Did not want to get into a melee over on the Thread about derailing a train with an emergency brake application to avoid a highway/rail grade crossing incusrion.
So I am going to start this Thread: It is about spontaneous and unanticipated brake applications. That is, a complete emergency brake application due to an 'event' with in the length of the train.
I have no idea HOW OFTEN THIS KIND OF AN EVENT WILL HAPPEN?
My guess is that it still does happen, but no idea as to the frequencies?
Do they occur as often 'these days', as it seems to have been in years past?
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/1999/r99t0256/r99t0256.asp#a3
The link is to a report by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada on a 1999 incident in Ontario. [snip] "...At 1311 eastern daylight time on 23 September 1999, Canadian National freight train M304-41-21, destined for Toronto, Ontario, derailed 26 cars, the 56th to the 81st behind the locomotives, near the north siding switch at Mowat, near Britt, Ontario. The derailed equipment included 14 residue tank cars last containing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), 1 tank car loaded with LPG and 3 tank cars loaded with anhydrous ammonia..." [snipped]
[The resultant derailment also involved a fire and BLEVE with the LPG car. Ultimately, 'the causes' also included a widening of the track gauge. ]
Do the occurr often? - a division with about 600 Main Line miles - mostly double track. A UDE (UnDesired Emergency) will happen about once per 8 hour shift - somewhere on the Division that will have 40 to 50 trains operating at any point in time on the Division as a whole.
They happen for a variety of reasons. Air hose coupling strikes a road crossing. A air brake valve malfunctions. A old air hose bursts. The air brake trainline on a car breaks. The always popular broken knuckle or pulled out drawhead and 1001 other causes. Once the UDE happens, the crew will announce on the Road Radio Channel - EMERGENCY EMERGENCY EMERGENCY and then state their train designation an the milepost they are at. The Train Dispatcher will be notified.
Each railcar contains a thousand or more parts, the failure of one of these parts on one of the 100 to 200 cars that make up todays freight trains can cause the UDE. All these are incidents that happen by themselves, not as a result of a derailment, although it is possible for a derailment to happen because of the UDE.
When the UDE happens, the Conductor must start walking the train to find the cause (UNLESS, after the train comes to a stop, the Engineer is able to reset the air brake system and get the brake line to recharge as identified by the pressure reading from the EOT-and this only applies to trains not carrying HAZMAT.) Trains carrying HAZMAT must be inspected, on the ground, to verify that ALL the HAZMAT cars are still on the rail. My carriers rules WILL NOT let any train pass the train in Emergency, until the HAZMAT has been verified on the rail. Air restoring immediately is a sign of a brake valve that is defective in that it is hypersensitve to a change in air pressure. If the result of the inspection reveals a 'mechanical' issue, it is then up the Conductor to determine what is required to remedy the situation. This information is communicated to the Train Dispatcher as well as if Car Dept. assistance is required.
With up to 14000 foot trains, a UDE can be a very lengthy delay for the train involved as well as any other trains on the Subdivision - freight or passenger.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACDWith up to 14000 foot trains, a UDE can be a very lengthy delay for the train involved as well as any other trains on the Subdivision - freight or passenger.
A few months ago, BNSF had a UDE at the Rochelle crossing. As I recall, it took almost two hours to get the train going again. If I recall, it was due to a broken knuckle, but I could be wrong. In any event, it stopped traffic on the UP for that amount of time.
EDIT: June 23, 2016, 75 minute hit as discussed in the Rochelle webcam thread.
http://cs.trains.com/trn/f/111/p/231186/2880207.aspx#2880207
EDIT: Still having trouble getting the link to activate, for some reason.
ChuckCobleigh BaltACD A few months ago, BNSF had a UDE at the Rochelle crossing. As I recall, it took almost two hours to get the train going again. If I recall, it was due to a broken knuckle, but I could be wrong. In any event, it stopped traffic on the UP for that amount of time. EDIT: June 23, 2016, 75 minute hit as discussed in the Rochelle webcam thread. http://cs.trains.com/trn/f/111/p/231186/2880207.aspx#2880207
BaltACD
Hour and 15 minutes is a minimal delay. For 'dispatching purposes' figure a hour of delay for each mile of train - MINIMUM. Your footage may vary.
