Transit

You're almost certainly right that the rental Amtrak pays for its LD trains is too low - the freight railroads have been complaining about it for years.  But that's a different issue from the one I was addressing.  Whether too high or too low, the rental Amtrak pays its host railroads includes compensation for the infrastructure it is using, including the host railroad's capital costs.  To my knowledge, Amtrak treats the rental as an "operating cost"(there could be an exception to this where Amtrak pays for Amtrak owned improvements, but that's normally a small part of the infrastructure it is using when it's a tenant).  On the corridor, by contrast, a big chunk of the money Amtrak is paying for infrastructure is treated as capital costs, not operating costs.  That means, if you just compare Amtrak's "operating cost" coverage on the corridor vs the long distance services (a comparison I've seen made many times), you're comparing applies and oranges. The comparison isn't really telling you anything about the relative economic viability (or nonviability) of the two services. 

The reason I raised the Amtrak issue is because it's a modern example of the "operating cost" comparisons which are frequently made in discussions of streetcars vs buses.  In fact, you'll see them in this thread - streetcars are said to have lower "operating costs" vs buses above a certain level of traffic.  But, if the streetcar's infrastructure costs are being excluded from this comparison (because they are "capital", not "operating" costs), the comparison is meaningless.  Costs are costs.  From a business standpoint, if the money is being spent, it doesn't matter much what bucket they are assigned to in the accounting system.  After all, when you pay for a restaurant meal, does it matter much to you whether you put your copy of the check into your right rather than your left pocket?

A possible varient of this problem is that a "depreciation" element might be included in the streetcar operating costs.  This would make the comparison more meaningful as an accounting exercise, but not as the basis for business or public decisionmaking.  The reason is that depreciation is based on what was spent in the past, not what will be needed in the future.  A streetcar system with old, nearly worn out infrastructure (a description which fits many of the U.S. streetcar operations that survived into the 1950's) may have very low annual depreciation charges (or none, if the assets have been fully depreciated from an accounting standpoint).  The thing a businessman or public agency making a conversion decision wants to know is what costs WILL be incurred in each scenario - the replacement costs of the streetcar assets and how soon they will need to be incurred if the streetcar system is retained vs the costs that will be incurred if the system is converted to buses.

I'm afraid that I've been singularly responsible for taking this thread way beyond a discussion of DC streetcars, which was its original purpose.  Call it a weakness.   

Falcon48:

That means, if you just compare Amtrak's "operating cost" coverage on the corridor vs the long distance services (a comparison I've seen made many times), you're comparing applies and oranges. The comparison isn't really telling you anything about the relative economic viability (or nonviability) of the two services. 

I would counter that the rental payment is such a small part of the overall cost of the LD train operations that it's irrelevant when comparing operating costs. It's not "apple and oranges", its' "Macintosh and Red Delicious". As you point out, servicing capital is a real business cost - most of the time. In the case of US transportation, capital is more often than not given some sort of subsidy - or even a free ride -so comparisons of any kind are rarely very clear. Amtrak is not viable no matter how you rearrange the deck chairs, though some parts of the operation generate (or consume) more operating cash than others. How you allocate all of this to the corporation's capital spending really doesn't matter in the end. e.g. the NH to Boston electrification benefits both the Acela and Conventional trains. How would you allocate the revenue from each toward the debt service? If you decided that the conventional service wasn't generating enough cash and decided to can it, then Acela would have to carry the whole load and the overall picture might be worse. (morphing threads are not bad!)

I don't recall I said anything about the allocation of costs between two services that are using the same rail infrastructure.  I was using an Amtrak example to illustrate a point about streetcars vs buses. However, with respect to your comments about capital costs being susidized, I will say that, whether the capital costs are funded from the farebox, or are funded by the government through subsidies, they are still costs of the service in question and must be taken into account in assessing economic viability, whether the issue on the table is streetcars vs buses or Amtrak. A susidy may make the economics more favorable for the party being subsidized, but it makes the economics correspondingly less favorable for the subsidizer (and, if the government is providing the subsidy, the poor taxpayers upon whose back all harebrained government schemes seem to ride).  There's no free lunch.

