Roughly twenty-five years ago, around the time of Albert Speer's death, Trains ran an article (by a German citizen, IIRC) about proposed improvements to the German rail system. These were supposed to be centered in Silesia, which was a focal point of the Nazi quest for Lebensraum.
The reason for this inquiry being that the perennial rumors about a trainload of stolen loot (gold or works of art, take your pick) hidden somewhere in a tunnel in that region, have again surfaced on a general history forum at city-data.com. I would like to add a link to any Internet-accessible research, if possible. Thanks in advance for any help.
http://www.city-data.com/forum/history/2436431-train-possibly-carrying-german-nazi-gold-2.html#post41028041
During the Nazi era and before, most of Silesia (Schlesien - Ger.; Śląsk - Pol.) was and had been Prussian territory since 1742, Germany after 1870, so although it would not have been an object of Lebensraum, it was the site of many underground factories and storage facilities. It has been part of Poland since 1945. The supposed tunnel is therefore in Poland.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
ndbprrThere was also an article about super trains that were about 4 times bigger and wider. A follow up MR article had some models a guy made that ran on the two outside rails of double track lines.
Those were planed, but never built. Just proved impractical once the war started.
Even the rail systems for the supper artillery proved to be too time consuming to build once the war started. Germany should of spend at least an other year or two, building up their forces.
Good thing they did not!
Ken G Price My N-Scale Layout
Digitrax Super Empire Builder Radio System. South Valley Texas Railroad. SVTRR
N-Scale out west. 1996-1998 or so! UP, SP, Missouri Pacific, C&NW.
I read somewhere that the German military had 1944-45 as their target for full readiness. But Hitler jumped the gun, egged on by the success of Italy, Franco in Spain, and especially the success of the Japs.
alphas I read somewhere that the German military had 1944-45 as their target for full readiness. But Hitler jumped the gun, egged on by the success of Italy, Franco in Spain, and especially the success of the Japs.
Lots of "what if" scenarios about the Germans and World War II. No matter the time they had to prepare or their technical superiority of weapons, when you have 1/2 to 2/3 of the worlds population against your empire or your allies........your going to lose. At a point in warfare numbers matter more than technology or technological advancement. It's a big reason we avoided conflict with China back before it's recent technical and economic advances. World War II was a war only a mad man would start......in fact, most wars follow that template and war should never be taken lightly as a solution to anything.
CMStPnP alphas I read somewhere that the German military had 1944-45 as their target for full readiness. But Hitler jumped the gun, egged on by the success of Italy, Franco in Spain, and especially the success of the Japs.
World War II was a war only a mad man would start......in fact, most wars follow that template and war should never be taken lightly as a solution to anything.
I think it's been established that Hitler's government did not expect the war to start over the invasion of Poland -- particularly if you look at contemporary Polish politics. It's not really too different from the idea that World War 1 would develop from the pulling on entangling alliances following the assassination of an obscure figure in an obscure country. I think it is also true that even so, much of the course of the war could have gone very differently, particularly if England had not established an effective air defense against the then-current Luftwaffe deployment, or the Japanese had not reacted against the oil embargo with Pearl Harbor (but had consolidated the 'co-prosperity sphere' sources of oil instead). The European imperialist experience in Africa, the Japanese experience in China, and the general nature of governments in South America all point to how easy it can be to control large masses of population effectively, albeit not by shooting or repressing them en masse. If I recall correctly, many communities in the Ukraine and other regions of the USSR treated the Nazis as liberators ... for a short time. Germany was the great 'economic miracle' nation during the Depression, and its prestige in South America was likely to be even more pronounced than it was in the period of the late '30s and early '40s that militarization instead of war was proceeding.
Fortunately for us, all this is supposition and alternative history.
I believe many of your statements about what "has been established" are not.
Quoting Wizlish: "I think it's been established that Hitler's government did not expect the war to start over the invasion of Poland...."That is true. Adolf Hitler had no idea that little rabbit "It's peace in our time" Neville Chamberlain would turn into a wolf. He knew what Winston Churchill had been saying--but Churchill had no power in the government until after Poland was invaded.
