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[url]http://dotlibrary2.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?websearch&site=dot_railroads[/url] It is the second union pacific accident listed from the top for 1951. In case that doesn't work I went ahead and pasted the report here. I hope this helps. I don't have any clue why the first link didn't work right. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION WASHINGTON REPORT NO. 3443 UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY IN RE ACCIDENT AT WYUTA, WYO., ON NOVEMBER 12, 1951 Report No. 3443 SUMMARY Date: November 12, 1951 Railroad: Union Pacific Location: Wyuta, Wyo. Kind of accident: Rears-end collision Trains involved: Passenger : Passengers Train numbers: 104 : 102 Engine numbers: Diesel-electric units 998, 988B : Diesel-electric units CNW and 985B 5007B, UP 928B and UP 987B Consists: 12 cars : 13 cars Speeds: 2 m.p.h. : 77 m.p.h. Operation: Signal indications Tracks: Double; tangent; 0.80 percent descending grade eastward Weather: Snowing Time: 11:27 a.m. Casualties: 17 killed; 159 injured Cause: Failure to operate following train in accordance with signal indications Recommendation: It is recommended that the Union Pacific Railroad Company extend its automatic cab-signal system to the remainder of its line between Ogden and Omaha INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT NO. 3443 IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER THE ACCIDENT T REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY February 11, 1952 Accident at Wyuta, Wyo., on November 12, 1951, caused. by f1ail1ure to operate the following train in acocordance with signal indications. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 1 1 REPORT OF THE OOM ISSION PATTERSON, Commissioner: ù On November 12, 119511, there was a rear--end collision betwieen two passenger trains on the Union Pacific Rail1road at Wyuta, Wyo., which resul1ted i. In t the death of 11 passen- ù gearrB, 3 Pull11man employees, 1 mechanical department employee, and 2 traiIn--service employeesrnrloyees, and the injJury of 142 passengers, 2 Pullman employees, 1 raiIlway--mail clerk, 10 dining-- car employees, and 4 train-servicoe employees. This accident was investigated in conjunction with Y representatives of the Wyroming Boarning ordar of Equalization and Public Service Commission. 1 Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Corn- merce Act the aboe-entit1ed procoeding was referred. by the Commission to Commissloner Patterson for consierat1on and disposition. -3- ***4- Eastward main track Report No. 3443 Union Pacific Railroad Wyuta, Wyo. November 12, 1951Center siding Westward main track Tangent 2,539 ft. 199 ft1 ù 31g. 9214 1,36 ft. (J) o Green Rivei, yo. 104,7 mi. X (Point of accident) Wyuta, Wyc. 5,9 nil, o Wahsatch, Utah 25.1 mi, o Echo I 39.9 ml. o Ogden, Utah Pont o: accident 1,234' 4,083 r I Wyuta ö-+-(Station sign) i7 ft 3,203ft 44 ft, I West j ---idin-switch Sù 9224 Cr -1.ù,-t c" 0r4 H ù -4 ù .HCi ù0 ù 37ZZ : ù ù 1o 0 z I ' ) / 5 -. 3443 Location of Accident and Method of Operation This acci1dent occurred on thab.t part of the Wyoming Division extending rid1;' between Ogden, Utah, and r Green River, Wyo.,, 175.6 miles, a doutbl1e--track line, oveor wihich trains moving rnovn with the current of traffñfice arc operateod by signal Indications., At Wyuta, Wyo.c,, 70.9?O9 mimiles east of Ogden, a siding 1.23 miles in leng1dnth is located between the main tIr tracks., The west'ost siding-si1switch ch in the eastward main track is 2,849 feect west of the station sig1n. Thie accident occurreod. on the eastwarTd'rarI main track at a point 4,0O83 feet. east of the wrio pest sid1ing-ns-witchii and 11,234 feect east of the stati1on .sign., From the Frqni the west there are, in suucceossion, a 1 degree cur've to the left 1,522 feet in length, a tangent 3,20O3; feect, a 1 degree0 curivwe to the left 8117? feet, and a tangent 199 feet to thc point ofl' accident and. 2,539 freet eastward,. The griadeo varies betweeon 0.02OO2 peorceont and . 