Below is the most powerful first person description of a serious railroad accident that I have heard. Throughout our previous discussions about this collision, I could eventually visualize what happened in detail, but still, a lot of detail was missing, including the exact moves of the engineer and conductor, the arrival of the Amtrak train, the timing, etc. That is all finally clarified by this interview. This was the classic switch position mistake that seems to have occurred many times throughout history.
It seems as though the conductor had made a lot of moves through various switches that night and had to keep track of how they were lined, and so, he simply forgot to re-line one of them. He makes no excuses for his mistake, but just finds it difficult to believe that he did what he did.
It is stunning how similar this accident was compared to the Robinson, NM head-on collision on the ATSF RY in 1956. In both cases, you have two crew members disagreeing and questioning each other about whether the switch is lined right. In this case, it was the engineer and the conductor, and in the Robinson wreck; it was the engineer and the fireman. And in both cases the disagreement was being debated right up to the moment of the collision. It was the collision that settled the question in both cases. In both cases, the person who had wrongly lined the switch could not explain why, other than just believing he had correctly lined it.
In the Cayce collision NTSB report, the conductor’s interview reveals a fairly long and detailed process of giving up his track authority. Apparently there was some confusion about the need to refer to the switches by their number rather than their name. I have not read and assimilated all of that. It almost seems as if the conductor, in executing the thorough process of giving up his track authority, somehow perceived that process itself to be his assurance that he had restored the mainline switch. In other words the completion of the process became proof that the switch was properly lined, when in fact, the conductor had forgotten to properly line it.
Another curious point is that the engineer tells the conductor that he is unsure that the conductor restored the switch, but only at the last minute does he tell him. And in telling the conductor that he is unsure about the switch, the engineer reveals that he bases his doubt on observing the actions of the conductor at the time he was on the ground and was supposed to restore the switch. Why didn’t the engineer ask the conductor about the switch at that time? If he had, I doubt that the wreck would have happened. Yet, the engineer only brought it up seconds before the Amtrak train came into view.
From the NTSB report, https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/61000-61499/61332/616800.pdf
In the words of the conductor:
“I just saw the numbers that were written down, then released our EC1. As we were sitting there waiting on a ride, my engineer said, are you sure you got that main line switched back? And I said, yeah, I'm sure I got it back. And he said, well, because when we pulled back, I could swear you were down at the derail already. I know you walk fast but I don't know if you walk that fast. I'm like -- I was like, well, you got me second-guessing myself, but I'm sure I did. I said, well, flick on the light and see if it's lined.
And we turned on the light, and we were about six or so cars back from the switch so we couldn't see it. There's no light at the switch. And he was like, well, I'll get -- I'll go down and check it out. I want to stretch my legs anyway. As he got up to walk down, we saw Amtrak. Right when he was walking down the stairs, Amtrak 1 came around the corner. You see -- saw their light. And so -- sorry. Take your time. If you we need to, we can take a break. A. I just need a minute. MR. TORRES: We're taking a break.
MR. VARGO: And so, we saw Amtrak coming around the corner. And I was sitting there because I was sure I had the switch lined back. And I saw my engineer walking, you know, shining his flashlight towards the switch. Now as he was walking, I mean, he was still a far distance away, you know, you couldn't see anything. And as they approached the switch, you know, I was confident that I had it lined. I mean, I wasn't second-guessing anything. I mean, I knew I lined it. And then they just hit the side, aimed -- you know, come flying down right at us, I mean, fast, coming fast, right at us. And, I mean, I froze for just a split-second and just headed towards the engineer door and just kept running.
And they hit us and I just -- I remember falling down. I was thinking I was going to die. And I got crushed, and I was pinned and I couldn't move. And somehow I -- somehow I got loose and fell down between the engine and Amtrak. And I was -- I was doused in diesel fuel. And I remember looking over at the Amtrak, at the locomotive and I was like -- I mean, it was just tore up. And I said, there's no way they made it. And I just kept feeling so bad right there because, I mean, you know, obviously, the switch didn't line itself.
And I just kept thinking there's no way I didn't line it back for the main line. And I ran around the engine on the other side. And I think at that point it really hit me that I was just covered in diesel. And I thought everything was just going to blow up. I mean, that's what I had in my mind -- it was just going to all blow up and I was going to burn down.
