When I was in high school, there was a story in our literature book about a passenger train engineer who was on something like Horseshoe Curve, and he realized that the freight train coming down the other side of the curve had broken in half, and the loose rear half was catching up with the front. It being a train of oil tanks, there would be a disastrous explosion when the two halves collided.
The story followed his actions as the situation dawned on him, and his actions to avoid being caught up in the ensuing fireball.
(Part of the reason for my interest in this story at this late date is my wondering HOW the author explained WHY the freight engineer didn't KNOW his train had separated, why air brakes didn't stop one or the other of the halves... Thus the believability of the story).
I've searched with about every keyword I can think of -- but get no results (at least, no results concerning THIS particular story).
I think the story was also printed in Readers Digest, about 10 years after I first read it.
Does anyone remember this story?
/Lone
Remember: In South Carolina, North is southeast of Due West... HIOAg /Bill
Lone
We had a book in Grade School that seemed a lot of your story. It was at Galesburg and a freight had broken in half and I believe the train derailed and fouled the other main the passenger was on. That was a long time ago, but I can remember it was at Galesburg. Does that ring a bell??
CZ
Could your story date back to the late 1800s? If so, that would put in the era of link and pin couplers and no air brakes. I've read stories dating to those times about situations like you describe, although I don't think they were set on Horseshoe Curve.. A train parts and the front end has to race ahead of the rear end.
Jeff
The one in 1947 was a single train running too fast. That wreck is documented on the DOT web site.
There was an additional wreck also on the grade with 2 K4's that left the inside tracks without touching the outside tracks. That was due to excessive speed. I believe that one had several people killed. the one I listed in 1947 did not completely derail. If you google the red arrow accident, you can read about the other one.
THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT NEAR GALLITZIN, PA., ON FEBRUARY 28, 1947
SUMMARY
Railroad: Pennsylvania
Date: February 28, 1947
Location: Gallitzin, Pa.
Kind of accident: Derailment
Train Involved: Passenger
Train number: 3
Engine numbers: 1428-5525
Consist: 13 cars
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Estimated speed Front portion of train, standing : Rear car, in excess of 60 m. p. h.
Operation: Signal indications
Track: Four; 9 degrees 15' curve; 1.73 percent descending grade eastward
Weather: Clear
Time: About 4:08 a.m.
Casualties: 1 killed; 13 injured
Cause: Passenger-train car becoming separated from train and moving out of control on grade, as result of defective coupler, defective air-brake equipment, and defective hand brake
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
INVESTIGATION NO. 3080
IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.
THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY
April 14, 1947.
Accident near Gallitzin, pa., on February 28, 1947, caused by a passenger-train car becoming separated from the train and moving out of control on a grade, as a result of a defective coupler, defective air-brake equipment, and a defective hand brake.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 1
PATTERSON Commissioner:
On February 28, 1947, there was a derailment of a passenger-train car moving out of control on a grade on the Pennsylvania Railroad near Gallitzin, Pa., which resulted in the death of 1 Pullman porter, and the injury of 12 passenger and 1 train-service employee. This accident was investigated in conjunction with a representative of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.
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Diagram
Inv. No. 3080 Pennsylvania Railroad Gallitzin, Pa. February 28, 1947
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Locatio
This accident occurred on that part of the Pittsburgh Division extending between Division Post, near Altoona, and Pittsburgh, Pa., 112.6 miles, a four-track line in the vicinity of the point of accident. The main tracks from south to north are designated as No. 1, eastward freight; No. 2, eastward passenger; No. 3, westward freight; and No. 4, westward passenger. Trains moving with the current of traffic on tracks Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and in either direction on track No. 3 are operated by automatic block-signal and cab-signal indications. The derailment occurred on track No. 4 at a point 8.43 miles west of Altoona and 3.37 miles east of the station at Gallitzin. From the west of track No. 4 beginning at home signal 32R, located. 1,556 feet west of the station at Gallitzin, there are, in succession, a tangent 441 feet in length, a 6 degree 45' curve to the right 785 feet, a tangent 785 feet, a 3 degrees curve to the right 125 feet, and a tangent 3,727 feet to the east portal of a tunnel, which is 3,605 feet long, then there are numerous sharp curves and short tangents. From the west, in the immediate vicinity of the point of derailment, there are, in succession, a tangent 1,008 feet in length, an 8 degrees curve to the right 595 feet, a tangent 262 feet, a 3 degrees 30' curve to the left 905 feet, a tangent 297 feet, and a 9 degrees 15' curve to the right 518 feet to the point of derailment and 423 feet eastward. The west end and the apex of a vertical curve are, respectively, 1,600 and 350 feet west of the station at Gallitzin, and 2,200 and 950 feet west of the west portal of the tunnel From the west portal of the tunnel eastward the grade varies between 1.00 percent and 1.81 percent descending throughout a distance of 3.26 miles to the point of derailment, where is 1.73 percent.
