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Three Years ago this morning

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Three Years ago this morning
Posted by BroadwayLion on Thursday, July 14, 2016 9:39 AM

The Route of the Broadway Lion The Largest Subway Layout in North Dakota.

Here there be cats.                                LIONS with CAMERAS

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Posted by Euclid on Thursday, July 14, 2016 10:55 AM

Quote from the link:

The FRA reported that the four breached and burned cars [at Mosier, OR] were modern CPC-1232s (a standard the railroads voluntarily instituted in late 2011), upgraded with full-height head shields and insulated metal jackets. Such upgraded cars are approved for use by the FRA, which remarked in its report: “The tank cars involved in the derailment performed as expected in the incident based on tank car performance metrics.”

In other words, the new tank cars are expected to breach in a 25-mph derailment. In more other words, the entire mandated fleet renewal was a monster red herring that distracted attention from fixing the root cause of exploding oil trains: contaminated crude oil containing dangerous and entirely unnecessary concentrations of explosive gases, even though those concentrations have been reduced by state law.

 

The last I heard, there was an admission by boosters of the 1232 cars that the cars would not be breach-proof in a “high speed” or “high energy derailment.”  I don’t recall that those terms were ever defined as to actual speed.  But now the term “high speed derailment” has been defined as one occurring as slowly as 25 mph.  I wonder how it works at say 10-15 mph.    

 

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Posted by Randy Stahl on Thursday, July 14, 2016 4:03 PM

BroadwayLion

Off by a few days.. the wreck happened on July 6th 2013.

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Posted by Overmod on Thursday, July 14, 2016 5:13 PM

BroadwayLion

It's not his fault; it's that guest-editor journalist Thomas.  Not the first post he's made recently with the date wrong, either.  Guess he likes the sound of it for some reason.

I observed the 6th with respect and a moment of silence.  No one should have had to suffer incompetence the way those poor townspeople did.

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Posted by MidlandMike on Thursday, July 14, 2016 6:43 PM

Euclid

Quote from the link:

The FRA reported that the four breached and burned cars [at Mosier, OR] were modern CPC-1232s (a standard the railroads voluntarily instituted in late 2011), upgraded with full-height head shields and insulated metal jackets. Such upgraded cars are approved for use by the FRA, which remarked in its report: “The tank cars involved in the derailment performed as expected in the incident based on tank car performance metrics.”

In other words, the new tank cars are expected to breach in a 25-mph derailment. In more other words, the entire mandated fleet renewal was a monster red herring that distracted attention from fixing the root cause of exploding oil trains: contaminated crude oil containing dangerous and entirely unnecessary concentrations of explosive gases, even though those concentrations have been reduced by state law.

 

The last I heard, there was an admission by boosters of the 1232 cars that the cars would not be breach-proof in a “high speed” or “high energy derailment.”  I don’t recall that those terms were ever defined as to actual speed.  But now the term “high speed derailment” has been defined as one occurring as slowly as 25 mph.  I wonder how it works at say 10-15 mph.    

 

 

The crude is not "contaminated" with gases, as they occur naturally in the crude as it comes from the ground.  (ND) State law sets standards for seperating out the gases.  The Oregon inident was reported as non-explosive, unlike Lac Megantic.  Also the new car standards with heat shields may have restricted the fires to 4 (breached) cars, instead of the entire larger pile of cars.  Both oilfield processing and the better tank cars combined have apparently tended to minimize damage.  They are never going to be able build a crash proof or derailment proof tank car.

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Posted by Euclid on Thursday, July 14, 2016 7:38 PM

MidlandMike
They are never going to be able build a crash proof or derailment proof tank car.

Midland Mike,

Nobody ever expected or promised a crash proof or derailment proof car.  I don't see any particular reason to accept the author's premise that the 1232 strength standards were a red herring to distract from the problem of volitility.  But I think the point he makes about the stronger cars breaching at a speed as low as 25 mph has merit.  I recall asking many times what the higher strength standards were intended to accomplish.  I could not find and answer.  Now we know the answer.  I would say that the chance of the 1232 standards preventing a breaching and fire in a derailment is extremely low, considering the probability of derailments happening at speeds above 25 mph.  That certainly was not the way it was presented when it was proposed.   

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Posted by schlimm on Thursday, July 14, 2016 8:01 PM

Overmod
No one should have had to suffer incompetence the way those poor townspeople did.

Greed was a factor as well.  The rail owner uses one-member crews to increase profits.  It seems possible that a second person might have been more careful.

C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan

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Posted by dakotafred on Thursday, July 14, 2016 8:22 PM

schlimm
 
Overmod
No one should have had to suffer incompetence the way those poor townspeople did.