0.80 O8O percent deascending eccenaieastward n' eastathroughout a distance of 6.04 miles immediately west of the point of accident, and it is 0.80 percent descending eastward at that point. Automatic signals 9268, 9256, 9242, 9224, and 9214, governing east-bound movements on the eastward main track, are located, respectively, 5.21 miles west, 4.01 miles west, 2.55 miles west, 4,157 feet west, and 1,386 feet east of the point of accident. These signals are of the three-indication color-light type and are approach lighted. The red, yellow, and green aspects appear at distances of 17 feet, 18 feet, and 19 feet, respectively, above the level of the tops of the rails. Aspects applicable to this investigation and the corresponding indications and names are as follows: Aspect Indication Name r. throutout a (istance Qf 6e04 mile$ imied1ateIy woBt of the point of accidcnt, an it is 0,80 percent d.ocend1ng eactar. at that points Automtic sigrwls ?268, 9256, 9242, 9224) 9214, govern1n eastbound overorts on t o astrara main tiack, are iocatd, rospctive1y, 5.21 iI1es wot, 4)01 miles wost, 2.55 riI?es viest, 4,17 feet west, and 1,333 œOL1t east of the poInt of ccicIent, Thcs añrLa1s are o' he t reo1rllctibn color- 1iht typo and are aproacii 1itcd, The rcc9., yollow, and green aspccts appear at distances of 17 foot, 18 feet, and 19 feet, respectively, above tie level o the tops o th rails, Aspect8 applicable to this inveSti{tofl and the corroponding iridicatiori and fliiO8 are as o11os Indi.cation Name Green Proceed. Clear si.gnal.i Yeell11ow Immedi ateoly reduce speecedc to 20 miles per hour, and as I Approach roach signal. to 20 miles per i.our, an as much slower as necessary in orde.r to be able to stop befoore passimng t:hec next s.ignal1,. RedEL Sstop.,, Sttop signal.na1, The coontrolling 111n circuits of these s1ignals Cna]ùs are so arrangedo d that, when the ii block of signal 9224 is .s ococupiedc, csignall 9224 displaysc a redJ aspeoct and signal1 9p242 di1spla1ys yellow aspect. This carrier's operating rules read in part as follows: , p -6- 3443 This can't or' a operating rules road in part as follows: DEFINITIONS DEFINITIONS Reosetricoteod Speeod,.---Proceooeod prepared to satop sBhliort of train, obstrucotion, or switch not propeorly lined, and be onh lookout for broken rail, or anything that may affect movemeont of train. 27. A signal iimnppeorfecotl1y displayed or the abseoncoe of a signal at a plan wheore a signal is usually displayeod, must be regardeod as the most restrictive z'eetriotive indicoation that could be gfiven lvon by that signal, except that wthen a light is not burning on a color lilghnt signal other than a Permissive signal, it must be regarded as a Stop signal. ù4** * * 34. All411 members of engine, train and yard creows, when pracoticloablle, must coommunicate niunioate to eacoh other by its nawmne the indicloation of each signal affecoting the movement of their train or engine. 99. When a train stops, eoxcoept when colear of the main tracok, the flagman must go back immediately with flagman'st a signals, a sufficient distance to insure full proteoctiolon. * * *0 * * * If U the flagman is recalled before rieaching the required distance, he will, if necoesseaary, place two torpedoes on theo rail; by night, or during foggy orx' stormy weathoer, he must display a lighted fusee in addition, to protecot his train while returning,. WThen a train is moving under coitrcoumsatancoes in whtich it may be overtaken by another train, the flagman must take o such action as may be necessary to insure full protecotiton. By night, or by day when ton the view is obscBoured, lighted fusees must beo thrown off at proper intervals. Fflagman's signals: Day saignal--.sa.aA reod flag, not less than teon torpedoes and six fusBeoes 99(A). * * * 99 (A). * * * Conductors and engineers are responsible for protection of their train, and when protectIioon is necessary, they must see that it is provided with utmost promptness and in strict accordance with the rules. * .* * 489. , In foggy or stormy weather, engineers must approach all signal with great care, prepared to respect indication given, stopping if necessary to determine the indication,. 509. W509. Then a traitn or engine iIs stopped 'by a S2top iIndication of an automatic block siIgnal, iIt may proceed when signal changes to Approach or to Proceed indication; or if signal remains at Stop---- * * * C(d) On double track, train or engine may proceed * * * * but must move, at restricted speoed to the next home signal. The maximum authorized speed for passenger traeins was' 6 79 miles per hour,. Description of Accident No. 104, an east--bound firistst--class streamlined passenger train, known as the City of Los Angeles, consisted of Diesel-- electric units 998, 988BE, and 985BE, coupled iIn multiple--unit control, one baggage--mail car, one dormitory car, two