Throughout a distance of 518 feet immediately west and 60 feat immediately east of the point of derailment the tracks on the curve involved are laid on a fill. In the immediate vicinity of the point of derailment a rock wall slopes upward at an angle of about 30 degrees and faces track No. 4 at an angle of about 45 degrees. At a point 60 feet east of the point of derailment a hillside cut which is practically perpendicular, parallels track No. 4 on the north. The wall of the cut is about 15 feet distant from the centerline of the track. On the curve involved the structure of track No. 4 consists of 130-pound rail, rolled in 1930, cropped to 35 feet in length, and relaid in 1946, on an average, of 21 treated hardwood ties to the rail length. It is fully tieplated with double-shoulder tieplates, spiked with 5 spikes per tieplate, provided with 6-hole angle bars and an average of 8 rail anchors per rail length. It is ballasted with crushed stone to a depth of 36 inches. The specified curvature was 9 degrees 15', and the specified superelevation was 3-1/2 inches. At the point of derailment the curvature was 9 degrees 07', the superelevation was 2-7/8 inches and the gage was 4 feet 8-5/8 Inches.
Brake and Train Air Signal instructions read in part as follows:
11. Where inspectors are employed to make a general inspection of cars upon arrival at a terminal they must make a visual inspection of * * * hand brakes, * * * and make necessary repairs * * *
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15-b. (Passenger Trains)--* * *
* * *
Inspection at Terminals
44. Duties of Inspectors and Repairmen--All car inspectors and repairmen whose duty it is to inspect and make light repairs to trucks and draft arrangements must also be required to give the same attention to hand brake defects, * * *
45. Brake Cylinders, Triple Valves, U-12, D-22, * * * --Inspector must see that these parts are cleaned, lubricated, and tested not less frequently than indicate below:
Passenger Equipment
U-12 and D-22 Valves, Brake Cylinders, Slack Adjusters, Relay, Quick Service and Safety Valves -----------15 months
52. Inspection and Repairs of Hand Brake Connections--All parts end connections of the hand brake should be carefully examined and any necessary changes and repairs made.
The maximum authorized speed for passenger trains moving on track No. 4 is 40 miles per hour on tangent track and 30 miles per hour on the curve involved.
Description of Accident
No. 3, a west-bound first-class passenger train, consisted engine 5525, one baggage car, one sleeping car three coaches, two sleeping cars, one dining car and five sleeping cars, in the order named. The ninth and thirteenth cars were of lightweight, high-tensile-steel construction, and the remainder of the cars were of conventional all-steel construction. At Altoona, where engine 1428 was coupled ahead of engine 5525 to assist this train to Gallitzin, a terminal air-brake test was made. No. 3 departed from Altoona at 3:13 a.m., and because of inadequate steam pressure, it stalled about one mile east of Gallitzin. After a delay of about 16 minutes the train was started and it proceeded to Gallitzin, where it stopped at 3:54 a.m. on track No. 4, with the front of the train about 50 feet east of signal 32R and the rear about 160 feet west of the west portal of tunnel. Soon afterward engine 1428 tee detached, and a road air-brake test was made. Then, when an attempt was made to start the train, the thirteenth or rear, car become detached from the train. This car moved eastward out of control to a point 3.37 miles east at Gallitzin, where it was derailed.
The car overturned to the north and slid eastward on its left side, then struck the rock wall and was diverted upward and southward toward track No. 4. The car stopped practically upright, with its front truck en track No. 4 at a point 138 feet east of the point of derailment and its rear end about 15 feet north of track No. 4. The left aide of the car was crushed inward the left side sheets were scraped and torn, and the left side of the roof was crushed inward about two-thirds its length.
The flagman was injured.
The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred about 4:08 a.m.
The thirteenth car of No. 3, Pullman Cascade Mirage, a sleeping car of lightweight-steel construction was built in 1940, and placed in service August 5, 1940. It is 84 feet 6 inches long between the pulling faces of the couplers, and contains 5 bedrooms and 10 roomettes. The A end which was coupled to the twelfth car, is of non-vestibule design, but the B end is equipped with a vestibule. Its lightweight is 27,500 pounds. The car is provided with two 4-wheel trucks spaced 59.5 feet between the truck centers, and has clasp brakes on all wheels. The journals are equipped with roller bearings.
