shoebomber” Richard Reid, who has been convicted of attempting <br />to ignite a bomb hidden in his shoes during an international flight. <br />A federal judge dropped the charge, concluding that airplanes do <br />not fall within the meaning of “mass transportation vehicle.” <br />Congress subsequently closed this loophole in section 609 of the <br />“Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of <br />Children Today Act of 2003,” or “PROTECT Act.” <br />• <br />805: Enhances the ban on material terrorist support by making it apply to <br />experts who provide advice or assistance to be used in preparing for or <br />carrying out terrorism crimes, and to acts occurring outside the United <br />States. The section also adds to the list of underlying terrorism crimes for <br />which provision of material support is barred, makes it clear that <br />prohibited material support includes all types of monetary instruments, and <br />enhances penalties for material support. <br /> <br />Page 30 <br />-28- <br />& <br />On October 21, 2002, six United States citizens who live near <br />Buffalo, New York were indicted on charges of providing support <br />or resources to terrorists. In the early summer of 2001, these men <br />allegedly participated in weapons training at a terrorist training <br />camp in Afghanistan known to be used by al Qaeda. At a <br />safehouse on the way to the camp, they are alleged to have seen a <br />video on suicide bombing that featured the attack on the USS Cole, <br />in which 17 U.S. sailors were murdered. The indictment alleges <br />that the defendants also were trained in the use of assault rifles, <br />handguns, and long range rifles. While they were at the camp, <br />Osama bin Laden visited and delivered a speech instructing the <br />approximately 200 trainees in anti-American and anti-Israeli <br />sentiment as well as general al Qaeda doctrine. <br />& <br />On October 30, 2002, two Pakistani nationals and one United <br />States citizen were charged with conspiring to provide Stinger anti- <br />aircraft missiles to anti-U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Syed Mustajab <br />Shah, Muhammed Abid Afridi and Ilyas Ali were charged with <br />conspiracy to distribute heroin and hashish and conspiracy to <br />provide material support to al Qaeda. The defendants allegedly <br />arranged to exchange 600 kilograms of heroin and five tons of <br />hashish for cash and four Stinger missiles, and stated that they <br />intended to sell the missiles to al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan. <br />& <br />On November 1, 2002, four men, including a United States citizen <br />and a U.S. resident, were charged with conspiracy to distribute <br />cocaine and conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign <br />terrorist organization in a drugs-for-weapons plot to deliver $25 <br />million worth of weaponry to the United Self-Defense Forces of <br />Colombia (known by its Spanish language acronym, “AUC”). The <br />AUC – whose leader, Carlos Castaño-Gil, was charged with five <br />counts of drug trafficking in September 2001 – is an 8,000-member <br />Colombian paramilitary group listed on the State Department’s <br />Foreign Terrorist Organization List. The two U.S.-based <br />defendants allegedly sought to broker a deal between an <br />undercover law enforcement officer and the other two defendants, <br />who are high-ranking AUC leaders. The charges assert that, under <br />the agreement, the AUC would have exchanged cocaine for five <br />shipping containers full of Russian- and Eastern European-made <br />weaponry, including shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, 9,000 <br />assault rifles, and 3,000 grenades. <br /> <br />Page 31 <br />-29- <br />• <br />Section 905: Requires federal law enforcement agencies to disclose <br />expeditiously to the Director of Central Intelligence any foreign <br />intelligence acquired by the Department in the course of a criminal <br />investigation, except when disclosing such information would jeopardize <br />an ongoing investigation. <br />& <br />On September 23, 2002, the Attorney General released guidelines <br />that formalize the procedures and mechanisms already established <br />for the Department of Justice and other federal law enforcement <br />agencies that acquire foreign intelligence in the course of a <br />criminal investigation. <br />Whether the Department has used the surveillance techniques and other <br />amendments authorized by sections 204, 206, 214, and 215 is classified. <br />Accordingly, the answer relating to the Department's use of sections 204, 214 and <br />215 will be delivered to the Committee under separate cover. The answer relating <br />to the Department's use of section 206 will be provided to the House Permanent <br />Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) pursuant to the direction in the <br />Committee's letter of April 1, 2003, and in keeping with the longstanding <br />Executive branch practice on the sharing of operational intelligence information <br />with Congress. <br />B. <br />In your judgment, how many of those investigations would