Johnny
WizlishNapoleon, among others, had an answer to this. And a very large part of the Nazi 'success' in the 1930s involved an astute use of divide-and-conquer as well as 'let's not get involved'. Even today there is a great deal of ... well, let's call it willingness to be exploited and p0wned by small, motivated groups with the wrong kind of strong self-identification and motivation. The 'military readiness' year my father heard (the analysis done by a bunch of foreign-policy people at Columbia SIA before the late '80s) was 1943. That involved far more than just building up the numbers of tanks and Schmeissers available to start a war, and in particular it involved coordination and development of the captured industrial assets, particularly in Czechoslovakia, and the development of fuel-supply and provisioning arrangements to match Guderian's deployment abilities.
I am only going to go over what jumps out at me off the post vs go argument by argument here.
It wasn't the Nazi's it was Hitler himself #1. Secondly the German Army disagreed and was weary of Hitlers various moves and considered his adventures either "lucky" or "fortunate" for not triggering a military response. They would have attempted to dipose him earlier had it not been for the oath to follow him and then his apparent success.
WizlishThat point was clearly not reached in the parts of the European war that corresponded to the 'built-up' and evolved forces that would have been available iby 1943, and I would argue that a properly-conducted Barbarossa would have easily handled the 'behind-the-Urals' strategy: whether or not the Germans provoked Stalin's purge of his armed forces intentionally, the Russians couldn't even defeat little Finland. Keep the masses disorganized and they become little impediment.
Writing was on the wall once the Soviet Union was attacked in 1941 and most German Generals knew it.
My read of history is the Russians did defeat Finland fairly decisively and it led to the invention of the term "Finlindization" where Russia dictated a good portion of Finnish government policy in exchange for not occupying as well as Finlind ceding territory to Russia. Typically when a country signs a treaty and hands over a large chunk of it's independence along with some territory it is considered a military defeat. Not much difference between Finlindization of the country and it being a former Russian occupied state, IMO.
WizlishI think it's been established that Hitler's government did not expect the war to start over the invasion of Poland -- particularly if you look at contemporary Polish politics. It's not really too different from the idea that World War 1 would develop from the pulling on entangling alliances following the assassination of an obscure figure in an obscure country. I think it is also true that even so, much of the course of the war could have gone very differently, particularly if England had not established an effective air defense against the then-current Luftwaffe deployment, or the Japanese had not reacted against the oil embargo with Pearl Harbor (but had consolidated the 'co-prosperity sphere' sources of oil instead). The European imperialist experience in Africa, the Japanese experience in China, and the general nature of governments in South America all point to how easy it can be to control large masses of population effectively, albeit not by shooting or repressing them en masse. If I recall correctly, many communities in the Ukraine and other regions of the USSR treated the Nazis as liberators ... for a short time. Germany was the great 'economic miracle' nation during the Depression, and its prestige in South America was likely to be even more pronounced than it was in the period of the late '30s and early '40s that militarization instead of war was proceeding.
"Hitler's Government"? Are you sure you didn't mean to say "Hitler was surprised" because a large part of his government was not surprised including the Army. Like I said......mad man unrestrained.
Also, how do you plan that Germany invades the UK with no amphibious ships and while the British Navy is so strong........even without air cover that would be a neat trick. Fact is that the Germans naviely felt the British would unconditionally surrender if they dropped enough bombs on them. Without a land bridge to invade and no control of the seas, Germans had no plan B.
The proposed rail system was called the "Breitspurbahn". There are a bunch of interesting link's and images if you Google search the word.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breitspurbahn
It has been suggested;perhaps apocryphally, that Hitler's obsession with this and other megaprojects (perhaps "megaloprojects"(as in Megalomania) is more apt) tied up vital railway engineering resources at a time in the war when Allied air power was severely disrupting the German's rail transportation network throughout occupied Europe..
"I Often Dream of Trains"-From the Album of the Same Name by Robyn Hitchcock
Tom Clancy used his Jack Ryan character to point out in one of his books - "Debt of Honor", I believe - that:
- Paul North.
Wizlish
I think it's been established that Hitler's government did not expect the war to start over the invasion of Poland --
I seem to recall a TV documentary where they interviewed people involved in WWII in Germany (somewhat before this present 70th Anniversary of everything...)
If I recall this correctly, the Wehrmacht (Army) officer who literally led the invasion of Poland (riding a horse - he must have been a Cavalry officer) had, possibly not by coincidence, led the troops into the Sudetenland and also into Austria.
His comment was "we just did everything the same way, but this time the Poles started shooting back at us - that hadn't happened before...."