The hand-brake equipment is of the horizontal-lever ratchet type provided with a hand-clasp latch, mounted on a staff through the buffer beam at the B end and near the left diaphragm post, A 20-tooth bottom ratchet 3-13/16 inches in diameter is secured on the brake staff at the platform level. A cast-steel pawl, slightly angular in shape, one end of which has a long and a short tailpiece for the insertion of a person's foot and the other end a tooth to engage the notches of the ratchet wheel, is provided with a 1-inch cast-steel trunnion. The pawl is secured to the trunnion by a 3/4-inch bolt and a washer. A bracket plate provides a rigid metallic connection between the brake shaft and the pivot of the pawl. A set of gears, the ratio of which is 5 to 1 is mounted at the lower end of the brake shaft. The hand-brake arrangement applies braking force on the two wheels at the left side of the B-end truck, and the calculated braking force is 39 percent of the lightweight of the car. The dynamometer reading of this force was 7,000 pounds. To apply the hand brake a person clasps the latch, pulls the horizontal lever about 90 degrees toward the A end, inserts the tooth of the pawl in the bottom ratchet, then pushes the lever about 90 degrees to obtain another purchase on the top ratchet for another pull. If the pawl fails to engage the bottom ratchet no braking force can be obtained.
The air-brake equipment of this car consists of a D-22-AR control valve, a combined auxiliary emergency, and displacement reservoir, two 16-inch by 72-inch supply reservoirs, a 12-inch by 10-inch brake-cylinder mounted on each side of each truck, two conductor' s emergency valves, an F-S relay valve, related piping, and armored-type air hose at each end of the car. The four brake cylinders of this type of brake system are connected to common supply reservoirs. After a brake application excessive leakage from one cylinder will deplete the supply reservoirs and pressure in all four brake cylinders within a short period. Repeated application and release-of the train-brake system within a short period will deplete all reservoir pressures. The lightweight braking ratios are as follows: 90 to 100 percent with 36-pound brake-cylinder pressure, and 150 percent with 60-pound brake-cylinder pressure. According to the rules of the Pennsylvania Railroad the brake-cylinder piston is required to adjusted for travel of 5 inches. D-22 control valves are required to be cleaned at intervals not in excess of 15 months. The air-brake system on this car was last cleaned June 7, 1945, at St. Louis, Missouri
The twelfth car, a conventional-type standard all-steel Pullman, and the thirteenth car were provided with swivel-shank A. A. R. Type T tight-lock couplers at each end. These couplers have tight contours in the coupler heads and knuckles, wings on each side of the coupler head, and interlocking pins and funnels on the wings. When connected the couplers from a solid beam, horizontally and vertically, to prevent lateral or vertical movement between coupler faces. These couplers are provided with rotary-operated coupler-release rigging, which is connected below the coupler to the operating mechanism of the coupler. This mechanism consists of the lock, lift toggle, knuckle thrower, rotary lock-lifter and trunnion, and primary and a secondary anti-creep, feature. When all parts are in closed position and all parts are in operating condition these couplers will no open unless the uncoupling lever is raised. The lift toggle is provided with a 3/8-inch tell-tale hole so that it can readily be observed if the lock is in closed position. The rear coupler of the twelfth car was east in June, 1943, and the last shop inspection was made at Sunnyside Yard, N. Y., on December 20, 1946. The twelfth and thirteenth cars were assembled in the train of No. 3 at Sunnyside Yard, N. Y., about 7 p.m. February 27, and the equipment of this train was inspected at Harrisburg and Altoona, Pa., respectively 142.6 and 11.8 miles east of Gallitzin.
Discussion
Because of inadequate steam pressure, No. 3 stalled at a point about 0.9 miles east of Gallitzin. The train was held on the grade by use of the independent brake valve for a period of about 14 minutes while steam pressure was being increased, then the engineer of the first engine made a 15-pound brake-pipe reduction to held the train while closing the slack. After a period of about 2 minutes the train proceed, and it stopped on track No. 4 at the apex of the grade at Gallitzin about 3:54 a.m. When the train stopped the forward part was on the descending portion of the grade and the rear part was on the ascending portion of the grade. The rear end was 160 feet west of the west portal of the tunnel. The stop at Gallitzin was made after the engineer of the first engine made a 12-pound brake-pipe reduction, which was not released until after the first engine was detached. The engineer of the second engine encountered difficulty in placing the double-heading cock on his engine in open position. About 2 minutes elapsed before he released the train brakes after which he recharged the brake pipe and then full-service brake-pipe reduction was made to test the brakes. Then the brakes were released. About 4:03 a.m., when the engineer attempted to start the train it was necessary to reverse the engine to close the slack. Then, when a forward movement was started the brakes became applied in emergency. Immediately afterward it was discovered that the rear car had become separated from the twelfth car and was moving eastward on the descending grade. At this time the enginemen were on the engine, the conductor and the front brakeman were in the ninth car and the flagman was on the rear end of the thirteenth car. When the flagman observed that the thirteenth car had become detached from the train and was moving eastward on the descending grade he attempted to stop the movement of the car by the use of the hand brake which was on the east end, but could not force the pawl into position to engage the ratchet. This defective condition of the hand brake prevented application of braking force at the brake shoes. The car moved out of control a distance of 3.37 miles to the point where it entered the 9 degrees 15' curve to the right, and the car overturned to the north at a point 581 feet east of the west end of the curve. At this point the curvature was 9 degrees 07' the superelevation was 2-7/8 inches, and the gage was 4 feet 8-5/8 inches. The overturning speed for this car on the curve was estimated as bot 62 miles per hour.