have been much <br />more difficult or impossible without the authorities available under the Act? <br />Answer: In our judgment, the Government’s success in preventing another <br />catastrophic attack on the American homeland in the 20 months since September <br />11, 2001, would have been much more difficult, if not impossibly so, without the <br />USA PATRIOT Act. The Department’s overall experience is that the authorities <br />Congress provided in the Act have substantially enhanced our ability to prevent, <br />investigate, and prosecute acts of terrorism. <br />Some of the authorities provided in Title II of the Act substantially eased <br />administrative burdens and increased the efficiency of law enforcement without <br />changing the underlying substantive legal standards – for example, sections 219 <br />and 220. In such cases, the USA PATRIOT Act’s authorities made available <br />resources that otherwise would have been devoted to administrative tasks, thereby <br />maximizing the law enforcement personnel available to investigate terrorists. In <br />other instances, the Act in fact allowed the Department to access information that <br />previously had been unavailable, as a legal or practical matter, or simply more <br />difficult to obtain. For example, the Department’s response to question 12, supra, <br />explains how section 218 of the Act facilitated the terrorism investigation of Sami <br />Al-Arian and other alleged members of a Palestinian Islamic Jihad cell in Tampa, <br />Florida. <br /> <br />Page 32 <br />-30- <br />17. <br />The Act supplemented the government’s authority to freeze and forfeit assets of <br />suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations. Please provide the Committee with <br />information related to the freezing or confiscation of such assets since the enactment <br />of the Act. <br />A. <br />Please identify all suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations whose assets <br />the federal government has frozen or forfeited? <br />Answer: Since September 11, 2001, the United States has frozen over 600 bank <br />accounts and $124 million in assets around the world. We have conducted 70 <br />investigations into terrorist financing with 23 convictions or guilty pleas to date. <br />The Department of Justice has not been given the responsibility of freezing <br />terrorist assets held in the United States. Such freezing results from the <br />designation of terrorist-related groups and individuals under Executive Order <br />13224 and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), both of <br />which are enforced by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets <br />Control (OFAC). However, Justice Department lawyers have successfully <br />defended in court a number of these freezings – for example, on December 31, <br />2002, the Seventh Circuit upheld Treasury’s freeze on the assets of Global Relief <br />Foundation, which is believed to have supported Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and <br />other known terrorist groups. See Global Relief Found. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748 <br />(7th Cir. 2002). <br />In most terrorism cases, it has not been necessary for the Justice Department to <br />seek forfeiture of U.S.-based terrorist assets under the USA PATRIOT Act’s new <br />authorities, because the assets had already been frozen by OFAC. “Forfeiture,” <br />unlike freezing, enables a court to transfer to the United States the ownership of <br />assets which are the proceeds of or are related to a particular crime. Section 806 <br />of the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the government’s authority to forfeit <br />terrorist-related assets; this change was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G). <br />After September 11, 2001, the Department of Justice filed a seizure warrant on a <br />New Jersey bank account suspected of containing assets belonging to one or more <br />of the 19 dead hijackers. The Department also included a forfeiture count in the <br />Texas indictment of Hamas leader Musa Abu Marzook, United States v. Elashi, <br />CR No. 3:02-CR-052-R (N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 17, 2002). Each of these actions, <br />however, were based on pre-USA PATRIOT Act authority. <br />B. <br />Please identify the specific authority, whether or not under the Act, that the <br />federal government has asserted in freezing or forfeiting the assets of <br />suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations. <br /> <br />Page 33 <br />-31- <br />Answer: The judicial forfeiture action in the Marzook case was predicated on <br />money laundering. Assets of terrorists and terrorist organizations, and those who <br />act for or on behalf of, provide financial or other support for, or are otherwise <br />associated with them, can also be frozen pursuant to Executive Order 13224 <br />(Global Terrorism) and Executive Order 12947 (Individuals and Groups who <br />Threaten Middle East Peace Process). <br />C. <br />Have any seizures or forfeitures been challenged in court? <br />Answer: The Civil Division of the Justice Department has been