That would suggest that the expectation of WWII not starting on the Polish border extended a long way down below Adolf Hitler....
Looking at it in terms that we'd understand here, with red DB Schenker locomotives running in many countries in Europe but particularly in the UK, and with British electric locomotives painted red for DB(S) running in Romania, I wonder if the Germans haven't done better recently....?
M636C
schlimmI believe many of your statements about what "has been established" are not.
The only statement I meant to make about what was 'established' was that the Nazi government did not anticipate widespread war breaking out over the invasion of Poland. A large part of that was the scholarship (I do not have references, but will try to find them if you want them) indicating that much of the military buildup, particularly in some aspects of armor, would not have reached desired levels until 1943, and it would make little sense to start a war over something as comparatively insignificant as Poland -- particularly with Stalin eagerly going after his half -- until the readiness had been secured.
I will cheerily grant you that Barbarossa's timing seems premature, and those two years of preparation would have been particularly significant ... as things turned out.
All the other 'points' I was making were, of course, opinion and speculation. There are references that back up aspects of those opinions, of course, but for every speculative reference there are plenty of equally-well-reasoned different ones...
To correct your various misassumptions would require your enrolling in upper level European history classes and seminars as a major, at a minimum. The grounded background needed takes time.
CMStPnPAlso, how do you plan that Germany invades the UK with no amphibious ships and while the British Navy is so strong........even without air cover that would be a neat trick.
Adequate preparation for an actual invasion of Great Britain would, of course, have involved construction of a great many cross-Channel ships and, probably, amphibious craft, together with much more preparation than Seelowe actually wound up getting 'in the event.' There were other actions, including a better blockade, that would easily have been available to the Germans had the Battle of Britain gone other than it did.
With respect to the 'strength' of the British Navy in repelling a cross-Channel invasion: you evidently have not learned the lesson taught by (perhaps 'to' is a better word) the Repulse and the Prince of Wales. (Or the Bismarck and the other large German capital ships, or the Yamato and Musashi, not to be excessively anti-British). Had the Germans acquired effective air superiority over Britain, which I do not consider would have been terrifically difficult given more buildup of Luftwaffe reserves, and development of countermeasures against Chain Home and other radar systems, I would not think much of the chances for any element of the British Navy 'in being' in 1941 to be effective in stopping a large-scale German invasion for any substantial length of time, or to overcome a submarine blockade.
That presupposes, of course, that the United States could be kept from coming into the war on Britain's side. To me that is perhaps the dumbest of all the dumb mistakes Hitler made, declaring war on the United States shortly after Pearl Harbor. Perhaps I am chauvinistic, but I do not think the Allies would have won the war nearly as quickly, or with 'unconditional surrender,' had the United States not participated directly, as early as it did (but still not nearly early enough for Churchill)
I do agree with you that the "1000-year Reich" was fatally unstable, and that only by the profoundest chance did Hitler avoid assassination during the war years. I also agree that a German 'victory' following Hitler's death from any of the assassination plots would be unlikely... but that is another whole story and set of speculations.
Very little of this relates to the original topic, or to railroading.
Wizlish That presupposes, of course, that the United States could be kept from coming into the war on Britain's side. To me that is perhaps the dumbest of all the dumb mistakes Hitler made, declaring war on the United States shortly after Pearl Harbor. Perhaps I am chauvinistic, but I do not think the Allies would have won the war nearly as quickly, or with 'unconditional surrender', had the United States not participated directly, as early as it did 9but still not nearly early enough for Churchill)
That presupposes, of course, that the United States could be kept from coming into the war on Britain's side. To me that is perhaps the dumbest of all the dumb mistakes Hitler made, declaring war on the United States shortly after Pearl Harbor. Perhaps I am chauvinistic, but I do not think the Allies would have won the war nearly as quickly, or with 'unconditional surrender', had the United States not participated directly, as early as it did 9but still not nearly early enough for Churchill)
There has been some arguments made about Hitler being goaded into declaring war by FDR since the mood in the US was very much opposed to getting involved in another European war. The fact that the US declared war on Germany on Dec 11 as opposed to the December declaration of war on Japan is one of the lesser told stories.
The US was biding its time as well, trying to get war production ramped up before getting into the fight. The US build up before WW2 is another one of the lesser told stories. As it was the production led offensive didn't get going "full steam ahead" until 1944.