 

Greed was a factor as well.  The rail owner uses one-member crews to increase profits.  It seems possible that a second person might have been more careful.

 

 
Yet it took two to run a red light down in Texas, right?
 
The problem at Lac Megantic was a cheapjack operation that left a bomb parked, running and unattended, at the top of the hill. It doesn't matter how many people weren't in the cab not taking care of the train. Nine, ten, it wouldn't have made any difference.
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Posted by schlimm on Thursday, July 14, 2016 10:19 PM

dakotafred

 

 
schlimm
 
Overmod
No one should have had to suffer incompetence the way those poor townspeople did.

 

Greed was a factor as well.  The rail owner uses one-member crews to increase profits.  It seems possible that a second person might have been more careful.

 

 

 
Yet it took two to run a red light down in Texas, right?
 
The problem at Lac Megantic was a cheapjack operation that left a bomb parked, running and unattended, at the top of the hill. It doesn't matter how many people weren't in the cab not taking care of the train. Nine, ten, it wouldn't have made any difference.
 

I said might.  It would certainly have increased the possibility (double) that one of two guys might "park" the train correctly, likely at the bottom of the hill.

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Posted by Randy Stahl on Friday, July 15, 2016 4:40 AM

There were many chances to break the chain to prevent what happened. All of them slipped away.

One more phone call might have broken the chain...

 

 

Randy

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Posted by M636C on Friday, July 15, 2016 5:27 AM

I was surprised that the lead locomotive was regarded as roadworthy.

It had "repairs" consisting of polyurethane seeking to overcome a broken casting in a power assembly.

It actually caught fire while unattended and was shut down, rather understandably by the local fire authorities. Ironically, this led to a fire far worse than could have been imagined.

On the subject of crude oil, it is by definition what comes out of the ground and while the general public think of it as basically tar, it contains all the light end that can be used as solvents and the like.

Tanker ships designed for crude oil have a system that sprays the crude oil onto the tank sides to clean the tank as the cargo is pumped out, which at least suggests that they recognise that it has solvent properties.

The oil industry knows what the properties are of the oil they ship but are still happy to ship it in inadequate vehicles if it saves a dollar or two.

Some incidents, as Randy indicated, have as many twists and turns where a single action by one person could have prevented the disaster as an Agatha Christie novel. If the second unit had been left idling as well, the lead unit could have been shut down once it caught fire without causing the runaway. If the firemen had understood that shutting down the locomotive, even it it was on fire, affected the brakes, they would have got someone from the railroad to do something about it.

M636C

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Posted by BaltACD on Friday, July 15, 2016 7:35 AM

M636C

If the second unit had been left idling as well, the lead unit could have been shut down once it caught fire without causing the runaway. If the firemen had understood that shutting down the locomotive, even it it was on fire, affected the brakes, they would have got someone from the railroad to do something about it.

M636C

The operator short cut the rules and was using locomotive independent air brakes as a part of the required hand brakes being applied to hold the train.  Had he applied the requisite number of hand brakes to the cars, and the cars alone, the train would still be in place at the top of the hill today.  Hand brakes applied to engines (which are effective on one truck) have about half the holding power of car hand brakes (effective on both trucks).  The independent air brake applied to the locomotive consist is subject to bleed off if the running locomotive that supplies the air is shut down and no longer supplying air.

The operator simply failed to properly secure his train.

Never too old to have a happy childhood!

              

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Posted by Shadow the Cats owner on Friday, July 15, 2016 7:47 AM
I read the TSB report and they identified 18 separate items that had to happen in sequence for that wreck to happen. 18 separate failures and if just 1 of them did not happen that wreck does not happen. Where I work at we deal with Haz Mat all the time I am the Safety compliance officer at my plant. Where I work we make cleaning Chemicals of all types from Flammables to Food Grade organic based. I routinely have to manage 20-30 different hazardous safety sheets know what to do if there is an accident and also have know how to clean up the mess if something goes wrong. Some of the stuff we work with at full strength can literally dissolve skin off you. Why was that fire so severe remember the Propane tank that caught fire during the derailment. It was heating the outsides of the tank cars heating the oil up and causing it to vaporize. The cars failed and there was a BLVE or Boiling Liquid Vapor Explosion that happened. That is the worst thing that could have happened in this case. Yes the condition of the engine played a part the lack of brakes applied played a part however a 1500 degree flame on a tank car loaded with 30K gallons of crude oil heating it up to the point the car ruptured was the primary reason that fire was so nasty.
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Posted by Euclid on Friday, July 15, 2016 7:52 AM

M636C
If the firemen had understood that shutting down the locomotive, even it it was on fire, affected the brakes, they would have got someone from the railroad to do something about it.