involved in <br />judicial challenges to the OFAC designation and freezing actions of <br />terrorist-related entities that have a U.S. presence. These challenges involved two <br />Illinois-based charities suspected of being associated with al Qaeda (Benevolence <br />International Foundation and Global Relief Foundation), a Texas entity believed <br />to be a Hamas front (Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development) and two <br />entities affiliated with an al Qaeda-connected Somalian financial network known <br />as al-Barakaat (Global Service International, Inc. and Aaran Money Wire <br />Service). <br />D. <br />What have been the results of any such challenges? <br />Answer: The United States was successful in defending the Holy Land <br />Foundation challenge in district court, and the case is now on appeal to the D.C. <br />Circuit. One issue remains in the district court and has been stayed. The Seventh <br />Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction in Global <br />Relief Foundation and ruled in favor of the government on all of the statutory and <br />constitutional claims raised in the appeal. The government has moved to dismiss <br />the remaining issues in the case on the grounds that the administrative record <br />amply supports Global Relief’s designation under Executive Order 13224. <br />Although the designations of certain Barakaat-related entities have been <br />withdrawn, their challenge has not yet been dismissed. <br />E. <br />Has any court, pursuant to section 316 of the Act (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 983 <br />note), admitted evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible in a forfeiture <br />proceeding? If so, on what circumstances justified admitting such evidence <br />in such cases? <br />Answer: Because no forfeiture cases have yet been brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. <br />§ 981(a)(1)(G), there has been no occasion to invoke the tool provided in section <br />316 of the Act. To the extent that section 316 also applies to freezing orders and <br />confiscations under IEEPA, the Department of Justice is unaware of any instances <br />where the evidentiary rules discussed in section 316 were invoked. <br /> <br />Page 34 <br />-32- <br />18. <br />Section 402 authorizes appropriations to triple the number of INS Border Patrol <br />Agents and Inspectors in each state along the Northern Border, and also authorizes <br />appropriations to provide necessary personnel and facilities to support such <br />personnel. <br />A. <br />How many additional Inspectors has the INS hired at the Ports of Entry <br />along the Northern Border? <br />B. <br />How many of those hires are working as Inspectors along the Northern <br />Border at this time? <br />C. <br />By how many Inspectors has the total staffing at the ports along the <br />Northern Border increased since September 11, 2001? <br />Answer: Pursuant to the Committee’s April 1, 2003, letter, in light of the transfer <br />of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to the Department of <br />Homeland Security (DHS), we have referred these questions to DHS for a <br />response. We previously provided the Committee with a copy of this referral. <br />19. <br />What technology improvements have been completed and what additional <br />technology improvements are planned for FY2003 expenditures to improve <br />Northern Border security? <br />Answer: Pursuant to the Committee’s April 1, 2003, letter, in light of the transfer of the <br />INS to DHS, we have referred this question to DHS for a response. We previously <br />provided the Committee with a copy of this referral. <br />20. <br />Subtitle B of Title IV of the USA PATRIOT Act gives the Attorney General <br />additional authority to detain certain suspected alien terrorists, and improves <br />systems for tracking aliens entering and leaving the United States and for inspecting <br />aliens seeking to enter the United States. Section 411 amends the Immigration and <br />Nationality Act (INA) to broaden the scope of aliens ineligible for admission or <br />deportable due to terrorist activities, and defines the terms “terrorist organization” <br />and “engage in terrorist activity.” <br />A. <br />Has the INS relied upon the definitions in section 411 of the Act to file any <br />new charges against aliens in removal proceedings? If so, how many times <br />has it used each provision? <br />Answer: Prior to the transfer of the INS to DHS, the INS had not relied upon the <br />definitions in section 411 of the Act to file any new charges against aliens in <br />removal proceedings. <br /> <br />Page 35 <br />-33- <br />Despite the fact that this authority has not yet been used, each case is reviewed for <br />the potential use of the section 411 amendments to the immigration law. The <br />options in reviewing the case of a suspected alien terrorist range from continuing <br />an ongoing intelligence-gathering operation to criminal prosecution to removal, <br />including both conventional removal under Title II of the Immigration and <br />Nationality Act (INA) to removal before the Alien Terrorist