With respect to your comments on cost allocation, there is no one "right" way to allocate costs between two services using a single rail infrastructure. The "right" answer largely depends on the question being asked.  For example, if you are simply trying to compare the financial performance of two services using the same infrastructure, the most obvious way is to just allocate the joint and common costs between services on a unit basis (cars or passengers).  For example, if Service A has half the cars and Service B has the other half, you allocate the costs 50-50.  "But wait", the advocates of Service B might say.  "The infrastructure would exist for Service A even if Service B weren't being provided".  So, they would argue that the only costs Service B should be assigned are the incremental costs directly attributable to the service (presumably, in this example, less than half of the total costs).  This isn't necessarily "wrong".  In fact, it is "right", if the question on the table is whether Service B should be discontinued. That's because, in a discontinuance, only the avoidable (incremental) costs of the Service B will be saved.  The costs that will be incurred anyway on Service A will not be saved if Service B is discontinued.  This, in fact, is the way joint and common costs are handled in STB rail abandonments 

This question of cost assignment between services using the same rail infrastructure is likely to rear its ugly head big time with positive train control (PTC).  The statutory PTC mandate requires installation of this technology on (i) lines carrying intercity or commuter passenger trains, and (ii) lines with 5 million or more GTM which also carry TIH.  Now, I don't know what freight railroads are planning to do about recovering the billions of dollars they are going to have to spend on PTC systems, but it's a pretty good bet they will seek to recover this money from the passenger operators and TIH shippers whose traffic is triggering the need to install these systems.  That's pretty straighforward if a particular segment of track has to be PTC equipped just because of passenger service, or just because of TIH traffic.  But what about a track segment that carries both (and many routes do)? You can bet, in this case, the passenger operators will be arguing they shouldn't pay anything because the PTC would have to be installed to support the TIH traffic even if there were no passenger trains.  The TIH shippers, in turn, will argue that they shouldn't pay anything because the PTC would have to be intalled to support the passenger trains even if there were no TIH.  It will be a battle royal.

Finally, as I said in an earlier post today, I am probably the person most responsible for expanding this thread far beyond its original purpose (which, as I look back at the first posting, was merely to answer an inquiry about some old conduit streetcar tracks in Georgetown). This time, however, I'm innocent.

daveklepper:

Operating costs include track maintenance including eventual track replacement but do not include the initial investment.   When I say that Woodward Avenue, Detroit, and Flatbush Avenue, Brookly,. regular streetcar lines, should have remained streetcar lines, I would note that the track was in good condition when lines were abandoned, and that the equipment was reasonably modern.  When it comes to the vast majority of streetcar and interurban lines in the USA, of course you are right, and the swing to personal auto transportation made then good candidates for bus conversion.   I am merely pointing out that there were and are exceptions.   Note that Philadelphia has restored streetcar service on Garrad Avenue and that the historic F line in San Francisco (mostly PCC's, some Milan Peter Witts, and an occasional special like the Blackpool "boat" and MUNI No. 1) is the one line that comes closest to paying all its operating costs in the entire MUNI network.

I think even you would agree that abandonment of Long Beach PE by the government authority that then owned it was a  bad mistake.    And Nortons Point in Brooklyn was similar (smaller) but much harder to restore, since much of the ROW now has buildings.

But to say that GM dfid not cause the conversion of streetcars to buses is like saying that Electro Motive did not cause the dieselization of North American Railroads.

But, again, it was not a conspiracy, just smart business practice.

 

A few comments on the above post (not necessarily disagreements)

1. Perhaps you have seen some financial statements I have not, but I'm not aware that "operating costs" shown by transit companies included costs for "eventual replacement" of their streetcar investment.  To do that, they would have had to calculate current replacement costs for the infrastructure, and then allocate that against operating income on some annual basis, something I very much doubt they would have done (particularly in the 1950's).  What they may have done is include an annual depreciation charge.  As I pointed out in another posting, this would understate (probably significantly) the future capital investments needed to keep the streetcar system in operation.  The reason is that depreciation is based on past investment (which, in the case of a streetcar company in the 1950's, could have been made in the 1920's or before).  Further, many streetcar companies probably had fully depreciated capital assets by the 1950's, in which case no depreciation charges would have been taken against operating income for these assets.