M636C

 

I don't think the firemen were to blame whatsoever.  They were trained by the railroad company on how to fight locomotive fires, and that training instructed them that the first step is to pull the emergency fuel cut-off to shut down the engine.  At the fire at Nantes, the firemen were accompanied by an employee of the MM&A Railroad.  That person was in phone contact with the two supervisors who were not on site.  The supervisors were also in contact with the engineer who offered to go back to the site to assist.  One or both supervisors told him not to go. 

 

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Posted by Randy Stahl on Friday, July 15, 2016 3:22 PM

M636C

I was surprised that the lead locomotive was regarded as roadworthy.

It had "repairs" consisting of polyurethane seeking to overcome a broken casting in a power assembly..

The JB Weld was NOT applied to a power assembly. It was applied to a chip in the cam galley. I do not believe it was a factor. One theory is that this was the cause of the failure. My theory based on 20 years of actual 7 FDL experience suggests another theory. One power assembly was in fact missing a valve, it put a hole in the piston. None of the cams were broken or damaged.

 

Randy 

 

Randy

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Posted by Randy Stahl on Friday, July 15, 2016 3:25 PM

Shadow the Cats owner
I read the TSB report and they identified 18 separate items that had to happen in sequence for that wreck to happen. 18 separate failures and if just 1 of them did not happen that wreck does not happen. Where I work at we deal with Haz Mat all the time I am the Safety compliance officer at my plant. Where I work we make cleaning Chemicals of all types from Flammables to Food Grade organic based. I routinely have to manage 20-30 different hazardous safety sheets know what to do if there is an accident and also have know how to clean up the mess if something goes wrong. Some of the stuff we work with at full strength can literally dissolve skin off you. Why was that fire so severe remember the Propane tank that caught fire during the derailment. It was heating the outsides of the tank cars heating the oil up and causing it to vaporize. The cars failed and there was a BLVE or Boiling Liquid Vapor Explosion that happened. That is the worst thing that could have happened in this case. Yes the condition of the engine played a part the lack of brakes applied played a part however a 1500 degree flame on a tank car loaded with 30K gallons of crude oil heating it up to the point the car ruptured was the primary reason that fire was so nasty.
 

There was no Propane in the area of the wreck. 30 or so cars were ripped WIDE open.

 

Randy

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Posted by Overmod on Friday, July 15, 2016 9:29 PM

Randy Stahl
There was no Propane in the area of the wreck.

She means the propane in the ground tank that supposedly cooked off due to the radiation heat from the fire intensity; the one that the initial reports (including, I think, one from Harding himself) thought had to be involved in the fire.  I'd have to review the accident report to get the exact wording.

I have to be pedantic because here comes that BLEVE in Bakken crude business again, this time coming from someone claiming technical knowledge of flame accidents.  A BLEVE only occurs when the propagation speed of the combustion in the vapor cloud exceeds detonation speed.  That is not what is observed in these fireballs -- they are progressive combustion, with the light fraction dispersing the heavy fuel and probably helping carburete it, but not creating an organized FAE effect.  The reason the fire at Megantic was so nasty was just as Randy indicated: so many of the cars burst open and sprayed through mechanical shock; the light fractions accelerated some (almost no doubt) critical-mixture fireballs; it was the specific composition of the 'oil' that made the result so nasty, but it was the progressive derailment and accordioning of tank cars almost flying through the air that caused the widespread fire.  You may recall that some of the underailed cars were successfully retrieved; they did not cook off.

The one good thing that came of this, eventually, was that the shippers started degassing the crude fractions before loading the oil in the cars.  That simple thing has made all the difference since in avoiding terrible (or terrible-looking) fireball explosions.  I look at Mosier and think -- quietly, but with more than a little recognition -- what would likely have happened with undegassed product in those cars.

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Posted by jeffhergert on Saturday, July 16, 2016 2:09 AM

BaltACD
 
M636C

If the second unit had been left idling as well, the lead unit could have been shut down once it caught fire without causing the runaway. If the firemen had understood that shutting down the locomotive, even it it was on fire, affected the brakes, they would have got someone from the railroad to do something about it.

M636C

 

The operator short cut the rules and was using locomotive independent air brakes as a part of the required hand brakes being applied to hold the train.  Had he applied the requisite number of hand brakes to the cars, and the cars alone, the train would still be in place at the top of the hill today.  Hand brakes applied to engines (which are effective on one truck) have about half the holding power of car hand brakes (effective on both trucks).  The independent air brake applied to the locomotive consist is subject to bleed off if the running locomotive that supplies the air is shut down and no longer supplying air.

The operator simply failed to properly secure his train.

 

Some hand brakes only work on one truck. Tank cars sometimes are equipped with this type of hand brake.

Jeff

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