Removal Court under <br />Title V of the INA. Cases are reviewed with the goal of taking the appropriate <br />action to protect the national security. <br />In the past, decisions have been made to forego filing security-related charges <br />(that would include the amendments made by section 411 of the USA PATRIOT <br />Act) for a variety of reasons, including: (1) the fact that the underlying evidence <br />on the security-related removal charge is classified and cannot be declassified; (2) <br />there was a clear non-security-related charge of removability that would result in a <br />more expeditious removal since security-related charges of removal may generate <br />more litigation; (3) aliens charged with security-related grounds of removal have <br />asserted claims for asylum based on the fact that they have been labeled as <br />“terrorists” by the United States government, thus prolonging the proceedings. <br />B. <br />In your July 26, 2002 response, you stated that one alien had been denied <br />admission under these new provisions. Have any aliens been denied <br />admission under these grounds since that response? <br />Answer: Prior to the transfer of the INS to DHS, at least three aliens had been <br />denied admission under these new provisions. <br />C. <br />What effect have the amendments to the INA in section 411 of the Act had on <br />ongoing investigations in the United States? <br />Answer: Since passage of the Act and before transfer of INS to DHS, INS and <br />the Department’s Criminal and Civil Divisions issued field guidance and <br />undertook numerous training efforts to familiarize INS field attorneys and <br />officers, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, FBI officials, and other federal personnel with <br />the new provisions. This guidance is being employed in pending investigations. <br />D. <br />Section 212(a)(3)(F) of the INA, as amended by section 411 of the Act, <br />renders inadmissible any alien who the Attorney General determines has <br />been associated with a terrorist organization and intends while in the United <br />States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in activities endangering <br />the United States. Has the Attorney General made such a determination with <br />respect to any alien thus far? <br />Answer: The Justice Department had not made use of this provision prior to the <br />transfer of INS to DHS. <br /> <br />Page 36 <br />-34- <br />The security-related cases we have encountered at ports-of-entry in the recent past <br />have involved aliens subject to removal on other grounds. Due to the time <br />sensitivity of such cases, it was more expeditious to deny admission based on <br />other charges than to refer the cases to the highest levels of the Departments of <br />Justice and State. Nevertheless, we believe that this authority is an important tool <br />to maintain in current law for use in appropriate cases. <br />E. <br />Have there been any challenges to the constitutionality of the charges added <br />to the INA by section 411 of the Act? If so, please identify the case(s) and the <br />status of the proceedings. <br />Answer: Because, prior to the transfer of the INS to DHS, the INS had not relied <br />upon the definitions in section 411 of the Act to file any new charges against <br />aliens in removal proceedings, this question is inapplicable. <br />21. <br />Section 412 of the Act provides for mandatory detention until removal from the <br />United States (regardless of relief from removal) of an alien certified by the <br />Attorney General as a suspected terrorist or threat to national security. It also <br />requires release of such alien after seven days if removal proceedings have not <br />commenced, or if the alien has not been charged with a criminal offense. In <br />addition, this section of the Act authorizes detention for additional periods of up to <br />six months of an alien not likely to be deported in the reasonably foreseeable future <br />if release will threaten our national security or the safety of the community or any <br />person. It also limits judicial review to habeas corpus proceedings in the U.S. <br />Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, or any <br />district court with jurisdiction to entertain a habeas corpus petition, and limits the <br />venue of appeal of any final order by a circuit or district judge under section 236A <br />of the INA to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. <br />A. <br />At the time of your July 26, 2002 response, you had not used the authority in <br />Section 412. Have you used the authority since that response? If so, please <br />state: <br />i. <br />How many of the aliens for whom certifications have been issued have <br />been removed? <br />ii. <br />How many aliens for whom the Attorney General issued certifications <br />are still detained? At what stage of the criminal or immigration <br />proceedings are each of those cases? <br />iii. <br />How many of the aliens who were certified have been granted relief? <br />How many of those aliens are still detained? <br /> <br />
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