- Erik
I remember my friend's father telling me that they swapped axles on trains going into Russia. I had read that engineer batallions were laying a third rail and pulling up the outside rail for use later. They followed right behind the army.
He insisted on how they jacked up the car and swapped the axles. You have to accept his version, as he was fighting in Russia at the time.
Also remember that the German Army trained in Russia (away from prying eyes), for their armoured tactics. In return, they trained Russian officers in armoured tactics.
Later, Stalin purged the officer corps, fearing many were German spies, since they had worked with the Germans and been trained by them. During the invasion, the bonus was the Russians reacting exactly how the Germans had trained them.
betamaxI remember my friend's father telling me that they swapped axles on trains going into Russia. I had read that engineer batallions were laying a third rail and pulling up the outside rail for use later. They followed right behind the army. He insisted on how they jacked up the car and swapped the axles. You have to accept his version, as he was fighting in Russia at the time.
Where did you read about changing the gauge by re-laying the rail? That would make reasonable sense for an organized invasion being backed up by full railborne support from a nation or network using standard gauge, that did not intend to make any use of captured equipment without first changing its gauge. But there would be colossal requirements for new power when consolidating operations in a newly-conquered region, particularly areas with extensive switched trackage -- if I remember correctly, Russia had very large numbers of standard locomotive designs, including the greatest number of 2-6-2s in the world, which would be difficult or impossible to convert to standard gauge even on an emergency basis.
Of course, there are a number of practical accounts of very rapid mass gauge changes in the United States, for example for some of the southern lines. A very large number of workers were provided all down the line, and if I remember correctly an adequate number of 'gauge' spikes were measured for and driven. At a prearranged time (or ona prearranged signal) the workers would unspike the rail on the side to be moved, slide it to the waiting spikes, and counterspike to hold it, then drive the 'rest' of the spikes. My suspicion is that some gentle waving back and forth of the line of the rails was done so that many switches could be left at least temporarily undisturbed, but the references I have seen don't mention this point.
I would think that changing gauge via wheelset replacement would be a quicker and somewhat easier approach when invading an area with extensive 5' trackage, but it would depend on how intensive the subsequent use of the rail system would be.
I confess I find the whole short-term history of the 'armed forces purges' followed so quickly by the non-aggression pact (and then, of course, so quickly by Barbarossa) to be fascinating. Likewise the evolution of Russian tank design, particularly their understanding of Christie's principles when so few others recognized their significance.
Just a quick one and then I may be back.
Fact is, the German Wehrmacht had no plans for invading Britain at all, that just wasn't part of the plan. Any invasion of Britain by the Germans would have been an improvised operation which the German Army and Navy weren't crazy about at all. NO military men like to do things "on the fly," especially the Germans. Even Hitler was VERY reluctant to invade Britain. When the Brits wouldn't quit Hitler reluctantly gave the go-ahead but no-one had any real enthusiasm for it.
The Luftwaffe, maybe. They were sure they could hold up their end of the operation.
Yes, Hermann Goering was quite proud of his Luftwaffe--however, his boys were unable to conquer the RAF. As Winston Churchill said, "Never have so many owed so much to so few," considering how the pilots and ground crews kept the fighter planes in the air and were able to destroy so many German bombers and fighters.
As to invasion plans, Herr Hitler (as Winston Churchill styled him) ordered that small craft be gathered along the French coast--and from time to time these were sunk by the RAF.He and his planners apparently never realized what would be necessary to carry a conquering army across the channel--but the English began working on the matter even before Herr Hitler declared war on the United States--in accord with his agreement with the Japanese to do so after they declared war on us. It is truly amazing at the cooperation between the British and American armed forces that sprang up after 7 December 1941.
If you have access to Winston Churchill's history of the Second World War, I advise you to read it, as well as William L. Shirer's three books on the Third Reich.
I have a book The German National Railway in World War II by Janusz Piekalkiewiez The text is mostly English translations of German documents including letters, dispatches, orders, and reports.
The Germans had two types of railroad troops following the army. The "gray" railroaders and the "blue" railroaders based on their uniform color. They greys were former railroad men that had been drafted into the army. They provided direct services to the front. As the front moved forward the greys turned the lines over to the blues who were civilians.
After initial heavy loses the Russians became very efficient at moving most of their railway equipment east and destroyed most of what was left so it wasn't available to the Germans.