2. I don't know much about the specific Detroit or Brooklyn streetcar lines you mention.  As I think you recognize, I was talking in general terms and there, of course, could have been some exceptions (although I have to wonder whether the Detroit line's ridership held up enough in the postwar period to support continued streetcar operations). One consideration in retaining individual streetcar lines in a city otherwise converted to bus is the need to retain support facilities for a technology used only on a single route or a few routes.  With respect to Girard Avenue in Philadelphia, it's a mystery to me why they restored ths line as a streetar line.  It doesn't go into a subway and doesn't seem to serve an area where a "historic" line would have any value.  But. sometimes, the workings of government are unfathomable.  I'm very familiar with the F line in San Francisco, and I agree that this route is very successful.  But this route is really unique. It has huge tourist patronage and serves as an alternate "historic transit" route to the cable cars to/from Fisherman's Wharf.  It simply wouldn't work as a bus line.   

3.  I agree that, looking at it from today's vantage point, the abandonment of the former PE Long Beach line by the government authority that then owned it (others reading this post should note that it was NOT abandoned by a company affiliated with GM or National City Lines) was a mistake from the standpoint of public transit policy.  But, at the time, the service had to be funded from the farebox - public transit subsidies weren't available.  So, from the standpoint of the public authority that abandoned it at the time, it was not a mistake.

4.  I agree that GM "caused" the abandonment of streetcar lines and that its subsidiary EMD "caused" the dieselization of U.S. railroads in the sense that they produced products (buses and diesel locomotives) that transit operators and railroads believed were superior to the technology they were currently using and wanted to buy.  That, as you recognize, is not a conspiracy.  It's good, old fashioned capitalism.  It's no different than what happened when Frank Sprague came out with a product (the electric streetcar) which caused the mass extinction of cable cars in most American cities. 

 

Exactly.   The Toronto system is well-managed, and track replacements are scheduled routinely, wiht the system kept in good shape.   It comparitive operating costs on a passenger mile basis were available to me and bus passengers cost about 25% more to handle than streetcar passengers both per passenger and one a passenger mile basis.   I think this information is still available at APTA.  It was only specific heavy lines that should have been kept, and most of DC's lines fitted that desciption, otherwise Roy Chalk would not have wished to keep them.   And at the time, the PCC's were mostly relatively new, and many did see further service in Cairo, Alexandria, and Sarajavo.

 

Remember that while track requires replacement after 50 or 60 years, the streetcar can also last that long, while a bus wears out in 15 years.    There was a dramatic improvement in streetcar technology with the PCC.   But a modernized PCC, equipped with wheel chair lift at its front door, air-conditioning, and electronic based instead of relay based controls, can hold its own in performance and passenger comfort with the latest equipment.

And why did PTC put streetcars back on Garrad Avenue.   Public pressure.   The riders wanted them back.   The riders prefered streetcars over busses.   Given a choice between a hard wood seat cold in winter and warm in summer noisy hard riding 40-year-old relic, and a modern bus, in 1950 or today, most riders would prefer the bus.   But between any bus and a well-maintained PCC or a modern LRV, the riders will choose the rail vehicle.

A few points:

(1) As I recall, the Girard streetcar reactivation in Philadelphia was actually quite controversial.  It was held up some time by local opposition (probably adjoining property owners). At one point, I believe SEPTA indicated it was considering the disposal of the newly modernized PCC equipment.

(2) I question whether the Toronto "operating cost" comparisons with bus include all of the infrastructure related costs, for the reasons stated in my earlier notes. It's undoubtedly true, however, that a streetcar system capable of operating trains will likely have lower "operating costs" per passenger (or even per vehicle) than a system (streetcar or bus) that uses only single unit vehicles.  But, in most U.S. cities, the problem by the 1950's wasn't capacity - it was the opposite.  There wasn't enough traffic to fill even single unit cars on a regular basis (in Omaha-Council Bluffs, for example, which was once a major streetcar metro area, they removed the standee straps from the streetcars in the 1930's).  An additional problem in the U.S. by the 1950's was that the population (customer) base was expanding beyond the historic limits of the streetcar system, while the areas served by the streetcar system were declining. 