Amazing information, esp with ever-lengthing trains.Thank You.
BaltACDHour and 15 minutes is a minimal delay. For 'dispatching purposes' figure a hour of delay for each mile of train - MINIMUM. Your footage may vary.
As I recall, the "separation" was relatively close to the head end. I guessed knuckle because it was corrected relatively quickly, i.e., drawbar would have been expected to take considerably longer to deal with, but it could have been a hose just as easily, I suppose.
It used to be that whoever was assigned to "walk back" (or "walk up", back in the day) would carry the hose and air-hose wrench with him. A dummy hose it the pocket wouldn't be a bad idea, either. BTDT.
Carl
Railroader Emeritus (practiced railroading for 46 years--and in 2010 I finally got it right!)
CAACSCOCOM--I don't want to behave improperly, so I just won't behave at all. (SM)
Sam,
When you say that “bad things can happen,” I believe that you are suggesting that bad things can be caused by a “Spontaneous Brake Application.” So I assume that you are saying that a spontaneous brake application caused the wreck of the CN train reported in the link you posted.
Near the start of the report, it says this:
“At 1311 eastern daylight time (EDT),(1) at Mowat, near Britt, Ontario, the crew members experienced a train-initiated emergency brake application.”
In skimming through the report, however, it appears to me that the “spontaneous brake application” or “train-initiated emergency brake application” did not cause the derailment. It was the result of the derailment. It was simply the first sign that something was wrong. And what was wrong turned out to be a derailment.
Generally this type of application also called an Undesired Emergency Application (UDE) happens in every pileup due to a separation of the brake hoses. In one sense, it is not abnormal, or unpredictable, so it might not be considered to be a UDE. I have heard at least one engineer make that point. But in another sense, any emergency application not initiated by the engineer might be considered a UDE, and that includes an emergency application caused by a pileup or other types of wrecks.
While a UDE typically is caused by a wreck, a UDE from other causes which are unpredictable; or even an intentional, engineer-initiated emergency application can cause a wreck. So a UDE is usually a typical result of a wreck, and sometimes a UDE from other causes can then cause a wreck. And sometimes an intentional emergency application can cause a derailment or pileup as well.
Euclid Sam, When you say that “bad things can happen,” I believe that you are suggesting that bad things can be caused by a “Spontaneous Brake Application.” So I assume that you are saying that a spontaneous brake application caused the wreck of the CN train reported in the link you posted. Near the start of the report, it says this: “At 1311 eastern daylight time (EDT),(1) at Mowat, near Britt, Ontario, the crew members experienced a train-initiated emergency brake application.” In skimming through the report, however, it appears to me that the “spontaneous brake application” or “train-initiated emergency brake application” did not cause the derailment. It was the result of the derailment. It was simply the first sign that something was wrong. And what was wrong turned out to be a derailment. Generally, this type of application also called an Undesired Emergency Application (UDE) happens in every pileup due to a separation of the brake hoses. In one sense, it is not abnormal, or unpredictable, so it might not be considered to be a UDE. I have heard at least one engineer make that point. But in another sense, any emergency application not initiated by the engineer might be considered a UDE, and that includes an emergency application caused by a pileup or other types of wrecks. While a UDE typically is caused by a wreck, a UDE from other causes which are unpredictable; or even an intentional, engineer-initiated emergency application can cause a wreck. So a UDE is usually a typical result of a wreck, and sometimes a UDE from other causes can then cause a wreck. And sometimes an intentional emergency application can cause a derailment or pileup as well.
Generally, this type of application also called an Undesired Emergency Application (UDE) happens in every pileup due to a separation of the brake hoses. In one sense, it is not abnormal, or unpredictable, so it might not be considered to be a UDE. I have heard at least one engineer make that point. But in another sense, any emergency application not initiated by the engineer might be considered a UDE, and that includes an emergency application caused by a pileup or other types of wrecks.
Thanks, to BaltACD who laid that information out for me,(and maybe, some other Posters,here?) We are now aware of the term explaining an" Undesired Emergency Application" (UDE).