coaches, two dining cars, one lounge car, four sleeping cars, and one observation--sleeping car, in the order named., All 12 cars were of lilIghtweight steel construction and were equipped with tight-- lock couplers. This train departed from Ogden at 9:45 a., m.,, on time, and passed Wahsatchch, the last open office, 65 miles east of Ogden, at 11:09 a.m., rn, 8 minutes late. It stopped at signal 9242, at signal 9224, eand at signallrnai 9214, because the lenses of these siIgnals were covered with ice and snow and the enginemeen were unable to determine the iIndications., Immediately after the train was started. at signal 9214 the rear end was struck by No. 1002 at a point 4,1157 feet east of signal 9224 and 4,0083 feet east of the west siding-switch at Wyuta., No., 102, an east--bound first--class streamlined passenger train, known as the City ocf San Francisco, co¢nsiscted of CNW Diesel--electric unit 5007BTh and UP1W Diesel--electric units 928B and 987TBh, coupled in multiple--unit control, two mail coars, one -7- 3443 n - 3443 (.crmitorydormitory car, two coaches, two dining cars, one lounge carcnr, and o.id five sleeping cars, in the order named., All 113 cars were of lightweight steel construction and were equipped l pod wiIth tight-- lock couplers.ù This train dpepa.rted from Ogden at 10:07 a.m., 12 12 minutes late, and passed Wahsatch at 11:21 a.m., 10 minutes and T)assed. late. It passed signals 9242 and 9224 and while moving at a speed of 77 miles per hour it struck the rear end of No. 104. Wahsatoh at 11:21 a. m,, 10 iinutoS late. It passed s12:naj..s 9242 and 9224 and while moving at a speed of 77 miles per hour it struck the rear end ol' No, 134, All cars of No. 104 were deraeiled. Separations occurred at each coupling of the rear six cars. The ,Iled Searations occurred at each coupling of the rear sIx cars, The tenth, elo1eovcenth iti.a, and twelfth cars were demolished., The ninth car stopuped on its right side, with its rear end about 45 feept south of the track and iIts front end on the track structure., The other cars stopped upright and approximately iIn line wiIth the track., The eighth and ninth cars were badly damaged,. the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh cars were somewhat damaged, and the first and second cars were slightly damaged,. The entire train of No., 102, except the reoar car and the rear truck of the twelfth car, was derailed,. Separations occurred between adjaaceont units of the train from the first Diesel--electric unit to the fifth car,. The first Diesel-- electric unit stopped on its right side, with its front end on the track structure and 365 feet east of the point of accident and its rear end about 45 feet south of the track and on top of the tenth car of No., 104,. The second unit stopped on its right side, with its front end near the rear end of the first unit and its rear end on the track structure., The third unit stopped on iIts right side, with its front end against the rear end of the second unit and. its rear end about 40 feet south of the track. , None of the deraiIled cars was overturned., The first car stopped at the reoar of the third Diesel--electric unit, approximately at right angles to the track, with its front end toward the south and its rear end on the track structure., The second car stopped with iIts front end near the rear end of the first car and iIts reoar end about 50 feet south of the track. The third car stopped with iIts front end aainst the reoar end of the second car and its rear end on the track structure., The fourth car stoppnueed iIn line with the track., The fifth car stopped with its front end on the track structure and its, rear end about 20 feet south of the track., The sixth car stopped with its front end against the rear end of the fifth car and its reoar end on the track structure., The other d,erailed cars stopped apprioxiImaetel1y in line with the track., The three Dieselo1-electriIc units, the fiIrst car, and the fifth to the ninth cpars, iInclusive, weore badly damaged., The seceond third, fourth, tenth, and eleventh cars were somewhnat damaged. Extra 1475 East, an ecast--bound freiIght train consisting of Diesel-electric units 1475, 1l484B, and 1484C, coupled iIn 3443 multiIple.