Quiet Zone Question

[aegrotatio]

The "old town" neighborhood of Manassas, VA, has several intrusive and dangerous crossings, with an inexplicable grade-elimination overpass over a road only marginally more busy than the other three.

The "at-grade" crossings are "quiet zones" in the late evenings with prominent yellow-orange signs stating this.  I haven't been to Manassas Park Junction lately, but I believe they exist there, too.  I haven't heard any news of incidents since the "quiet zones" have been implemented.

 

[zugmann]

Phoebe Vet

I am a proponent of light rail.  I just don't believe that people are smart enough to be allowed to cross RR tracks.

 

 

I believe most people are.

 

Just that certain percentage that will screw it up for everyone else. 

 

 

I grow tired of bending over backwards for that percentage.

[Euclid]

Eliminating all grade crossings would solve the grade crossing problem once and for all.  But there is no point in wishing for it as just an abstract objective.  The question is whether or not it can be made practical.  I suspect that there is not enough money in the entire world to pay for it.  If we started today, when would it be finished?  

Not only would every crossing need to be replaced with an overpass or underpass, but also vast amounts of commercial and residential property would have to be demolished and rebuilt in order to accommodate all of new bridge and tunnel approaches.  Vast amounts of public infrastructure such as streets, drainage systems, and utilities would also have to be rebuilt in these areas.  In some cases, it might be better to just move the railroad to a new city bypass on a newly acquired right of way.

While such a crossing elimination would prevent death, injury, and property damage, I don’t think those savings would come anywhere even close to being justified by the cost.    

[Falcon48]

Euclid

I think that the quiet zone approval process is so complex that no two experts would agree on whether it results in crossings becoming more dangerous after converting to a quiet zone.  The FRA says that the intent is that there is no added danger in converting to a quiet zone.  I don’t recall seeing if they assure us that will be the case.  U.P. says they believe it won’t be the case, but they don’t say why.  They never called me back to answer that question.

The city engineer that I spoke to here said they were assured that no quiet zone conversions will be approved unless it is proven that they will NOT increase the danger.  He also explained that their quiet zone danger level is subject to change dependent on national crash statistics at other crossings.  The idea that one crossing will change in its danger level because statistics show a change in completely different crossings strikes me as being quite nebulous.

So when the FRA assures us that they have a system of proving the danger levels of crossings before and after a quiet zone conversion, I think the concept of “proof” is defined by the FRA under their terms; as opposed to an objective measure of safety.    

 

  See my post of 12/29/14 (and the links I provided) for FRA's explanation of its quiet zone methodolgy.  In general, the idea is that a quiet zone won't be approved unless (i) there are crossing improvements made that cause the resulting risk in the quiet zone to be no greater than the pre-improvement risk with horn blowing, or (ii) the resulting risk in the quiet zone is less than NSRT. 

As I mentioned in my earlier post, I am not a statisical expert, so I don't know how statistically valid the FRA methodolgy is.  I would point out, however, that the FRA methodology permits an increase in risk, as long as the resulting risk is below NSRT. 

[Falcon48]

Euclid

 

schlimm

 

Euclid

I conclude that the FRA position, although stated as fact, is basically unprovable. 

 

 

By your "standard" the UP position is also unprovable, with an even smaller data base.  

 

 

 

 

Oh yes indeed, the U.P. position is definitely unprovable.  I meant that to go without saying.  They say their position is a “belief.”  They offer no explanation, let alone proof.

Nevertheless, I think their belief represents the facts.  That is what I believe.

I believe that neither side has proved their case.  But the FRA tells the public that they have. 

 

 

  This isn't as unproveable as you might think.  The problem is there are different questions being addressed by FRA and UP.

The FRA "quiet zone" methodolgy addresses two questions: (i) whether crossings in a proposed quiet zone are "safe enough" without improvements that an increase in risk from a quiet zone is acceptable. This is the case when the predicted "no whistle" risk level is below the statistical "Nationwide Significant Risk Threshold" (NSRT) FRA computes with its quiet zone methodology, or (ii) whether crossing improvements in a proposed quiet zone coupled with a cessation of whistling will make the quiet zone "as safe as" it was before the improvements with trains whistling.

UP's position, on the other hand, seems to address a different question:  Would  quiet zone crossings, regardless of any "improvements", be even "safer" if trains whistled at them?  In other words, even if crossing improvements coupled with a "no whistle" requirement would make the quiet zone "as safe as" the QZ was prior to the improvements, would the crossing in the QZ be safer still if trains continued to whistle at them?  The answer to that question is clearly "yes" (and, if you ran this scenario through FRA's quiet zone methodolgy, it would almost certainly support that conclusion). 