When I read the Transport Canada Report and it stated that the derailmant was betrween the 56th car back in the train, and the 80 st car. I was surprised, that the event had happened towards the rear of the train particularly when it was stated that a 'partial blame' was due to a widening of the gauge. From the report:
Defect
Euclid Sam, When you say that “bad things can happen,” I believe that you are suggesting that bad things can be caused by a “Spontaneous Brake Application.” So I assume that you are saying that a spontaneous brake application caused the wreck of the CN train reported in the link you posted. Near the start of the report, it says this: “At 1311 eastern daylight time (EDT),(1) at Mowat, near Britt, Ontario, the crew members experienced a train-initiated emergency brake application.” In skimming through the report, however, it appears to me that the “spontaneous brake application” or “train-initiated emergency brake application” did not cause the derailment. It was the result of the derailment. It was simply the first sign that something was wrong. And what was wrong turned out to be a derailment. Generally this type of application also called an Undesired Emergency Application (UDE) happens in every pileup due to a separation of the brake hoses. In one sense, it is not abnormal, or unpredictable, so it might not be considered to be a UDE. I have heard at least one engineer make that point. But in another sense, any emergency application not initiated by the engineer might be considered a UDE, and that includes an emergency application caused by a pileup or other types of wrecks. While a UDE typically is caused by a wreck, a UDE from other causes which are unpredictable; or even an intentional, engineer-initiated emergency application can cause a wreck. So a UDE is usually a typical result of a wreck, and sometimes a UDE from other causes can then cause a wreck. And sometimes an intentional emergency application can cause a derailment or pileup as well.
UDE's happen as a result of derailments. That is not what this thread is about!
Euclid: To further expamf on the comment about the Track Gauge widening in the area: There is this Sec. 1.9 Particulars of the Track
[snip] "...1.9 Particulars of the Track
The track was a single main track, rated as Class 3 in accordance with TC's Railway Track Safety Rules (TSR) which prescribe industry standards for classes of track and maximum operating speeds.
The rail was 136-pound continuous welded rail (CWR) laid on hardwood ties and fastened with double-shouldered plates and three spikes per tie plate. The ballast was crushed slag. The bridge ties and bridge approach ties were in poor condition and showed evidence of being spike-killed with a resultant lack of ability to hold proper gauge. Other track components were in good condition.
A joint track inspection was performed by the CN track supervisor and assistant track supervisor on 23 September 1999 before the derailment, and no deficiencies were noted. Track geometry was recorded by a track geometry car on 10 June 1999. Wide gauge of 7/8 inch was identified on the bridge and an 11/16 inch warp(7) was noted immediately north of the bridge. The same defects were noted on a test run on 13 May 1999.
The track alignment consisted of a reverse curve. The alignment from the north (the direction of travel) consisted of a five-degree left-hand curve, with approximately 200 feet of tangent track connecting to a five-degree right-hand curve. The right-hand curve commenced near the abutment of the bridge. The alignment of the track was poor with a short easement curve (spiral) connecting the tangent track to the full body of the curve. The designed spiral length was 196 feet and the actual length was approximately 39 feet starting at the south abutment of the bridge. The superelevation (banking) was, on average, 1 1/2 inches through the bridge and 3 inches through the main body of the curve south of the bridge. The ideal curve elevation for the five-degree curve should be 4 1/4 inches for an equilibrium speed(8) of 35 mph. CN's Standard Practice Circulars (SPCs) at the time of the derailment called for a maximum imbalance(9) of one inch. The SPCs have since been revised to accommodate a maximum imbalance of two inches for freight trains.
The cross-level variation approaching the bridge and immediately after the bridge showed a warp in the track. Between the south end of the bridge and the first set of wheel marks, there was a 1 1/8 inch deviation from the uniform profile. The track gauge was 1 1/8 inches wide at the beginning of the spiral and 1/8 inch tight in the area where the first wheel marks were noted. The variation in gauge was 1 1/4 inches in a distance of approximately 80 feet. The maximum allowable tolerances were
Because of the 'Spirialing' of that section's curvature apparently within the derailing train, a car's wheels began to climb the 'high rail' and contributed to the dynamic of the derailment(?)
CShaveRR It used to be that whoever was assigned to "walk back" (or "walk up", back in the day) would carry the hose and air-hose wrench with him. A dummy hose it the pocket wouldn't be a bad idea, either. BTDT.
