1994 Wilson Quarterly article inspired PBS Streamliners

[wanswheel]

Excerpt from "The Lost Promise of the American Railroad" by Mark Reutter

http://archive.wilsonquarterly.com/sites/default/files/articles/WQ_VOL18_W_1994_Article_01.pdf

As the world of tires and wings overtook the railroads, the great Gothic city terminals that once echoed with the bustle of travelers and the clatter of baggage carts began to resemble the relics of a fallen empire. "Year by year the railroads have simply been drifting out of the public consciousness," David P. Morgan, editor of Trains magazine, wrote in 1958. "Nobody hangs around the depot to see the 5:15, assuming it's still there, and a generation of Americans has never been inside a train." Without anyone realizing that it would be the start of a postwar pattern in other industries, America let the technological advantage built by the two Budds, Hal Hamilton, and Charles Kettering slowly slip away.

Speed, cost, and efficiency were the three elements that had made the streamliner such a luminous success in the 1930s. Remarkably, all three were undercut or penalized by government policies in the postwar period. For example, Railway Age reported in 1944 that the industry was thinking of fielding daytime expresses that would run between New York and Chicago in 14 hours, a two-hour improvement over the fastest overnight schedules. Cars on these trains would connect with the fleet of West Coast trains at Chicago, making the coast run in about 36 hours, so that a passenger leaving New York on a Saturday morning would arrive at Los Angeles Monday morning. But the ICC effectively killed this idea before a single train left the station. In 1947, the agency imposed a 79-MPH limit on all passenger trains not equipped with special signaling devices in their locomotive cabs. The rule, which went into effect in 1950, further restricted trains running on lines without other trackside signals to 60 MPH.

The problem with the regulation was not just the estimated $80 million it would cost the carriers (the equivalent of roughly $400 million today), but the minimal improvement it would make in passenger safety. Because some of the fastest stretches of track were used by so few passenger trains a day and under such safe conditions, several railroads argued that special signaling was not warranted. The railroads' line of reasoning irked ICC commissioner William Patterson, who complained in a hearing, “When you get to the final analysis here, it is a question of whether you [the railroads] should determine how these funds should be used or whether the government should. . .  And hasn't Congress given the commission that responsibility?"

 

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/streamliners-wilson-quarterly/

[samfp1943]

Thanks, Mike(wanswheel ) for posting that! 

The center paragraph, IMHO, seems to codify all that is effecting AMTRAK today.

FTA:"...Speed, cost, and efficiency were the three elements that had made the streamliner such a luminous success in the 1930s. Remarkably, all three were undercut or penalized by government policies in the postwar period. For example, Railway Age reported in 1944 that the industry was thinking of fielding daytime expresses that would run between New York and Chicago in 14 hours, a two-hour improvement over the fastest overnight schedules. Cars on these trains would connect with the fleet of West Coast trains at Chicago, making the coast run in about 36 hours, so that a passenger leaving New York on a Saturday morning would arrive at Los Angeles Monday morning. But the ICC effectively killed this idea before a single train left the station. In 1947, the agency imposed a 79-MPH limit on all passenger trains not equipped with special signaling devices in their locomotive cabs. The rule, which went into effect in 1950, further restricted trains running on lines without other trackside signals to 60 MPH..."

And again, In the third paragraph, it delivers a 'coup de grace' [ Legislatively?]  to AMTRAK...       Today, we have been gifted by Regulators with Positive Train Control (PTC) ; whose cost is still climbing, as its installation, and implementation drags on, past tghe appointed date of activation.

   Rather than letting an Industry (with its knowledge of its' own Operations and Needs) move to a similar point.      Regulators and Politicians, opt with a 'knee jerk' reaction to a 'high profile' situation in a highly visible environment (California).     Their sole goal is to make the Public 'Think" they have really 'solved' a problem...Their sole goal,  seeming to be seen  doing Something, while helping their (re)elections?  This kind of thing has tastes of that ole, self-serving, American Political, Bi-partisianism.

The following is a link to UPRR's site on Estimates ofTHEIR COSTS to implement PTC {just of a little reference] @ http://www.up.com/media/media_kit/ptc/about-ptc/index.htm

it also lists other associated incremental additions to their facil;ities.

I would think that if the 2008 'Chatsworth Crash' had happened in a less highly visible location; all thould have happened would have been a few days in the 'News Cycle' ,and then a foot note in History(?).   A couple of examples  might be " Big Bayou Canot 1993 AMTRAK Sunset Ltd"  The track was repaired, but the Sunset Limited has yet to return on that route.

Bayou Canot Toll   47 killed  103 injured

Chattsworth Toll   17 killed  135 injured

[BaltACD]

samfp1943

I would think that if the 2008 'Chatsworth Crash' had happened in a less highly visible location; all thould have happened would have been a few days in the 'News Cycle' ,and then a foot note in History(?).   A couple of examples  might be " Big Bayou Canot 1993 AMTRAK Sunset Ltd"  The track was repaired, but the Sunset Limited has yet to return on that route.

Bayou Canot Toll   47 killed  103 injured

Chattsworth Toll   17 killed  135 injured

 

The Sunset Limited did not stop operation between New Orleans and Florida account of the Bayou Canot incident (which WOULD NOT have been prevented by PTC), it was done in by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 which destroyed CSX's line between Mobile and New Orleans and severely damaged all the communities along the Gulf Coast between those locations.

[samfp1943]

BaltACD

 

 

 

samfp1943

I would think that if the 2008 'Chatsworth Crash' had happened in a less highly visible location; all thould have happened would have been a few days in the 'News Cycle' ,and then a foot note in History(?).   A couple of examples  might be " Big Bayou Canot 1993 AMTRAK Sunset Ltd"  The track was repaired, but the Sunset Limited has yet to return on that route.

Bayou Canot Toll   47 killed  103 injured

Chattsworth Toll   17 killed  135 injured

 

 

 

 

The Sunset Limited did not stop operation between New Orleans and Florida account of the Bayou Canot incident (which WOULD NOT have been prevented by PTC), it was done in by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 which destroyed CSX's line between Mobile and New Orleans and severely damaged all the communities along the Gulf Coast between those locations.

 

  Of Course, you are right, BaltACD.   The point I was after, was that the Big Bayou Canot crash happened in an area that was close to being inaccessible to media, who seemed to make note that it happened; but was then relegated it to what almost amounted to an historical footnote(?).  PTC was not going to happen until 2008.  see link @ https://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/P0621

The Chatsworth Crash happened in an area that was subject to fairly easy access. The Press News Cycle, made it a 'cause celebre'.  Thus, a chance to make political 'hay' out of it.

[Katrina, was just a comedy of missed political opportunities.. The trainset of the "City"[of New Orleans] was not used in the evacuation of NOLA, and was evacuated, virtually empty. But the Katrina debacle is a whole 'nother tale..]