-.unijt control, 89 cars and. a caboose, was occupying the siding at Wyuta when the accident occurred. The rear .end was standing approximately 380 feet east of the west siding- -switch,. The thiIrty--sixth to the forty--third cars, inclusive, of this train were struck by the derailed Iied equipment of Nos., 104 and 102 and were derailed,. Heavy wet snow was falling, and there was a strong wind from the west at the time of the accident, which occurred at 1111:27 a. m., The flagman of No. 104, the engineer of No. 102, and the Diesel--electric maintainer of No. 102 were killed. The front brakeman of No., 104 and the fireman, the conductor, and the flagman of No., 102 were injured. The locomotiIve of No., 102 consisted of one .2000--horseepower DiIesel--electric unit, which was provided with a control compartment at the front, one 2250--horsepower unit, and one 2000--horsepower unit.ù The first Diesel--electric unit was provided with a safety--control feature actuated by a foot pedal., The control compartment of the filrst Diesel--electric unit was so badly damanged as a result of the accident that the position of the controls at the time the accident occurred could not be determined. Discussion On the day of the accident Extra 1475 East departed from Ogden at 5:45 a,. m. Members of the crew said that rain and snow were falling iIntermittently as the train proceeded from Ogden to Echo, 39.,9 miles east of Ogden, and heavy wet snow was falling from the time the train departed from Echo until after the accident occu.rred., Because snow was sticking o the lenses of the signals in the vicinity of Wahsatch the crew experienced difficulty in distinguishing their aspects. The train departed from Wahl-isatch at 10:55 a., m., The employees on the l1oconmotive said that the green aspects of the signals between Wahsatch and W1rtyutta were very obscure., It was necessary for the engineer to restrict the speed. of the train to between 20 and 25 miles per hour in oOrder to be certadin of the indications of the signals,. The conductor and the flagman said that the red aspects of some of the signal s . between Wahsatch and Wyuta were visible from the cupola of the caboose, but the aspects of others were not., At Wyuta visibility was restricted by faelling snow to a distance of about 200 feet, and there wasS between 8 and 10 iInches of new snow on the ground. The train entered theo siding at WI'Tyuta to permit Nos., 104 and 102 to pass., When the train stopped to enter the siding the flagman placed a lighted 5--minute red fusee on the track, and as the train proceeded into the siding he - 10 -. 3443 threw off a second fusee., The train stopped on the siding thg at 11:20 a. m., The flagman said that No., 104 stopped at signal l 9224 soon after he closed the siding swiItch. As No. 104 passed him he observed that the flagman wWas standing in the rear vestibule of the eleventh car and. that the markers and the red oscillating signal light at the rear of the rear car were lighted., A short time later No., 102 passed signal 9224 without stoppiIng, and he assumed that No., 104 had passed signal 9214., He watched No., 102 pass, but heo did not notice whether any one was visible in the control compartment of the locomotive,. After Extra 1475 East stopped on the siding the conductor proceeded&. eastward along, the north side of the train., He heard No., 104 start from signal 9224 and proceed eastward, but he did not know that that train stopped at signal 9214., He was about 250 feet east of the caboose when No. 104 passed, and was about 800 feet farther east when No. 102 passed. He said, that the sound of the Diesel engines of No., 102 indicated that the engines were working under load and he did not think that they were shut down until the collision occurred. The engineer, the fireman, and the Diesel--electric maintainer of No., 104 said that they were in the control compartment at the front of the locomotive from the time the train passed Wahsatch until the accident occurred. They said they could distinguish the aspect of signal 9268,. which indicated Proceed, and the aspect of signal 9256, which indicated Approach. As the train approached signal 9242 they could see the mast, but they could not see a light in the signal., After the train was stopped at the signal they still were unable to determine the indication., A short time after leaving signal 9242, No,. 104 overtook Extra 1475 East., The employees on the locomotive of' No. 104 observed the flagman of Extra 1475 East close the siding switch after that train entered theo siding at Wyuta, but they were unable to distinguish the aspect of signal 9224 either before or after he closed the swiItch., The train was stopped at signal 9224., It then proceeded to signal 9214, anrid, because the enginemen could not see a light in the signal, it was stopped at that signal also., The employees on the locomotive said that the train was started forward immediately after it stoppoed., The rear end was struck by N,. 