The investigation disclosed that the top portion of the rotary lock-lifter of the rear coupler of the twelfth car was broken at the rotor, 1-5/8 inches below the point where it rested upon the trunnion. Discoloration of the metal of the rotary lock-lifter indicated that the break had existed during a considerable period. It apparently had broken as a result of a severe blow on the gusset section, which was somewhat flattened. An improvised split-key had been inserted in the tell-tale hole of the lift-toggle and, because of the light construction of this key, it had been drawn into the lock-block cavity. After the accident the knuckle of the coupler at the west end of the thirteenth car was found in open position, as a result of bend skirting of the car having forced the uncoupling lever to raised position during the derailment. The couplers of both cars were gaged for height, contours and gathering arms, and the measurements were within the required specifications. The anti-creep features of both coupler were in good condition. The lock of the coupler of the thirteenth car could not be raised by the hammer-and-bar method of test. The lock of the rear coupler of the twelfth car could be raised by this test, because of the broken lock-lift lever.
Tests of the air-brakes system f the thirteenth car disclosed that the packing-cup of the left rear brake-cylinder piston was ruptured. This condition permitted brake-cylinder pressure to escape through the breather port and, as a result the brake would release in about 3-1/2 minutes after a 20-pound brake-pipe reduction was made. The brake would release from an emergency application after an interval of 2 minutes 20 seconds. The piston travel of each brake cylinder was as follows: B end, left side, 6 inches; B end, right side, 3-1/2 inches; A end left side, 3-1/2 inches; and A end, right side, 4-1/2 inches. During a test simulating the repeated application and release of the air-brake system, such as occurred in the vicinity of Gallitzin, this action depleted the pressure in the reservoir system of this car to the extent that the brake released from an emergency application after an interval of 38 seconds. The brake-cylinder-piston packing cup was of the Buna-S rubber, 12-inch, snap-on type. The packing cup had become disconnected. from the piston and was lying at the back end of the cylinder. About 60 percent of the outer rim of the cup had ruptured and was detached from the central body. Under the rules of this carrier, care equipped with D-22 type control valves are required to be cleaned at intervals not exceeding 15 months, The air-brake equipment of the car in question was last cleaned and oiled 20 months 21 days prior to the day of the accident. The components of the material of the packing cup were such that rupture could have occurred at any time after it was placed n service. The actual time when the rupture occurred is not known.
Because of the broken lock-lift lever, which nullified the anti-creep feature, the slack closures made during the attempt to start the train at Gallitzin resulted in the knuckle lock at the rear of the twelfth car becoming opened, and the thirteenth car became separated, from the twelfth car. Then the separation occurred, the brake-pipe hose parted and the air-brakes became applied at an emergency rate of application. Under normal condition, the brake of the thirteenth car would have remained applied throughout a considerable period of time. However, because of excessive leakage of air at the left rear brake cylinder and the repeated application and release of the train-brake system in the vicinity of Gallitzin, the reservoir pressure became depleted to the extent that the brake held a few seconds only.
Examination of the hand-brake equipment of the thirteenth car of No. 3 disclosed that the long tailpiece of the pawl was broken adjacent to the trunnion. Discoloration of the metal of the pawl indicated that the break had existed during a considerable period of time. It appeared to have been broken as a result of its having been struck a severe blow by some metallic object. In addition, the trunnion was corroded to such an extent that the pawl could not be moved by striking it with a hammer. This condition caused the hand-brake to be inoperative. The hand-brake system was arranged to provide a braking ratio of 39 percent of the lightweight of the car. If the hand brake had been in operative condition, this accident would not have occurred.
This is the accident with the two K4's in the same vicinity.
THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT NEAR GALLITZIN, PA., ON FEBRUARY 18, 1947
Inv-3078
Date: February 18, 1947
Train involved: Passenger
Train number: 68
Engine numbers: 422-3771
Consist: 14 cars
Speed: In excess of 65 m. p. h.
Tracks: Four; 8 degrees 30' curve; 1.73 percent descending grade eastward
Weather: Hazy
Time: 3:21 a.m.
Casualties: 24 killed; 138 injured
Cause: Excessive speed on curve
INVESTIGATION NO. 3078
April 7, l947.
Accident near Gallitzin, Pa., on February 18, 1947, caused by excessive speed on a curve.
PATTERSON, Commissioner:
On February 18, 1947, there was a derailment of a passenger train on the Pennsylvania Railroad near Gallitzin, Pa., which resulted in the death of 15 passengers, 6 railway-mail clerks and 3 train-service employees, and the injury of 121 passengers, 4 railway-mail clerks, 7 Pullman employees, 4 dining-car employees and 2 train-service employees. This accident was investigated in conjunction with a representative of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.
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Inv. No. 3078 Pennsylvania Railroad Gallitzin, Pa. February 18, 1947
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Location of Accident and Method of Operation
This accident occurred on that part of the Pittsburgh Division extending between Pittsburgh and Division Post, near Altoona, Pa., 112.6 miles. In the vicinity of the point of accident this is a four-track line. The main tracks from south to north are designated as No. 1, eastward freight; No. 2, eastward passenger, No. 3, westward freight; and No. 4, westward passenger. Trains moving with the current of traffic on these tracks are operated by automatic block-signal and cab-signal indications. The accident occurred on track No. 2, at a point 103.83 miles east of Pittsburgh and 1.83 miles east of the station at Gallitzin. From the west on track No. 2 there are, in succession, a 1 degree 20' curve to the left 1,965 feet in length, a tangent 1,024 feet, a 0 degree 30' curve to the right 255 feet, a tangent 1,031 feet and an 8 degrees 30' curve to the right 190 feet to the point of derailment and 950 feet eastward. The grade for east-bound trains on track No. 2 varies between 1.42 and 2.36 percent descending throughout a distance of 1.74 miles immediately west of the point of accident, where it is 1.73 percent descending.
On the curve on which the accident occurred, the structure of tract No. 2 consists of 130-pound rail, rolled in 1929, cropped to 35 feet in length, and relaid in August, 1946, on an average of 21 treated hardwood ties to the rail length. It is fully tieplated with double-shoulder tieplates, spiked with 5 spikes per tieplate and provided with 6-hole angle bars and 8 rail anchors per rail length. It is ballasted with crushed stone to a depth of 36 inches. The specified superelevation on the curve was 3-1/2 inches, and the gage varied between 4 feet 8-3/8 inches and 4 feet 8-7/8 inches. At the point of derailment the superelevation was 3-3/8 inches and the gage was 4 feet 8-7/8 inches. The west 250 feet of track on the curve involved is laid in a rock out, the walls of which rise to a maximum height of about 30 feet. The remainder of the track on this curve is laid on a 92-foot fill, the base of which is 370 feet wide.
Semi-automatic signal 50R, governing east-bound movements on track No. 2, is 1,052 feet west of the point of accident. This signal is of the position-light type, and is continuously lighted. A flange-oiling device and the west end of the circuit of a track speed-recording device are located, respectively, 720 feet and 800 feet cast of signal 50R. The circuit of the speed-recording device is 0.2 miles long.
Time-table special instructions read in part as follows:
2419. * * * Engineman of eastward passenger trains will * * * make a running test of the air brakes just before passing over the summit east of AR.
I can't identify the story for you but if the setting was almost any time in the 19th Century or the early part of the 20th then the explanation is easy. Air brakes were not standard and were not required in interstate commerce until the 1893 Railroad Safety Appliance act. The act had a 7 year grace period and even then not all cars had to have air brakes. An amendment in 1903 stated that at least 50% of the cars be under the control of the engineer (air brakes operated from the cab) and an additional amendment in 1910 put that percentage to 85%. However, in each case it was interstate - intrastate was not included.
I have first person accounts of railroading during that period and several mention the issue of trains breaking in two in the manner you describe. In each case it was either a case of the break occuring past the cars with air brakes (my descriptions indicate the practice was to put all of the cars equipped with air brakes in a line right behind the engine in order to take advantage of the air couplings, however, somewhere in those books I'm almost sure I remember reading about some non-air brake cars being equipped with through air lines so this wasn't necessary) or happening on a train without air brakes.
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