(3) The statement that streetcar trackage lasts 50-60 years may be true of modern construction, where the rails are fastened to concrete panels.  But I seriously doubt whether it was true as to historic streetcar construction, where the tracks were built on wood ties (just like regular railroads) and then covered by the street material.  The drainage issues alone wouldn't have been favorable to long life.  Most streetcar systems that survived into the 1950's were rebuilt during the 1920's, and were converted before they needed to be rebuilt again.  But Pittsburgh is a good test of the 50-60 year estimate.  Assuming the Pittsburgh system was last renewed in the 1920's, it would have been in place roughly 40 -45 years by the late 1960's, when I started riding it as a young, eager railfan (I'm giving away how old I am).  While still operational (sort of), it was absolutely wretched.  Riding it was like being in an airplane caught in a storm (or a roller coaster at the nearby Kennywood Park).  The operators had to know where all of the broken rails were in the street so they didn't sail off into a sidewalk or a building.  There's something slightly unnerving about seeing a streetcar inch down a downtown street while the rail ahead of it lifts out of the pavement. 

(4) There is no question that a modern LRV or air conditioned, reconditioned PCC car operating on good track gives a ride that is equal or superior to a bus.  But the issue a trasit operator faced in the mass conversion period was whether the existing streetcar system could give that kind of service without substantial new investment.  Keep in mind that, before the mass conversion process got underway, most streetcar systems  didn't even use PCC's, and the ones that did still relied on standard streetcars for the majority of their services. This situation didn't change until enough lines had been converted to permit the remaining lines to be operated entirely by PCC's (1954 in Chicago). 

(5)  A major impetus for streetcar conversions was that many cities wanted the streetcar tracks out of the streets, regardless of what the transit company at the time might want.  City opposition to street trackage was already being felt by the 1930's (see the Hilton/Due book on interurban railways).  NYC's opposition is well known.  Apparently, based on the some of the other posts in this thread, it was also true in DC.  However, there's one aspect of the DC system I haven't seen discussed.  The city portions of the DC system were conduit lines.  When did they begin using salt in DC fro snow removal? Even though DC residents don't like to admit it, it does snow several times a winter in DC, sometimes heavily.  I would imagine that salt would wreak havoc with a conduit system in pretty short order._

I agree that Pittsburgh Railways should have bought fewer PCC streetcars, itself converted the lighter feeder lines to buses where service would not be compromised, especially some street running outer shuttle lines, some of which even got PCC's. and invested more in rebuilding downtown orginal installation track.   But the tracks on Woodward and Gratiot and Michigan (only those three lines) in Detroit and on Canal in New Orleands were in good shape and cars rode smooothly, the historic and well maintained cars in New Orleans and the modern and well maintained PCC's in Detroit.   Political pressure and GM was involved in both.

Tracks in Toronto have always been kept in good shape and the ride is smooth.   Again, economically, the heavy lines are the lines that economically should have been kept streetcar. and where the track renewal economics make sense.  Toronto has converted its lighter and feeder lines to bus and dosn't run streetcars above rapid transit on the same street.  It has a balanced approach to transportation, but the easy money prevented such a solution for the Twin Cities.  In New York and DC it was simple prejudice, the needs of the private auto driver having precedence over that of the transit rider.  But again, even these two matters, GM was at least partly responsible, the lease purchase deal and the psychology that to be a real American, one must own an auto and public transit is for the poor and foreigners.   Sure there was contorversy in Philadlephia, but what the riders wanted was streetcars.  It was not the riders that objected, just those used to parking their cars where streetcars did and now again run to access the carbarn. 

 

Under the Roy Chalk management, those DC lines that had deteriorated conduit had already been abandoned.   The conduit operated systems had learne how to cope with snow and sleet and ice, and the newer conduit installtions benefited from improved technology and did not require the heavy maintenance that the older ones it.  The quality of steel alloys, the alloy of the power rails, all that was studied seriously.  The Manhattan lines ran reasonably reliably in winter, probably more reliably than the buses, because Third Avenue did bring out its fleet of snowplows and snow sweepers, while the bus lines were completley dependant on the City;s equipment.   Huge snowstorms did tie up the lines, but tied up everything else, including some surface and above ground third rail subway lines.

 

Incidentally, some of the bad downtown Pittsburgh tracks never got replaced and continued to be used by the South Hills lines until the downtown subway was built replacing them.   Toward the end, the streetcars moved slowly across the Smithfield Street Bridge at something like 5mph!

 

I guess Pittsburgh Railways was counting on someone building a subway for them.  Like the New York Westchester and Boston entering Manhattan.    Never happened.

 

 

Anyway, if you wish to see where there car culture has brought the world and even the USA, contact my friend Jerry Spriggs, Jerry.spings@gmail.com and ask him to attach the demographic study to his reply and listen and watch.