So, what this boils down to is a question of regulatory policy.  FRA has made a policy decision that it will not require whistling if (i) crossings within a quiet zone present a risk level below NSRT once routine whistling is prohibited, or (ii) improvements made at crossings within a quiet zone compensate for whistling.  If either of these conditions are met, FRA will not require whistling even if whistling would result in a statistically greater safety level.  This is the best they could have done given the political situation they were faced with when they adopted the train horn rule, and is certainly better from a safety perspective than if the rule had not been adopted (or had been legislatively overturned), and quiet zones were left in the hands of state and local governments (see my post of 12/8/14 discussing the politics behind the FRA train horn proceeding). 

As i said before: politics is the art of the possible.          

[Euclid]

Falcon48

 

Euclid

 

schlimm

 

Euclid

I conclude that the FRA position, although stated as fact, is basically unprovable. 

 

 

By your "standard" the UP position is also unprovable, with an even smaller data base.  

 

 

 

 

Oh yes indeed, the U.P. position is definitely unprovable.  I meant that to go without saying.  They say their position is a “belief.”  They offer no explanation, let alone proof.

Nevertheless, I think their belief represents the facts.  That is what I believe.

I believe that neither side has proved their case.  But the FRA tells the public that they have. 

 

 

 

 

 

  This isn't as unproveable as you might think.  The problem is there are different questions being addressed by FRA and UP.

 

UP's position,...

... seems to address a different question:  Would  quiet zone crossings, regardless of any "improvements", be even "safer" if trains whistled at them?  In other words, even if crossing improvements coupled with a "no whistle" requirement would make the quiet zone "as safe as" the QZ was prior to the improvements, would the crossing in the QZ be safer still if trains continued to whistle at them?  The answer to that question is clearly "yes" (and, if you ran this scenario through FRA's quiet zone methodolgy, it would almost certainly support that conclusion). 

 

The Union Pacific RR says this:

“Union Pacific believes quiet zones compromise the safety of railroad employees, customers, and the general public.”

They are saying that they believe quiet zones compromise safety.  That would mean reducing the safety of a crossing when converting it from a non-quiet zone crossing to a quiet zone crossing.

However your interpretation quoted above would mean that there is no reduction of safety in converting a crossing to a quiet zone, but the crossing would be safer than it was when it was non-quiet zone, if horn blowing was added back to the crossing after the quiet zone qualifying improvements were made. 

I understand that point, but I do not think that is what U.P. means.  I see nothing in their statement that would indicate such an intended meaning.   I do not think U.P. and the FRA are addressing two different questions.  I think it is the same question, and the U.P. and FRA are diametrically opposed in their answers to that question.   

 

[Euclid]

I did look at that reference to the FRA process for qualifying quiet zones.  But it is over 100 pages of details that are full of positions bouncing around relative to each other.  What is needed are a couple of well written paragraphs that clearly state how the FRA can assure us that a quiet zone creation does not compromise safety.  The contrary position by Union Pacific is just one simple sentence. 

But here is another way of looking at it.  The city engineer that I spoke to told me that they could lose their quiet zone if there were certain changes in the national average of crossing accidents, which I assume means an increase in such accidents.  So here is my question:

Why would the quiet zone crossings in Wayzata, MN suddenly become more dangerous with the occurrence of a few bad accidents in say California?  What is the connection? 

[Wizlish]

Euclid

Why would the quiet zone crossings in Wayzata, MN suddenly become more dangerous with the occurrence of a few bad accidents in say California? What is the connection?

For one thing, if 'similar' crossings in California start to show previously-unreported (or unmodeled) risks that would apply to Wayzata.  Or if increased or changed rail traffic patterns that proved to cause an increased incidence of accidents started to be observed at Wayzata.

Or if national priorities or policies change -- for example, with regard to using 'yield' or 'stop' signs to augment the 'message' about yielding right of way at crossings -- in some states or areas, and this has a measurable impact on safety statistics.

Other scenarii can be thought of, including different ways of taking or keeping the data, or analyzing or assessing the statistics.

[schlimm]

Euclid

Why would the quiet zone crossings in Wayzata, MN suddenly become more dangerous with the occurrence of a few bad accidents in say California?  What is the connection? 

Also, as Falcon48 pointed out, the "statistical Nationwide Significant Risk Threshold (NSRT) FRA computes with its quiet zone methodology" can change based on newer data.

[Euclid]

Schlimm,

I think that the measuring authority that can answer these questions is indeed the statistical Nationwide Significant Risk Threshold (NSRT), as you suggest. It is referred to in the material posted by Falcoln48. And I understand that it measures changes in risk over time.  I assume that those changes in risk would be applied to the measure of risk at various crossings.