One of the missions of the greys was to regauge the track so it could be used by standard gauge equipment. The regauged many kilometers of main line, but generally ignored sidings, yards and maintence facilities. Because of this operations were very inefficient untill the blues could get in to finish the work and operate the trains.
Initally the blues were under army jurisdiction and were dependent on them for supplies and even euipment. Many army commanders did not realize their value so their needs were often ignored. Just when things were starting get better for them they were removed from army jurisdiction which caused additional problems.
Eventually many of the blue railroad workers were "volunteers" from conquered areas. They were generally poorly treated and not very motivated.
Another problem is that German locomotives were ill suited for the conditions in Russia. Their fuel and water capacity was inadequate. German locos required a higher level of maintenance than Russian locos. There was a high breakdown rate. Service, repair and maintences facilities were inadequate.
High priority was given to trains headed toward the front. The lower priority given to returning cars and locos to the west resulted in shortages. Additionally the huge number of prisioners requiring transport west tied up equipment, sidings and yards making getting supplies to the front even more difficult.
I tried to sell my two cents worth, but no one would give me a plug nickel for it.
I don't have a leg to stand on.
Firelock76Fact is, the German Wehrmacht had no plans for invading Britain at all, that just wasn't part of the plan.
That is not a fact at all.
schlimm To correct your various misassumptions would require your enrolling in upper level European history classes and seminars as a major, at a minimum. The grounded background needed takes time.
You can't reteach history to Americans set in their ways. A few weeks ago on another website I observed a Civil War discussion over the topic of the flying of the Confederate Battle Flag. There are people out there that think slaves were happy in the South, the Civil War was over States Rights not Slavery, and that the Sons of Confederate Veterans organization has no ties to the KKK and no cross over membership (despite the fact some of the linkages is documented all over the internet). Completely unbelieveable misguided representations of history and reality. Some of it can be blamed on the Lost Cause movement of the Civil War but not all of it. Some of it is just grounded in pure racism that past relatives held.
WWII historical views have some of the same warpages in places, you'll find. Hence it is better to just return to the topic of Trains, IMHO.
schlimm Firelock76 Fact is, the German Wehrmacht had no plans for invading Britain at all, that just wasn't part of the plan. That is not a fact at all.
Firelock76 Fact is, the German Wehrmacht had no plans for invading Britain at all, that just wasn't part of the plan.
Sorry to disagree but yes it is. I got it from a filmed interview with General Adolf Galland, the Luftwaffe fighter ace. General Galland said the German Army and Navy were very reluctant to attempt an invasion and so was Hitler, in fact Galland was there when Hitler said so.
In fact, Hitler had sent peace feelers out to the British government in an attempt to negotiate a settlement in the West that would give him a free hand in the East. Then he could attempt his invasion of the Soviet Union without looking over his shoulder, as it were.
Needless to say, the Brits rejected the peace feelers, and I don't blame them. I would have as well, since Hitler had demonstrated too many times he just wasn't to be trusted. Why would the British government trust him this time?
And considering what we know now that they didn't know then thank God Almighty they didn't!
I'll add two comments here which are well documented.
One, Hitler seriously considered an invasion of England by sea, but when he met opposition from his military experts who considered such an invasion untenable, he decided to postpone any plans so as not to interfere with his planned invasion of the Soviet Union. The risk of a protracted war in the West was the deciding factor to postpone any such invasion.
Two, there was ongoing internal discussion within the Nazi hierarchy to reach a negotiated settlement with the Brits. For one thing, Hitler had a sort of "fondness for the English, believing them to be part of the Aryan race or at least closer to that "ideal' than other ethnicities were. For another thing, Hitler could always renege on any agreement with the English, and there was plenty of precedent for that.
You have to look no further than the Rudolf Hess flight to England to get into the mind of one Nazi official. Hess, anxious to regain his lost influence with Hitler, made the flight, not because he was a madman but because he foolishly acted out what had been talked about so often within the Nazi hierarchy, a negotiated settlement with the English.
Rich
Alton Junction
Firelock76Sorry to disagree but yes it is. I got it from a filmed interview with General Adolf Galland, the Luftwaffe fighter ace
So let me get this straight: Your source for the level of planning for a naval invasion was ... someone high up in a notorious competitive service?