Falcon48:

You're almost certainly right that the rental Amtrak pays for its LD trains is too low - the freight railroads have been complaining about it for years.  But that's a different issue from the one I was addressing.  Whether too high or too low, the rental Amtrak pays its host railroads includes compensation for the infrastructure it is using, including the host railroad's capital costs.  To my knowledge, Amtrak treats the rental as an "operating cost"(there could be an exception to this where Amtrak pays for Amtrak owned improvements, but that's normally a small part of the infrastructure it is using when it's a tenant).  On the corridor, by contrast, a big chunk of the money Amtrak is paying for infrastructure is treated as capital costs, not operating costs.  That means, if you just compare Amtrak's "operating cost" coverage on the corridor vs the long distance services (a comparison I've seen made many times), you're comparing applies and oranges. The comparison isn't really telling you anything about the relative economic viability (or nonviability) of the two services. 

The reason I raised the Amtrak issue is because it's a modern example of the "operating cost" comparisons which are frequently made in discussions of streetcars vs buses.  In fact, you'll see them in this thread - streetcars are said to have lower "operating costs" vs buses above a certain level of traffic.  But, if the streetcar's infrastructure costs are being excluded from this comparison (because they are "capital", not "operating" costs), the comparison is meaningless.  Costs are costs.  From a business standpoint, if the money is being spent, it doesn't matter much what bucket they are assigned to in the accounting system.  After all, when you pay for a restaurant meal, does it matter much to you whether you put your copy of the check into your right rather than your left pocket?

A possible varient of this problem is that a "depreciation" element might be included in the streetcar operating costs.  This would make the comparison more meaningful as an accounting exercise, but not as the basis for business or public decisionmaking.  The reason is that depreciation is based on what was spent in the past, not what will be needed in the future.  A streetcar system with old, nearly worn out infrastructure (a description which fits many of the U.S. streetcar operations that survived into the 1950's) may have very low annual depreciation charges (or none, if the assets have been fully depreciated from an accounting standpoint).  The thing a businessman or public agency making a conversion decision wants to know is what costs WILL be incurred in each scenario - the replacement costs of the streetcar assets and how soon they will need to be incurred if the streetcar system is retained vs the costs that will be incurred if the system is converted to buses.

I'm afraid that I've been singularly responsible for taking this thread way beyond a discussion of DC streetcars, which was its original purpose.  Call it a weakness.   

We are on the same page.... The only question that remains is if the transit operators were operating on the assumption that they had an ongoing, profitable business or if they knew they were slowly going out of business. If it was the latter, then the smart thing to do is wring the last bit of life from the streetcar infrastructure and vehicles, and then convert routes to buses.

Again, the Toronto system is a well-mange dsystem in whicvh continual upgrading of track and other fixed acilities takes place and is included in the operating costs.  Every year they program a particular piece of track to rebuild, with cars rerouted to parallel lines if possible, or single tracked with pancake portable crossovers. or temporary bus substitution.   Most transit experts recommend buses for lines having less than 15,000 passengers a day, llihgt rial or streetcar can beocme competitive  if their a cheap private right of way in the 15,000 - 25,000 per day patronage, but really starts becoming cost effective above 25,000 passengers/day.   Above 80,000, bewtter go to completely grade separated rapid transit.   Probalby 98% of the transit lines by mileage cary less than 15,000 passengers by day, so the bus is by far and away the vehicle of choice.   But rail does have a place and always really did have a place and this definitely inlcudes on-street operation where appropriate.

I think that different transit companies had different views of their future prospects, and those views also changed over time.  In the late 1940's, some transit companies were obviously optimistic about their future prospects and the prospects for continued streetcar operations.  These were the companies which ordered postwar PCC cars.  But many of of these companies apparently changed their view in the early 1950's.  Chicago is a good example.  It bought a large fleet of new PCC cars in 1948, and then began a massive conversion program just a few years later. Twin Cities is another. There's at least one case where a city ordered postwar PCC cars and then decided to convert to bus before the cars were delivered (Louisville).  The new cars were then sold to other cities.  By 1951, however, the market for new streetcars had dried up.  In part, this was because so many conversions were underway that a transit operator that stil wantedto operate streetcars could get modern secondhand equipment.  But it also reflected the fact that many operators had become pessimistic about the prospects for continued streetcar operations. 