What I am wondering about is how that risk is measured and applied to crossings. In talking to someone, I got a sense that a town’s quiet zone authority could be diminished by rising number crossing accidents in other towns, in circumstances where there was no connection between the two sets of accidents.

If that were true, it might be explained that any rise in the number of accidents is seen to raise the collective risk of the big national risk pool as a whole.  And then that would raise the danger of all grade crossings like a rising tide of risk.       

But I am not sure if the NSRT draws conclusions that way, or even makes that interpretation.  So that is what I am wondering.

It would be interesting to see some kind of quick walk-through of the process that could give an immediate idea of the mechanics.  Maybe it could also include the effect of the ongoing risk assessment.       

[aegrotatio]

What about the modified quiet zones with the locally-installed horns with audio beam-forming to only be heard at full volume by folks on the road that is involved in the crossing?

 

[Wizlish]

aegrotatio

What about the modified quiet zones with the locally-installed horns with audio beam-forming to only be heard at full volume by folks on the road that is involved in the crossing?

Those are called "wayside horns" and here is a quick description that covers many of the points about them.

Here is a link containing research information from one of the cmpanies that makes these:

http://www.quietzonetech.com/index.php?q=content/ahs%E2%84%A2-research-findings

Note the way in which engineers have positive feedback that the system is operating -- it's not just a light on a cabinet, or hope that activated lights and gates also mean activated wayside horn.  Always nice to see evidence that crossing-safety designers think of railrosders as people, too...

 

[Convicted One]

zugmann

How would we know?

 

I'm fairly confident that Euc's observation on what Union Pacific believes and why was an intentional counterpoint to Ed's chaffing over the use of an editorial piece as a source document.

Or perhaps he was just trying to rile up the resident know-it-alls? What do you think? Did it work?

[jeffhergert]

Wizlish

 

aegrotatio

What about the modified quiet zones with the locally-installed horns with audio beam-forming to only be heard at full volume by folks on the road that is involved in the crossing?

 

 

Those are called "wayside horns" and here is a quick description that covers many of the points about them.

Here is a link containing research information from one of the cmpanies that makes these:

http://www.quietzonetech.com/index.php?q=content/ahs%E2%84%A2-research-findings

Note the way in which engineers have positive feedback that the system is operating -- it's not just a light on a cabinet, or hope that activated lights and gates also mean activated wayside horn.  Always nice to see evidence that crossing-safety designers think of railrosders as people, too...

 

 

The Ames, Iowa installation that is linked in the "research findings" link is no longer in use.  They eventually did outfitted all crossings in Ames proper.   It was discontinued a few years ago and turned into a full blown quiet zone. 

The automated horn system was maintained by the city.  If it failed to activate, we reported the failure (and blew the engine's horn) to the dispatcher who would then notify the city.

Jeff

[mudchicken]

(1) Part of UP's beef with the system is the assessment team being a majority of non-railroaders making railroad safety decisions. (Even FRA brass was uncomfortable about that, but politics over-ruled) (2) QZ's can be removed. Including twice in MN. Usually it is a local public agency failing to live up to its part of the bargain or failing to carry through on agreed to improvements. (3) There is a considerable push in congress to lessen the investment by local agencies ("safety if its only cheap and convenient" is their mantra) because of the costs and related restrictions.

[zugmann]

Convicted One

Or perhaps he was just trying to rile up the resident know-it-alls? What do you think? Did it work?

 

Beats me.  I don't know crap, and I don't care that much anyhow.

[Convicted One]

Euclid

how the FRA can assure us that a quiet zone creation does not compromise safety. 

 

There is a crossing of a major  traffic artery less than 1/2 mile from where I live. I spend a considerable amount of time less than 500 feet of that crossing persuing recreational activity.  Looking at the employee timetable from back in the Wabash days, it is listed as a silent crossing.  None the less, there have been "W" whistle signs located at the crossing's approaches ever since I can remember.

The funny thing is, current day trains sound their horns maybe 75% of the time at this crossing.  Why they don't the other 25% of the time I've often wondered.

There have been only a couple crossing mishaps at this location over the last 40 years. Both times I recall reading in the paper that NS emphasized that they had sounded the horn prior to the mishap. Statistically this would indicate that the crossing is no more safe when the horn is sounded, than whe it isn't.

 

Which has me wondering if there is a statistic for the percentage of instances where an engineer fails to blow the horn THAT LEADS TO A COLLISION,  ( e.g.: for all instances where an engineer fails to sound the horn, what percentage leads to a collision versus not?) compared to the percentage of instances where the engineer DID blow his horn but a collision happened anyway.

 

Underneath all of that is my personal suspicion that the instances where some impatient fool decides to try and blow through a crossing despite dropped gates and flashing lights will not materially change regardless if the train sounds his horn, or not. All that changes is if the fool is deaf during the final few seconds before impact.