Don't forget the duct tape. Maybe some zip ties, air hose gaskets and heavy duty pliers. When I was a conductor, I had an army-surplus over the shoulder pouch with all my supplies ready to go.
Jeff
jeffhergert CShaveRR It used to be that whoever was assigned to "walk back" (or "walk up", back in the day) would carry the hose and air-hose wrench with him. A dummy hose it the pocket wouldn't be a bad idea, either. BTDT. Don't forget the duct tape. Maybe some zip ties, air hose gaskets and heavy duty pliers. When I was a conductor, I had an army-surplus over the shoulder pouch with all my supplies ready to go. Jeff
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
One train, ~15,000 feet long > a UDE causes ~3 hours delay**. Labor cost = 1X + UDE delay costs
3 trains, @ 5,000 feet long > UDE causes 1 hour delay. Labor cost= 3X + UDE delay costs
Also, are longer trains more likely to pull knuckes or drawbars > UDE?
It would be interesting to see how much the delays cost in total vs labor costs saved with longer trains?
** Using Balt's numbers
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Murphy Siding jeffhergert CShaveRR It used to be that whoever was assigned to "walk back" (or "walk up", back in the day) would carry the hose and air-hose wrench with him. A dummy hose it the pocket wouldn't be a bad idea, either. BTDT. Don't forget the duct tape. Maybe some zip ties, air hose gaskets and heavy duty pliers. When I was a conductor, I had an army-surplus over the shoulder pouch with all my supplies ready to go. Jeff No bubble gum and bailing wire?
No bubble gum and bailing wire?
That's reserved for airplanes.
Norm
schlimm 1) One train, ~15,000 feet long > a UDE causes ~3 hours delay**. Labor cost = 1X + UDE delay costs 2) 3 trains, @ 5,000 feet long > UDE causes 1 hour delay. Labor cost= 3X + UDE delay costs It would be interesting to see how much the delays cost in total vs labor costs saved with longer trains?
1) One train, ~15,000 feet long > a UDE causes ~3 hours delay**. Labor cost = 1X + UDE delay costs
2) 3 trains, @ 5,000 feet long > UDE causes 1 hour delay. Labor cost= 3X + UDE delay costs
Murphy Siding schlimm 1) One train, ~15,000 feet long > a UDE causes ~3 hours delay**. Labor cost = 1X + UDE delay costs 2) 3 trains, @ 5,000 feet long > UDE causes 1 hour delay. Labor cost= 3X + UDE delay costs It would be interesting to see how much the delays cost in total vs labor costs saved with longer trains? I'm not sure I follow your math above.1) For example: 15,000' feet of trains causes a 3 hour delay (1 event x 3 hours)2) For example: 15,000' feet of trains causes a 3 hour delay (3 events x 1 hour)What am I missing?
I'm not sure I follow your math above.1) For example: 15,000' feet of trains causes a 3 hour delay (1 event x 3 hours)2) For example: 15,000' feet of trains causes a 3 hour delay (3 events x 1 hour)What am I missing?
The 3 event scenario makes the dispatchers day a whole lot more difficult with situations to work around. Unless a crew goes on the HOS Law, delay is not that much of a cost increaser in the overall scheme of operational expenses. However, when it causes 5 or 6 other trains/crews to go HOS - big problems and big expenses. As always, where and when and the position of other trains on the territory and if HAZMAT is or isn't involved are the big issues to navigate around.
Murphy SidingI'm not sure I follow your math above.
A 15,000 ft train with one UDE takes 3 hours to clear up, which in turn ties up other trains and crews (add HOS problems, possibly). So what I was wondering is this: Are the labor savings of very long trains worth the potential costs of a higher potential for UDEs and multiple.compounded delays?
We're running 12 to 15K manifests just about everyday. They started limiting them to 40mph and that removed some problems with train handling in the exCNW ATC territory. Enough are making it across without incident. However, some savings is lost because they sometimes call an extra crew to help split and yard these large trains DP trains. So they must be saving enough.
Distributed power has helped to mitigate in train forces that lead to broken knuckles and drawbars, leading to building of longer trains (hopefully) safely. It also takes longer for a conductor to walk his train. If you have a UDE that takes 90 minutes to repair (knuckle or air hose), you have gotten off lightly, also if you have only delayed three trains you got off lightly
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