102 immediIately after the train began to move., The conductor and the front brakeman were iIn the vestibule between the third and the fourth cars from the time the train passed Wahsatch until the accident occurred., They said that visibility was restricted to the extent that they were unable to see either end of their train when it stopped at the signals between Wahsatch and Wyuta. They looked at each of these signals as the train passed them, but they could not see a light in any of them., There were no surviving witnesses a ts -11- 3443 to what action was taken by the flagman between Wahsatch and W.yuta. T'the rear coar had an enclosed observation compartment at the rear end with a door but without steps, and flagman iden alighted ' from and re--entered this iis car only at the vestibule at the front end. The flagman of Extra 1475 East observed that the flagman of No. 104 was standing in this vestibule when No. 104 passed the. w ù west siding--switch at Wyuta. ù Surviving members of the crew of No. 102 said that the brakes of the train were tested at Ogden and functioned properly when used en route. The fireman said that he had no difficulty in determining the aspects of the block signals until after the train passed Wahseatch. The snow then became heavier, and the power windshield wiper failed to keep the windshield on the left side of the conttrol compartment of the locomotive clear of slush. He said that signal 9256 indicated Proceed at a distance of aboQut 11 mile but he could not distinguish the aspect when the train was closely approaching the signal. He said he did not see the aspect of either signal 9242 or 9224 but both the engineer and the Diesel-electric maintainer, who was in the control compartment, called each signal as indicating Proceed. He assumed that they cotuld see through the windshield from the right side of the control compartment more distinctly than he could. from the left side. The fireman did not observe a fusee or hear the explosion of a torpedo between Wahsatch and the point of accident. The fireman said that because of track curvature to the left and Extra 1475 East occupying the center siding at Wyuta, the employees n the locomotive of No. 102 could not see the red oscillating signal light at the rear of No. 104 until they were closely approaching the rear end of that train, and that the engineer made an emergency application of the brakes immediately after the light became visible to them. The collision occurred before the speed of the. train had been reduced. The engineer and the Diesel--electric maintainer were killed in the accident. The members of the train crew said that after leaving Ogden they noticed nothing unusual in the operation of the train until the accident occurred. The tape of the speed recording device on the locomotive of No. 102 indicated that the speed was reduced in compliance with a speed restriction at Wahsatchb and then was increased in the usual manner. The train approached Wahsatch at a speed of about 480 miles per hour. The speed was reduced from 48 miles per hour to 30 miles per hour within a distance of about 700 feet, and was then in- ' creased from 30 miles per hour to 77 miles per hour within a distance of 4 miles. A speed of about 77 miles per hour was then maintained until the accident occurred. Immediately after the accident occurred the flagman of No. 102 proceeded westward to provide flag protection. He said that when he. reached signal 9224 he observed that the signal indicated Stop. The lenses of the signal were completely covered by snow, but he could distinguish the red aspect by standing at the side e - 12 - 3443 of the signal. He then proceeded westward to a point a short distance west of signal 9242. By this time the storm had abated somewhat, and he could .see that the signal indicated Approach. The signal lighting circuits are so arranged that these signals were lighted dueo to a freigriht train occupying the main track at Wahsatch after No. 102 passed that station. The signal maintainer arrived at Wyuta about 11 hour 25 minutes after the accident occurred and immediately proceeded to signal 9224. He found that the lenses of the