So I should believe, say, that Marine aviation is a complete and total boondoggle because an Air Force airman said so ... and had some quotes to 'prove' it?
Whether or not Douhet's doctrine applied, I think the early assumption on the Germans' part was that a sea invasion would be largely unnecessary if a surrender could be achieved through air power. If not, then air superiority is a very, very compelling advantage especially over a relatively limited sea reach. As noted, by the time it became recognized that the Battle of Britain was going poorly for the Luftwaffe, Barbarossa had been prioritized. If Churchill is correct in his history of WWII that the RAF was only a few weeks from effective collapse at one point, perhaps more than one point (I will have to look up the reference) it would be reasonably likely that air superiority over the sea part of the invasion could have been assured up to the point beachheads for fast armor could be secured. (Remember that one of the original premises here was that greatly increased construction of munitions would be assured by 1943?)
I don't see any tendency for Britain to declare war on Germany if the premature invasion of Poland had not taken place -- "peace in our time" being in its fullest ascendancy at that point -- and I feel reasonably sure that Britain would NOT have responded to an attack by Germany against Stalin's Russia in 1941 or any other time if there were no declared state of war between England and Germany at that time ... more likely, a completely-justified (in my view) opinion that 'they finally got what they had coming' after the signing of that non-aggression pact and the shenanigans that followed.
(It would of course be interesting to see what would have happened with France if Poland had been quietly partitioned instead of being the casus belli. It was my understanding that German interests had sufficient control over elements of the French government to establish a regime "friendly" to Germany even in the absence of overt military aggression sufficient to trigger a treaty-based response from Britain ... and an increased level of military buildup could only have worked to the progressive disadvantage of both the French military and the BEF. Would British resistance against an invasion effort have been as strong had there been no miracle at Dunkirk?
What reason would General Galland have for lying thirty-plus years after the fact? In fact, let me quote Galland quoting Hitler:
"No! I don't like this! We got to try other things before we think about invading England!"
Do any of you have any idea what's involved in an amphibious assault? Well, as an old Marine and student of military history let me spell it out.
First, where are you going to land? What are the beaches like? Will they support vehicular movements easily, especially heavy vehicles like tanks? Where are the avenues of inland movement off the beaches? Are they capable of allowing vehicular movement or are they just footpaths? Do they lead to main roads? Where do THOSE roads lead?
Then, what kind of opposition to the landings are you likely to meet? Remember unless you're very lucky an amphibious landing is a frontal assault with usually no flanks you can turn and little space to manuver, if any. What kind of troops are on the beach? How many? How well armed? How well dug in or covered and concealed? Are they well-trained and highly motivated to resist (and we can be sure the Brits were in 1940)?
Then there's the sealift problem. What capacity do you have? Can you move the required amounts of troops and supplies? Do you know how to load the supply ships so that supplies needed NOW can be offloaded NOW and those that will be needed later can be off-loaded later. Do you have enough purpose-built invasion craft to expedite ship-to-shore movements? Do you have more than enough since you're bound to lose some?
Then there's the supporting arms. Do you have enough naval gunfire assets to prep-fire the beaches so the troops going in will have an easier time? How about air assets? (OK, no problem for the Germans there with the Luftwaffe at the height of its power, but remember the fighter escorts couldn't stay too long on the other side of the Channel.)
I'm just scratching the surface here. I won't even go into troop training for amphibious assaults.
The Germans had no experience in any of these things, hence the very real and justifiable hesitation on their part. They'd invaded Norway but that wasn't a cakewalk and the German Navy had gotten a bloody nose there, losing two heavy cruisers and quite a bit of their destroyer force.
Remember, it took two years to plan the Normandy invasion, and even there things went wrong.
They make it look so easy in the war movies. Just load the grunts on the ships and off you go. "Hey-diddle-diddle, straight up the middle!" Too, too easy.
Excerpt from Hitler by Joaquim C. Fest
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joachim_Fest
“It almost causes me pain to think that I should have been selected by Fate to deal the final blow to the structure which these men have already set tottering. It never has been my intention to wage wars, but rather to build up a state with a new social order and the finest possible standard of culture. Every year that this war drags on is keeping me away from this work, and the causes of this are nothing but ridiculous nonentities, as it were “Nature’s political misfits….” Only a few days ago Mr. Churchill reiterated his declaration that he wants war…. Mr. Churchill ought, perhaps, for once, to believe me when I prophesy that a great Empire will be destroyed—an Empire which it was never my intention to destroy or even to harm. I do, however, realize that this struggle, if it continues, can end only with the complete annihilation of one or the other of the two adversaries. Mr. Churchill may believe that this will be Germany. I know that it will be England."