And then there were the many streetcar propoerties which had never ordered PCC cars, either pre-war or post war.  Most of these properties had probably decided in the 1930's to run their existing systems until it wore out or required additional investment and then convert (which is actually a very a rational approach).  Probably the best example was Milwaukee, WI, where the transit company's intention to eventually convert to busses was known by the mid 1930's (as you might expect in this situation, Milwaukee never bought PCC's).  Omaha-Council Bluffs is another - theiri newest cars were built in 1917, although parts of the system stagered on until 1955.  Denver is another.

There's one final group to consider -transit companies that were so broke that they couldn't  even raise the money to convert and kept on operating increasingly dilapidated streetcar systems until they were taken over by public authorities.  Pittsburgh is probably one of these.  Although it had a large PCC fleet (both pre and post WWII cars), which showed that it had been optimistic about its streetcars at least through the late 1940's, the system and the cars had become wrecks by the 1960's and 70's.  In fact, many of the PCC's went to the scrap heap after 30+ year of service with the original paint they had when delivered

Falcon48:

In the late 1940's, some transit companies were obviously optimistic about their future prospects and the prospects for continued streetcar operations.  These were the companies which ordered postwar PCC cars.  But many of of these companies apparently changed their view in the early 1950's. 

A parallel situation to the RRs that made massive purchases of new passenger equipment in the late 40's.

But again, there were lines where patronage held up and only political pressure caused the bus substitution.   Flatbush Avenue, Brooklyn (and a few other lines as well), much of the Manhattan and Bronx Third Avenue system (the lighter lines had been converted already), Gratiot, Michigan, and Woodward in Detroit, Canal Street, New Orleans, would have made more sense to remain rail, and the bottom line would probably have been better, not worse.

Third Avenue Transit Lines that should have remained rail include Fordham, Treemont, Webster, Southern Boulevard, Westchester Avenue, and Boston Road.   These were very heavy lins, and Third Avenue had inhouse capability of building their own modern cars for less money than the price of a new bus.

 

In Manhattan, Third Avenue wanted to completely rebuild the Broadway - 42nd Street track in time for the World Fare of 1939-1940, during 1938, but LaGuardia would not give them permission.  After WWII the track on this line was really worn out, and this was an extremely heavy line, a car in sight at all times.

lOVED THE PICTURE... BROUGHT BACK A FEW MEMORIES...

NO, NEVER BEEN TO DC, BUT: DID GROW UP IN A "TROLLEYTOWN". IN CASE YA'LL HAVE FORGOTTEN, DIDN'T KNOW

OR CARE ETC: THE MOTOR CITY: "DETROIT" HAD A PRETTY GOOD

STREET CAR SCHEDULE. MY MEMORY IS OF PCC'S OF: "THE D S R"

DETROIT STREET RAILWAY. NEVER HEAR ANYTHING ABOUT "OUR"

STREETCARS/TROLLEYS. ROUTES WERE ON THE MAJOR THOROUGHFARES: JEFFERSON AVE, GRATIOT, MICHIGAN, WOODWARD & A FEW OTHERS I'VE FORGOTTEN. SADLY WERE

REPLACED BY THOSE D--- TROLLEY BUSES'... WHICH DIDN'T LAST

LONG. ALL RAN TO TERMINUS IN DOWNTOWN IF MEMORY SERVES.

USED TO BE ABLE TO PICK UP AT CITY LIMITS WITH GROSSE PTE PARK, TRANSFER, END UP AT BRIGGS STADIUM... SEE AL KALINE AND TIGERS PLAY... OR GO TO OLYMPYIA AND SEE THE WINGS AND GORDIE HOWE PLAY... ALL GONE NOW.ETC. OH WELL. JUST SIGN ME:

      SOUTHEASTERN HS CLASS OF 58. CITY CHAMPS FOOTBALL 57, EAST SIDE CHAMPS BASEBALL 57 & 58. AKA:DAS ADLER!

 

 

Let me point out, again, that I was speaking in general terms when I discussed the reasons transit operators would convert streetcar lines to busses.  Could there have been some isloated lines where these dynamics didn't apply?  Sure (although one has to wonder whether the lines you mention would have stayed as streetcars much beyond the 1950's even without city opposition).  Add to these the handful of lines in some cities that operated in subways or tunnels that couldn't practically be converted (Boston, Philadelphia, San Francisco).  But the mileage represented by these lines is insignificant compared to the streetcar mileage that used to exist in this country.