signal were covered with ice aend snow to a depth of 3 or 4 inches. He said that it was necessary for him to remove the ice and snow before he could determine that the signal was displaying a red aspect., He then proceeded to signal 9242 and then to signal 92114., He found the lenses of each signal covered with ice and snow to approximately the same extent that the lenses of signal 9224 were covered. When the automatic block--signal system was tested after the accident occurred, it functioned as intended. WThen No. 1104 stopped at the signals in the vicinity of Wyuta, and while it was moving between these signals, the flagman was required to take such action as was necessary to insure full protection, and the conductor was required to see that protection was provided. There were no surviving witnesses as to the action taken by the flagman. Any fuseec;es which he may have left or thrown off were not seen by the fireman of No. 102 or by the flagman of Extra 1475 East., The flagman was fully experienced, and the conductor said that from his observance of the flagman's work on previous occasions he was confident that the flagman would perform his duties properly without specific instruction., For this reason he did not consider it necessary to proceed to the rear of the train to ascertain that protection was being provided. According to the statements of the surviving witnesses, immediately prior to the time of the accident the lenses of signals 9242 and 9224 weore covered with ice and snow to the extent that the intended aspects swere not visible. Under the rules, No. 102 was required to stop before passing each signal and then proceed through the block at restricted speed. The engineer of No. 102 was killed in the accident, and it could not be determined why he did not operate the train in accordance with the most restrictive indications of these signals. Weather conditions similar to those which prevailed on the day of the accident are not unusual along the lineQ of this carrier in this vicinity. The automatic block signals on this line are equipped with hoods which serve as snow shields, but when wet snow is blown directly against the lenses of the signals, as it was on the day of the accident, the snow shields are not effective in preventing the snow from covering the lenses of the signals. The rules of this carrier provide that when the indication of a signal cannot be determined, the signal must be regarded as displaying g -13- 3443 its most restrictive aspect. They also provide that when a train stops or is moving under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by another train the flagman must take such action as may be necessary to insure t'tsure full protection. However, the investigation disclosed that in the instant case the following train was not operated in acscordance 300rdance with the most restritcttive indications of signals 9242 and 9224, and adequate flag protection was not provided for the preceding train. On the line of the Union Pacific between Ogden, Utah, and Omaha, Nebr., an asutomatic cab-- signal system is superimposed upon the automatic block--signal system between Green River and Laramie, Wyo., 251 miles, and between Cheyenne, Wyo., and Columbus, Nebr., 425 miles, a total of 676 milesniilis, and this installation is now being extended from Columbus to Omaha. This system provides a continuous aspect in the cabt of a locomotive to indicaete track conditions ahead, and the loco'mnotives which are opera8teod on these portions of the line now are equipped with this device. Some of these equipped locomotives arc also operated over that portion of the line on which this accoideont occurred. This system provides a substantial increase in rotection as compared with a system using roadwaŠy signals only. If a cab--signal system had been in service it is probable that this accident would have been averted. Cause It is found that this accident was caused by failure toc1 operate the following train in accordance with signal indications. Recommendation It is recommended that the Union Pacific Railroad Company extend its automatic cab--signal system to the remainder of its line between Ogden and Omaha. Dated at Washington, D. C., this eleventh day of February, 1952. By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson. S (SEAL) W. P. BARTEL, 4? .. . Secretary. . FOOT NOTE: 1. Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.
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