And I saw my engineer's light. He was -- come running back and he's like, I -- you know, he came up to me. He was like, I can't believe you made it out. How did you make it out? And I said, I don't know, you know, I just ran out the engineer door.
And luckily I had my phone on me and I called the yardmaster and told him what happened. And then I don't know if I called the trainmaster or trainmaster called, ended up calling me. I tried to call my wife and I let her know what happened. And somehow the engineer's brother had my phone number and called it, and I gave it to the engineer to talk to his brother. And we were just waiting for emergency vehicles to show up. I mean, and everybody came, and they were taking everybody out. And, I mean, now --that was it, till I went to the hospital. They took – they insisted I go to the hospital, but, I mean, I didn't want to go. I didn't feel like I deserved it.”
~~~
Usually in the airline industry if there is a disagreement steps are to be taken to verify what actually was done or said.l
blue streak 1 Usually in the airline industry if there is a disagreement steps are to be taken to verify what actually was done or said.l
There was not enough time for that in either the Cayce collision or the Robinson, NM collision in 1956 that I cited for comparison. In the Robinson disaster, the question of the switch position only emerged a couple minutes before the train arrived. The switch was correct, but the fireman on the ground had violated some rules in going up the switch and unlocking it prior to the meet.
The engineer may have thought that the fireman has mistakenly thrown the switch wrong as well, so he tried to convey his uncertainty by tooting the horn and eventually blinking the headlight. This raised doubt in the mind of the fireman, and at the last second, he decided the switch must be wrong, so he threw it. But it had been right and he threw it wrong in the face of the approaching passenger train.
At Cayce, the engineer laid out a compelling case as he explained to the conductor why he thought the switch had been left wrong by the conductor. But he only did this seconds before the Amtrak train came into sight around the curve. As I mentioned, I find it very strange that the engineer had not spoken up earlier when he claims to have noticed that the conductor had not restored the switch. At that point, they still had track authority so there was plenty of time to restore the switch for the mainline. Also, the engineer would have had to confirm the switch being right when they gave up track authority and verified the switch positions in that process.
Here is the interview of the freight engineer on the job that was struck by Amtrak due to the open mainline switch. In the interview of the conductor (above), the conductor describes being questioned by the engineer about the switch just as the Amtrak train was approaching, so it was too late to get to the switch to check its position.
In this conversation questioning the switch, the engineer reveals that his doubt about the switch being correctly lined goes back to when he failed to see the conductor throw the switch as would be expected. Since that was perhaps 30-60 minutes before the Amtrak train showed up, I wondered why the engineer did not confirm the switch position at that time when there would have been plenty of time to correct it if it was not lined for the mainline.
Here in the interview of the engineer, there is intense questioning about the engineer seeing the conductor’s moves which seemed to lack the throwing of the switch for the mainline as would have been required. The transcript is difficult to read, but it seems that the engineer did question the conductor about the switch earlier when it first saw the conductor apparently failing to line the switch for the mainline. But he did not go so far as to go and check it himself. It seems that he sort of dismissed the issue when the conductor reaffirmed that the switch was correctly lined. So the conductor went ahead and released his track authority.
However, later when they were sitting in the locomotive cab waiting for the crew van, the engineer had what he referred to as a “feeling” or an “intuition.” Apparently, he suddenly felt that the switch was wrong despite what the conductor told him earlier. So that is when he again questioned the conductor who again reassured him that the switch was correctly lined. But the engineer had such a strong doubt that he decided to walk down to the switch and check it. But by that time, it was too late since the Amtrak train had just come into view as the engineer was climbing down the steps of the freight engine, intent on walking down the check the switch which was some hundreds of feet away. But since the Amtrak train was already in view, it would arrive at the switch faster than anyone could get there and check how it was lined. So the engineer said he would just walk down a ways and “watch them by”.
The conductor remained seated and watched as the Amtrak train approached. Both the engineer and conductor watched apprehensively, hoping that the approaching Amtrak train would validate the premise that the mainline switch was correctly lined. But it was not. Both men watched the Amtrak engine suddenly veer off the mainline and come flying into the siding.
Here is a link to download or open the PDF of the interview with the CSX engineer. It runs about 52 pages, but it immediately gets right into the focus of what the engineer observed of the conductor’s moves to re-line switches and set derails at the finish of their work. This subject is gone over several times as the engineer is interviewed by different people.
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=464943&docketID=61332&mkey=96974
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