Contrary to general expectations, Hitler’s speech did not contain his grand offer of peace but merely a highly general “appeal to reason.” This change was a first manifestation of his loss of hope, in the face of Churchill’s intransigence, of ever making peace with England. In order not to betray any sign of weakness, Hitler combined his appearance with a display of military power by appointing Göring Reichsmarshal and twelve generals field marshals. He also announced a large number of other promotions. But the principal indication of his real state of mind was the order he had already given three days before his address to the Reichstag: “Directive Number 16 on the preparation of a landing operation in England.” The code name Sea Lion was selected for this project.
Significantly, up to this point he had developed no ideas on the continuation of the war against England because this war did not fit into his design, and the changed situation had not prompted him to revise his strategy. Spoiled by luck and by the weakness of his enemies hitherto, he trusted in his genius, in fortune, in those fleeting opportunities he had learned to utilize so instantaneously. Directive Number 16 was rather evidence of chagrin than of definite operational intentions. The introductory sentence pointed clearly to that: “Since England, in spite of her militarily hopeless situation, as yet shows no signs of readiness for a rapprochement, I have decided to prepare a landing operation against England, and if necessary to carry it out.”
It remains a possibility, therefore, that Hitler never seriously considered the landing in England but employed the project merely as a weapon in the war of nerves. From the autumn of 1939 on, the military authorities, especially the commander in chief of the navy, Admiral Raeder, had repeatedly but vainly tried to interest him in the problems of a landing operation. And, in fact, as soon as Hitler assented to the plan he began introducing reservations and mentioning difficulties of the sort he had never previously recognized. Only five days after he had launched Sea Lion he spoke of the difficulties of the operation in extremely pessimistic terms. He demanded forty army divisions, a solution of the supply problem, complete mastery of the air, the establishment of an extensive system of heavy artillery along the Channel, and a large-scale mining operation; all this was to be accomplished in no more than six weeks. “If it is not certain that preparations can be completed by the beginning of September, other plans must be considered.”
Hitler’s qualms were not connected solely with his complexes about England. Rather, he well understood the type of resistance Churchill had alluded to. A world power with remote overseas bases had all sorts of ways of holding out. Invasion or conquest of the motherland was not necessarily defeat. For example, England could go on fighting from Canada, could draw him deeper and deeper into the conflict in the wrong area, and finally involve him in the dreaded war with the United States. Even if he succeeded in destroying the British Empire, Germany would not gain from that, as he commented in a conference on July 13, 1940, but “only Japan, America and others.” Consequently, with every step he took to intensify the war against England he was undermining his own position. Not only sentimental but also political reasons argued for his seeking England’s assistance rather than her defeat.
Out of such considerations Hitler, though with signs of embarrassment, developed his strategy of the following months: gradually to force England, by political maneuvering and by restricted military action, to make peace. Then he would after all be able, with his rear position secured, to undertake his march to the East. It was the old dream on which he was still fixated, the ideal constellation that he had pursued for so long by political means and which he now, undeterred, sought in open conflict.
The military means of applying pressure included the “siege” of the British Isles by the German submarine fleet and, above all, the air war against England. The paradoxes of his design emerged in the curiously halfhearted manner with which Hitler waged the struggle. Disregarding all the arguments of his military advisers, he refused to go over to the concept of “total” air or naval warfare. The Battle of Britain, the by now legendary air battle over England that began on August 13, 1940 (“Eagle Day”), with the first major raids on airfields and radar stations in the south of England, had to be broken off on September 16 after heavy losses because of bad weather conditions. The Luftwaffe had failed to achieve any one of its goals. British industrial potential had not been struck a really heavy blow, nor had the populace been psychologically crushed, nor had the Luftwaffe won air superiority. And although Admiral Raeder had reported a few days before that the navy was ready for the landing operation, Hitler postponed the project “for the present.” A directive from the High Command of the armed forces dated October 12 specified “that the preparations for the landing in England are from now until spring to be maintained solely as a means of political and military pressure upon England.” Operation Sea Lion had been abandoned.
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